It is the political task of the social scientist—as of any liberal educator—continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his task to display in his work—and, as an educator, in his life as well—this kind of sociological imagination.


Political competence, inasmuch as there can be a universal definition of it, undoubtedly consists in the ability to speak in universal terms about particular problems—how to survive dismissal or redundancy, an injustice or an accident at work, not as individual accident, a personal mishap, but as something collective, common to a class. This universalization is possible only by way of language, by access to a general discourse on the social world. This is why politics is in part bound up with language. And here again, if you like, we can introduce a bit of utopia to attenuate the sadness of sociological discourse, and convince ourselves that it is not too naive to believe that it can be useful to fight over words, over their honesty and proper sense, to be outspoken and to speak out.


All this means that the ethno-sociologist is a kind of organic intellectual of humanity, and as a collective agent, can contribute to de-naturalizing and de-fatalizing human existence by placing his skill at the service of a universalism rooted in the comprehension of different particularisms.


So far I have created imaginary conversations between Bourdieu and Marxism: how Bourdieu appropriated so much of Marx but took it in a direction unimagined by Marx, namely the political economy of symbolic goods; how in many ways Gramsci and Bourdieu are at loggerheads over the sources of the durability and depth of domination; how despite common views of colonialism Bourdieu and Fanon clash over the means of its transcendence, and finally how Bourdieu’s understanding of masculine domination as symbolic power was a pale imitation of Beauvoir’s feminism. We turn now to another convergence, this time between Bourdieu and Mills. Both deeply ambivalent about Marxism, they shared similar sociological and political projects, despite living a half a century apart and on different continents.

The quotes from Bourdieu and Mills above are chosen to underscore their convergent views on the relations between sociologists and their publics, a notion of the traditional intellectual who can potentially challenge domination by de-naturalizing and de-fatalizing what exists, demonstrating the links between the taken-for-granted lived experience (the particular) and the social forces which constitute it (the universal). They differ, however, in that Bourdieu recognizes and lives out the contradictions between “science as a vocation” and “politics as a vocation,” to use Max Weber’s terms, since science rests on a break with common sense and politics rests on an engagement with common sense. Mills, on the other hand, would probably have as little tolerance for
Bourdieu’s scientific “jargon” as he did for Parsons, since he doesn’t see such a break between science and common sense, identifying the sociological imagination (linking micro and macro) with the political imagination (turning personal troubles into public issues). We will return to this question in the conclusion, but first we must build up the case that, despite their obvious differences, Mills is Bourdieu draped in 1950s American colors.

**Striking Convergences**

Bourdieu’s major methodological text *The Craft of Sociology* (written with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron in 1968) exhibits uncanny parallels with C Wright Mills’ famous elaboration of the sociological imagination in 1959. Indeed, one cannot but notice that the title of Bourdieu’s book is borrowed from Mills’s famous appendix, “On Intellectual Craftmsanship.” Both books are critical of the divorce of theory from empirical research, both books emphasize social science research as process – a *modus operandi* rather than a *opus operatum* as Bourdieu would say. Bourdieu follows Mills in attacking US sociology for its professionalism, its formalism, its empiricism, and its provincialism. Yet there is not a single reference to Mills, except the inclusion of a short extract – one of 44 “illustrative texts” – from *The Sociological Imagination* in which Mills criticizes public opinion research for creating its own spurious object, an argument also found in *The Craft of Sociology* and one that Bourdieu will elaborate later in his career.

Given their similar methodological outlooks and empirical foci, the comparison of Bourdieu and Mills underlines how the world has changed since the 1950s (while, in some ways, reverting back to that era) as well as the abiding differences between the United States and France. Still, there are parallels in the political context which shaped their writing. In the US, the immediate years after WWII witnessed the continuity of the radicalism that had begun in the 1930s, but it wasn’t long before reaction asserted itself in the form of McCarthyite witch hunts, a broad anti-communism, American triumphalism, and the “end of ideology.” Just as Mills confronted the swing away from the political configuration of the New Deal, much of Bourdieu’s writings can be seen as coming to terms with the dénouement of the 1960s and the rightward turn in the 1980s and 1990s. Both sustained a critique of the present at a time when progressive alternatives were in retreat.

Biographically, they came from very different backgrounds – the one grew up the son of a postman in a village in the French Pyrenees, the other from middle class stock in Texas. More interesting, however, they both began as philosophy students but quickly turned from abstract and abstruse intellectual preoccupations to a more direct engagement with the world. For Mills his interest in pragmatism gave him a particular stance on sociology, opposed to structural functionalism and survey research, just as Bourdieu reacted against the pretensions of Sartre and his circle as well as against social reform sociology.

Like Bourdieu, who developed a knee jerk reaction against the Marxism of the communist intellectuals who surrounded him at the École Normale, Mills had his
Marxism refracted through the milieu of New York leftism. Only very late in his life would Mills take up a serious engagement with the history of Marxism. Like Bourdieu he borrowed many ideas from Marxism, but, like Bourdieu, he never quite identified with its political project. Thus, both were hostile to the Communist Party, and were never members, although again both exhibited sometimes overt and sometimes covert sympathies for democratic variants of socialism.

Both openly recognized the influence of Weber with whom they shared a preeminent concern with domination, its reproduction and its repercussions. Like Weber they never spelled out any future utopia. Both had only a weakly developed theory of history: Mills focused on the shift from a 19th century aristocratic order (alongside putative democratic publics) to the new regime of power elite and mass society while Bourdieu subscribed to modernization theory, based on the differentiation of relatively autonomous fields, analogous to what Weber called value spheres.

Mills and Bourdieu were reflexive sociologists, inasmuch as they dissected the academic and political fields in which they operated -- although they were more adept at applying that reflexivity to others than to themselves. Both were invested in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of sociology, and the sociology of the academy. Mills’s dissertation was a study of the history of pragmatism -- the secularization and professionalization of philosophy. Following in the footsteps of Veblen, Mills was always critical of the American system of higher education, but, again like Bourdieu, had a fondness for its elitist aspects. Still, both felt themselves to be outsiders in the academy and from this vantage point wrote their savage criticisms, lambasting the establishment, generating the hostility of their colleagues and the adoration of new generations of sociologists.

Both were public sociologists but also major public intellectuals, and not just in their own countries but across the world. Both served their scholarly apprenticeships as professionals but soon sought out wider audiences. Neither hesitated to enter the political arena as intellectuals, and their careers displayed a steady movement from the academy into the public sphere. Mills was writing in an era of passivity and his notions of mass society reflected this. Like Beauvoir he inspired a movement he never anticipated – the New Left of the 1960s. It remains to be seen whether Bourdieu will inspire such a movement -- certainly his political writings and addresses played an important role in public debate in France. Certainly, both held out hope for intellectuals as a “third force,” as Mills once called it, that would pioneer progressive politics in the name of reason and freedom.

**Classes and Domination**

Bourdieu has come to be known for his metatheoretical framework – centering on fields, habitus and capital and above all symbolic violence – that transcended his own empirical projects, a theoretical framework that has been taken up by others. Mills’s only venture into broader theoretical issues, *Character and Social Structure*, written with Hans Gerth, was never taken up by sociologists. Nonetheless, Mills’s critical evaluation of the social structures of his time and his invitation to the sociological imagination have
inspired successive generations of students. There are definite parallels in Bourdieu’s corpus since, like Mills, he rarely made sorties into pure theory, even though his empirical research was always more theoretically self-conscious than Mills’. Its impact transcends sociology not just in reaching the public realm but it has also spread into many disciplines, beyond sociology and beyond the social sciences into the humanities.

The three major works of Mills to address US society in the 1950s dealt sequentially with labor and its leaders (New Men of Power, 1948), the new middle classes (White Collar, 1951) and the dominant class (The Power Elite, 1956). Mills’s framework for studying US society does develop over the decade of his writing, but there is also a clear continuity in his approach to US society: ever greater concentration of power in a cohesive economic-political-military elite; a passive but burgeoning new middle class of professionals, managers, sales workers, and bureaucrats; and finally a working class betrayed by its leaders. These are also the three classes treated in Bourdieu’s monumental, Distinction. Whereas Mills works his way up the social hierarchy Bourdieu works his way down, from the dominant classes to the petty bourgeoisie and finally to the working class. Both study the way the dominant classes impose their will on society, but where Mills focuses on the concentration of resources and decision making in the power-elite, Bourdieu takes this concentration of power and wealth for granted, instead focusing on how domination is hidden or legitimated by the categories the dominant classes use to secure their domination.

Bourdieu, therefore, aims his analysis at symbolic domination, the exercise of domination through its misrecognition. Simply put the dominant class distinguishes itself by its cultural taste. Whether this be in art, architecture, music, or literature, the dominant class presents itself as more refined, more at ease with its cultural consumption than the petty bourgeoisie whose taste is driven by emulation and the working class whose lifestyle is driven by economic necessity. The distinction of the dominant class actually derives from its privileged access to wealth and education, but it appears to be innate, thereby justifying its domination in all spheres of life. According to Bourdieu the popular aesthetic of the working class -- its concern with function rather than form, with the represented rather than the representation -- is a dominated aesthetic, bereft of genuine critical impulse. Bourdieu’s innovation, therefore, turns on viewing class not just as an economic-political-social formation but also as a cultural formation. Class members possess not just economic capital but also cultural capital, so that a class structure is a two dimensional space defined hierarchically by the total volume of capital but also horizontally (within class) by the composition of capital (the specific combination of economic and cultural capital). He shows how this class structure is mirrored in the distribution of cultural practices and patterns of consumption.

It is interesting to compare this vision of class structure with Mills’s Power Elite where he describes the dominant class as three interlocking sets of institutions -- economic, political, and military. He calls them “domains,” but he might as well have called them fields. He also writes about their distinction and their ruling class life style, inherited through families, acquired in elite schools and colleges, and developed through networks of self-assurance. Mills even devotes a chapter to “celebrities” who distract
attention from the concentration of power. Symbols of prestige hide the power elite from public view. This is all quite parallel to Bourdieu, but ultimately the emphasis is very different. Mills is not interested in the relation between cultural and economic-political elites -- between the dominant and dominated fractions of the dominant class as Bourdieu puts it -- but in the changing relations among the three pillars of the power elite, and in particular the ascendency of the military (the warlords). This different emphasis reflects the very different place of the United States and France within the world order – the one a dominant military power, the other a cultural nobility.

If there is divergence in the conceptualization of the dominant class, there is more convergence in their respective discussions of the middle classes. A theme that threads through both discussions is the insecurity of the middle class, trying to maintain its position within the stratification system. As the gap between the middle classes -- especially the old middle classes subject to deskilling, but also the new middle classes subject to bureaucratization -- and the working class closes so the status panic of the former intensifies. As a form of capital, education becomes more important than property in asserting middle class distinction. *White Collar* makes much of the rising importance of education but also the role of the mass media and the illusory world it creates. Mills devotes considerable space to the fate of the intellectuals, their loss of independence through bureaucratization, becoming a technocracy serving power, unresponsive to publics. Mills describes, in terms directly analogous to those of Bourdieu, how the academic field is looking more and more like an economic market, invaded by the logic of corporate capital.

On the subject of the working class, both Bourdieu and Mills have much less to say. Bourdieu’s more ethnographic *Weight of the World* has a richer, if untheorized, exploration of working class life than *Distinction* which is reliant on survey research. The culture of the working class is a dominated culture, responsive to the pressing needs of economic necessity and the prestige of the dominant culture. Mills’s analysis of the working class is thinner since the *The New Men of Power* is devoted more to labor leaders than to the led. The argument is very similar to the one Bourdieu makes in *Language and Symbolic Power* – the representatives of subordinate classes enter the field of power where they engage in a competitive game among themselves – the logic of the field of power trumps their accountability to the dominated. Mills describes how labor leaders, through their negotiations, are co-opted on to the terrain of the business class. They seek to attach themselves at the lower levels of the power elite. Both Mills and Bourdieu, therefore, see leaders manipulating the led, and representation becomes rhetoric used to simultaneously pursue and hide games within the higher reaches of society. Bourdieu’s (1990 [1982] and 1993 [1984]) essays on public opinion follow Mills’s contempt for mass society.

Yet alongside Mills’s cynicism is an alternative political vision, albeit a political vision that becomes more utopian over time. *The New Men of Power* describes the absorption of labor leaders into the power elite, accomplices of the “main drift,” but it also maps out the political field of the immediate postwar period as an array of publics that includes the Far Left (Leninist Left), the Independent Left (more critical than
interventionist), Liberal Center (which might include support for trade unions), the Communists (which he sees as anti-democratic fifth columnists), the Practical Right (which supports class war against unions and leftists), and Sophisticated Conservatives (corporate liberals tied to the military-industrial complex who see unions as a stabilizing force, managing discontent). Like so many commentators of his time, Mills expected capitalism to undergo another “slump” which would force the hand of the Sophisticated Conservatives, but also attract popular support to a true Labor Party (Mills supported Norman Thomas’s 1948 Presidential bid as candidate of the Socialist Party) that would organize worker control and democratic planning. Socialism, he asserted, had been derailed by social democracy, petty trade unionism and communism. In line with this program Mills hoped for a new type of intellectual, a “labor intellectual,” independent of but also committed to the working class, capable of forging a new vision and a new collective will.

Mills’s political optimism did not last long. Reaction swept across the country so that when he turned to White Collar (1951) he came up with a much bleaker scenario. There he refers to the middle classes as a rearguard, without a will of their own, siding with the prevailing forces in society, and, pending a slump, the prevailing forces lay with the power elite. When it comes to The Power Elite (1956) Mills is consumed by despair. Denouncing the “higher immorality” and “organized irresponsibility” of the dominant classes, his political imagination turns from the bleak future to the radiant past. He contrasts the mass society he sees around him with a democracy of publics, the founding dream and early practice of American society. Mills never reconciles himself to the present, never withdraws from the intellectual battle for another world.

If there was always a strong utopian element in Mills’s writings – at first projected onto leftist political forces and then as emancipatory projects buried in history – one is hard pressed to find any equivalent in the writings of Bourdieu who saw his public intellectual activity as a political project in its own right. In part this was because of the historic role of French intellectuals, starting with Zola, and the openness of the public sphere to such intellectuals -- so different from their more marginal place in US politics. No less important, Bourdieu was always opposed to conjuring up false hopes in the transformative potential of the dominated classes. His political engagement around issues of human rights, labor rights, education and so forth were firmly rooted in the concrete present. Bourdieu mobilized his analysis of the subjective experience of domination, so absent in Mills’s writings, against what he regarded as the illusions of leftist intellectuals. Bourdieu refused speculative connections across the yawning gap between hope and reality, the yawning gap that separated Mills’s utopian schemes and his sociological analysis, his political imagination and his sociological imagination.

The Sociological Imagination

The refusal to confront the gap between sociological imagination and political imagination, indeed the confusion of the two, can be found in the The Sociological Imagination, one of the most widely read and inspiring introductions to sociology. The Sociological Imagination, published in 1959 just three years before Mills died, looks two ways – back to sociology and forward to politics. Back to sociology it is a devastating
and memorable indictment of professional sociology for the sins of abstracted empiricism and grand theorizing. Abstracted empiricism refers to survey research divorced from any historical or theoretical context, typified in Mills’s mind by the work of his titular boss, Paul Lazarsfeld, with whom he had a most rocky relation. Abstracted empiricism approximates market research and exemplifies the bureaucratization of sociology, and more generally how intellectuals were increasingly serving the corporate world as consultants and experts and as orchestrators of public opinion. Grand theory, on the other hand, refers to the hegemony of structural functionalism within the world of theory, formal theory, arcane and inaccessible except to the initiated elite around Talcott Parsons. Grand theory builds an elaborate but empty architecture of the most mundane yet unsubstantiated claims. Against abstracted empiricism and grand theory Mills celebrated the sociologist as craft worker, uniting in the one person the development of sociological theory through engagement with empirical data. He paints a romantic image of the lone sociologist uncorrupted by the academic environment – a self-portrait of his isolation in and alienation from the academic world. This image is an absurdly unsociological vision of professional sociology – a Manichean struggle between god and the devil – but one that justified his own abandonment of that world.

If the first romance in The Sociological Imagination is with the sociologist as craft worker, the second romance is with the sociologist as “independent intellectual,” looking outwards into politics rather than inwards into academia. Here too there are two positions to avoid: on the one hand, the sociologist as advisor to the prince, the technician, the consultant, and, on the other hand, the philosopher king who aspires to rule the world. The advisor to the prince and the philosopher king are the counterparts in the political realm to the abstracted empiricist and the grand theorist in the academic realm, while the independent intellectual is the counterpart of the craft worker. The independent intellectual speaks to publics and at rulers, maintaining a distance from both. Here indeed is Mills’s notion of public sociologist – a concept he describes but does not name – for him a traditional rather than an organic intellectual.

The connection between the craft worker and the independent intellectual is made through the idea of the sociological imagination that famously turns private problems into public issues. But here the slippage begins: between, on the one side, the sociological imagination, namely the connection between social milieu and social structure, micro and macro, and, on the other side, the never specified political imagination that connects private troubles to public issues. It is one thing to demonstrate that unemployment is not a problem of individual indolence but a problem of the capitalist economy; it is another matter to turn that sociological understanding into a public demand or a social movement. Appreciating the broad structural determinants of one’s personal troubles is as likely to lead to apathy and withdrawal as to engagement. The New Men of Power, White Collar and The Power Elite each attempt in their own way to bridge the divide between sociology and politics, but in an abstract way as though sociological imagination inevitably leads to political engagement. Political imagination cannot be reduced to sociological imagination as Bourdieu knows only too well.
The first problem concerns the very existence of publics for Mills’s public sociologist to address. His books all point to the disappearance of publics and the rise of mass society, so with whom then will the public sociologist converse? Bourdieu recognizes the dilemma quite explicitly, albeit in a specific way. The argument is laid out in *The Craft of Sociology*, which speaks directly to Mills’s sociologist as craft worker. It criticizes both existentialism (the counterpart to Parsons’s structural functionalism) as well as the reaction to it in the form of imported American empiricism. Like Mills, Bourdieu’s work is a continual dialogue of theory and empirical research, the one cannot exist without the other. Bourdieu rarely indulges in flights of political fancy; his claims are always empirically grounded. On the other hand, he closely follows French philosopher of science, Bachelard, by insisting on the break between science and common sense, or what Bourdieu calls *spontaneous sociology*. For sociology such a break with common sense is especially important because its subject matter deals with familiar problems about which everyone has an opinion. Throughout his academic life Bourdieu will be fighting against what he regards as amateurish commentators, in Bourdieu’s language “doxosophers,” who claim to know better than sociologists.

Although the home of sociology, France has always had difficulty developing an autonomous professional sociology and separating itself from social reform and public discourse. In this sense the academic context of Bourdieu is very different from that of Mills. The one faces the struggle to create a science against common sense while the other is suffocated by professionalism, and struggles to reconnect to common sense. This accounts, at least in part, for their opposed genres of writing, the one always simple and accessible, the other dominated by complex linguistic constructions and the coinage of esoteric concepts. For a renewal of sociology to be accepted by the French academic pantheon, it was necessary to adopt the style of writing of the discipline with the highest distinction, namely philosophy. While denouncing the detachment of philosophy from everyday reality, Bourdieu nevertheless replicates a philosophical rhetorical style to establish sociology’s distinction, but the result can be separation from the wider publics he seeks to reach. He is only too aware of the gap between sociology and politics, even as he tries to overcome the gap in his later years. Mills suffers from the opposite problem – in making his books accessible and in resisting the idiom of science and high theory he loses credibility within the world of sociology, and in so doing mistakes his sociological imagination for political imagination.

Still, reacting to opposite challenges -- Bourdieu embracing science against common sense, Mills embracing common sense against hyper-science -- they converge on a common understanding of methodology, represented in the idea of craftwork as the interactive unity of theory and research. Likewise Bourdieu, no less than Mills, is committed to the idea of the independent intellectual. Moreover, his targets are the same as Mills. On the one side he denounces the philosopher king, or what he calls the “total intellectual” epitomized by Jean Paul Sartre and, on the other side, he denounces the

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1 Thus, one is surprised by the way he treats “love” and gay-lesbian movements in *Masculine Domination*.

2 Obviously, Mills and Bourdieu are also affected by the styles of thinking and writing that prevail in their own national intellectual fields.
advisor to the king, the technocrats, the experts, consultants to the state, servants of power. The philosopher king – the public intellectual as total intellectual -- has a certain reality in France that it does not have in the US. Notwithstanding the higher appreciation of the intellectual in France, Bourdieu nonetheless faces the same dilemma as Mills. Neither sees a public out there that they can address. Mills talks of a mass society, atomized, withdrawn, and alienated from politics and public discussion, whereas for Bourdieu the problem is, if anything, even more serious. The habitus is so deeply inculcated that the dominated are unreceptive to criticism of domination. Furthermore the independent intellectual faces the power of the media and its own mediators. Bourdieu lost no opportunity to attack the media’s power to determine the message, to even shape the research that becomes the message. Although Mills was also aware of the power of the media, he never wrote such a broad assault on the media’s hostility to critical discourse as Bourdieu carries out in *Television*.

Whether they sought it or not, both -- but Bourdieu more than Mills -- became celebrities in their own time for their angry oppositional views. They became media events in their own right, and the more they railed against the establishment the more celebrated they became! Yet both were opposed to the idea of the organic intellectual who would circumvent the media and engage directly with publics. In theory both opposed the organic intellectual on the grounds that it compromised their independence, yet their actual practices were quite different.

C Wright Mills rarely so much as participated in any collective demonstration, protest, refusing to sign petitions, and generally avoided the people he somewhat contemptuously dismissed as the masses. He was a pure intellectual, speaking down to the people from his pulpit. Bourdieu, however, was very different. He was always ready to initiate or sign a petition, he was ready to talk to all sorts of publics and he could be found addressing workers on picket lines. He had no allergy to the people in whose name he spoke. Quite the contrary he had enormous sympathy for those at the bottom of social hierarchies, vividly expressed in *The Weight of the World* that describes the plight of lower classes and immigrants under modern capitalism. Here lies the paradox -- according to his theory such unmediated engagement is not only a futile but a dangerous activity, but he also saw it as the practice of public sociology, developing a political as well as a sociological imagination. Mills was always truer to the idea of the traditional intellectual, standing aloof from the individual and collective struggles below, but even he, in the last three years of his life, compromised his independence in a desperate political partisanship.

**From Sociology to Politics**

*The Sociological Imagination* (1959) was Mills’s farewell to sociology. In the remaining three years of his life Mills became a public intellectual, writing two short polemical books, intended to capture the public imagination. The first was *The Causes of World War Three*, a continuation of the arguments of *The Power Elite* but written for an even broader public. It condemned “crackpot realism,” and “organized irresponsibility” not just in the United States but in the Soviet Union too. Together these power elites were ushering in World War Three. He ends the book with an appeal to intellectuals to fight
against the insanity of “rationality without reason,” calling instead, you might say, for Bourdieu’s “realpolitik of reason.”

The second book was of a very different character. If The Causes of World War Three diagnosed the way the power elites of the two superpowers were heading toward the annihilation of the human race, Listen, Yankee, written in 1960, pointed to an alternative scenario – a socialism that was neither capitalist nor communist. The Cuban Revolution served to make the alternative real, it served as a “concrete fantasy” intended to galvanize a collective political imagination. Listen, Yankee is based on Mills’s short but intense visit to Cuba in 1960. He spent three-and-a-half long days with Fidel Castro and nearly a week with the head of the Institute for Agrarian Reform. In his account of the Cuban Revolution through the eyes of its leaders, Mills points to the already on-going and remarkable experiments in economic planning, education expansion, welfare provision and land reforms – experiments that would be institutionalized as the mark Cuban socialism. He undertakes a class analysis of the social forces that are driving the social transformations and the counter-revolutionary forces opposing it, not least the support being given to the counter-revolution by the United States. He describes the challenges Cuba faced both domestically and internationally. The open hostility of the US, Mills says, was driving Cuba into the hands of the Soviet Union, which thereby intensified US military threats. Listen, Yankee addresses the US public, befuddled by the jingoist media, ignorant of the destructive path of US imperialism throughout Latin America, but particularly in Cuba -- imperialism justified under the Monroe Doctrine. The Cuban Revolution should be seen, he argued, as a reaction to Yankee supremacy, an experiment in true democracy, an experiment that all people of conscience can learn from, an experiment they must defend.

It was only two years before the end of his 46-year life that Mills discovered the potential of Third World Revolutions. He was ahead of his time. In its class analysis, in its understanding of colonialism and imperialism, in its vision of socialism Listen, Yankee (1960) is a precursor to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth that appeared in the following year -- the same year that its author died at 35. These two sadly curtailed lives -- Mills and Fanon -- ended within three months of each other, inspiring in their different ways, social movements across the world. Both saw the key role of intellectuals in forging revolution, but Mills came to this idea very late in life, only when he began traveling abroad, especially to Latin America, where he discovered firsthand the significance of revolutionary theory, that he had previously dismissed as a Marxist ruse.

Just as Mills became ever more outspoken and radical during the last three years of his life, so in the last decade of his life Bourdieu also became more angry, more public, more accusatory. He had always seen sociology, or at least his sociology, as having political consequences in the sense that it revealed the hidden bases of domination, nonetheless his denunciations took on polemical force when faced with the conservative turn of politics in France and elsewhere. His book On Television (1996) and then the two short collections of essays Acts of Resistance (1998) and Firing Back (2001) spoke out against neoliberalism and the tyranny of the market. He established his own press Libér-Raison D’Agir to publish such politically motivated and publicly accessible books. His
magazine *Actes de la Recherche de Science Sociales* had always had a broad intellectual audience. He became a major intellectual spokesman of a broad left front in France, but also worked to develop what he called an “international of intellectuals.” He could be found on picket lines with workers as well as writing open letters to prominent leaders, protesting violations of human rights. He was committed to intellectuals as an independent collective force, an “organic intellectual of humanity” as he once called it. C Wright Mills had a similar vision of intellectuals as a Third Force, an idea he had formulated as early as World War Two when he taught at the University of Maryland, a view that stuck with him until his dying days. In *Listen Yankee* he wrote of Cuba as a cultural center of the world, proposing to establish a “world university” and with it the creation of an international community of progressive intellectuals. The parallels between Mills and Bourdieu are perhaps astonishing, but then they are also expressing the unconscious desires of intellectuals as a class.

Yet here is the paradox, Bourdieu recognizes that the role of ideas can have only limited effect on social change. The dominated, who have an interest in a critical sociology, cannot grasp its meaning, because their submissive habitus is so deeply inscribed, whereas those who can grasp its meaning have no interest in the message. There is a mismatch, as I have said before, between Bourdieu’s logic of theory and his logic of practice. His theory says such interventions are futile, yet he must also believe that such interventions might dislodge public discourse, and thus destabilize symbolic violence. In the final analysis, his own political engagement contradicts his attacks on ideology and consciousness as too thin to grasp the depth of domination. In the end, despite his theory, Bourdieu cannot but subscribe to the idea of the organic intellectual, engaged directly with publics as well as the traditional intellectual speaking from the tribune, addressing humanity. He feels compelled to supplement his sociological analysis with political engagement. We need to make sense of this by turning Bourdieu on Bourdieu.

**Intellectuals and Their Publics**

One of the curious features of Bourdieu’s opus, as we have seen time and again, is the simultaneous insistence on reflexivity and his failure to apply this to himself. To do so would have meant placing himself inside various academic fields, relativizing his knowledge, and thereby weakening his position in the combat sport that is sociology. To wrestle with the question of science and politics, it is necessary to restore the idea of sociology as a field of contradictions and antagonisms. Bourdieu provides us with the ammunition to do precisely that. We can turn, for example, to his analysis of the scientific field in which established players compete to accumulate academic capital in the face of challenges from the new generation, but it is more fruitful to go further afield and appropriate his analysis of the literary field in *Rules of Art* as a framework for examining the sociological field.

The literary field begins with an account of “bourgeois art”, that is art sponsored by the dominant classes. In the context of sociology this is what I call the *policy moment* in which sociology enters the service of various clients. The first rebellion against bourgeois literature comes from writers attentive to an audience of subaltern classes,
what Bourdieu calls “social art.” Within sociology this corresponds to public sociology – a sociology that is accessible and accountable to diverse publics, and entering into a dialogue with such publics. The literary field, however, is only really constituted when writers separate themselves both from the patronage of bourgeois art and the affiliations of social art to constitute “art for art’s sake,” that is “pure art” following its own autonomous principles. For sociology, too, this is the moment of its true birth. It comes with the constitution of what I call professional sociology – a sociology that is accountable to itself, that is to the community of scholars who develop their own research programs. Finally, the dynamism of the literary field comes from challenges to the consecrated artists, challenges from the avant-garde who seek to further the autonomy of art, but also shift the principles upon which its autonomy rests. Today’s consecrated art can be found in yesterday’s avant-garde. Within sociology this is the critical moment in which the assumptions of professional sociology are interrogated and transformed. New research programs emerge, at least in part, from the critical theorists of yesterday.

We can now look upon the field of sociology, or indeed any other academic discipline, in terms of the relations among these four types of sociology, what we might call the division of sociological labor. The four types can be arranged along two dimensions as in Table 1. On the one hand, there is the distinction between science with its academic audience (Bourdieu’s autonomous pole that includes professional and critical knowledge) and politics with its extra-academic audience (Bourdieu’s heteronomous pole that includes policy and public knowledge). The other dimension is defined by the distinction between dominant or consecrated knowledges (professional and policy) as opposed to the subordinated or subversive knowledges (critical and public). The dominant knowledges involve an instrumental rationality – solving puzzles defined by research programs (professional sociology) or problems defined by clients (policy sociology) – whereas subordinate knowledge involve value rationality, or what I call reflexive knowledge, that is dialogue either among sociologists themselves about the foundations of their discipline (critical Sociology) or between sociologists and their publics (public sociology).

Any discipline consists of these four interdependent and antagonistic knowledges. Without professional knowledge of the sort that Bourdieu created in most of his classic works there cannot be a public sociology whose intensity rose in his later life. Public sociology requires the translation of professional sociology into an accessible language, but it also requires an accountability to publics, achieved through dialogue. That is what Bourdieu tries to conjure up in The Weight of the World but the dialogue is at odds with his theoretical claims about the deep misrecognition of the dominated. His more polemical tracts, such as On Television, are widely read and discussed, and thus generate dialogue but it is a dialogue conducted, in a sense, at arm’s length.

Just as one can study the history of a field by studying the shifting patterns of relations among the four knowledges, so one can trace an individual’s career through those knowledges. Looking at Bourdieu’s academic trajectory, one might argue that he sets out as a critical sociologist, but over time his critique becomes absorbed as a reigning orthodoxy, at which point he turns to public engagement. Although he is critical of policy
science and its army of consultants, media celebrities, experts of one form or another, all servants of power, he nonetheless sits on government sponsored commissions for educational reform. The policy world cannot be excised from the discipline although, like the other knowledges, it must not come to dominate the discipline – the heteronomous pole must be kept in check. Likewise instrumental knowledge can prevail but not to the exclusion of reflexive knowledge.

**Table 1. Division of Academic Labor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SCIENCE Academic Audience</th>
<th>POLITICS Extra-Academic Audience</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMINANT</td>
<td>PROFESSIONAL</td>
<td>POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBORDINATE</td>
<td>CRITICAL</td>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
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We can now better appreciate the problems with Mills’s view of sociology. By celebrating the sociologist as romanticized craft worker and independent intellectual, and by reducing policy sociology and professional sociologies to their pathological types (abstracted empiricism and grand theory), he is denying the existence of a viable division of academic labor. He collapses all four types of knowledge into a single type of public sociology defined as the sociological imagination. The table above situates his early career as a professional sociologist in Wisconsin, Maryland and his early years at Columbia. But as he writes his famous trilogy, he cuts himself off from professional sociology to become a public sociologist, from which vantage point he writes *The Sociological Imagination*, critical sociology par excellence, before leaving the field of sociology altogether.

Mills’s critique of professional and policy sociology underscores the ever-present danger of professional sociology becoming irrelevant through self-referentiality and of policy sociology being captured by the client. These warnings are especially relevant today when regulation of the profession and commodification of knowledge threatens to cut off instrumental knowledge from its lifeblood -- reflexive knowledge. We have, therefore, to apply the sociological imagination to the field that is sociology, recognizing the broader forces at work in shaping its contours. Indeed, each type of knowledge can be divided into two zones: one looking inward and the other outward. Thus, policy sociology can be of the sponsored type, but it can also be more independent, and assume an advocacy role. Professional sociology can take the form of ritualized processes of regulation and control but it can also advance exciting research programs, especially when open to critical sociologists. Critical sociologists also suffer from a dogmatism, often rooted in subservience to other disciplines rather than a carefully trained critique of professional sociology as it is practiced.
Finally, we come to the two faces of public sociology. Mills’s public sociology sustained the independence of the sociologist through the dissemination of widely read exposés of domination and its ideological justification. It was a traditional form of public sociology addressed to publics without direct conversation with them, although they did, and still do, generate much debate. He stood aloof from the organic public sociology that would have brought him into dialogue with the very people he was writing about. Mills kept his distance from the “cheerful robots,” the duped and manipulated citizens of mass society, as though any engagement with them would contaminate his intellectual endeavors.

Similar sentiments can be found in Bourdieu but his venom was more usually aimed at the “organic intellectuals” who misleadingly think they can overcome the hiatus of habitus, intellectuals who don’t appreciate that the dominated adjust to the conditions of domination in ways difficult for intellectuals to comprehend. Yet Bourdieu violates his own admonitions and crosses over from traditional to organic public sociology when representing the voices of the dominated in The Weight of the World. He can no longer remain aloof from the plight of the subaltern. Although it requires a move outside the US, even Mills discovers organic intellectuals in the Cuban Revolution and, indeed, becomes their spokesperson to the American people. In the end both Mills and Bourdieu joined Marx, Gramsci, Freire, and Fanon in recognizing organic intellectuals as playing a crucial role in ideological warfare against the dominant classes. As Gramsci might say, by themselves, intellectuals cannot fight a war of position.