INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Political sociology lies at the intersection of the politics of sociology and the sociology of politics. In this introductory course we trace the changing parameters of this intersection in three successive periods since the Second World War.

Our narrative of the politics of sociology begins with the political sociology of the 1950s which presented itself as an alternative to and a critique of Marxism. Typically, it defended liberal democracy against communist (and fascist) totalitarianism. This era of self-confidence and cold war prompted critiques from an emerging new left, encouraged by the relaxation both of Stalinism abroad and of anti-communism at home. Marxism experienced a revival, particularly in the academy. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a burgeoning civil rights movement and anti-war protest. Even though they were not proletarian in character, these social movements were often inspired by Marxism. They exuded an optimism of a better world, even if they reminded many conservatives of the precursors to fascism. Marxism's developing theoretical framework focused on the inequities and internal contradictions of capitalism, concealed and reproduced by liberal democracy. However, equally hostile to Soviet communism as it was to advanced capitalism, Marxism ultimately failed to provide a convincing alternative to capitalist democracy. Declining social movements and the renaissance of conservative politics in the 1980s brought about a change in orientation. The study of politics sought to go beyond both earlier political sociology and Marxism -- in the end by identifying both as utopian (modernist?) projects. On the Right, just as on the Left, this was a period of growing uncertainty about the capacity of liberal democracy to cope with the deepening economic problems of capitalism. The temporary exuberance created by the collapse of Soviet Communism evaporated as capitalism would now have to stand on its own feet, bereft of a self-justificatory antichrist.

This narrative establishes the basis for studying three historic turns in the sociology of politics, dividing the course into four parts. Part I deals with Marxism beyond classical Marxism, focusing particularly on Gramsci's, Prison Notebooks, as the locus classicus of a Marxist theory of politics. His prison writings represent an unnoticed anticipation of the themes of political sociology. Thus, in these first three weeks, we show that Marxism is not the monolithic, ideological bloc of thought caricatured by political sociology. In Part II we study postwar political sociology as a response to the writings of Marx and ask how they differ from and go beyond Gramsci. Part III deals with Marxist responses of the 1960s and 1970s and asks how different they are from or go beyond the political sociology they sought to replace. In Part IV, we study the fragmentation of the field in the 1980s as a reaction against both political sociology and Marxism.

The course is designed to examine two hypotheses. With the (perceived) extinction of feasible, viable and attractive alternatives to a market economy and liberal democracy there is: (a) a convergence between "political sociology" and Marxism and, (b) the emergence of new ("postmodern"?) frameworks which go beyond political sociology and Marxism. In other words the literature no longer divides between Part I and Part II or between Part II and Part III, but between Parts I, II, and III on the one hand and Part IV on the other. What do the perspectives in Part IV share that cuts them off from the previous studies?

The seminar meets twice a week. I will lead the discussions during the first three weeks. Then each Monday, groups of three or four students will present collectively prepared papers, each no longer than 4,000 words, which they distribute to everyone in the previous session. A short opening commentary will be prepared by the previous group. In lieu of a final paper each student will contribute to two such papers. Each Wednesday I will lead a discussion in response to the previous Monday's seminar and attempt to provide overall coherence to the course. Grades are on a contract basis so that an A for the course is based on completion of both papers on time and within the specified length. There will be no incompletes, and no auditors. Numbers in parentheses refer to a reader which is available at Copy Central, 2560 Bancroft Way for $16.
I: FROM MARX TO GRAMSCI

It is often said that in Marxism there is no theory of politics, the political is reduced to the economic and democracy is an unimportant feature of the capitalist state. We will examine this proposition, beginning with Marx and Engels, the classics of German Marxism (Luxemburg, Kautsky and Bernstein), Lenin and then concentrate on Gramsci as the major political theorist in the Marxist tradition.

8/23 -- CLASSICAL MARXISM

In the writings of Marx and Engels the development of the internal contradictions of capitalism coincides with the intensification of class struggle. This suggests that transition to socialism will come first to the country with the most advanced economy. In fact the struggle for socialism emerged in countries of second rank, particularly strongly in Germany between 1890 and 1920. German Marxism tries to come to terms with this anomaly and with capitalism's ability to absorb economic crises as struggles moved in a more reformist direction. The different responses of Kautsky, Bernstein and Luxemburg can be seen as a debate about the nature of democracy and its relationship to capitalism.

8/25 -- Lenin, STATE AND REVOLUTION (#1)

Lenin supplies what is missing in German Marxism -- a theory of different stages of capitalism, a theory of the state and a theory of transition to socialism. In State and Revolution he translates the two stage transition -- a revolutionary transition to socialism and an evolutionary transition to communism -- into two political transitions (a) from capitalist democracy to the dictatorship of the proletariat and (b) from dictatorship of the proletariat to communism. How does he conceptualize each of these political forms? What is the relation of each to the economy? How does he understand the dynamics of transition between them?

8/30 Gramsci, PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS ["The Revolution Against 'Capital'" (2a); "The Study of Philosophy" and "Problems of Marxism" in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp.321-77; pp.419-468]

The young Gramsci came to Marxism via the Bolshevik Revolution which he called the "Revolution against Capital," that is an act of collective will that defied the deterministic economic laws of capitalism, postulated by classical Marxism. Instead of Lenin's two stage revolution, however, he developed the idea of prefigurative revolution based on factory councils as the nucleus of an alternative order developing within capitalism. His later reflections in prison on philosophy and history refined his earlier voluntarism. Taking Marx's Theses on Feuerbach and The Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy as point of departure, he created a Marxism in which politics and culture assume a clear autonomy from economic forces.


Not just in practice but in theory too Gramsci took Lenin as point of departure in an attempt to understand the specificity of the West, why revolution had failed in the West. His distinctive contribution was twofold: to expand the notion of the state to include not just repressive apparatuses but ideological apparatuses too and recognize the centrality of the emergence of civil society between state and economy. In the West, the transition of socialism can not be secured by seizure of state of power (war of movement) but requires the conquest of the trenches of civil society (war of position). Such a construction of proletarian hegemony requires the work of a "modern prince" (the communist party) and gives prominence to the role of organic intellectuals.

Gramsci was not just interested in drawing political conclusions from theoretical differences between early and advanced capitalism, West and East but was able to distinguish different relations between state and civil society among advanced societies. Italy took the road to fascism because it never experienced a real bourgeois revolution. Gramsci refutes attempts to liken fascism to Fordism by studying Americanism. In so doing he developed a theory of crises of hegemony. He also sought to develop a novel idea of socialism as the withering away of the state and the expansion of civil society.

II: POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Political sociology, as it came to be defined after World War Two, can be seen as a response to "totalitarianism" in the form of German National Socialism and Soviet Communism. However, Arendt, Lipset and Huntington offer very different perspectives. Arendt sees totalitarianism as an expression of the central predicaments of modernity. Lipset defends and anticipates the extension of liberal democracy as the ideal. Totalitarianism is its nemesis. Huntington, by contrast, argues that in changing societies totalitarian orders are the best guarantee of political order. Interestingly, each writer undertakes a critique of Marx as a political primitive but then develops (knowingly or unknowingly) the ideas of a Marxist after Marx. Thus, Arendt adopts many of the critiques of modernity of the Frankfurt School, Lipset adopts Bernstein's evolutionary socialism, and Huntington extols Lenin. This raises the question of how they differ from classical Marxism and Bolshevism and whether any of them go beyond Gramsci.

9/13-9/15 -- Arendt, TOTALITARIANISM, "Totalitarian Imperialism" (#3)

What are the distinctive features of totalitarianism? What is the difference between tyranny and totalitarianism? What are the social origins of totalitarianism? What was the appeal of totalitarianism to working classes and to intellectuals? What is the role and meaning of ideology and terror in her formulation? Are there problematic features in her characterization of totalitarianism as the replacement of class society by mass society and the state by mass movement? Is anything lost by the identification of National Socialism with Communism?

The Origins of Totalitarianism, of which Totalitarianism is the third part, was skewed toward the study of Nazism. Arendt, a fugitive from Nazism, identifies its historical origins in imperialist expansionism, racism, the decay of the nation state, the alliance between the mob and capital and anti-semitism. Only after the war, when Stalinist atrocities became known did she devote sections to the Soviet Union. Subsequently, this led her to ask how it was that "socialism" which was supposed to liberate society could turn into its very opposite. What was it about Marxism, in particular, that made it so appropriate as an ideology for totalitarianism? The last chapter of Totalitarianism, "Terror and Ideology," was supposed to be chapter four of her unpublished critique of Marxism, Karl Marx and the Tradition. What do you think were her criticisms of Marx? Do you think they also apply to Gramsci?

In the second edition (1958) of The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt included an epilogue on the Hungarian Revolution ("Totalitarian Imperialism"), which realized many features of her ideal of politics. What was this ideal and how does it compare with representative democracy based on parties and elections? How might she differ from Gramsci, whose writings were also inspired by a similar council revolution?

9/20-9/22 Lipset, POLITICAL MAN [Chapters 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 (pp.127-30;176-9); 6 (pp226-29); 7; 8 (pp.297-300); 10; 13; 14 (pp.459-69); 15]

Marx thought that democracy, specifically universal suffrage, would unchain class struggle. Bentham, Mill and Tocqueville also feared the destabilizing tendencies of democracy. Lipset, by contrast, studies the conditions of stability of liberal democracy.

If totalitarianism is based on mass society, then democracy is based on class society. Lipset's analysis recalls Bernstein's evolutionary socialism: optimism about the expansion of democracy; criticism of
the Marxian thesis of the polarization of classes and the inevitable growth of a revolutionary working class; elections are a form of democratic class struggle. According to Lipset the consensus necessary for two party democracy comes from an effective and legitimate political system that can absorb demands and avert extremist programs. Economic development creates and then integrates a large middle class which anchors the democratic order. However, where classes are not politically integrated and are possessed by authoritarian cultures, there is the danger of extremist movements. Lipset offers a rich assortment of conditions for stable democracy can you integrate them into unified whole?

How does Lipset's notion of democracy compare with Arendt's, and with Lenin's? In what way does it differ from Gramsci? Does Gramsci see the stabilizing influence of civil society in the same terms as Lipset, namely integration through cross-cutting ties? How would you compare Gramsci's "hegemony" and Lipset's "end of ideology", their understanding of the relation between parties and classes? How do their analyses of intellectuals differ?

9/27-9/29 Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER AND CHANGING SOCIETIES [Chapters 1; 2; 5; 6; 7]

Where Lipset focuses on the social bases of liberal democracy, Huntington is interested in "political order." While dismissing Marx as a political primitive, he extol's Lenin's conception of the mobilizing political party which in Huntington's view is the major instrument of effective modernization. Rather than opposing "communist totalitarianism" to Western liberalism, he identifies both as effective political orders to be distinguished from unstable, ineffective debile praetorian or traditional regimes.

Lipset, he argues, confuses modernity with modernization. Modernity is an accomplished condition based on a balance between institutions and participation and is compatible with democracy. Modernization, on the other hand, is a process antithetical to democracy. Third world countries are better advised to follow the totalitarian model. How is it that Western countries escaped the dilemmas of democracy? What does this mean for the prospects for democracy for countries that were members of the Soviet bloc?

While Huntington is critical of Lenin for underestimating the importance of Western democracy, this can hardly be said of Gramsci. Indeed, Huntington's framework may be regarded as a translation of The Prison Notebooks into modern political science. The centrality of the party, the idea of hegemony, the balance of state and civil society, the ambiguous consequences of liberal democracy, the role of intellectuals, the relations between reform and revolution are at the center of Huntington's concerns. What are we to make of this astonishing convergence of Marxist and conservative thought? Are their mechanisms for engineering political order as similar as they appear? How would they differ in their understanding of the disintegration of the Soviet Union? How would each evaluate the feasibility of the other's prognosis and prescription for the future?

III: THE REDISCOVERY OF MARXISM

Mounting dissatisfaction, with both the theory and practice of politics in the US, inspired a revival of Marxism which stressed the limitations of liberal democracy, the gap between ideology and reality, and the internal contradictions and exploitative moments of capitalism. This New Left Marxism was no less critical of the Soviet bureaucratic planning than of Western liberal democracies. Abroad it identified with the struggles of the Third World against imperialist oppression, while at home it was impelled by struggles against war and for the expansion of civil rights. Over time there has been a broad retreat from Lenin's radical vision: from instrumentalism to the (relative) autonomy of the state; from overthrowing the capitalist state to shaping social policy; from the withering away of the socialist state to its durability. Instead of revolution Marxism supported capitalist democracy and championed its expansion into all realms of society. Without a viable, feasible and attractive socialism beyond capitalism made it hard to distinguish Marxist theories from liberal or conservative thought. Disarmed Marxism suffered demise.
Arendt equates fascism and communism with totalitarianism, the product of the disintegration of class society. By contrast Moore distinguishes between fascism (Japan and Germany) and communism (Russia and China) precisely on their class origins -- a reactionary coalition of landed classes and weak bourgeoisie as opposed to peasant revolution. Moore understands the roads to democracy in England, France, and America as different ways of avoiding fascism and giving birth to an independent bourgeoisie. Is this an effective critique of Arendt?

Moore's historical analysis tempers the euphoria of liberals such as Lipset, pointing to the origins of democracy in violence perpetrated against subordinate classes; to the contingency of the democratic outcome, and to the limits of democracy as an instrument of development (India). His skepticism about the developmental potential of democracy and his restrained criticism of communism exhibit convergence with Huntington. But in analyzing the origins he places virtually all the emphasis on classes where Huntington focuses on parties and the state.

What, if anything, justifies categorizing Moore as a Marxist, a label he himself would no doubt disavow? Is it possible to reconcile his analysis with those of Arendt, Lipset and Huntington?

Gramsci's analysis of the origins of Italian fascism, e.g. in "Some Aspects of the Southern Question", also concentrates on Italy's failed bourgeois revolution, the coalition of landed classes and bourgeoisie, as well as the impediments to revolutionary coalition of peasants and workers. So how then does Gramsci's analysis differ from Moore's?

In Moore's analysis class interests reflect immediate material conditions, and give rise to the constellation of class alliances and conflicts which in turn are the precursors of different political regimes. Neither the organization of classes nor of the state itself is problematized. However, subsequently the state lay at the heart of the Marxist revival. Following C. Wright Mills' Power Elite, Miliband questioned the claims of pluralist political sociology (e.g. Lipset) that liberal democracy was responsive to all organized interests in society. He resurrected Lenin's arguments that capitalist democracy was democratic in form but capitalist in content, and that the dominant class, connected to state managers by social ties, used the state to protect its own economic interests.

Poulantzas criticizes Miliband for accepting the terms of his adversaries and for seeing social relations as social connections rather than "empty places." These methodological shortcomings make it difficult for Miliband to comprehend instances when the state acted against the interests of the dominant class in the interests of protecting the capitalist system. The state has to assume a certain relative autonomy if it is to protect capitalists from destroying capitalism in their ardent pursuit of profit. What is this "relative" autonomy and how is it that the state knows exactly what to do? Block argues that the state is not interested in protecting this or that capitalist, but in maximizing its revenues by protecting capital accumulation. Because they are located outside the economy and because they depend upon that economy, state managers have both the capacity and the interest to protect the capitalist order. Offe, on the other hand, argues that the state managers are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Selection mechanisms, embedded in the state, channel pressures from social groups in a way that reproduces class relations. Finally, in a later article, Poulantzas argues that the state is not only a structure but also an arena for class struggle. It is the combination of struggle outside and inside the state that determines the transformation and interventions of the state.
How does Gramsci understand the relation between dominant classes and the state? In Gramsci's framework how does the state manage to do what is necessary to maintain political order?

10/18-10/20 -- Przeworski, CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY [Chapters 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; Postscript]

Both Moore and the participants in the state debate take class formation and class struggle as unproblematic. Working from Gramsci, Przeworski explicitly problematizes these issues. He shows how classical Marxism assumed a zero-sum relation between classes and how a non-zero sum relation gives way to very different class dynamics in which socialism recedes from the agenda. In Przeworski's formulation, classes are not given as empty places in a social structure but as the result of the interplay of collective actors, particularly but not only parties, which create class or non-class identities. Once socialist parties decided to partake in electoral politics, the limited number of industrial workers inevitably lead to the dilution of socialist aspirations.

Is this argument any different from Lipset's emphasis on the burgeoning middle class and his view that elections are a form of democratic class struggle? Przeworski claims he has a more adequate (than Lipset) theory of the formation of class interests -- what do you think? What is left of Marxism by the time he has finished? What has happened to the state? How might Gramsci respond to Przeworski's appropriation of The Prison Notebooks?

10/25-10/27 -- Offe, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE [Chapters 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 7; 8; 11]

Offe turns to the state itself and tries to show how its attempt to counter contradictions of capital accumulation create contradictions within the state itself which paralyzes its effectiveness. The attempt to universalize the commodity form requires the expansion of non-commodity forms of the welfare state. In criticizing instrumentalist view of the state, he first postulates a particular contradiction internal to the capitalist economy and second, asserts it is the function of the state to ameliorate that gap. Are these claims empirical, theoretical, or metaphysical?

Highlighting the contradictions and limitations of the welfare state brings him into accord with conservative thought. However, he departs from conservatives, such as Huntington, when he denies the viability of their solution -- the dissolution of the welfare state. The problem does not lie within the state itself but at the level of the capitalist economy. Still, he anticipates the decline of the welfare state and electoral politics as the class compromise, upon which they are based, collapses. He, thus, underlines the anachronism of Przeworski's focus while offering an interpretation of the emergence of private corporatism at the highest levels and new social movements.

In Offe's theory it is essential that the state maintain its legitimacy. How does it manage to do it? How does Gramsci's conception of consent compare with Offe's conception of legitimacy? Offe conceptualizes this tendency as the withering away of the state and the rise of a vibrant civil society, which is exactly Gramsci's conception of socialism! Or is it? Where does Offe diverge from Gramsci?

**IV: BEYOND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY AND MARXISM**

Marxism began by discrediting political sociology, and ended by discrediting itself. Unable to provide a convincing conception of socialism, Marxism was disarmed by conservative appropriation of its critique of capitalism. Today the sociological study of politics sets out from a criticism of the limitations of both political sociology and Marxism, and moves to incorporate their insights into new paradigms. Reacting against totalizing theories, these new paradigms are usually eclectic, interpretive and inductive rather than systematic, programmatic and deductive. At the same time the very meaning of politics has changed so that for some it is concentrated at the level of the state, for others at the level of micro-institutions such as family, prison and school, while for yet others it is located in the spaces of civil society between institutions and the state. This Gramscian expansion of the meaning of politics has led to a fragmentation of the entire field, so that there is no
confinement of the political. The debate is no longer between Marxism and political sociology since both stand accused of utopianism. If there is an emerging debate it is between modernism and postmodernism.

11/1-11/3 -- Evans, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer (eds.), BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN [Chapters 1; 4; 6; 8; 9; 11]

Structural functionalism and Marxism lead up to studies of the state but fail to problematize its central role. The essays are divided in three loose parts: the state is an organization for achieving economic development and social policy, the state as an actor vis-a-vis other states and the state as shaping patterns of conflict. In this regard the editors try to bring coherence to very disparate essays by focusing on two aspects of the state as actor -- its autonomy and its capacity and the relation between the two.

Eschewing conceptual debate the editors recommend comparative historical variation to arrive at generalizations about the state. Are they handicapped by their unwillingness to treat conceptual issues seriously? If the state is a potentially autonomous actor then it must have interests, a distinctive rationality. What is that rationality? Are we back with the empiricist dilemma: the state acts in a particular way because its interests are such as such and its interests are such and such because it acts in a particular way. Is there any way of inferring interests from structure? What are the components of a state's structure? If the state is made up of different apparatuses, how does one understand the relationship among those apparatus to allow one to talk of "the state"?

How does Offe's analysis of the state (c.f. chapters 3 and 5) differ from Skocpol's (c.f. chapters 4)? Does Gramsci give the state the character of an actor? Would the essays by Katznelson and Laitin qualify as Gramscian? The editors talk about the role of intellectuals in shaping state policies, how does this differ from Gramsci?

11/8-11/10 McAdam, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY

One avenue from Marxism is to focus more on the state, the other is to focus on struggle or, when it is taken beyond the Marxist context, on "social movements." Traditionally collective behavior has been explained as an irrational psychological response to strain. This corresponds to a pluralist view of politics in which all interests can gain expression within the framework of modern liberal state. Resource Mobilization Theory recognizes social movements as a political movement of those exclude from access to democratic structures but has a power elite view of politics. McAdam's political process model highlights the importance of indigenous resources, the structure of political opportunities, a subjective moment of cognitive liberation and finally the social control response of the state.

Based on his analysis of the civil rights movement, is there any attempt to show that these factors are independent of one another? That one or other may be key and determine the others? What is the theory of politics that underlies his analysis? In what way might it differ from Gramsci's? Does McAdam's theory and analysis of the civil rights movement fit in with Offe's theory of social movements?

11/15-11/17 -- Omi and Winant, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES; Scott, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY [Introduction; chapters 1; 4; 7; 8] (#9)

Omi and Winant criticize prevailing paradigms in the field of race relations, the ethnicity, class and national paradigms for reducing race to something other than itself and thereby underestimating its importance in the US. Instead they propose a theory of racial formation in which race is contingently constructed by the state on the one side and by social movements on the other. The state responds to the civil rights movement with absorption and insulation, fragmenting the movement and restoring a conservative meaning of race by denying the legitimacy of group rights. Just as they place the formation of a new collective black identity (cognitive liberation?) at the center of the rise of the civil
rights movement, so they attribute the retreat of that movement to its failure to develop an effective ideology which would put race at the center of US society.

Why cannot the state revoke the one substantial gain of the movement, namely normative commitment to the ideal of racial equality? How does Omi and Winant's theory of the rise and fall of the civil rights movement differ from McAdam's? Does Omi and Winant's theory of racial state supply the missing component in MacAdam's analysis? How does the "racial state" fit with Offe's or Skocpol's view of the state? What would Gramsci make of Omi and Winant's use of "war of position" and "war of movement", of "hegemony", of the "racial state"?

Scott is equally dissatisfied with existing theories of gender which too easily take the categories male and female as given and fixed, paying little attention to their political construction. However, she is less interested in the way the state responds to social movements than how the dichotomy male/female is composed and used linguistically, not just to subordinate or exclude women, but also to legitimate different structures of domination, to constitute the meaning of class or to valorize (male) rationality. Are there reasons why a study of racial formation should focus more on the state and social movements while a study of gender formation should focus more on language?

11/22-11/24 -- MacKinnon, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE

MacKinnon develops a Marxist critique of liberal feminism for its individualism, moralism, voluntarism, naturalism and idealism. But she goes beyond Marxism by showing it to be antithetical to feminism. It is not that Marxism leaves women out or that it reduces gender domination to something other than itself, although it does both of these, but its conceptual framework and normative commitments embrace objectification, i.e. the making of objects, as a universal feature of human existence and a mode of emancipation. Such assumptions are inimical to feminism because in their relationship to men, women themselves become objects through the appropriation of their sexuality. Their subordination is a process of objectification. Interestingly, Arendt makes similar criticisms of Marx by pointing to the totalitarian implications of applying the vocabulary of production to history, viewing history as an "object" which has to be "made".

Unlike Scott whose primary focus is the constitution of gender through language and ideology, MacKinnon discovers the source of gender domination in concrete institutions and processes of sexual objectification. Still, they both see male domination as particularly effective because it is not seen as such, but lies concealed behind its "naturalness" and "universality." Therefore, the feminist method is consciousness raising in which women become conscious of their objectification rather than a science which separates thing from thought, rather than a science which takes objectification and objectivity as premises of its operation.

For MacKinnon the state masks the ubiquity of male domination by prosecuting its pathological forms (rape, battery, abortion) as acts of violence, separate from, rather than integral to, normal sexuality. Does this imply that the state is gendered in the way that Omi and Winant regard the state as racial? Or is the more appropriate analogy Poulantzas' view that the strength of the state lies in its ostensible neutrality with regard to class (gender)? From Mackinnon's perspective would Gramsci appear as just another, typical Marxist?

11/29-12/1 -- Bauman, LEGISLATORS AND INTERPRETERS

Policy-relevant social knowledge (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol), social identity and discourse (Omi and Winant, Scott), and even consciousness raising (MacKinnon) all give centrality to the social role of the intellectual. Highlighting the precarious identity of others reflects insecurity about our own which for Bauman marks the decline of modernist projects of Marxism and liberals. These projects originated with the rise of the modern state which created both the opportunity and the necessity for a
new order engineered by intellectuals. On the one hand rising levels of social and physical uncertainty, brought about by the disintegration of communal ties, called for a new mode of discipline. On the other hand, the emergence of a strong absolutist state made possible the educating, cultivating and civilizing, in short legislative functions of the intellectual. Thus the modern period consecrated the marriage of power and knowledge. However, as the modern state consolidated its new disciplinary regimes, first the legislative and then the legitimating functions of the intellectual became unnecessary. Spurned by the state, intellectuals sought other roads to power, most notably on the back of the proletariat. Subsequent disillusionment with these new agents, they could either declare themselves a new class or abandon the legislative enterprise altogether. Today, when the market seduces the consumer with purchasing power and the state represses those without purchasing power clamoring to enter the golden fortress, intellectuals lose their programmatic function and turning in on themselves they become interpreters between islands of a fragmented world.

Is there any significance in the simultaneous rise of Gramsci's civil society and the renewal of collective identification by intellectuals? Has Gramsci a conception of intellectuals with interests of their own? How does Gramsci combine the legislative and interpretive roles of intellectuals? Does Gramsci offer any intimations of postmodernity?