THE ROLES OF THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT IN THE
ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

A thesis submitted to the University of Zambia for the degree of Master of Arts
By
Michael Boris Burawoy.

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ABSTRACT.

Methodological shortcomings, a narrow focus on students as a group isolated from the wider society, the tendency to consider the student apart from the institution in which he operates - the university - and the difficulty of coming to terms with the transience of student status are some of the factors which have handicapped sociological inquiry in this area. Survey analysis may be supplemented by participant observation. Consideration of the student role may be supplemented by a consideration of the other members of his set of multiple roles. In the context of the Zambian social structure the student role is the focus of four sets of tensions. For historical reasons there exist two mutually exclusive avenues of recruitment to the ruling class, one passing through the educational system and the other through the party organisation. The result is competition between those with 'expertise' and those who exhibit 'loyalty and experience'. Tension between students and the party arises not only from competition but also from the arbitrary choice of criteria for upward ability in any particular instance. The exclusion of the student from the political arena and also from the central institutions and value system has given rise to a negative oppositionalism and the perception of the political elite as illegitimate rulers. This generates a second set of tensions between students and government. The third source of tension lies in a generalised resentment, an embryo class consciousness, of the mass of society towards those who have power and wealth and particularly those who consider they are entitled to such positions by virtue of their advanced formal education. Finally the structure of the university social system and the student community are antithetical to the political structure of the wider society. In the university directives flow upwards from below while in the wider society they flow in the opposite direction. This structural discontinuity, not only gives rise
to tension but also a segmentation of the student role into two discontinuous components - a civic role and a university role.

Apart from the student role, each student enacts other roles derived from the wider social structure and linking him to the society outside the university. Such role continuities however do not mitigate the tensions surrounding the student role. Within the university arena, extrinsically derived roles are only enacted insofar as they are compatible with the student role. Equilibrium between the university students and the government is sustained through a set of norms and expectations which sharply differentiate between the student's civic and university roles. A violation of these role expectations brings the students into conflict with the party or government. The absence of strong cross cutting ties and mediating forces results in the escalation of conflict unless a 'scapegoat' emerges to reunite the opposed groups in opposition to a third 'alien' element. It is characteristic of the Zambian social structure that there are relatively few cross cutting ties which can lock the social system into stable equilibrium. Governments can handle tensions between themselves and transplanted institutions, in this case the university, in at least three ways. First the university can be excluded from the national arena, and awarded a measure of functional autonomy on condition that its members accept a discontinuity between their institutional role and their civic role. Second the university may be incorporated into the party so that its activities may be regulated. The third possibility is the structural transformation of the university in such a way that it becomes compatible with the wider social structure and thereby reduces the tension.
PREFACE.

Any sociological inquiry arises from the interaction of the sociologist and the subject of study. Therefore, it is important for the writer to present some information about his orientation to the subject under investigation and the domain assumptions he brings with him to his study. However difficult a task the social scientist must strive toward a heightened self-awareness and become conscious of the assumptions implicit in his research.

My interest in students was first stimulated in 1965 by a visit to America, which was still digesting the implications of 'Berkeley' and experiencing the first large scale student sit-ins over Vietnam. The assumption of student status led to a heightened interest in the political role of students and to a four month visit to Africa in 1966. This served to introduce me to a few of the problems of education in South, Central and East Africa. In the following year I carried out a more systematic and better prepared study revolving around university education in India, in particular the 'problem' of medium of instruction in university education. The results and conclusions are written up elsewhere.

For those interested in student politics, 1968 turned out to be a challenging year and for those who were active in student politics it was a rare 'generational experience'. The turmoil in Europe and America led to a greater awareness of the capacity of the students to challenge the political order in the countries of Asia, Latin America and to a lesser extent Africa. As one who had observed the events of 1968 from

the vantage point of a British University, I became interested in undertaking intensive comparative study of students as between the advanced capitalist nations and the 'new' nations of Africa. After spending six months in South Africa, attempting to familiarise myself with the nature of student politics on the English speaking university campuses, I found myself in Zambia employed on the Copperbelt by Anglo American Corporation. In the following year entry to the University of Zambia as a M.A. student in sociology enabled me to undertake a participant observer study of Zambian students. The present thesis is the result.

I brought with me to the University of Zambia a set of prejudices which naturally arise from passing through the processes of a bourgeois liberal education in England, and from the security of middle class life in Britain. I understood little of the insecurity and anxiety associated with upward mobility, and of the tensions which pervade a small country such as Zambia which has only recently emerged from colonial rule and its attendant patterns of racial discrimination and stratification. However one might resist the assumptions of racial stereo-types inevitably one must adopt a set if, as had been the case of the writer before he entered the university, one has been living next to Zambians but interacting only in the context of status inequality.

Inevitably many of the background assumptions and prejudices I brought with me to the University of Zambia were drastically modified by the environment in which I interacted with other students as a student, albeit a white one. In so far as I became sensitized to the student culture and the assumptions of the community, it was through involvement in its affairs as a student. There is also the danger of falling into the other
extreme and adopting the student 'folk theory' as an explanation of student behaviour without analysing the underlying structural determinants and interests. Continual discussion with my teachers and my removal to Manchester to write up the thesis has hopefully made me conscious of the structural derivations of the beliefs and attitudes of the students.

Apart from the confluence of background and environmental influences the content and orientation of the thesis arises out of the nature of the sociological training I received at the University of Zambia. To Dr. Jayaraman I owe a great debt for guiding me through some of the mysteries of the Indian caste system, above all its relationship to class, and in so doing throwing light on the more general phenomenon of the manipulation of a cultural idiom in the pursuit of contextually derived interests. The concept of caste mobility and its cultural concomitants have illuminated many of the features associated with the upward mobility of the black 'caste' in Zambia. It was Professor Simons, my supervisor, who introduced me to political sociology and I had the great fortune to benefit from his outstanding analytical abilities and long standing experience and understanding of Southern Africa. His critique of an outline of this thesis proved to be particularly helpful in drawing my attention to the sensitivity of students to their different roles in the university and the wider society. Professor Van Velsen was always an inspiration during my three years in Zambia. Not only was I fortunate to have the benefit of his long experience of Central Africa, stretching back over two decades, but his unusually well developed critical faculties, his uninhibited enthusiasm for sociology and his continual interest in any research I undertook have been a spur to the completion of the dissertation. I am very grateful for
the opportunities I had of discussing my work with each of my teachers throughout my stay at the university. The theoretical framework to which I have been subjected emanated from their interpretation of Marxist writings which informed their analysis of society. The influence of the Manchester School of Social Anthropology and in particular 'situational' analysis, pioneered by Gluckman, Mitchell and Epstein, is unmistakable. The reader will also note the influence of the writings of a number of American sociologists, most notably Merton, Gouldner, Lipset and Shils.

I am particularly grateful to the members of the University Sociological Association and in particular its executive committees, around which revolved so many of my activities at the University of Zambia, for the opportunity of active participation in student life. My two years at the university will remain one of the most exciting and enjoyable periods of my life. I would like to thank Anglo American Corporation for awarding me a scholarship to pursue my M.A. studies. I am indebted to the Office of the Registrar and the Computer Department of The University of Zambia for providing me with data concerning the student population. In Manchester, I profited immensely from discussions with Morris Szeftel of the University of Manchester. His knowledge of Zambia and concern with political development acted as an invaluable corrective to my more wild ideas. It was he who impressed upon me the importance of competition between élites. I should also like to thank Mrs. Elise Oldham for typing out the thesis so meticulously and for applying pressure now and again to ensure its completion.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kwacha (Unit of currency, K1 = US $1.40 = UK £0.58)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUZS</td>
<td>National Union of Zambia Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMOLISA</td>
<td>Student Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNZA</td>
<td>University of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNZADRAM</td>
<td>University of Zambia Dramatic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNZASA</td>
<td>University of Zambia Sociological Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNZASU</td>
<td>University of Zambia Students' Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:

STUDENTS AND SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY.
The Stimuli behind Recent Inquiries into Student Behaviour.

Until recently students have been a neglected focus of sociological inquiry. The transience of student status, their relative isolation and as students their relatively insignificant impact on other sections of 'Western' society may all have been contributing factors to this omission. In addition, sociologists may be a little wary of making studies so near to 'home'. With the expansion of university education and the rising consciousness that education was not only for the privileged few but was one of the keys to the equalitarian society, the position of the student has altered accordingly. Three factors are worthy of note. Increased numbers of students have led to increased competition for jobs, the devaluation of the degree, and the depersonalisation of education. This in itself can but lead to enhanced dissatisfaction. An increasing awareness and preoccupation of the student with his role in society led to considerations of the nature of the society in which he now existed and which he would confront on graduating. Secondly students have become increasingly self conscious possibly because they are now more conspicuous by virtue of their numbers resulting in their definition as a distinct group. The enhanced self consciousness alongside an inflated view of their importance, engendered by the nature of their education and their inexperience of wider society, has contributed to the development of specific student interests despite the transience of the student status. These interests have not always revolved around narrow trade union concerns but have been extended to embrace other interests in society both opposed to and in support of existing regimes.
The student consciousness and the development of the student interest has spread with the assistance of mass media throughout the Western world and inevitably has had an impact, albeit very slight, on students of the 'new nations.' The third feature relates to the expansion in absolute, though not necessarily in percentage, terms of the number of 'radical' students who are prepared to make sacrifices in order to undermine existing authority in society.  

The disturbances at Berkeley in 1964 first drew the attention of a wide audience to the phenomena referred to above. It put pay to the idea of stereotypes of the student as a quiescent citizen of the American populus. Given the absence of any strong tradition of dissent on American campuses, the outburst and truculence of the students in opposing the administration of the university was all the more unexpected and clumsily handled. However small a minority, there were a number of students who had been in the Southern States working in the Civil Rights Movement during vacations. They had returned to the university disillusioned with the obstacles to racial harmony and the end of segregation and discrimination. Many now saw their student life in new ways, subject to the same mechanisms of 'oppression' and control as they had found in the wider society. The Free Speech Movement, precipitated by a relatively insignificant affair, became the focus of student resentment and discontent vis-à-vis the university administration. What had begun relatively innocuously developed into a radical critique of the American university as a symptom and microcosm of the society in which it was embedded. As protest gathered momentum, the universities' implication in the Vietnam War became a focal point around which the 'left'
students rallied support in a number of established universities across the United States. Combined with issues of more immediate concern the bureaucratisation and depersonalisation of university education brought thousands out in protest against the 'capitalist' system which they held accountable for the American malaise. The section was small in percentage terms but in absolute numbers it was sufficient to create turmoil. Nonetheless as one eminent sociologist said, despite the militancy of a small section of the student population, the problem in American higher education is the prevailing unquestioning, uncritical and conformists ethos of the vast majority of students.\(^4\)

The trouble on American campuses reached such dimensions as to cause widespread concern in political circles, particularly as it seemed to affect the better students in the more 'eminent' universities the most severely. As subsequent studies have tended to show, the militant students are the brighter students from professional backgrounds studying liberal arts subjects.\(^5\) If trends in sociological investigation follow the paths their sponsors wish them to follow then it was inevitable that students would become the focus of sociological inquiry. In the eventuality no less eminent a sociologist than Professor Lipset of Harvard University took pioneering steps in the centralisation, organisation and synthesising of studies in student politics. But student protest from the 'radical left' had already begun to disrupt universities in Germany, and it would not be long before Italy, France and England would be similarly affected. Clearly there was something in common between the attitudes, situation and environment of the students in the large universities of Europe and
America. To ignore these might lead to a narrow focus on factors typical of the American campus where broader perspectives embracing features common to universities in the Western world would be more appropriate. Lipset's study began to take on an international dimension. It was not long before studies of students of the 'new nations' were incorporated not only as a possible contrast but because quite clearly they had had more success in affecting political behaviour in the national arena. Students had been instrumental in the fall of unstable governments in Venezuela (1958), Japan (1960), South Korea (1960), Turkey (1960), South Viet-Nam (1963), Bolivia (1964), Sudan (1964) and Indonesia (1966). While in India student unrest had been a fact of life on almost every campus for many years already. This introduction is intended to provide a summary of these studies as a prelude and framework against which the remainder of the paper may be assessed.

Methodology.

It is clear from what has already been said that the recent glut of studies of students have assumed a comparative perspective. They have been less concerned with diachronic studies which examine changes over time than synchronic studies which highlight in comparative perspective structural features associated with different forms of behaviour. The resulting analysis is static rather than dynamic.

This emphasis is compounded by the tendency of the sociologists, possibly in their impatience to complete their investigations, to rely on the mechanistic techniques of survey through questionnaire and interview. Participant or non-participant observation has been precluded from their
methodological apparatus possibly because of the time factor but equally because those studying the students were not themselves students and would not have been accepted by the student body. The survey technique used by itself introduces severe limitations as a means of collecting data. A survey of opinions, attitudes, aspirations etc., can produce misleading results when applied to a cynical or suspicious student body. In the case of the Zambian student, it would have been ridiculous to pose questions concerning the student's political affiliation and social origins, never mind his attitudes towards potentially divisive issues of national policy. That students would be so sensitive to such questions and suspicious of the questioner is itself an important sociological observation worthy of deeper analysis. It reflects the status consciousness of the student, his feeling of powerlessness in the face of externally imposed authority, and the distrust that pervades the Zambian polity.

Beyond that the survey is unable to cope with how people actually behave as distinct from how people believe they behave. Actual behaviour is best studied by direct observation. Because the crucial dependent variable in any sociological inquiry is human behaviour, the survey technique is an inadequate tool of investigation when used by itself. Nevertheless many surveys are conducted which remain unrelated to human behaviour: studies of African students are particularly prone to this defect. Thus Jahoda's study of the social background, attitudes and aspirations of Ghanaian students in 1953 can only justify itself by reference to the important role students are presumed to assume in the future. But attitudes and background are not necessarily independent variables in the
determination of future behaviour. Indeed it could be equally argued that attitudes are situationally determined and those expressed by students while they are still at university will bear little resemblance to those of later life. Goldthorpe's study of students at Makerere suffers from the same drawback.\(^{11}\) Though a great deal of data is collected concerning the student's social background, his attitudes, his educational experiences and a study is also made of graduates of Makerere, comparatively little attempt is made to interrelate any of these variables. Nor is any attempt made to relate such variables to student behaviour in any systematic manner. In this respect studies of student politics in America are more meaningful. These inquiries have deliberately isolated one section of the student community - the 'political activists' and have successfully sought to compare their backgrounds, attitudes, etc., with those of the student population as a whole.\(^{12}\)

Too often the use of surveys invites research workers to view attitudes expressed as permanent and indicative of an underlying political culture. In this way majority opinions and attitudes are emphasised at the expense of divisions within the community belief system. Yet the divergent minority is often the significant group particularly in the consideration of political behaviour.\(^{13}\) By omitting to consider behaviour in addition to attitudes and background the significance of departures from the norm will be lost in the generalisations which make up conclusions about student sub-cultures.

Beliefs and values must be considered at two levels; the fundamental level embodied in the 'sacred values' of the community and at a more superficial level where they are
situationally determined often summoned into existence for the rationalisation of a specific set of interests. Ambiguities and contradictions within the central value system permit the manipulation of values within its framework. Conflict is easily expressed by drawing on different elements and subsystems within the central value system. \[14\] Surveys tend to ignore the variations and contradictions with the value system which only appear when conflicting groups mobilise support and rationalise their interests.

This introduces the more fundamental dilemma posed by the existence of two types of sociological explanation, namely that which treats the structural determinants as paramount and that which accords priority to values. At one extreme one may regard values as manipulated in support of or opposition to structurally determined interests, while at the other extreme social structures are modified if not transformed in accordance with a fundamental value system. Since any sociological inquiry must begin with some 'givens' and derive the existence of other 'givens', normally research either begins with values and regards structure of secondary importance, or begins with structure and possibly derives values. A conglomerate of factors predispose a research worker to adopt one or other approach, such as sociological background and interests, nature of study, etc. This study of Zambian students begins with the social structure and derives values and beliefs from that structure as well as student behaviour. This is not to say however that values do not influence and modify the social structure and behaviour, but rather that this is to be examined at a secondary level. \[15\] The value system's significance as a constraint on human behaviour must be separated analytically
from its function as a rationalisation or justification of human behaviour. The constraining, determining and rationalising functions of a value system will be encountered in the study which follows, but in all cases that system will be regarded as a derivative of the social structure.

It is suspected that the central value system typical of the 'new nations' is more ambiguous and amorphous than the core systems associated with the Western countries, which appear to impose greater constraints on legitimate behaviour. Thus in Zambia, for example, the absence of deeply held ideologies reflects the looseness of the central value system and the tendency for disparate values to be drawn upon in the prosecution and justification of specific interests rather than as constraints on behaviour. Other writers have referred to this same phenomenon in different terms emphasizing a conflict between or transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' values.\textsuperscript{16} The present study will contrariwise stress the manipulation of different elements of the value system as idioms through which conflict is expressed. Thus it is quite common for politicians to use 'traditional' values to justify one policy while using 'modern' values in the pursuit of another interest. Similarly socialist and capitalist aims and beliefs will be expressed by the same person in different contexts. In other words there has been little attempt to order the disparate value subsystems which comprise the central value system into a coherent and logical whole. But it must be immediately admitted that social structures are also manipulated in the interests of specific sections of society. The central institutional system can be as ambiguous and contradictory as the central value system. This is particularly apparent where the formal structure
and institutions, transplanted from a different society, are not rooted in and therefore not firmly integrated into that society. There is no consensus on the function and mode of operation of the new institutions, as there is in their country of origin. The following paper for example will illustrate just how the transplanted university is manipulated by those with political power for their own ends, and how despite the manipulation the university nevertheless moulds student behaviour and attitudes.

A Cultural Approach.

Springing from the surveys of attitudes, there has been a concomitant tendency to dwell on political culture as a dependent variable. Another set of studies concerned with the broader group of intellectuals have been pursued with a similar emphasis. It has been argued that the intellectual who is concerned with the absorption, development and transmission of ideas, does so in a relatively autonomous and structurally unconstrained manner. Therefore in the study of intellectuals ideas must be the primary variable rather than the social structure.¹⁷ The confluence of these two approaches through idea systems and attitude surveys is to be found in the influential work of Shils,¹⁶ who distinguishes six attributes of the political outlook of the intellectual in the 'new nations'; intense politicisation, nationalism, socialism, populism, oppositionalism and incivility. Insofar as these are not typical of the Western intellectual, Shils suggests they are the product of tension between province and metropolis in intellectual life, the desire to escape primordial attachments associated with their societies of origin, alienation
from authority and finally the coincidence of such attributes with fundamental dispositions inherent in 'traditional' society. Africa and Asia have remained primarily 'traditional' societies where religion and kinship form the foci of strongly held values. The development of the intellectual in the new nations has passed through three stages: constitutional liberalism, rejection of Western education and the embrace of an independence movement and finally in the post colonial era the schism between those intellectuals who cling to power and those who are severely alienated from the political authority. What emerges very forcefully from this analysis is the existence of a 'special' kind of 'underdeveloped' intellectual who, though he tries hard to emulate the intellectual of the metropolis, falls short for a number of institutional and cultural reasons. The province - metropolis relationship is the generator urging the 'new nations' towards 'modernity' while the characteristic features of the traditional society - its institutions and its values - retard and obstruct such a development. Indeed in concluding his analysis of Indian students he writes

The participation of the Indian student in the Civil Disobedience movement was a product of the disposition to refuse to be involved in the world of impersonal bureaucratic rule. It was a sort of truancy which manifested a deeper discomfiture. That discomfiture was the early product of India's movement from a primordial traditional condition into a modern large-scale civil order. It is against this that the Indian student is protesting; and the end of the protest is not in sight.

Shils, concerned with the origin of ideas, sees their emanation from a focal point and flowing outwards towards a periphery where their absorption is impeded by uncongenial institutions, belief systems and traditions. It is difficult
to regard the Zambian student as an intellectual as will be indicated in subsequent chapters and the concern for ideas becomes less relevant in this analysis. Rather than consider Zambian students in the light of Western 'culture', a reverse process will be pursued in which the Zambian student, his behaviour and his values, will be regarded as an outgrowth of his immediate environment. The emergent behaviour and beliefs will provide a focal point from which the behaviour and beliefs of students elsewhere in the world may be illuminated.

Comparative Perspectives.

The study of students, particularly the recent crop whose pre-eminent concern has been student politics, has sprung from an interest in students per se. Such studies have not been undertaken with a view to understanding the society in which the students find themselves, rather society is one of the variables influencing student behaviour. The result has been a wide ranging and, too often, superficial examination of student behaviour in many different countries. Inevitably those features of the student community which mark it off from other sections of society have been highlighted at the expense of characteristics in common with other groups. Thus it is not surprising to find that Lipset's study of students in 'underdeveloped' countries bears little relation to his study of other groups in both American and underdeveloped societies. Yet at the same time it should be noted that his analysis of American students though it differs markedly in concepts and approach from for example his seminal study of the International Typographical Union, nevertheless fits in with his general conception of American society as being too
liberal for any radical movement to persist or noticeably affect American society. Yet another look at Lipset's Political Man would reveal the differing conceptions he has of the 'misunderstood' intellectual — in his behaviour the epitomy of rationality and reason — and the American worker whose political outlook is characterised as authoritarian.

(One wonders how a radical student might rewrite the chapters of Lipset's book!)

The purpose of this paper is not merely to examine students in the light of Zambian society but also to examine Zambian society in the light of its students, who are sensitive to many social currents. As will be indicated in Chapter Four in some ways the student community may be regarded as a microcosm of the wider society. Such a study must inevitably cast light on the processes of integration and mobilisation as the university is an institution responsible for absorbing people from different sectional groups into a community and, four years later, thrusting them back into the wider society in entirely new roles and positions.

Because one of the concerns is to examine Zambian society, so due care should be taken to avoid emphasizing specifically student or university attributes in explaining behaviour when more inclusive phenomena of broader significance have equal or greater explanatory power. For this reason the writer's inquiries into the Zambian mineworker, though not incorporated into the body of this study, provide a broader canvas against which student behaviour and values may be assessed.

One of the problems which beset international comparisons of student behaviour is deciding on models and key variables. Lipset's broad sweep of student politics in developing countries
turns out to be a careful categorisation of a number of significant variables, but fails to single out one or two of cardinal influence.\textsuperscript{26} Any ambitious attempt to compare the nature of student politics in countries as different as England, America, India, Bolivia, Ghana and Japan suffers from a paucity of intensive qualitative studies of student politics in individual countries. Lipset's conclusions are based on data and studies conducted, perhaps a little too impatiently, through a technique that offers rapid results - the survey - but which is often barren of original hypotheses.

\textbf{Isolation of the Student.}

The specific concern with the student rather than the institution in which he operates - the university - or the society in which he lives, has led inquiries into student politics to consider the student as an isolate divorced from his environment. Indeed many writers have come to the conclusion that the student is severely alienated or cut off from the society in which he grew up. Such conclusions are yet a further, possibly inevitable, consequence of surveys portraying a set of attitudes and beliefs of students which tend to emphasize alienation from society. The research workers, being attached to the university, rarely get an opportunity to observe or question students outside the university environment in vacations or in the occasional term time sorties into the wider society. Yet students must be sensitive to any discrepancy between their role in the wider society and their role in the university, and the two must necessarily influence one another. Indeed it is the contrast between the student's civic and university roles that provides the point of departure for the
analysis which follows.

As Weinburg and Walker\textsuperscript{27} have pointed out the linkages between the student and society, in particular the political system, have been largely ignored in the recent studies of student politics. Their own analysis, important though it is, only furnishes two such linkages based on recruitment to political careers and government control over university finances. The present paper will explore 'system linkages' through the conceptual apparatus of role theory. Roles derived from the wider social structure will be examined for their significance in the interstices of the university social structure. Participation in national and community politics will be examined through the twin components of the student role, namely the civic role and the university role. Inspiration has been drawn from Epstein's seminal study of the Zambian copper miners where he showed that within the industrial context African townsmen behaved as workers in accordance with the dictates of the industrial organisation.\textsuperscript{28} Roles such as tribesman assumed only secondary importance, and when they came into conflict with roles derived from the industrial structure, specifically the worker role, then it was the 'extrinsic' role that was forsaken. What, however, has not been investigated, and yet is of considerable theoretical interest, is the precise nature of the influence of extrinsically derived roles. In the context of the work situation what importance as determinants of behaviour may be attached to roles of tribesman, husband, lover, old timer, etc. One study by Kapferer at Broken Hill mine does give some insight into the importance of secondary roles.\textsuperscript{29} A recent examination of absenteeism as a form of role conflict offers clear-cut instances where
commitment to extrinsic roles can occasionally take precedence over commitment to intrinsic roles. It will be a purpose of this study of Zambian students to examine as precisely as possible variations in the importance of extrinsically derived roles in the determination of behaviour.

In the process there arises the important, but usually neglected, distinction between politics internal to the community and politics in the wider society. It would be difficult to examine the one without the other, because of their intimate association and continual interaction. Changes in the political system outside the university have repercussions on student politics within the university. In the same way autonomous changes within the community political system, such as the assumption of office by a new executive can bring about a vivid response from outside, even if they do not bring about actual change.

Another group of studies, depending on the somewhat theoretically barren concept of elite, have tended to portray the student as detached from society. The use of the elite concept has been particularly prevalent in studies of African students conceived of variously as an educated, presumptive, incipient, aspirant, elite. The theory of elites as it is usually conceived in modern and older writings, sets a particular group - the elite - apart from the rest of society - the masses - but fails to introduce at a theoretical level any dynamic relation or interaction between the two. Thus the elite concept is particularly useful for those who have examined students as a community isolated and unconnected in any interactive sense with the remainder of society. In itself the concept encourages the view of students as an isolated
group preparing to take over positions of importance; it encourages the study of students in a social vacuum through surveys of background, attitudes and aspirations. When used in conjunction with analytic tools such as class then the elite concept can begin to pay dividends. In the following study the concept will be used to refer to a status group within the ruling class, and an examination of the ruling class must then necessarily also look at the recruitment patterns to and the relations between the various constituent elites.

The University and Society.

To consider the student without also considering his institutional environment, particularly the university is equivalent to divorcing the worker from his work place. The university system is crucial to the understanding of student behaviour. The universities of the Western world have evolved alongside and in consonance with society, often lagging behind changes outside. In the process of evolution a concordat of 'sacred' conventions has developed to govern operations and interactions between universities and government. The universities of the ex colonial territories, taking the Western university as a model, have not been given the opportunity to evolve along with society. On the contrary the university in the 'new nations' is expected to spearhead rather than reflect change and development. The transplantation of a university congruent with modern British society into a society with a very different social structure is bound to lead to problems of 'mal-integration' and incongruence. Its position in society is inevitably thwart with tension, unless it undergoes an adaptive metamorphosis. Ashby has described the story of
unstable equilibrium and confrontation that has dominated relations between universities and government in Africa.\textsuperscript{33}

Collins and Ben-David, recognising the importance of the university system as an influence on student politics, have constructed an interesting two dimensional typology in their study of academic freedom.\textsuperscript{34} In one dimension they distinguish between 'élite' systems and 'expert systems', corresponding to the ratio of students to population. The relatively high ratio of 185 per 10,000 in the United States (1958 figures) places that system in the expert category, while the lower figure of 19 per 10,000 places the British system into the élite category. According to this classification Zambia with a figure of approximately 3 per 10,000 is also an élite system. In the second dimension the writers distinguish between systems in which the university trains and educates for roles which are well known and accepted in the society, and systems which are created by a traditional, or at any rate uneducated, élite for the purposes of eventually reforming themselves or increasing their efficiency through training new and better qualified people of a kind that do not yet exist in the country.\textsuperscript{35}

Zambia falls clearly into the élite 'non model' category which the writers argue is inherently unstable because the replacement of an existing élite by a new one or the introduction of a new stratum in society is bound to lead to conflict.

No existing élite will put up gracefully with an open attempt to transform and replace it, and even less will young men reared as a future élite according to models of more advanced societies admit to the authority of a traditional ruling class.\textsuperscript{36}

In the Zambian case, the existence of large numbers of expatriates in important positions requiring advanced forms of
modern education mitigates the conflict between the incumbent Zambian ruling class and the emerging graduates. But as the university expands and the number of graduates increases com-
petition and conflict will intensify, particularly if recruit-
ment to high posts continues to stress loyalty and experience in preference to qualifications.

At present the Zambian system contrasts vividly with the elite model of Britain where there is continuity between activities within the university and outside, where there is a relative consensus on the role and purpose of the university between educationists and politicians and where those who govern the country belong to the same 'class', speak the same 'language' and have passed through the same educational pro-
cesses and institutions as those who administer and teach in the universities. Though the typology is useful, Ben-David and Collins do not consider possible movements from one type to another, in particular from the 'non-model' to the 'model' systems except in the ambiguous case of Germany. Clearly this is an area of paramount concern to Zambia and embraces theories associated with 'institutionalisation.' Once transplanted into the Zambian environment is it then possible to generate changes which assist rather than obstruct the integra-
tion of the university into the wider social system? Ashby in his work on universities in England, Africa and India sug-
gests possible constitutional amendments, structural modifica-
tions, and changes in course content but these are slight compared to what would be required to significantly reduce the friction between university and government.
Unanticipated Consequences.

Colonial governments, faced with the problem of legitimising their rule, invoked education to rationalise discrimination based on colour. Upward mobility, if it was at all possible, was often determined by the level of formal education acquired. The vast gulf which separated the opportunities for education for the colonised people from those for the colonial rulers ensured that the former never posed a serious threat to foreign rule. In the cash and urban sectors of the economy literacy and numeracy seemed to be the passport to 'success.' It was widely felt as it is today not only in Zambia but also by many Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia that the paper qualification, once achieved, would guarantee promotion. The lengths to which colonised peoples would go and the sacrifices they would make are witness to the widespread belief in the mystical powers of education.\(^{38}\) The inheritance from the pre-independence period was reinforced by the views of such well meaning organisations as UNESCO that education and particularly literacy was a key to the eradication of 'backwardness.'\(^{39}\) All that was holding the African nations back was the shortage of qualified manpower and widespread illiteracy. Accordingly ambitious plans for educational expansion were prepared and at great cost schools and universities were built and staffed by teachers imported from abroad.

Yet the concomitants of educational expansion have not all been beneficial. Alongside the growth of opportunities for educational achievement the view has emerged that it is not the educational content or its application that is
important, but the qualification which entitles the individual to promotion and more pay, irrespective of whether the education achieved leads to improved job performance. Education is widely seen as means to upward mobility into better jobs, rather than as a means to more productive, effective and efficient performance of present jobs, hence the often cited revolution of rising expectation. In the words of one commentator the Zambian is more status orientated than production orientated. The emphasis is more on individual enhancement than collective development, encouraged by the laissez faire orientation to development as distinct from the totalitarian mobilisational approach.

Writers have argued that the tension revolving around such transplanted institutions as the university reflects the more fundamental conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern' norms and values; between ascription and achievement, particularism and universalism. Equally the tensions may be attributed to the unanticipated consequences of transplantation ('modernisation'). In the eyes of those who ruled, the University of Zambia was an essential pillar in national development to provide the qualified indigenous manpower the country so urgently required. It was only dimly appreciated that the concomitants of the university apart from its narrow function as training Zambian manpower, were likely to create friction in society. The government was possibly unaware of the inevitability that students alienated from the central institutions of power would develop a set of political interests reflecting their own position in society which would be oppositional in content. The leaders of the country were possibly only dimly aware that the values inculcated by the
university might be at variance with those they considered desirable. They expected to be able to contain student political demands and the assumption of an 'intellectual arrogance' which attached an importance to formal educational qualifications out of all proportion to their 'worth' in the pursuit of developmental objectives. These and many more examples are to be found in the following pages which essentially constitute an essay in unanticipated consequences. Many of the consequences of the university and other 'borrowed' institutions are unanticipated precisely because they are borrowed. The manifest functions of a particular institution may remain the same on transplantation but its latent functions concealed in the fabric of society, only become apparent when its impact is observed in different social structures. Thus the consequences which are here referred to as unanticipated, are unanticipated because they do not appear in the country where the institution originated.

Conventional Explanations of Student Rebelliousness.

Amongst certain circles, the most popular explanation for expressions of student opposition revolves around the universal phenomenon of 'generational conflict.' Student 'rebellions' are manifestations of the propensity for children to question the authority of their parents, a perfectly healthy activity (so long as it is kept within certain prescribed limits). One writer views adolescent 'rebelliousness' as rites de passage enacted when the student passes from adolescence to adulthood, it is a feature of society related less to the organisation of power and wealth and more to the social organisation of age. The leading exponent of the generational
argument suggests that the students 'search the social order for a strategic avenue' to express their opposition to 'gerontocracy.'45 Though the opposition between generations is the basis of social progress, the 'student movement' reflects a breakdown in the generational equilibrium and as such represents a malady in society.46 Feuer writes early on his book,

The distinctive character of student movements arises from the union in them of motives of youthful love, on the one hand, and those springing from the conflict of generations on the other.47

Though an interesting exercise in social philosophy, the generational argument by itself has little explanatory power. It has to rely on 'special social circumstances' to explain variations in generational conflict both over time and from one country to another. A different set of circumstances must be drawn upon to explain why students, of all sections of youth, tend to be more prone to generational conflict, and indeed why certain sections of the student population tend to be more active than others. Nor does the theory of generational conflict have anything to say about the form the conflict will take. Furthermore the brunt of the attack seems to be absorbed by those who wield political, economic or military power. Why should this be so, if the fundamental element is the opposition between generations? Again the generational argument must be further modified to take into account the following student movements have amongst more than one generation. Once it has invoked a whole series of 'special social circumstances' the generational argument loses much of its significance and offers no new insights into the dynamics or mechanics of the 'student movement'. This is not to claim
that a generational gap does not exist but that a theory based on the opposition between generations is not helpful in explaining the variations in student behaviour which ultimately derive from the social, political and economic environment.

To dwell on the conflict or gap between generations is to obscure a gamut of fundamental issues revolving around the distribution of power and wealth in society. For those who wish to direct attention away from such fundamental issues to which the student is very sensitive, the generational argument is very appealing.¹⁸ Thus it is not surprising that those who wield power should be the ones who most frequently cast student oppositionalism or radicalism in the cloak of generational conflict. In the following essay the generational argument will be regarded as an idiom through which student 'radicalism' opposition and criticism can be 'explained away.' It is normally adopted by those who wish to avoid considering the specific issues the student raises, while at the same time giving the impression that student rebelliousness is a healthy phenomenon. Adolescent rebellion is an inevitable stage through which 'we all go before we mature and enter the wider world.'

The generational argument tends to regard student contributions to social change as imbued with irrational emotion.

Emotions issuing from the students' unconscious, and deriving from the conflict of generations, impose or attach themselves to the underlying political carrier movement, and deflect it in irrational directions. Given a set of alternative paths - rational or irrational - for realizing a social goal - the influence of a student movement will be toward the use of the most irrational means to achieve the end. Student movements are thus what one would least expect - among the most irrationalist in history.¹⁹
(The assumption that extremism is irrational is characteristic of the liberal tradition in sociology.) Other writers convey the same impressions of student movements as 'irrational', 'self defeating' emotional outbursts. Shils, for example refers to the 'ethos of the expanding ego [in] a regime of plenitude'.

Others have been more charitable in referring to the contrast between the 'ethic of absolute ends' and the 'ethic of responsibility'.

After examining the issues, arguments, demands and protests raised by students another writer concluded that what he was witnessing was a world wide revolt against the 'modernist tradition' springing from a cult of irrationality.

It is not the purpose of this paper to deny the validity of these approaches but it will nevertheless be concerned to point out the 'rationality' of student behaviour in Zambia in the context of his perceptions and role status in Zambian society.

Objectives of the Study.

At the most simple level the following account is a description of the activities and attitudes of Zambian students. It is also an attempt to arrange the description and analysis in such a manner as to highlight the social pressures which mould their behaviour and beliefs. Apart from illuminating the behaviour of Zambian students it is intended that the analytical framework will also contribute to an understanding of the behaviour of students in other countries both where universities have been long established and where they have made a relatively recent appearance.

However the significance of this study would be severely
diminished if it did not make a contribution, however small, to the body of sociological theory. It is hoped therefore to enjoin the analysis of the roles of the student in Zambian society with an explorative study of group tensions. In this Gouldner's *Wild Cat Strike* will be used as a framework of comparison. The essay has been arranged to suggest some hypotheses concerning societal tensions which incorporate role theory. Accordingly the first chapter will be concerned to outline the tensions in the social structure of Zambia, and in particular those revolving around the student role status. The second chapter will contrast the university social structure and the student role status in that structure with the wider social structure. The incompatible structures, it will be argued, lead to further stress between students and government. The fourth chapter explores factors which might mitigate the tensions outlined in the previous two chapters through sets of cross cutting ties binding the two opposed parties together. Having concluded that these forces tending towards tension reduction are weak and ineffectual, the fifth chapter seeks to delineate the conditions of equilibrium which allow peaceful coexistence between university and government. By implication a violation of these preconditions tends to plunge the two bodies into conflict and two such cases are considered. In the sixth chapter the mechanisms for the restoration of social order will be examined and alternative responses to the friction between the university and society considered. Finally, in the conclusion the behaviour of students in other countries is viewed in the light of the study of Zambian students and tentative hypotheses regarding a theory of group tensions will be presented.
NOTES.


4. See Lipset and Altbach, op.cit., p.236.

5. Ibid., pp.213-224.


7. The problems would perhaps be not insuperable but certainly in the case of the Zambian students the existence of a participant observer who was obviously not a student would excite a great deal of suspicion. See Appendix I. A successful study of students through participant observation is referred to in Becker, H. S., "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation," American Sociological Review, Vol. 23, No. 6, December 1958, p.652.


12. Lipset and Altbach, op.cit.

13. Ibid.


15. The relations between the superstructure and structure as explicated by Marx and Engels follows a similar line: the economic base is ultimately the determining element in social change, though the superstructure impinges on and modifies that base. See Simons, J., Notes On Some Early Sociologists: Karl Marx (Unpublished MS, University of Zambia, 1970), pp.9-10.
19. Ibid., pp.205-220.
33. Ibid., pp.290-343.
35. Ibid., p.162.
36. Ibid., p.167.
37. See Ashby, op.cit., pp.335-343.
38. This first came across forcefully to the writer when he was talking to students at Correspondence Colleges in South Africa and other parts of East, Central and Southern Africa in 1966.


40. See Burawoy, M., A Study of the Expectations of Form V Students (Kitwe, Personnel Research Unit, Copper Industries Service Bureau, 1969).

41. This was the view of the visiting professor of sociology from Poland, Professor Matejko.

42. Lipset, S. M., "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," op. cit.


46. Ibid., p.11.

47. Ibid., p.3.


49. Feuer, op. cit., p.8.


CHAPTER TWO

SOURCE OF TENSION:

THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ZAMBIA.

Since it is the intention of this work to illuminate student behaviour by reference to the structural features of Zambian society, so the latter's various elements will be examined first.

The Socio-Economic Structure.

A linguistically and 'tribally' diverse population distributed over an area of 290,000 square miles (larger than France, Belgium and Netherlands combined) and concentrated at certain focal urban areas, combined with an uneven development both in historical and geographical terms has given rise to a social structure of contrasts. Of the four million inhabitants approximately one quarter (25.4%) live in towns having a population greater than four thousand, while 24% live in the main 'line of rail' towns. The line of rail was constructed with the development of the copper industry to transport copper from the mines of Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia and from there out to the East Coast of Africa at Beira. It extends, therefore, from the Congo border in the North, to the capital of Zambia - Lusaka - and southwards to the border between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia at Livingstone. Economic development has been largely confined to the line of rail and has been particularly intensive in the small seventy by thirty five mile area known as the Copperbelt. There seven mines operate to produce copper which provides 95% of the nation's export revenue and around 50% of the gross domestic product. Though the population of the seven major towns on the Copperbelt amounts to 679,000, the mines themselves employ only 43,500
African workers and 4,727 expatriates, while subsidiary and service industries employ the bulk of the remainder.

Though nationalised in a 51% take-over in 1969 the mines are still managed, if not owned, by the two mining companies which began the commercial exploitation of Zambia's mineral resources in the late twenties of the present century. The mines which operate on a capital intensive basis rely on expatriate expertise and will continue to do so for some time to come despite plans for Zambianisation. At present about 10% of the labour force is expatriate occupying mainly technical and managerial positions.

Being so dependent on copper revenue and controlling only 12% of world copper production, the Zambian economy is very sensitive to changes in the prices on the London Metal Exchange over which it has virtually no control. Confronted with a precarious dependence on copper for its livelihood the Zambian government has made vigorous attempts to diversify the national economy, not always with success commensurate with the declarations of intent. Not only has Zambia inherited a colonial one-primary-commodity economy but one that is closely linked to the nation's ideological enemy - South Africa. Despite determined efforts to reduce trade with South Africa and visible sacrifices made to this end such as the building of the oil pipe line from Dar Es Salaam and the on-going construction of the Tan-Zam Rail link, Zambia's economy is still largely dependent on trade with the white supremacist regimes to the South. Table 1 makes apparent the extent of reliance, particularly with regard to imports.
TABLE 1 - ZAMBIAN TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports Rhodesia (% of Total)</th>
<th>Imports South Africa (K'000)</th>
<th>Total Imports (K'000)</th>
<th>Exports Rhodesia (% of Total)</th>
<th>Exports South Africa (K'000)</th>
<th>Total Exports (K'000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>156,438</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>335,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>210,742</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>380,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>246,116</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>493,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>306,350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>470,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>325,184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>544,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>311,797</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>766,489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the continuing trade with South Africa, an equally serious association with South Africa is through the many companies which have their parent companies in South Africa. The most outstanding example of this is the major copper mining company - Anglo American Corporation - which has not only investments in copper mining but also major holdings in other manufacturing industries and recently embarked on rural development through large scale farming enterprises.

All sectors of the national economy are still dependent on expatriate labour. The reliance on expatriates to run the mines has already been mentioned but the operations of central government also rely considerably on expatriates as indicated in Table 2. The table shows that in 1968 there were more expatriates employed in the top two divisions of the civil service than in 1966 and though the figures for 1963 are not complete they suggest that there were even fewer expatriates before Independence (1964). Nevertheless the number of Zambians in these two divisions has increased by 44.5% while the number of expatriates has only increased by 8.5% and this latter
increase may be attributed to increased demand for teachers to meet the expansion of the educational system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and Executive</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and Works</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, Medical, Police, Posts</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>2,884</td>
<td>4,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Prisons</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teachers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>8,577</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>11,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>13,230</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td>19,123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of wealth in Zambian society naturally follows the occupational distribution with 'non-Zambians' (expatriates) figuring at the top of the scale alongside a Zambian 'elite' with comparable or even greater incomes. An accurate assessment of income distribution amongst Zambians is not available but indications are that it is a very uneven distribution with a large proportion of the wealth concentrated in a small percentage of the population. The migration of able-bodied men to the towns has denuded the rural areas of those very people who could most assist their development. The migration into the towns has also meant that political power has flowed in the same direction and investment policies are
affected accordingly. The consequence is a widening gap between rural and urban incomes and worsening terms of trade for the rural areas vis-a-vis the towns. The distribution of the nation's wealth may be gauged from Table 3.

TABLE 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES IN ZAMBIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Worker</th>
<th>Approx. Total No. End 1968 (000's)</th>
<th>Approx. Annual Earnings End 1968 (Kwacha)</th>
<th>Increase in Real terms since 1964 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian Peasant Farmer</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambian Wage Earner Outside Mines</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambian Mineworker</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriate Employee Outside Mines</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriate Employee Copper Mines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are four major economic groups. First a multi-racial elite, with Zambians assuming the highest governmental and administrative posts and some managerial positions while the expatriate supplying the necessary skills for technical, professional and in some cases managerial positions. Beneath this elite there are the lower ranks of management, a white collar group and a labour aristocracy composed mainly of miners. Thirdly there is a mass of wage earners in non-mining industries, and semi-employed townsmen. Finally the remaining 70% are still peasant farmers, comprising the poorest, and becoming ever poorer, section of society.

Educational Structure.

The government views the educational system as the means
of making up the short fall of Zambian expertise and of re-
placing expatriates in both public and private sectors with
Zambians. With this in mind the educational facilities have
undergone rapid expansion including the establishment of the
University of Zambia.

Though Zambia has always been the source of great wealth
through its copper production, that wealth was largely
syphoned off into the pockets of the mining companies,
Southern Rhodesia and the British Government. Relatively
little development took place in Northern Rhodesia itself
except in so far as it was necessary for efficient copper
mining, and African education was particularly undeveloped.

Most African countries were, in terms of education,
poorly prepared for Independence but in Zambia
education facilities for Africans were even more
deficient than elsewhere. During the colonial era
African education was not given high priority: in
spite of comparative wealth, during most years far
more was spent on education for the few Europeans
than on all forms of education for the African
population. From 1954 to 1963 European education
had been a Federal responsibility financed from
Federal taxation, which tapped the main sources of
revenue in Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. In con-
trast African education was a territorial responsi-
bility relying entirely on local funds. The result
was that African education, to a large extent, was
cut off from the major source of Zambia's wealth,
revenue from copper. Secondly, in spite of Zambia's
comparatively advanced industrial structure,
opportunities for apprenticeship and on-the-job
training of Africans were hindered by racial dis-
crimination. Until 1959, no African was permitted
by law to be apprenticed in Zambia. Thirdly, the
discriminations of various sorts inside the Civil
Service, trade unions and in the private sector
limited the opportunities for Africans to gain
practical experience and responsibility in many
types of work. Of course, there were exceptions
and many individuals and institutions had laboured
for many years to right these injustices. Indeed,
without their tireless efforts, Zambia would have
remained an educational desert. But the lack of
priority, the general shortage of funds for educa-
tion and the limitations of training opportunities
meant that steps that were taken in other countries
during the crucial decade before Independence, were
not taken in Zambia. Zambia was less prepared than most other African countries to the north, east or west of Africa.

The result was that at Independence the scarcity of educated Africans in Zambia was extreme. In Zambia in 1964, there were in total just over 1,200 Africans who had obtained secondary school certificates in the country - about the same number as Kenya in 1957, Uganda in 1955, Tanzania in 1960 and Ghana in 1943. The number of Zambian graduates at the same time was scarcely 100.17

It had been left largely to the missions to provide what little African secondary and even primary education there was in the country.

Without any doubt, the educational scene in Northern Rhodesia was dominated by the Missions almost up to the date of Independence in 1964. The vast majority of primary schools and a proportionately large number of secondary schools were under Mission control in 1963. The voice of representatives of voluntary agencies on the African Education Advisory Board carried considerable weight, partly because of their unique experience of African educational problems and because of their appreciable contribution in terms of finance and personnel to the educational system.18

Faced with a chronic shortage of indigenous manpower the new Zambian government put educational development and expansion at the forefront of its priorities. This has since been reflected in the ambitious education targets embodied in the first Five Year Development Plan.19 Amongst these was the enrolment of students into the new University of Zambia. The university was opened in 1966 when 310 students were enrolled, in 1967 536 enrolled, in 1968 948, in 1969 1,298 and in 1970 1,469.20 The university's tentative goal for total enrollment is 5,000.21 In 1968 99 awards were received by graduating students including 27 degrees; in 1969 the number of awards rose to 218 including 112 degrees; in 1970 the number of awards
increased to 243 including 113 degrees. The distribution amongst the different subjects is shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4 - UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA AWARDS 1968 - 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. (Human Biology)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Eng.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Law.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Social Work.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dip. Social Work.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate Certificate of Education</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associateship Certificate of Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate in Adult Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>218</strong></td>
<td><strong>243</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government has tried to allocate graduates to jobs in accordance with its own priorities for Zambian manpower. Thus a large proportion of graduates have been directed into the teaching profession to offset the reliance on expatriates. To ensure the distribution of graduates in accordance with development objectives the government introduced a bonding system which bound, under a legally enforceable system, those students who accepted government bursaries (the vast majority) to enter the job decided for them by the Manpower Directorate. They also forfeited the right to choose their subject of study.
while at university. Each discipline taught at the university received a quota restricting the number of students to that laid down in the development plan. The highest quota was for students combining an arts or science degree with education. There had been considerable pressure from students and from some members of the academic staff to have the system removed or modified in view of the frustrations and hardship it generated. Accordingly in 1971 the choice of students for the different disciplines was made less arbitrary by delaying the final decision until the second year and the Minister of Education announced that in 1972 the bonding to government would be lifted and students would be able to choose their own careers. The government had in any case had great difficulty in effectively directing students to pre-determined jobs, precisely because the acute shortage of educated manpower put the graduate at a premium. Table 5 shows just how short of educated manpower Zambia is, and how the expatriate dominates the top of the nation's educational pyramid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Educational Qualifications</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Non-Africans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>3,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma or 'A' Level</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>5,944</td>
<td>6,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'O' Level</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>11,965</td>
<td>13,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form II</td>
<td>7,282</td>
<td>11,409</td>
<td>18,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Form II but in jobs</td>
<td>12,015</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>13,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requiring secondary education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In jobs requiring primary education or less</td>
<td>249,666</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>249,757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A closer look at the educational structure as it appeared in 1969 shows how small a proportion has had so much as a lower secondary education.

**TABLE 6 - EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF AFRICAN MALES FIVE YEARS AND OLDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No Schooling (%)</th>
<th>Lower Primary (%)</th>
<th>Upper Primary (%)</th>
<th>Lower Secondary (%)</th>
<th>Upper Secondary (%)</th>
<th>Technical or Higher (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7 - EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF AFRICAN FEMALES FIVE YEARS AND OLDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No Schooling (%)</th>
<th>Lower Primary (%)</th>
<th>Upper Primary (%)</th>
<th>Lower Secondary (%)</th>
<th>Upper Secondary (%)</th>
<th>Technical or Higher (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus the university student even before he enters the university is amongst the one per cent most highly educated members of the Zambian population. When he graduates he moves into the top 0.1%. This point cannot be over-emphasized and, as shall be shown later, has a significant bearing on the student's attitudes to education, to his role in society and to those less educated than himself. In the context of these statistics the students may be considered to form an 'educational elite' in a way that students in societies with long established universities could not be so called.

The Political Structure.

The formal political system of Zambia is modelled on the Westminster system, with formally 'independent' legislature, executive and judiciary. In practice the legislature and executive act as a single body controlled by the dominant party - the United National Independence Party. The judiciary too has had to give up some of its independence when its decisions were not welcomed by the party. The position of the President as Head of State, Chief Executive, and Secretary General of the ruling party has no counterpart in the Westminster system.

The separation of the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary, to the extent that it ever exists, is promoted by the operation of an effective two party system in which the sanctity of these institutions are accepted by those who may be in a position to subvert them. Where one party has a virtual monopoly of power through its control of wealth, the mass media and the coercive apparatus of the state, the appearance of a legitimate opposition party as a contender for
power is a practical impossibility. In such circumstances the legislature is effectively an instrument of an executive composed in this case of members of the central committee of UNIP. Following the 1964 General Elections the state of the parties in the National Assembly was: UNIP - 55 seats (plus five M.P.'s nominated by the President); African National Congress - 10, and the National Progressive Party (the successor to the United Federal Party) making a clean sweep of the ten seats reserved for the white minority and those Indians who opted for it. In the second parliament the number of seats increased from 80 to 110 - five of which were nominated by the President, and following the General Election of 1968 the representation of the parties was: UNIP - 81 seats (plus the five nominated members); ANC - 23 seats; Independents - 1 seat. Though still less than a quarter of the National Assembly, the opposition had gained more seats than expected.

Voting patterns followed regional allegiances, as indicated in Table 8.

**TABLE 8 - DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY PROVINCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1964 Election</th>
<th>1968 Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. UNIP Seats</td>
<td>No. ANC Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reserved Roll Seats: N.P.P. - 10

*One of these was an independent elected through support of ANC.*
ANC support has been mainly confined to two provinces: Southern Province where they held 12 seats, Western Province with 8 seats and Central Province 3 seats. Southern Province has consistently been the heart of ANC support ever since Africans were allowed onto the electoral roll. Western Province traditionally a thorn in the flesh of national unity, had shown its disaffection with the government before the 1968 election by supporting the newly formed United Party. This party, led by the Lozi from Western Province, Nalumino Mundia previously a Cabinet Minister in the UNIP government, had support both in Western Province and the Copperbelt but was banned just before the 1968 elections. The United Party votes were transferred to the African National Congress in Western Province.

The only other party to make an appearance since 1968 has been the United Progressive Party led by the former Vice-President and at the time of his defection from government, Minister for Provincial and Local Government and Culture - Simon Kapwepwe. He announced his resignation from government and his Presidentship of the new United Progressive Party in August 1971. The UPP was seen as a 'tribal' party since its leadership and support was predominantly from the Bemba speaking people from the Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces. After a month of its existence over a hundred of its known leaders were put in detention, but Kapwepwe himself escaped this fate. These included a former Cabinet Minister, a former minister of state, three other members of parliament, four ex-district governors, 6 ex-regional secretaries and two ex-mayors. As Molteno points out many of the top officials had been removed from their posts in government or party for various offences. Following the detentions nine students from
the university abandoned their studies to take up the now vacant posts in the UPP organisation. The bye-elections which took place as a result of MP's changing their party gave the UPP only one seat and that was Mufulira West which was held by Kapwepwe. In a second round of detentions in February 1972 123 leading members including Kapwepwe himself were rounded up and the Party banned. 36

Intra-party competition has played at least as significant role in the political system as inter-party competition; indeed they may be seen as closely related to one another. 37 The formation of UP and UPP may be looked upon as the result of intra-party strife. Evidence of such factional strife is to be found in the analysis of the 1967 Mulungushi Conference of UNIP when the fifteen member central committee was elected. The manner of selecting delegates to the Mulungushi elections of 1967 favoured the Bemba speaking peoples. This sectional group then struck an alliance with the Tonga-Ila speaking group (from Southern Province) and together they campaigned to enthrone their own leaders. As a result the Bembas achieved a dominant position in the central committee of UNIP at the expense of leaders from Eastern and Western Provinces. Recruitment to positions of leadership within UNIP have been widely interpreted in terms of sectional politics and similar interpretations have been made with regard to factionalism within the national leadership. 38

Developments since the 1967 Mulungushi Conference may be seen as a struggle to reduce representation of the Bemba speaking people in central government and party structures. This is how many supporters of the UPP viewed the events. Following the 1968 elections there were changes in the cabinet which
gave greater representation to the Eastern and North Western Provinces at the expense of the Bemba speaking group. Later in 1969 the Bemba dominated central executive of UNIP was dissolved together with the party constitution. A new constitution which was finally adopted in May 1971 made it very much more difficult for the central committee of UNIP to come under the domination of a single sectional group. Molteno in fact suggests that the adoption of the new constitution, which put pay to the Bemba dominance won at the Mulungushi Conference of 1967, precipitated the formation of UPP as a separate political party. 39

January 1969 also saw the expansion of the party apparatus with the creation of new structures at the provincial and district levels. A Minister of State of Cabinet rank was assigned to each Province. Under the Minister of State the new post of District Governor was created for each district. The District Governor combined both the political and administrative functions with the assistance of a District Secretary and Regional Secretary. 40 Though the President has suggested that there should be an exchange of personnel between the party and the civil service, nevertheless this has rarely occurred and the district governors were nearly all recruited from the ranks of the party rather than the civil service. 41

The civil service, following its British counterpart, is expected to be non-political in its execution of duties. Competition exists between the civil servant and party officials for a number of reasons. First the civil servant earns considerably more than the equivalent party official and second the party official regards his contribution to the Independence struggle as slight, which, to the extent that
this is true, maybe, in part, attributed to the restrictions imposed by the colonial government on the political activities of its civil servants. At present the party and civil service structures parallel one another from the cabinet rank to the district level.

Support for the United National Independence Party is concentrated in the poorer sections of the Zambian society. Intellectuals, professional classes, the mineworkers and the students have little to no representation in the party. The resistance of the mineworkers to incorporation into the party has been documented by Bates. The case of student estrangement from the party is more complex as will be shown in succeeding sections.

THE STUDENT ROLE IN THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

Parsons draws a basic distinction between the two concepts role and status.

This participation in turn has two principal aspects. On the one hand there is the positional aspect - that of where the actor in question is "located" in the social system relative to other actors. This is what we call his status, which is his place in the relationship system considered as a structure, that is a patterned system of parts. On the other hand there is the processual aspect, that of what the actor does in his relations with others seen in the context of its functional significance for the social system. It is this which we shall call his role.

The distinction between status and role is at the root very closely related to that between the two reciprocal perspectives inherent in interaction. On the one hand each actor is an object of orientation for other actors (and for himself). In so far as this object-significance derives from his position in the social relationship
system, it is a status significance. On the other hand each actor is orientated to other actors. In this capacity he is acting, not serving as an object – this is what we mean by his playing a role.\[44\]

It is usually assumed that the status accorded to a particular role is uniquely defined. For the student role, as will be shown, this is by no means the case, and the concept of status set is therefore introduced. Regarding status in more specific terms as a position in the social structure distinguished by a set of rights and obligations enforceable through social sanctions, then the ambiguity arises from the disparate sets of rights and obligations of 'ego' towards different 'alters.' Within the Zambian social system, for example, those with university education define the student status in different terms from those without higher education. The status set is a system of disparate rights and obligations integrated to a lesser or greater extent through various social mechanisms associated with a single social structure. The role, on the other hand, expressing the behavioural counterpart of status, is here defined to be unique in that it embraces all aspects of the behaviour of the role incumbent. Thus, to each social structure there are roles and associated status sets. Just as the actor is the basic unit of the social system so, transposing, the role status is the basic unit of the social structure. In the following essay the role status will frequently be abbreviated to role, but implicit in any use of the term role is the existence of a status corresponding to each social structure.

The role set refers to the set of multiple roles which
each actor must inevitably act out during the course of his life. In the following account the 'roles of the student' refers to such a set of multiple roles, whereas the 'student role' refers specifically to his role as a student. Each role may be subdivided into 'role segments' corresponding to the different social structures from which the role is derived. Thus, the student role may be divided into a university role derived from the university social structure and a civic role derived from the wider social structure. To each role segment there also corresponds an 'arena' of action where 'role segment behaviour' is uniquely defined. However, arenas need not be isolated but may intersect to a lesser or greater extent. The intersection of two arenas represents the area of 'common' role behaviour compatible with both the corresponding social structures, or more simply the area where behaviour corresponding to role segments overlaps.

Between two different arenas there will be a discontinuity in role behaviour. This constitutes what will be referred to as a role discontinuity - a discontinuity between two role segments and the associated status sets. The role discontinuity need not only refer to 'situational discontinuity' but also 'processual discontinuity' over time, as between the student role in the past and in the future. Roles may also 'continue' from one structure into another, when enacted in one arena but derived from a social structure corresponding to a different arena. The activation of 'extrinsic' roles in the interstices of a social structure will be referred to as 'role continuities.' The twin concepts
of role continuities and role discontinuities provide the analytic framework of subsequent chapters.

**Role Discontinuities Over Time.**

One of the peculiarities of the student role is its transience, and consequently both future and past roles take on central importance as influences on present role behaviour. Secondly in the following sections considerable stress will be given to the political elements of the student role. This is justified in view of the all-pervasive character and dominance in all spheres of life of the political system - a feature typical of regimes where a new political elite has rapidly supplanted an old one.

Secondary school students and African teachers played a significant role in the Independence movement as active sympathisers with the United National Independence Party and according to one source as messengers between the two rival organisations ANC and UNIP.\(^{45}\) They were responsible for fermenting disturbances at schools again in collaboration with the African political parties. Students, teachers, clerks, workers, villagers collaborated in fighting the common enemy - the colonial government. Many of the first recruits to the University were indeed just such students who had been politically active before Independence. They naturally saw no reason why their political activities should cease now that Independence had been won and the 'fruits' were available for distribution.

The government's view, however, was somewhat different.
It viewed the students solely in terms of their future role as specialists, technologists, civil servants in short as an incipient professional 'class'. The government did not wish to consider the students as a pressure group in their own right, and pursued a policy designed to depoliticise the student body. Yet the government recognised from the beginning the dilemma it was faced with, not only as regards students but many other sections of society which had been politically active before Independence and whose demands for power and influence were in their view antithetic to effective government. Once the students were acknowledged, albeit unofficially, as an interest group with its own goals to pursue, there were primarily two approaches. Either the students' political interests and leanings could be incorporated into and thereby controlled by the ruling party or they could be deliberately excluded from and given no access to the formal political system. Both alternatives had their drawbacks. Bringing students within the party would have incurred opposition from those whose positions in the party rested not on expertise but on loyalty and their contribution to the Independence struggle. Indeed these latter officials may have felt threatened by the students who may have been accorded influence based on their superior education. Feelings of 'anti-intellectualism' aroused by students expecting influence appropriate to their supposedly superior 'enlightenment' would have been unleashed, precipitating a destructive conflict within the party. Yet to exclude them from the national political processes would encourage opposition and resentment from outside, from a vocal, radical and articulate body. To isolate the student from national problems would leave him
less prepared to cope with such problems when he graduates and perhaps also the party would benefit from the presence of student representatives. In the event the government has been unequivocal in its intent to exclude students from the political system. As early as 1964 at the first National Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students the Minister of Education, John Manakatwe, made the government’s view clear.

...Now that we have won political Independence, we cannot and will not tolerate the continued existence of backward economic systems. A rapid change in the situation has become imperative. The philosophy which should guide Zambian students to-day is quite simple. They must develop those skills and acquire that knowledge which their less fortunate brothers who left school too early do not possess. A large number of Zambian students should take advanced courses in science and mathematics, both at secondary and graduate level which will be of the greatest importance in the development of this country and the advancement of the fortunes of the students themselves. This is vital if our nation is to develop and survive in the modern world.

Mr. President, I must now seriously sound a word of warning to all the delegates who are here assembled. In my preliminary remarks I said that Zambia's progress in the next few years will depend upon the unity of its people. To perform with success the tremendous task before us in Zambia, our people must not only be united, - they must also be disciplined. An undisciplined nation is confused, impotent and worthless. In any orderly community there should be those who lead and those willing and prepared to be led. Naturally, wherever there are intelligent self-conscious men and women, there will be always differences of opinion between them - this is good in itself and essential for progress. But criticism of one another must not lead to intolerance or hatred. We must learn to instruct and to be instructed, to lead and also to be led; we must learn to compromise for the sake of harmony and the orderly progress of our country.

Mr. President, I have been concerned as Minister of Education, at the large number of students in Zambia who have become indifferent to the observance of school regulations, far too many smoke or drink alcohol despite the strict school regulations on these matters. I concede that there have been some heads of schools who have been too hasty in the expulsion of offending students. But
there has been in recent years a tendency on the part of pupils to flout authority with impunity. Next year I intend to mobilise all the forces at my command to ensure that misconduct of any kind is severely dealt with. We would be failing in our duty if we cannot impress upon the young generation the importance of self control and discipline. If a student is provoked or unjustly treated there are always many ways in which a constitutional protest can be made. The task of your members is mainly to study well and utilise fully the opportunities before them, so that they can be fully prepared for the responsibilities they must inevitably assume after leaving school. Ill-considered criticisms of the government by students will not be tolerated. It would please me greatly if you would give a new year instruction to your members to the effect; "Leave politics to the politicians". If you adopt this motto, I am sure your members would be doing this country a very great service indeed. Thus, such time and surplus energy of your members as they may have can then be used in more constructive efforts such as mass literacy campaigns, participation in self-help schemes, voluntary teaching in evening classes and so forth...47

Such a forthright denial of student participation in the political system is unusual in the light, for example, of experience in other African countries.48 Perhaps one reason is the extreme shortage of educated Zambians and in particular the paucity of university educated personnel in the party organisation. Ian Scott has documented the recruitment to 'central political positions' in the UNIP organisation, showing how and why the party is "unquestionably the dominant group represented at the national level" and examines "the relationship of the organisation to the 'intellectuals' as one group which one might expect to see represented in central political positions".49

The party's slate for the 1968 election shows the same emphasis on local officials as that of 1964. With the increase in the number of parliamen-tary seats from 75 to 105 it would perhaps have been expected that other groups in the society would start to make inroads on the
privileged position of the party organisers. In fact, the only group of any size represented, apart from the men of the organisation, were the civil servants and their representation was about one-fifth that of the organisation's. Among the party officials there were some who had risen very quickly within the ranks. Four of the five successful candidates under the age of thirty were regional secretaries at the time of their selection and ten candidates were serving regional secretaries. Yet none of these had reached that rank three years previously (in August 1965) and only a few of them had attained more junior rank of youth regional secretary at that time. The selection of these officials is clearly more a reflection of the importance of the party organisation in current Zambian politics than of any role played by these officials in the pre-independence movement.

Not only has the organisation been represented in parliament, it has also succeeded in obtaining representation in the Cabinet and at the Minister of State level. By January, 1970, four former regional secretaries, in a Cabinet of twenty-three, had attained the rank of Cabinet Minister. Of the twenty-seven Ministers of State, ten had been former regional secretaries and two more had local level organisational experience in the party. The same pattern of local level party representation has applied in the selection of district governors. When the administrative changes were announced in November 1968, it was thought that the post of district governor "might be interchangeable, that is, between politicians and civil servants." In fact, the selection of district governors appears to have been dictated by much the same considerations which applied to the selection of Members of Parliament. Of the fifty-three district governors selected in December 1968, for example, twenty-eight had organisational links with the party at the local level and two more had been national level organisers. Only eight of those appointed were former civil servants and six of them were given positions in the Barotse and Southern Provinces. Since Independence then, recruitment to these central political positions has been primarily from the local party organisation or, perhaps more accurately, of the success of a number of local organisations in gaining representation at the centre.

Not only is recruitment through the party from the local levels, but the formal educational attainment of the 1968 UNIP election candidates is relatively low.
Of the forty-four local level organisers chosen, only two had completed secondary school and only one had attended university.* Of those with university degrees, eleven of the fifteen had no organisational experience at the local level.

* Even these were out of character. Two were Eurafricans educated in South Africa and the third went to university after he had served as a regional secretary. To my knowledge, only one regional secretary has ever obtained a university degree. 51

Dominated by relatively poorly educated officials the anti-intellectual sentiments have been more influential than in other African countries where university graduates were to be found in greater numbers in the party organisations. Scott also comments that there is opposition to the intellectual in the party.

....there is some evidence to suggest that the party organisation receives the intellectuals, in the wider context of the society as a whole, to be a long term threat to their privileged access to central political positions. As President Kaunda has put it, "The freedom fighter may be jealous of the ease with which the intellectual wins high positions without personal sacrifice...." The President goes on to say that, although the possibility of friction between the two groups is always present, "in Zambia...these two groups within the party have achieved a remarkable degree of unanimity". Nonetheless the term 'intellectual' was one of abuse during the 1967 Central Committee elections and some regional officials believe that the intellectuals, who were unsuccessful except where they were running against one another, lost because they were reputed to have a somewhat high-handed and neglectful attitude towards the party organisation. If the party has a general attitude towards 'intellectuals', it is perhaps expressed most succinctly in a resolution passed by a Lusaka regional seminar in March 1969; "The Government should give political jobs to the politicians with no regard to higher educational qualifications". 52

Graduates or students wishing to enter party politics must begin at the lowest rungs and make their way up. Replying to
a question concerning the prospects of the student in the party raised at a meeting between students of the university and President Kaunda in October 1971, he said that UNIP was a democratic organisation and at every level selection for posts in the party is conducted through elections. Positions can only be gained by contesting elections and this applied to the student as to anyone else: the student was no different and had no advantages. As a further disincentive, the lowest full time official in the party hierarchy - the regional secretary - receives a monthly official income of K60, approximately one third of what the graduate would receive on leaving university. As Scott points out the local party organisation is a workers' and peasants' organisation and "tends to produce leaders, slightly better educated than the general population who are then recruited to the national level".53 In such circumstances a graduate's university education may be a positive disadvantage to him when contesting for support amongst the electorate.

The government therefore views the function of the university in terms of its contribution to the creation of a professional and technocrat 'class' to replace the expatriates and to foster the expansion and development of the national economy. In the view of the government it is wasteful for Zambian graduates to compete with other Zambians for jobs which in their estimation do not require a university qualification, such as positions in the party bureaucracy. Students who graduate with a B.A. are expected, in the main, to deploy their training not in an administrative post in government or party bureaucracies where there are already Zambians, but in the teaching profession where expatriates predominate.
In contrast to the government's beliefs about the future role of the student, the student himself sees his future much less clearly and regards his reception in the wider society as being much cooler than the government would have him believe. The student perceives a generalised resentment towards him which he attributes to an assumed threat he poses to Zambians holding senior positions without advanced qualifications in formal education. Thus in a survey conducted in 1969, it was found that only 7% of Zambia's top three hundred Zambian civil servants had university degrees. 54

The student's expectations as regards his future derive from the rapidity with which a number of Zambians were propelled into high positions at the time of Independence, for which, the student feels, they were not qualified. With their 'superior' qualifications i.e. university degrees the students expect equally rapid promotion despite their lack of experience. The Zambians who hold the senior positions frequently attack the students who "think they know everything just because they have a degree" and who lack experience and maturity to perform responsible jobs effectively. The following is a fictional commentary on the conflict between a student and one such senior Zambian - a junior minister one time the student's schoolmate.

"But look here chum, don't think by virtue of your being at University you will straight away be general managers, justices, medical officers etc. You'll need to acquire the necessary experience before you move a notch further. You know it has taken us a long time to climb the ladder, alright?" "I agree, but, but, but...I hesitate to say it aloud, but if it takes a standard four bloke ten years to become a General Manager, does it follow that my apprenticeship has also to take all that long? I see no reason why within one year I can't grab that "expatriate's only job"."...He protested. "But what's the point in Zambianizing
and at the same time creating artificial posts for the expatriate? I know a Zambian in a para-statal body who Zambianised an expatriate post, and the expatriate became General Manager extra-ordinaire."

Graduates entering the mines have complained bitterly of the practices which discriminate against them in favour of the expatriate with similar qualifications. On the one hand he finds himself in a small minority amongst fellow Zambians who have won their high positions in the mines by virtue of their experience and loyalty, and who are likely to resent the rapid promotion of the graduate. On the other hand the graduate faces further resistance from the expatriate who wishes to protect his job against critical juniors and who prefers the Zambian whose poor qualifications ensure a subservient and dependent subordinate. For, the poorly qualified Zambian, who has risen through the industry on the basis of loyalty, experience and job performance, will find it very difficult to find alternative employment according the same income and is therefore in a much weaker position than the graduate who is so much more favourably placed in the labour market. It is for these sorts of reasons that the student perceives his future in bleaker terms than the government. It is, however, true to say that his assessment of his future derive from what are often exaggerated expectations originating from the exigencies of the immediate post independence period when personnel were promoted on the basis of their contribution to the Independence movement rather than their expertise. His feeling of deprivation stems also from an exaggerated conception of the worth of his qualification, which again stems from the shortage of educated personnel and the importance government has attached to education. One student,
who felt that the government was deliberately trying to frustrate him and his colleagues by insisting that all public administration students attend a further year at the National Institute of Public Administration after graduating before being allowed to enter the civil service, commented, "It doesn't pay to be a student". Though perhaps a somewhat exaggerated view, nevertheless it echoes the sentiments of many students.

One can delineate two basic criteria of recruitment to and mobility within any organisation, namely that based on loyalty and experience and that based on expertise and formal qualifications. In those societies where the educational system has been well established, and where substantial numbers of graduates are to be found in the high positions in each organisation it is possible for candidates in the recruitment and mobility processes to be both "experts" and "loyal". The distinction between the two is less significant than it is in those countries whose educational systems for the indigenous population have lagged behind the development of their organisations. Here it is difficult to find personnel who are both "experts" and also "loyal" and "experienced" and those responsible for recruitment and promotion must decide in each instance which criterion to select. Inevitably in such circumstances the competition between the personnel represented by each criterion becomes acute and since jobs normally require a combination of attributes the decision to opt for any one is often arbitrary. This makes the resolution of competition and conflict very difficult and since there are no rules in the competing pressures unrelated to the choice play an important role in resolving the conflict. Thus the future of
a Zambian graduate will possibly depend as much on the power he can summon in his support as on the effectiveness with which he would perform the job.

Present Role.

The government would like to see the students in terms of their future roles as members of a professional 'class' and their sojourn at the university a period of preparation for their future. Though students do accept their university career as a training for the future, it is nevertheless as far as they are concerned only a partial definition of their situation. Any continuously existing community composed of a homogeneous membership occupying identical positions in the social system must develop a characteristic set of interests and values which will be passed onto and possibly modified by succeeding enrolments. These values and interests will be a product of their anticipated future roles and their view of their present student role in the context of the Zambian social structure. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the political sphere where the values and interests nurtured in the university have come into direct conflict with both the party and the government.

It will be recalled that in his speech to the first National Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students, the Minister of Education suggested that students "leave politics to the politicians". Attitudes of students to this conception of the student role are made clear in the first and fourth opinion polls conducted by the University of Zambia Sociological Association. Students were asked to express their attitudes to the following statements.
The student body should make public its views on national issues.

87% agreed, 7% were uncertain, 6% disagreed

The student body should make public its views on international issues.

73% agreed, 16% were uncertain, 11% disagreed

Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians.

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed

Further evidence that student leaders, and as shall be shown later the structure of the university community does not allow the student leaders to deviate far from general student opinion, have not been prepared to "leave politics to the politicians" is apparent in the confrontations that have occurred between students and the party. As early as 1966, when the university had barely opened its doors, the Third Annual Congress of NUZS passed the following resolution.

The National Union of Zambia Students condemns all those who have and still make dangerous statements which result in furthering violence and intimidation through Youth activities.

That there have been recent massacres of many souls by the Youth of a certain political party.

That a citizen is deprived of his right to fundamental human rights through intimidation and violence.

That some members of the government in very responsible positions have produced dangerous statements in order to protect and safeguard their political and governmental positions.

It urges all those responsible for inciting Youth to act ruthlessly to stop this most inhuman and satanic behaviour. Our Youth should be told that our enemies are those whites who would like to see Zambia suffer instability by perpetuating colour prejudices.

Condemns all those responsible for law and order for their failure to maintain the protection of every citizen and hence facilitating violence and
fear of political parties. Condemns the main political parties concerned for this use of oppression to undermine individual liberties and suppress the opposition. Urges that the government takes a firm action against any breach of the law by the Youth.61

The first public confrontation came at the beginning of 1967 when school students returning to school in Eastern Province by bus were asked by UNIP youths to produce their UNIP cards.

UNIP youths are forcing passengers at Lusaka's bus station to buy party cards. The youths tell people boarding buses for the Eastern Province that if they do not bring cards they cannot board the bus.62

The following day Solomon Kalulu - National Chairman of UNIP - was reported in the press to have said that "carrying of party cards was a matter of UNIP policy. The students should understand that and they must carry membership cards wherever they went".63 The President of NUZS - an UNZA student - retaliated by arguing that it was government policy that students should not be involved in party politics and that Mr. Kalulu's statement therefore contradicted his own government's stated policy. The President of NUZS warned that if the practice of demanding cards continued then it might result in violent resistance by other youths.64 The following day the press reported that the Kitwe National Convention on Development had recommended a reorganisation of Zambia's Youth movement and that,

....the plenary session also threw out a recommendation by the committee [which dealt with "the role of youth in the nation" and under the chairmanship of Dingiswayo Banda] to "ban and scrap" the National Union of Zambia Students. The committee had alleged that the union had become a "vehicle for undesirable influences and activities and in some cases foreign influences".65
As front page news, NUZS had little option but to reply and President Kasuka Matukukwa did so in the idiom of the national interest.

NUZS strongly refutes the allegation that we are under foreign influence...This is baseless, irresponsible and unfounded. The students of this country are so patriotic and dedicated to the advancement of Zambia that they can't be suspected of being under foreign influence. To ban and scrap NUZS is tantamount to stabbing Zambia in the back.66

The UNIP youths had ample ammunition with which to retaliate; first their card checking campaign had been attacked and now their own Minister of Youth (Dingiswayo Banda) had been rudely rebuked in the press for his comments about NUZS. The Lusaka UNIP Constituency Secretary threatened 'Red Guard' activities and that the youth would march on the university if the student leaders did not explain their recent remarks in the press.

"If it means a clash we will clash...nobody has ever before complained...about the selling of cards at the bus station. The Government has given them bursaries but they continue criticising the Government - why?"67 Acrimonious exchanges between students and UNIP officials continued for another two days, until the proposed march on the campus was referred to 'higher authorities' and the Minister of Education arranged a meeting with NUZS leaders. The upshot was a conciliatory press communiqué from NUZS - "We are looking forward to co-operation and understanding with our brothers."68 The matter ended peacefully enough but bitterness towards students who asserted themselves in national politics remained as Ndola's regional secretary is reported to have said, "Students should stick to their studies. They are politically immature."69

Two months later the Minister of Education made his
Munali Declaration on the political role of students. This was an inevitable amendment of his earlier statement made in 1964 which had become obsolete in the face of the policies of NUZS. Declaring the interests of NUZS to be identical with those of government, he said,

But as the Government's source of power is the Party, it follows that the translation of students' interests and efforts must be channelled through the Party Machine.70

In his carefully worded statement he was not calling upon students to become party activists but to cease from pursuing an independent oppositional role. He was advocating reconciliation with the party, relinquishing the independence of NUZS to the supremacy of the party. A more precise definition of the relation between UNIP and NUZS was conveniently omitted, and the only conclusion to be drawn from the declaration was that Mwanakatwe was asking the students to desist from making statements against the party.

Between the confrontation with UNIP in January 1967 and the Munali Declaration of April 1967, the President of NUZS had applied for financial assistance from the International Union of Students (the communist dominated international student organisation) and had accepted an invitation to attend the Ninth Congress of the IUS in Mongolia. There he delivered a speech endorsing his government's stand on various political issues in particular the situation in Southern Africa. NUZS was affiliated at that time to both the IUS and the ICS (the non-communist dominated international student organisation) and it was to these affiliations that Dingiswayo Banda was presumably referring when he spoke of foreign influence in NUZS. In his Munali speech Mwanakatwe made his views about
the affiliations very clear.

...over the past year or so the reaction of students to some of our national activities have been inspired by outside influences...This is the way foreign governments have contrived to penetrate enlightened leadership in African Independent States for their own selfish ends...

Last night Mr. Mwanakatwe confirmed that his Munali speech had been a straight directive to quit... Its affiliation to the two international bodies was contrary to the principle of non-alignment... Neither could it be allowed to become a member of other world organisations. This is in accordance with the policy the government has applied to trade unions. The students' union must be treated in the same way.71

However NUZS did not disaffiliate from either international organisation until the following year at the Fifth Annual Congress (September 1968) when it was decided to leave the ISC because of its supposed association with the CIA but to remain affiliated to the IUS.72 At the seventh Congress in 1970 the President reported that NUZS had dropped all dealings with both international organisations.73 Nevertheless it is clear that both the government and the party were at pains to depoliticise the student body and it is equally clear that the students have been unwilling to totally withdraw from presenting their views on national and international issues. This persistent refusal, tolerated as long as public announcements were not outspokenly opposed to the party or government, ultimately and inevitably led students to a confrontation with the party and government. The details of the 'university crisis' of 1971 will be related in a later chapter.

Studies of students have paid relatively little attention to the student role outside the university environs during the vacations. At such times their activities are more difficult to record, and their student role is possibly of less
importance in determining their behaviour. Yet their role in the wider society during vacations and the attitudes of others towards him at such times must be a contributing factor to their political behaviour during the times their activities are directly affected by involvement in the all-embracing student community.

Vacational employment does not follow any particular pattern and students apply to government and private enterprise either through the Dean of Students or through their own initiative. The jobs they accept tend to be white collar occupations in the towns, where their relatively advanced levels of formal education would supposedly be of some assistance to their employers. They are paid at student rates which vary from about K70 to K120 per month. Students rarely undertake jobs that involve manual labour or even enter into semi-voluntary schemes, though a tiny minority have been involved in such projects as smallpox vaccination campaigns, the construction of a clinic and a measles immunisation programme. Students have not been encouraged to undertake any co-ordinated programme of 'national service' to promote the developmental interests of the nation as has been the case in other countries such as Tanzania. However student leaders have on many occasions expressed a desire to participate in such a national service. Thus at the Fourth Annual National Congress of NUZS in 1967, there was a discussion over a National Service, and towards the end of 1970 following a meeting between student leaders and the President the former declared the necessity for a National Service and again there have been similar calls in early 1972. However, in this matter the leadership does not necessarily reflect the sentiments of the bulk of the
students, as indicated in the second opinion poll.

Students should be forced to participate in a National Service of one year before receiving their first degree.

Agree 36%, Uncertain 9%, Disagree 55%75

Though many students are eager to participate in schemes of national development and leaders have expressed this desire on many occasions, no one in government has been prepared to openly encourage the student to take an active part in national development. Even so much as participating in the life of the workers in the areas neighbouring the university, and undertaking surveys there has been regarded by students with fear and has encountered a barrier of non-co-operation from the municipal officials both in government and the party. So conscious of the mistrust accorded to them by Zambians and expatriates in senior positions, those students who have other qualifications to commend them for a job may avoid revealing their student status when seeking vacation employment. Others who have no other qualifications to offer a prospective employer have been known to over-play the 'superior' qualifications they possess and in so doing incurred the resentment of employers.

Though students have made their voices heard on a variety of public issues through their two organisations the National Union of Zambian Students and the University of Zambia Students Union (UNZASU), in general the government has been successful in restricting the student role within narrow limits closely related to their future roles as members of a professional 'class'. Yet apart from 'leaving politics to the politicians', Mwanakatwe has added to and elaborated his conception of the
student role.

Although the University is very closely linked with the problem of manpower requirements of Zambia, it should not be regarded merely as a factory to turn out the men and women required to man the services of the society. It should be the centre for the highest intellectual development of those Zambian scholars who will gain admission to it, helping them to understand the aspirations of the less educated men and women in the land, to break tribal and racial barriers within which they have grown and to foster in them a national consciousness.

Every effort should be made to discourage the University from turning out graduates who will form a privileged élite in Zambia, an exclusive class of intellectuals who will be ashamed to return to their villages to live and work among their kinsmen for the general good of the country. The role of the University must be to bridge the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' so that gradually the evils of a class-conscious society are completely eliminated. In the furtherance of this ideal, the University's staff and students should restrain their demands for better living conditions, bearing in mind that the University was not intended to be a prestige institution which would create new and unrealistic standards of living. Lest we forget - the University of Zambia was established with immense good will from the public. Old women sold their eggs to raise funds for the new University, old men gave some money from selling their catch of fish, townsmen signed stop orders to contribute regularly from their bank accounts the funds sorely needed by the Government for the University project. The sacrifice of the old people and the young men and women, as well as the countless hundreds of teachers and their pupils who organised raffles and concerts to raise funds for the University, was an act of faith - faith that the University would produce the élite which the nation wants, 'one which is more concerned with its responsibilities than with its rights, an élite dedicated to the noble task of nation-building, however hard and humble the demands'. Indeed, in the years ahead the University will become inevitably the most expensive educational project in Zambia. Yet it would continue to win the hearts of men and women in the country on the basis of the University's students' contribution to nation-building efforts.
But active student participation in nation-building, bridging the gap between the poor and the rich, etc., cannot be achieved so long as the government pursues a policy of depoliticisation of the student body which is designed to sever links between the students and the party and to stress the student's future role at the expense of his present role. The student role which Mwanakatwe and many others advocate is incompatible with the constraints generated by the wider social structure. The emphasis on the student's future role as a member of a professional 'class' or an 'élite' contradicts the emphasis on students forging links between the poor and the rich and the cultivation of a feeling of close kinship with their uneducated brethren who work in the fields.

**STUDENT STATUS IN THE ZAMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE.**

Though the government would like to look upon the student in terms of his future role alone, it has had to accommodate the fact that setting up a university with a concomitant student community leads to series of consequences which were unintended and possibly unforeseen. How then has the government come to regard the students qua students? How have other sections perceived the student? To what extent is the status of the university student in the Zambian social structure uniquely determined? In the previous section perceptions of student status in society entered into the discussion of the student role. However, it is difficult to assess with any accuracy what the student status is without conducting detailed surveys of the Zambian population. For this reason most studies of students omit to pay much attention to the way in which sections of the society regard the student. 77 But
this is a factor which inevitably affects student behaviour and will therefore be given some attention in this section. The attitudes and perceptions of the student status in society is likely to be markedly influenced by the background, interests and the extent to which students present a threat to those interests. For this reason two relatively well defined groups will be considered, those who hold dominant positions in the society and those who don't.

Perceptions towards Students within the Political Elite.

For the purposes of this discussion, the political élite will be defined as that section of the ruling class whose members are to be found at the apexes of government and party organisations. The non-availability of information makes it impossible to analyse the attitudes prevalent within the other élites - administrative, military and economic - towards the university student.

There are three general strains in the perception of students amongst members of the political élite. First the favourable view of students as a set of intellectuals with much to contribute to the development of the country. Second the view that they represent the young generation destined to replace the older generation now in power - an incipient political élite. Third an unfavourable view, that they represent a 'parasitical' group ungrateful for the sacrifices society is making on their behalf. The prevailing view will depend on who is espousing it and in what context. Observations of these perceptions may be gauged in crisis situations when the context becomes overriding influence must be avoided and therefore the following will dwell on two relatively informal
but nevertheless public occasions when students came up for
discussion in the context of their position in society.

The following debate in the National Assembly concerned
the Vote of thirty six million kwacha to the Ministry of
Education. It took place on February 28th, 1969 soon after
the 1968 elections which had followed the banning of the
United Party. The protagonists of the different views were
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Moto Nkama and
the Minister of Education, Wesley Nyirenda. Nkama had been
an active UNIP member coming up through the ranks of the party
via the posts of Regional Youth Secretary and the Regional
Secretary on the Copperbelt. He attended Roma University
College 1960-1961 and Oxford University in 1964 but without
having received a degree. He had served as Deputy Head of the
Zambian Mission at the United Nations and is in his early
thirties.78 Wesley Nyirenda, on the other hand, has a very
different background. Ten years older than Nkama, Nyirenda
has moved up to his present position by virtue of his educational
background. One of the very few who managed to attain a
measure of education during the colonial period, he attended
Munali Training Centre and Chalimbana Training College for
teachers between 1940 and 1944. He has also attended the
Pholela Institution in Natal after which he went to the London
Institute of Education, where he received a degree and post
graduate diploma in education. He became Deputy Speaker of
the Northern Rhodesian National Assembly and then Speaker of
the Zambian National Assembly and finally Minister of Education.79
These two politicians represent two distinct types of recruit-
ment to central political positions, and are therefore likely
to perceive the students in correspondingly different terms.
It is very important, Mr. Chairman, for the Government to realise that unless schools are brought into the general line of the UNIP Government, schools, colleges and indeed the University of Zambia here in Lusaka, could become centres of subversion and sabotage. We have seen these examples elsewhere in Africa.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it is an open secret that a few months ago, our University here in Lusaka, was in fact acting as a centre of sabotage. I may even add that the University of Zambia was in fact a stronghold of the now banned party called U.P.

Now, Mr. Chairman, secondly I would like to get from the hon. Minister of Education his comments on the following: The students at the University of Zambia, are somewhat out of touch with what the Government is doing. This may be so because the students at the University of Zambia, unlike the students of Universities in other countries, not only in Africa, but in Europe, have less work to do. I am sure that many hon. Members will agree with me when I say that it is a sad sight when we see many students from our university roaming the streets, doing nothing but drinking and drinking like fish.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, that is a very serious matter. Time has come for these students to realise that the University of Zambia was, as a matter of fact, built out of the sacrifice, the sweat and toil of the common man. We must realise that even our people, in the remote villages contributed in order to make this University the success that it is today.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is a great shame to see many of the students from our University concentrating on things other than their studies. I would like, therefore, to hear from the hon. Minister of Education as to what disciplinary measures he contemplates in order to bring students such as these to order. 80

As Minister of Education, Nyirenda was obliged to defend the students against such attacks and the replies he made were more favourable than perhaps he would have made in other circumstances. Nevertheless when visiting the University he has made similar comments, but added some remarks critical of the students which were played down in his speech in parliament. 81

To the accusation that the university is a centre of subversion, he not only denied that this was true but went on to
explain how such misconceptions have arisen.

If I may be allowed to speak my mind, I do not know how many hon. Members who are this morning contributing to the debate on the University of Zambia and on my Ministry, have taken the trouble to visit the University campus. There is a feeling amongst those of us who have been entrusted with education that the young men and women at the University have started badly because they have not been given a chance by us politicians in particular. Here are young men and women whom we have tried to run away from. Time and again some of us in leading positions in politics have been invited to go and talk to these young men and women.

Time and again we have been asked to mix with these young men and women who have been thrown into an institution, that is enjoying academic freedom, we have been asked to mix with them so that we can guide them and discuss their problems with them. But what has been our response? The University of Zambia is a place, we have asserted, that is harbouring saboteurs. It is a place where all subversive activities and sabotage are hatched. It is a place you know where the lecturers and professors are suspect. It is a place where young men and women who think that they know more than we do are kept. It is a place where you keep young men and women who think that they know better than Cabinet Ministers and they know better than Parliamentary Secretaries, District Governors and backbenchers. 'What institution is this that you are putting up, of young men and women who are very political and who will think we do not know our job. It is a place where they think that it is only academic education that matters and that we are all useless in politics'. This is a common argument.

I think we have misunderstood these young men and women. I think we have not taken the trouble to go and argue out issues with them. They are as anxious as hon. Members are this morning in this House, to be understood. They have sent me letters to find out why it is that leading politicians, people who are in key positions and who ought to influence policy at the University, do not even take the trouble to go and find out what University work is all about. I think the start has been bad through no fault of these students.82

Alienating students from the political processes and personnel will inevitably lead to misconceptions about their behaviour and the nature of the university, and shortcomings within the student community may be attributed in part to shortcomings in the leadership. He continues to argue that the isolation
of the university students has led to the interpretation of criticism as opposition.

Let it be observed that a University by its very nature, is an institution where freedom in academic thought is pursued. It is not a centre where some sort of indoctrination must take place, otherwise we might as well write off this nation...We want them, while they are there, to develop a critical mind. That is a professional place it has nothing to do with whether you are Congress or you are UNIP or you are a member of the now banned United Party. That is a place where people pursue academic freedom, they must be free to argue even with me as their Minister of Education, they must be free to argue with their lecturers and so on...In other words here are young men and women who will want to approach a problem purely from the academic angle...83

Academic freedom has been considered by academics as essential to the pursuit of learning, scholarship and research in universities, as in the following definition.

that freedom of members of the academic community, assembled in colleges and universities, which underlies the effective performance of their functions of teaching learning, practice of the arts and research. The right to academic freedom is recognised in order to enable faculty members and students to carry on their roles.84

However, in the eyes of those who have not attended university, and indeed to many who have academic freedom is at best an ideology to protect the comfortable and secluded life of academics and at worst an ill-conceived subterfuge under whose cloak all forms of subversive activity are allowed to take place unhindered. This latter view of the university usually accompanies that view which regards students as a 'privileged elite' which should be grateful for the sacrifices being made on its behalf; criticism of the government or party is tantamount to 'biting the hands that feed them'. Interestingly Nyirenda does not counter Nkama's perception of university students as parasitical and ungrateful by arguing that
university education is less a privilege and more a right earned on the basis of merit. Rather he reminds the House that students are adults and must be treated as such.

Now I want to make it clear here that the University students drink if they want to drink... But, any student who is found so drunk that he becomes irresponsible, is disciplined like any other student. But, let us remember that they are men and women who are enjoying academic freedom and that freedom is necessary because if they have to do research and make contribution to the knowledge that we find in the books today, they must be given that freedom. If we discipline them like kids, then we will get nothing out of the University in so far as contribution towards research is concerned.

But over and above the defense of academic freedom and critical spirit, Nyirenda employs another common argument to counter accusations of irresponsibility and oppositionalism - the 'generation argument'.

That attitude which has prevailed at that University for a long time that these young men and women are proud, they think they are Cabinet Ministers, they think they can run this country better. We must change that attitude, because they are not like that. I have seen them. They are simple innocent men and women who are busy doing some research. They do not know more than we do. They are confused boys who will sort themselves out eventually.

When I left the University, I thought I had wonderful ideas and I thought I was a very clever man until I began teaching, when I was cut down to size. While I was at work, I knew that I did not know and I became humble. Leave them to be mischievous during this period because they have reached that stage. We all pass through it, when they think they know and they splash there and ask for this and so on, life will teach them a lesson and once they know what the truth is, they will be solid men and women.

This is the view of a graduate who looking back on his career sees the 'folly of his youth' and recognises the same tendencies in the new generation of students. However, it is much more difficult for the politician without experience of university life to sympathise with these sentiments, and
tolerate student excesses in such a benevolent fashion. It becomes even more difficult if these same politicians are in the long term threatened by students who, with educational qualifications, are supposedly better fitted to rule and administer the nation's affairs. The more firmly entrenched in the political leadership, the more one can afford to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the students.

The higher the leader is in the structure of political decision-making the more he plays the role of conciliator, settling differences between warring and competing interests. For such leaders the interpretation of conflict between students and the government or between students and the party as a manifestation of a generational gap is particularly convenient. For in talking of a generational gap one accords conflict an air of inevitability and even legitimacy and in so doing avoids censuring either side. It is not surprising, therefore, that the President himself, in his role as chief conciliator between rival, competing or conflicting groups, finds the generational argument particularly congenial.

Yet the dangers of a wider generation gap in developing countries are potentially greater than in many developed countries in which student unrest is almost part of national life. Often, the cause of the generation gap lies in the phenomenon associated with the older generation. For most of the youth the older generation is not associated with wisdom, experience, level-headedness and mature consideration. For them it is associated more with negativism, sloppiness, hard-headedness and irresponsiveness towards change. On the other hand, for most of the old generation the youth are not associated with dynamism, consideration, level-headedness and so forth. They are associated more with irresponsibility, riotous behaviour, cynicism, over-adventure, arrogance, intellectual snobbery and downright exclusive possessiveness.

These conditions do not promote a climate for the narrowing of the gap between generations.
They, indeed, breed conflicts which can only be resolved through sides re-examining critically their premises.

The responsibilities of the old and young generations in Zambia are even greater for, due to the misfortune of our historical past, the old generation like in any other developing country is associated not only with the epithets I referred to earlier on but with illiteracy and ignorance. They will continue to be associated with dependence on those whose earning capacity in terms of income is greater than theirs. The youth for their part will, in the circumstances, be associated with, inter alia, pride, elite consciousness and selfishness.87

Though in some ways a balanced view of the perceptions one generation has for another, it fails to analyse the source of those perceptions and the basis of the conflict between students and other sections of society; the generational gap is more an idiom in which the conflict has been expressed.

But the generational idiom has also been used to attack the students, as Sikota Wina88 makes very clear.

All over Africa today a new generation is grooming itself for taking over the political control of Independent African States hitherto fought for and liberated by an older generation now in its afternoon...With all the responsibilities [laid upon] the only university in a [young African country like Zambia it would be a] tragic day when society as a whole begins to regard the University student as a dirty, shiftless, no-patriot, existing solely for himself, under the guise of campus radicalism.89

Wina's address followed a widely publicised demand by the student union for increased government bursaries, which aroused considerable resentment from governmental circles with one junior minister reported in the press as saying that 'students want to compete with ministers'. Wina made reference to the student demands reminding them of the mass poverty which still persists amongst the majority of the population.
But even granting that there is a case to answer here, the procedure followed by the student organisation perhaps even raises more resentment than the amount of money involved - I am talking about the weapon of protest marches and demonstrations from a community which is supposed to set examples to society, particularly in an African society... the attitude adopted so far has been unfortunate, for a public display of indignation on your part for increased allowances amidst a population whose per capita income is a mere K186 and in which 21,820 people share one doctor degrades you in the eyes of the very public which looks up to you with a veneration which is sometimes uncalled for. 90

The students must set an example of selflessness and sacrifice, particularly as they will be the leaders of tomorrow, upon whom the nation's future will depend. The view expressed here represents a more sophisticated version of Nkama regarding students as an 'incipient élite' 'leaders of tomorrow'. Many in the party, of course, do not accept that students are tomorrow's leaders asserting that their own claim to leadership is of a higher order of legitimacy than that of the 'élitist', 'unpatriotic', 'subversive' student. Only an established leader in the political élite can afford to suggest that students are the leaders of the future. As Wina himself said at question time.

The student organisation here regards itself as an encircled enemy, and you are not breaking through that shell. Other people - the ones they are referring to - and I know this feeling exists in government circles, they are people you are referring to, think that the university student is something that is completely out of Zambia. So this coolness has been existing and I think it is important for both the progressive students at this university and the progressive people in government circles to be able to bridge the gap. 91

The more established the leader the more he can afford and therefore the more likely he is to tolerate what might appear to jeopardise the positions of those lower in the
political hierarchy. Those who themselves have been recruited through the educational system, rather than the party, to the central political system — a small minority which tends to dominate the ministerial ranks — are inclined to be more sympathetic to the student's demands, interests and political pursuits. However those on other rungs in the party hierarchy, who have had to leave school at an early age, may regard students as a potential long-term threat to their future. To them any political involvement by students is interpreted as a direct challenge to the supremacy of the party in political affairs. They wish to resist any attempts by the students to gain access to the party apparatus, fearing that students may be permitted to enter at higher levels and thus put pay to their own opportunities for upward mobility. Local UNIP officials may be expected to be the most virulent in their attacks on students insisting that they 'stick to their studies and keep their noses out of politics', while Kaunda, Kapwepwe, Wina and a few other leaders with 'intellectual' backgrounds would like to see students more involved in national development under the aegis of the party.

The Perceptions towards Students within the 'Subject' Classes.

The antipathy of party officials towards students can be a powerful influence in the formation and articulation of an anti-student public opinion, particularly in the towns.

Sikota Wina was very frank on this point.

Give us the facts and say this is why we are protesting, and we will find a solution. But my main fear is that if this controversy over university bursaries is going to continue, I think you might gradually find other groups of people mobilising other people who might think that K40 is too much. K40 is not much
money. But if you keep shouting [that] you want even K10, you might find other people organising people to say, 'You see, you are having nothing to eat. These people at the University, they are now demanding K10 - the University has become a trade union'.

And again later in the evening,

I think you must find yourselves, the political party which is in the majority, and which some of you don't support but which is in the majority, is very easily in a position where they can mobilise...public opinion, to say that students (noise) - I'm not threatening, I'm saying to you a fact because these are the things (much noise and boos) which I hear as I travel around the countryside and I hear what people talk about... When I came here some friends of mine told me: "Look. Those chaps are not important at all and the earlier it is made clear to them the better ..."

Officials have been known to threaten to organise UNIP Youth to march on to the campus, and earlier in this chapter it was noted that a similar threat was voiced by the Lusaka UNIP officials. Following the publication in the press of an open letter to the President from the student union executive - widely interpreted as arrogant and insulting - criticising him for the manner in which he was conducting his foreign policy, nation-wide demonstrations in nearly all the towns were staged in opposition to the students, suggesting that there is an underlying hostility towards the students from many quarters of society, not only from those in the party.

These feelings may be interpreted as a form of embryo class antagonism of the masses towards those who are reaping and will reap the advantages of a 'superior' education. The colonial heritage has made it very clear how necessary formal education and articulateness in English were in moving into the higher strata and the continuing emphasis on education as a criterion of recruitment to better paid jobs has only
accentuated its importance. In clashes with students, police have been seen to go out of their way to 'beat up' defenceless students. However, such actions of individual constables in the 'riots' of 1970 and 1971 were often stimulated by the contempt in which they were held by students making derogatory remarks about their 'illiteracy' and 'ignorance'. Nyirenda, in the passage already quoted, spoke of the general view of students as 'people who think they know better because of their academic education', and it is certainly nearer the truth than Nyirenda was prepared to admit in the National Assembly. Such beliefs in the superior judgment, opinions and actions of the 'educated' man have given rise to widespread resentment, amongst those who have not had the opportunities of education. Lipset has made the following perceptive remarks.

"...It is clearly necessary for men in politics to try to demolish the strength of opposition views, and the very fact that the intellectuals have always claimed that their superior education and intelligence make their views important has tempted those who have disagreed with them, in both Europe and America, to resort to anti-intellectualism. The masses nowhere have real understanding of or sympathy for the problems of intellectual life, and they can be roused against intellectuals as part of their general resentment against the advantages of the more privileged and powerful. Engels noted how, in the early days of the European Socialist movement, it was possible for anarchist and other left-wing opponents of Marx to foster among Communist workers "inerradicable suspicion against any schoolmaster, journalist, and any man generally who was not a manual worker as being an 'erudite' who was out to exploit them." And David Riesman has correctly observed that political anti-intellectualism may be regarded as a form of the "class struggle" reflecting the fact that various groups "feel threatened by...the growth of intellectualism," and the powerful enemy is "no longer only bankers, lawyers, drummers...[but also] professors, teachers, writers, and artists.""

Public hostility towards student involvement in politics in the United States of America has been recorded in an opinion
poll conducted amongst Californians towards student protests in that State during 1964 and early 1965.

The California Poll has recently completed a survey of public opinion throughout the state and finds that 92 per cent of the adult public has heard or read something about the demonstrations, and 74 per cent of the public takes a disapproving attitude towards them. 99

Even though the public may be easily aroused to express hostility towards students in some contexts, in other contexts the worker or villager will express deference towards the student. For example, students were usually accorded the greatest respect when they were working with or interviewing mineworkers. 100 Interestingly, miners were frequently unwilling to be interviewed in the second half of the month when they would have no money to 'entertain' the student at the taverns. Again miners were often reluctant to have their interviews conducted at their home because they were embarrassed about their overcrowded concrete shacks which the mines provided as homes. It appeared that the students coming from the University of Zambia were identified with government, and miners would inform the students to tell President Kaunda what misery they were living in. 'It is good you are doing these studies, because now the government will know what conditions we are living in'. The university itself appeared to the workers as an extra-special school closely linked to government. When it was decided to build the University just after Independence local UNIP officials were asked to collect funds from the people as a contribution towards the costs. The nation-wide appeal for funds was publicised as being for the construction of a 'people's university' from which the future leaders of the country would be recruited, and where
they would study.

Political leaders still refer to the sacrifices of the people of Zambia which made possible the construction of the university. The students therefore must be grateful for the sacrifices that have been made and are being made by the taxpayer to enable them to study and enter a 'privileged' élite. Political involvement and criticism is not seen as the inevitable consequence of establishing a university community, or as student commitment to national development, but rather as a sign of arrogance and 'élitism' stemming from an inflated view of their importance. In the eyes of the public, learning and political activity are two totally independent and separate activities, the one is not the logical product of the other. These views are little different from the views of the British public or the American public when, for example, they have been confronted with student political activity in recent years, the difference being that they are not held so tenaciously by the political élites in these countries.

The difference devolves on the very low proportion of graduates in the Zambian political élite, and the pressure from the party to ensure that graduates are not favoured in the recruitment to the political élite by virtue of their education. In those societies where the vast majority of members of the ruling class have attended university, and where university education is an accepted and even preferred qualification for entry to the party organisation, students do not pose any long term threat and their political activities are therefore more easy to tolerate. Such a university educated leadership would also be more sympathetic to
student involvement in public issues and would perhaps regard such involvement as a healthy rather than pathological sign.

In a society where the leadership has passed through university themselves it is more difficult for them to argue that students should be grateful to society for their education and should express that gratitude by supporting the incumbent leadership. Rather in such societies university education is regarded in the same light as primary education is in Zambia - namely a right to which all those who fulfil the necessary qualifications are entitled. Where the view of university education as a right rather than a privilege prevails amongst the rulers, so the anti-intellectual, anti-student sentiments to be found amongst the lower classes are less likely to be exploited as a weapon to contain student oppositionalism and politicisation.

In a society such as Zambia where the leadership is faced with problems of maintaining national unity, where dissonant forces are continually threatening to dismember the nation and where there is a prevailing insecurity within the political elite arising partly out of the nature in which it took over the reins of power so the threshold level of criticism is much lower than in the more self confident and established nations of the West. The idea of academic freedom and the critical function of the university is more widely accepted in European societies, but even there, there are definite limits upon the extent of opposition that will be tolerated. The different stresses under which a nation must function particularly as they affect the political elite and the legitimacy accorded to opposition in the political system are important determinants of the upper tolerance limits of student oppositional politics.
Ashby has emphasized the importance of convention in safeguarding the academic freedom and by implication the right of free criticism.

What is sometimes overlooked in Africa is that in Europe - even in Britain - and in America it is the conventions, not the constitutions, of university government which provide the real safeguards for academic freedom...When universities are exported, these conventions are unlikely to be exported with them; and this has been the cause of some difficulties in the universities of tropical Africa.106

All these factors - the level of education prevalent in the political élite, stresses within the society itself and the degree of institutionalisation of a code of behaviour mutually acceptable to the government and the university - determine the probability that public opinion will be aroused against the student.

STUDENTS AND ELITES IN AFRICA.

There is a tradition in the studies of African societies to refer to the upper strata as constituting an élite.107 Thus, African students have been variously referred to as an 'incipient élite',108 a 'presumptive élite',109 an 'educated élite',110 an 'aspirant élite',111 etc. There has been some considerable debate and confusion over the meaning to be attached to the concept of élite and little consistency in its use. It is proposed therefore to first consider the concept and then to examine its place in studies of students in African nations.
The Concept of an Elite.

In its traditional usage, originating in the work of Pareto and Mosca, the dimension of power was invoked as an integral element in the definition of the elite concept. Its extension to the upper strata of African society before their succession to political rule was, therefore, discontinuous with its traditional connotations in political sociology. This prompted social scientists to redefine the concept so that it more closely approximated to the 'situation' of the high status groups in the African societies, namely those who possessed an advanced Western education or who were rulers in traditional African societies. Nadel, who was one of the first to adapt the concept to the African context, defined a social elite as,

a body of persons enjoying a position of pre-eminence over all others...[having] some degree of corporateness, group character, and exclusiveness. There must be barriers to admission...Above all, the pre-eminent position must be regarded, by the members of the elite as well as the rest of society, as belonging to the former not fortuitously, because of some possession, experience or interest they happen to share, but by right - by a corporate right which is not within the reach of everyone...As I see it, a high status group functions as an elite only if two further conditions are satisfied: its superiority must be of a very general kind, and it must be imitable.  

Lloyd has added one further dimension, namely that the elite should be an innovating body of persons. In the African context he considers an elite as denoting those who are Western educated and wealthy. It is as "pursuers of modernity" that in Lloyd's view they are innovating. Whether in fact African students may be regarded as a social elite rests on their pre-eminent position in the field of
education being regarded as a "corporate right" and their superiority being of a general kind i.e. "the various interests, achievements, characteristic manners, and the moral outlook of the [students being] regarded...as qualities valued and judged desirable."\textsuperscript{116} Though such a description may fit Ghanaian students in 1955, in view of what has already been said in respect of the status of the Zambian student and his relations with other sections of the population it would be difficult to categorise him as a member of a social élite.

With Independence and the emergence of an African political élite', the concept of social élite is no longer so commonly invoked and the traditional usage of the élite concept, embracing a strong component of power, has been restored. Following Mills' definition of the power élite as composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in position to make decisions having major consequences,\textsuperscript{117}

Barkan considers the feature distinguishing élites from the rest of African society is their involvement in 'high level decision making'.\textsuperscript{118} In many of the political studies of African students, Lasswell's definition of élite is implicitly if not explicitly used,

The power élite, in common with all élites, is influential; it differs in having severe sanctions at its disposal.\textsuperscript{119}

Sociologists however have been reluctant to totally abandon the concept of social élite. Thus Goldthorpe in his study of Makerere students speaks of an educated élite. He however introduces an interesting distinction between class and élite.
However one defines the term, African families are certainly not small, and the family is not the unit of social class in the same way as it is in the West, so that it is sometimes better to speak of an élite (of individuals) rather than a class (of families). 120

By defining the family as the basic unit of class, the concept becomes inapplicable in the African context because of the extremes of poverty and wealth which coexist within the single African family. The élite concept, on the other hand, which takes the individual as its basic unit, is equally applicable to Africa as it is to any other society referring, as Bottomly defined it, to functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society. 121

In focusing on the family as the distinctive basic element in the notion of class, its universality and much of its analytical significance, as contained for example in Marxist theory, evaporates without offering any theoretical framework to take its place.

Henceforth, this paper will adopt a Marxist concept of ruling class whose dominant position...is to be explained by its possession of the major instruments of economic production but its political dominance is consolidated by the hold which it establishes over military force and over the production of ideas. 122

The relation between family and ruling class becomes an empirical question which introduces such problems as surround social mobility, recruitment to the ruling class, etc. While still retaining the notion of class, the élite concept can be introduced to enrich the analysis of the ruling class itself. In such a conceptual scheme the élite is defined as a status
group within the ruling class, which can then be looked upon as comprising a set of parallel élites including the military, the government administrators, political leaders, and the economic directors. The segmentation of the ruling class will be apparent to the extent that there are few linkages between élites, little overlapping membership, differential patterns of recruitment, competing élite interests rather than common class interests, etc. One would speak of ruling 'élites' rather than a ruling 'class' to the extent that the ruling class is divided into competing, non-interacting, sharply differentiated élites. But both concepts are valid tools of analysis in any society except the 'stateless' or in which there is an equitable distribution of economic resources. Which is the more appropriate depends on the problem at issue. Thus an examination of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled might see class as being of primary significance, whereas an examination of the ruling class itself might make use of the élite concept.

Amongst the élites which comprise the ruling class, there are usually one or more dominant members with a decisive influence on the behaviour of the ruling class as a whole. In the Zambian context this core of the ruling class would be the political élite representing the highest levels in the party organisation and the few recruited to the cabinet from other élites. It is the political élite which takes the initiative in decision-making, and is able to enforce its decisions through the coercive machinery of the state. It is on the political élite that pressure is exerted by other élites and sub-élites, waiting in the wings to take their places in the ruling class, and it is the political élite
which serves as the pre-eminent reference group, both of comparative and normative types,\textsuperscript{125} for all sections of Zambian society.

Studies of Students which Invoke the Elite Concept.

In the actual studies of African students relatively little attention has been directed to a precise and 'operational' definition of élite. The question of definition was easily avoided because such studies often concerned themselves with the attitudes and social origins of students considered as an isolated section of society. Little serious attempt was made to place them in their present and future roles in the social structure or examine their relations to other groups in society. Were this to be accomplished possibly many of the assumptions implicit in these studies would be modified and concepts such as élite, as it refers to students, would be refined.

Prior to Independence, the study of students was likely to focus on their status as a 'new' or 'Western' élite, usually confining their attention to a study of attitudes and social origins. Writers even then justified their studies by reference to the important role students were destined to play in the future of their countries. Jahoda introduces his social background study of Ghanaian students with these words.

These students form the subject of the present study; many of them are likely to attain key positions in the country; they form the nucleus of a new élite, and the question of their origins therefore appears important.\textsuperscript{126}

One of the most impressive studies in this area, that conducted by Goldthorpe,\textsuperscript{127} considers all the students who passed through Makerere between 1922 and 1960 in terms of their
social origins. He also conducted an attitude survey amongst those who were attending the College in 1954, 1958 and 1959, together with a follow-up survey amongst students who had left college in the thirties. Referring to the prominent place of Makerere students in public life, he writes:

It [Makerere] embodied African hopes for the future in a manner which has endowed it with a unique prestige; and while it would be too much to suggest that former students of the College made up the whole of the African elite, they constituted so substantial a part of it that a study of the social background, careers, and adjustment is of some importance in understanding the general processes of social change in the three East African countries. 128

In the field of political science and political development, studies of African students have similarly accepted the assumption that some students at least are destined to be the future leaders of their nations and therefore any examination of their aspirations and political attitudes is of considerable importance. Marvick, for example, introduces his analysis of the social and political attitudes amongst students at Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone, as follows:

For the next generation, however, the calibre of African leaders will depend on the young people who are today busy acquiring their certificates of higher education, either overseas or in African universities. Tomorrow, they will be the professional men, the governmental and community leaders - whether politicized or philistine - of still "new states".

To be sure, their apprenticeships in public life will come only after they leave college. But something can be guessed of the contribution they will make or fail to make by examining their perspectives and interests while still students: by studying their attitudes towards traditional society, toward their careers and their academic preparation for careers, toward the student community and the communities to which they will soon return, toward the nation's symbolic political struggles and toward the substantive problems of modernization that await solution. 129
Finlay opens his paper on Ghanaian student politics with the following words:

University students in Ghana, like those in other developing nations, are an incipient elite destined to hold political power in the future...130

and Hanna begins another paper with the assumption that students constitute the reservoir from which future national political leaders will be drawn.131

(Italics are mine)

Such assumptions were not always compatible with the aspirations and attitudes expressed in the analyses which followed. Thus Jahoda's study of Ghanaian students revealed that none wished to enter politics immediately after graduating, while 8% aimed to enter politics within twenty years of leaving university.132 Both Finlay's studies of Ghanaian students and Goldthorpe's of East African students revealed similar patterns. Somewhat at variance with the latter studies, Hanna found nearly half of the students at the University of Ibadan expecting to be active in politics after leaving university, but that, of course, is very different from becoming a 'national political leader'.133 Marwick discovered similar degrees of student interest in local politics after graduation.

Only about one in every four or five would say that he expected to be simply a "good citizen", giving moral or financial support to "worthy causes." There was a middle ground, especially at the level of community affairs; one could be a "civic leader" without being a "politician." It was this role that appealed to two out of three Creole and Ibo students; among Yoruba, however, such a distinction was less meaningful. More than a third intended to be local politicians; only an additional third planned to be civic leaders.134
If the political scientists attach so much significance to the attitudes and aspirations of students as affecting their future role and role performance then the expression of antipathy towards 'politics' noted in all the studies but statistically significant in the studies of Ghanaian and East African students puts in doubt the assumptions upon which the studies are based. Only Marwick's study is free from such a fallacy since his definition of a leader refers not specifically to a career or occupation but the general role in the community, as an 'influential'\textsuperscript{135} or opinion leader, whereas the other studies interpret political leadership as decision-making at the national level.

Barkan's study of East African students takes expressed attitudes and aspirations as his starting point.

To determine the type of role students will probably play following their graduation from college, the members of the sample were asked to respond to questions which focused on their conceptions of success, their career plans - both for the immediate future and the long run, their conceptions of authority and legitimacy, and their stereotypes of several groups which are usually regarded as élite.\textsuperscript{136}

Not surprisingly he comes to conclusions that contradict the assumptions of earlier studies.

Rather than wanting to exercise power by making decisions which will affect the lives of many of their countrymen, most East African university students prefer to implement the decisions of others. Rather than wanting to innovate new policies to deal with the myriad of problems confronting their countries most students want merely security for themselves and their families. Though they realise that courage to accept risks is a distinguishing characteristic of leadership, they themselves want to avoid taking any risks.\textsuperscript{137}

But he concludes in an apparently contradictory fashion:
It might be more appropriate, therefore, to describe students as an emergent upper-middle class instead of accepting the well worn cliché that they will be the leaders of tomorrow. Though many members of the future social, administrative and political élites will have been university students, most students do not think and behave as if they are anticipating such status. 138

The difference between Barkan and the other analysts is not so great as at first appears since he does assume that many members of the 'power élite' will be university graduates. He is suggesting, perhaps, that there is a difference between members of an élite who all engage in high level decision-making and the leaders. In that case the distinguishing feature is perceptions of roles and of role performance rather than merely the role itself. Students in East Africa are unlikely to be the 'leaders of tomorrow' not because they will not occupy the appropriate roles but because they don't express those attitudes characteristic of leaders. Yet at the end of his article he writes, paradoxically;

To conclude, it would seem that East African students should not be regarded as a presumptive élite so much as an emergent upper-middle class. They will achieve this status because entrance into most of East Africa's high status and high salaried occupation is virtually dependent on high educational qualifications alone. Entrance into East Africa's various élites, however, requires additional qualifications, the most basic of which is an interest in participating in the making of high level decisions. At the present time, students do not possess this interest, and it is not likely that they will develop one in the immediate future unless events change dramatically in their countries. 139

(Italics are mine)

The confusion, typical of studies that limit their area of inquiry to student attitudes, may be partly attributed to
the failure to refer attitudes and aspirations to forces in the social structure. Present attitudes cannot be extrapolated into the future with a view to gauging future attitudes, future roles and future role performances without reference to the social forces which mould them. To suggest, as Barkan seems to, that entrance of students into the East African élites, is dependent on their exhibiting an interest in participating in high level decision-making ignores the very much more important factor of recruitment patterns. What opportunities has the student, attitudes apart, for choosing his career? Even if he were inclined to high level decision-making would he be admitted to the appropriate élites? In Zambia, as has been shown earlier in the chapter, positions involving high level decision making, are unlikely to be filled by students if the determination of present incumbents to remain in 'power' persists or if recruitment policies continue to place students at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis the party loyalists. Thus the lack of interest in major decision making may be regarded as a realistic assessment of the opportunities available to the student and may be viewed as a mode of anticipatory socialisation.\(^{140}\)

Apart from Goldthorpe's study, the above papers fail to examine the patterns of recruitment to the various élites - however defined.\(^{141}\) But even Goldthorpe's analysis of graduate occupations is not entirely satisfactory since his interest is in the progression and diffusion of graduates throughout society. He does not assess the relative importance of Makerere as one of a number of 'reservoirs' from which members of the élites are recruited. For example, what proportion of the members of parliament, cabinet etc. are
graduates of Makerere. Lloyd has made some general comments concerning recruitment patterns.

Those attaining ministerial rank in governments tend to be among the better educated. The politicians have usually attained their educational qualifications, and hence elite membership, before becoming politically active, and certainly these qualifications are not rewards for political service. Yet, as political parties develop their organisation down to the village level, as the central party secretariat takes over some of the functions of the civil service, and as promotion to this secretariat from the lower ranks in the party hierarchy is made on the basis of political loyalty, so does the party become an avenue of mobility into the elite. It is an avenue most likely to be utilised by those who have been frustrated, by lack of ability or finance, in educational advancement. Such development of party organisation seems to be found in two contrasting situations. In Ghana, for instance, the original appeal of the C.P.P. was mainly to the 'verandah boys', the less-well educated clerks and teachers; the better educated elite was, in the 1960's, apathetic towards the party, and thus seen by the political leaders to be an opposed group. In Tanzania and Guinea the absence of a cadre of trained African administrative officers has prompted the development of party organs to fill the gap at the village and district levels.142

Earlier in this chapter the recruitment patterns to the United National Independence Party showed only nine members of parliament as having degrees, that is approximately 10%, and, not surprisingly, not one of these were graduates of the University of Zambia. To the extent that such recruitment patterns persist, students will not be the 'political leaders of tomorrow' and their apparent withdrawal from the ambition to high level decision-making is consistent with their pre-determined future as a 'professional class'. Starting from the firmer terrain of the social structure and recruitment patterns to elites, one can then explore the significance of the attitudes expressed by the students.
The Aspirations of Zambian Students.

The aspirations of Zambian students closely resemble the aspirations of students in other African countries as revealed in the studies of Goldthorpe, Jahoda et al. Though such a conclusion is based more on participant observation of the students at the University of Zambia it is nevertheless confirmed in a study, conducted during 1969, of the Expectations of Form V Students. Kitwe students in the last year of secondary school were asked to write an essay of two to four pages on the topic "Myself in Ten Years Time". They were asked to include references to their style of life, occupation, family, interests, etc. as they imagined they would be in ten years time. Students were not told that the essays would be used to gauge their expectations of their future. The essays were received and 'content analysed' under a number of items, including anticipated occupation, leisure time activities, relations with kinsmen, possession of material goods, place of living, etc. The conclusions were summarised as follows,

1. The student's desired style of living is essentially European but human relations are still governed to some extent by traditional values.

2. The expectations of the students as described in the essays are unrealistic in a sense that they would not be in a Western, achievement oriented, society. This could lead to unfortunate consequences.

3. Status and wealth were seen to be derived essentially from educational qualifications.

4. The students, uninterested in power, were concerned firstly for their security and welfare of themselves and their family. There was noticeably little idealism or nationalism.
5. Those who were more "rurally oriented" seemed to display a higher degree of "national consciousness".

6. Amongst the essays there was a marked conformity - suggesting that the professional class into which they will move will be lacking in original, innovatory thought and governed by a common set of material values.  

A subsequent set of essays received from schools in the rural areas were not materially different in content. As in the Kitwe essays, students were oriented to towns and the associated style of life. In a personal communication, one teacher in a rural secondary school pointed to the negligible appeal of the Young Farmers' Club, vividly contrasting the popularity of the 'Ball Room Dancing' Club. A similar outlook characterises the students at the University.

In their dress, life style and desire for material possessions the students resemble the Western oriented élites. Whether by reference to the "European" or by reference to the Zambian élites the student undergoes a process of anticipatory socialisation in which he adopts the life style and values of the professional class into which he expects to move. Interesting confirmation of the students' taste in clothing, for example, comes in their reaction to the European students who are to be found in 'beat' apparel of long hair, torn vests, shorts and basket ball boots.

We know only too well that we are Africans. But we are not a synonym to dirt. Thus, those of you who come to Africa after orientation think that you must look unkempt to measure to the national standards are also unwanted. Those too who knew us before Independence should not be trying to set what they regard as African standards since whatever conditions we underwent were oppressive and you cannot deny you were the oppressors' sympathisers.
A similar view is expressed in the news column of **UZ**.

The outside world is set on degrading the University. Some people are criticising students for dressing like 'Hippies' or Thugs. They say students go down Town in dirty Jeans and Minis, displaying uncombed and unwashed hair. This issue was also discussed on TVZ. [Television Zambia]

Student reaction has been to scoff at these allegations, 'because UNZA students are some of the cleanest students in the World'. Here suits are still 'in' and washing is not considered 'square'. The students asked the accusers to look at the modern American or British university students to see what being a Hippie is like. 146

In the examination of the relations between workers and students, evidence will be adduced to indicate that the student already looks upon them from the standpoint of a dominant class. The students adopt, to the extent that their income permits, a style of life which is in accord with their anticipated status as a member of a professional class at present dominated by expatriates.

**The Myth of Students as 'Leaders of Tomorrow'.**

If, indeed, students are not destined to hold positions in the political elite in the near future, if the recruitment patterns are designed to exclude students, and if in any case only a tiny minority could conceivably occupy such positions as high level decision-makers, then why do national political leaders (not to mention political scientists) continue to refer to students as the 'leaders of tomorrow', a presumptive elite, an incipient elite, etc.? Any ruling class perpetrates a set of myths which justifies the subjection of the ruled to the rulers. Thus the workers are exhorted to work harder for the spurious goal of the 'national good'. To
justify the continual censorship of the worker and his sub-
jection to the dictates of management, government has promoted
the myth of worker indolence, and worker indiscipline. Simi-
lar views have been promulgated about the student, that he too
makes insufficient contributions to the national goals, des-
pite the sacrifices made on his behalf by the common man.

But, I would be less than honest if I pretended
that you, the students, have all done as much as
was possible to you to involve yourselves in the
betterment of the welfare of your fellow men...
This university is the result of an enthusiastic
response of all sections of our community, rich
and poor, to the appeal for financial support...
That enthusiasm for the national good is not
being matched now in the university by an equal
determination among all the students to leave
not just the university, but the country as a
whole, better than they found it when they
entered the university... It is not too much for
society to expect the student body to be fired
by a missionary zeal; it is not too much for
society to expect and hope that students, who
owe it so much, will see fit to take an interest
in the social and educational problems of their
fellow men....

This is the most frequent moral assault on the students, but
there is, too, another less self-righteous but more benevolent
approach, associated with the inevitable process of genera-
tional mobility. The students, so the myth informs us, will
be the leaders of tomorrow. Therefore they should set an
example to the rest of society in the way they behave, that is
they should behave responsibly pursuing the 'national good'.
There are also implications in this argument that the student
has no need to question the system or the leaders of today
since they, the students, will be soon taking over. Their
interests are identical with the incumbent leadership, namely
the preservation of the status quo. These assertions by those
who control the avenues to power inevitably evoke counter-
assertions and counter-myths concerning the nature and
characteristics of the incumbents within the ruling class in particular the political elite.

Whatever the myths and the idiom in which conflict is expressed, the underlying structural features which represent the source of the tension between students and those who control or hope to enter the avenues to political power remain the same, namely competition for those positions which entitle their incumbents to a share of the wealth of the country. Ultimately the tension between students and the remainder of society results either from the fact that they will inevitably enter the higher income brackets or from the potential challenge they present to those who have either managed to enter the ruling class, or are hoping to do so in the near future,
NOTES.

3. There are two major operating companies: Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines is responsible for Rokana Division (Kitwe), Nchanga Division (Chingola), and Konkola Division (Chililabombwe), Roan Consolidated Mines is responsible for Mufulira Division (Mufulira), Luanshya Division (Luanshya) Chambishi and Chibuluma Divisions (Kalaluashi). In addition NCCM runs the lead and zinc mine at Kabwe and RCM runs the Ndola Copper Refineries. NCCM was previously owned by Anglo American Corporation and RCM by Roan Selection Trust. With nationalisation Zambian AAC has a 49% share holding in NCCM and RST a 49% holding in RCM.
4. In 1967, for example, copper contributed 52% of Net Domestic Product and 97% of export revenue. RST and AAC, Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969 (Kitwe: Copper Industry Service Bureau, 1970), Table 2, p.28.
5. Statistical Year Book 1970, op.cit., Table 1.2(b), p.4.
6. Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969, op.cit., Table 1.4, p.42.
9. The price fluctuations on the London Metal Exchange and the production of Zambian copper as a proportion of world production is shown in Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969, op.cit., Graph II, p.37 and Table 1, p.27.
11. Figures are computed from Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table 14.1, p.165 and Table 14.8, p.172.
13. Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table 4.4, p.44.
16. Hall writes,

The Copperbelt was the milch cow and Northern Rhodesia suffered a net loss in the years 1953-63 of nearly
£100,000,000 - the bulk of which was used to develop Southern Rhodesia and the rest to prop Nyasaland. As though this were not enough, when the £280,000,000 Federal debt was divided up at the end of 1963, Northern Rhodesia was saddled with £96,000,000 - for which it had relatively little to show in the way of assets; it was more than five times the territory's national debt in 1953.

Hall, 1969, op.cit., p.61.


19. The targets may be summarised in projected enrolment figures included in the First National Development Plan. Enrolments (Number of children).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual, 1963</th>
<th>Actual, 1966</th>
<th>Planned, 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>342,125</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>699,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>6,525</td>
<td>16,910</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are taken from Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table I, p.158. For further details of the plan and the difficulties it was confronting in the first two years see Mwanakatwe, op.cit.

20. Statistical Year Book of Zambia 1970, op.cit., Table 3.8(a), 3.8(b) and 3.8(c), pp.32-4.


22. Figures are taken from the addresses by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia at the first, second and third graduation ceremonies.

23. Ibid.

24. In 1970, 79% of the students were on Zambian Government Bursaries. In 1971, the corresponding figure was 76%. (Figures supplied by the Comptor Centre and Registrar's Office.) For an outline of the quotas for the different fields of study see Mwanakatwe, op.cit., pp.193-4.

25. In August, 1969 considerable publicity was given in the Zambia Mail to mental disturbances amongst students who had been forced to do courses they were not interested in. Dr. Nunn the government psychiatrist at Chainama Hills Hospital said that in 1969 alone 'he was treating 10 to 15 students, some of whom got upset as a result of their courses.' Zambia Mail, 22 August, 1969. There was also an editorial on the matter in the Zambia Mail, 29 August, 1969.


28. Ibid.


30. For an analysis of the relations between the legislature and the executive see Tordoff, W. and Molteno, R., Parliament (To be published in a forthcoming book on Zambian politics.)

32. Young, op. cit., p. 52.

33. Scott and Molteno, op. cit., p. 44. Also data kindly provided by Ralph Young of Manchester University.


39. This analysis follows Molteno (1971), op. cit., p. 6.


41. Ibid., p. 11.

42. Ibid., pp. 2-7.


45. Conversations with Kasuka Matukwa.

46. Such a policy of depoliticisation has been noted by other commentators in reference to other countries. See for example Weiner, M., *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chapter VII.

47. Mwanakatwe, J., Opening speech at the First National Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students, Oppenheimer College, 12 December 1964.

48. In other African countries the appearance of party branches supported from outside suggests either a greater willingness on the part of government to tolerate student participation in the national political arena, or the desire to regulate student political activity.


50. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

51. Ibid., p. 5.

52. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

53. Ibid., p. 8.


58. Opinion Poll One, Question 12.


60. Opinion Poll Four, Question 11.

61. Press Release by the Publicity Secretary, NUZS concerning the Third Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students held at the University of Zambia from 2nd to 3rd September.


70. Mwanakatwe, J., Speech at Munali Secondary School, 1 April 1967.

71. Times of Zambia, 4 April 1967.


73. Matakala, M., Address to the Seventh Annual Congress of the National Union of Zambia Students, 22 August 1970.

74. In Tanzania the national service met with severe opposition from the students, leading to the closure of the university and the suspension of 300 students in 1966.

75. Opinion Poll Two, Question 15.


78. Although we have an idea of how educated men regard their kinsfolk, we do not know what their kinsfolk think of them; nor do we know enough about how other sections of the community view them. (p.85).


80. Ibid., p.83.


87. Kaunda, K., The Challenge of the Generation Gap (Speech by His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda, Chancellor of the University of Zambia on the occasion of the graduation of its second students, on Saturday 6th June, 1970), p.2.
Sikota Wina has been one of the most prominent politicians in the country. At present he is the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism. Though he went to Fort Hare University in South Africa he never completed his degree, being expelled for political activities.


Wina, op.cit., p.7.

Wina, op.cit. Answer to questions from students. Tape Recording.

President Kaunda, for example, explicitly complained in 1969 that enthusiasm for the national good is not being matched now in the university by an equal determination among all the students to leave not just the university, but the country as a whole, better than they found it when they entered the university...I would be less than honest if I pretended that you, the students, have all done as much as was possible to you to involve yourselves in the betterment of the welfare of your fellow men.

(Address by Dr. K. D. Kaunda at the First Graduation Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 17 May 1969.) Kapwepwe has been the leading politician to come out openly in favour of student participation in national politics as is witnessed by his call for a branch of UNIP on the university campus and the incorporation of nine students into important positions in his new party, UPP. Mr. Arthur Wina, at that time Minister of Education, expressed the following sentiments in Parliament,

Finally I am hoping that the discussions which are now under way with the appropriate authorities of the University of Zambia should be able to produce some form of national service, that should again enable the students of our University to redirect themselves to the service of the country and the service of the common man.

Hensard, No. 13, 8 March 1968, col. 848.

Wina, op.cit. Answer to questions from students. Tape Recording.

Ibid.

There are at least two occasions. The first was over the dispute between Dingiswayo Banda and the NUZS leadership already referred to. A second instance was over the statement made by NUZS President in October 1970 which was interpreted as a refusal on the part of students to take up their allotted places in the UNIP National Council. On this occasion the district governor in Lusaka threatened the President of UNZASU with UNIP youth if the latter did not conform to UNIP demands.

This will be considered in a later section. Suffice it to say that police the world over seem to relish the idea of butchering students and, if their behaviour at the annual demonstrations outside foreign embassies is anything to go by, then the Zambian police are no exception to the rule,
97. During their spell in a prison cell after the demonstration of 1971, students not only launched into a tirade of abuse at the police but scrawled derogatory remarks on the walls to the effect that the police were 'uneducated and illiterate' and needed to be educated in government policy and that Zambia was no longer a colonial regime. The students were delighted when the newspapers of the following day echoed their sentiments.


100. During the vacations the writer worked with students on sociological projects on the mines. From conversations with the students and from their field notes the deference they were accorded is apparent.

101. Indeed they do so repeatedly and exaggerate the contribution of the population at large out of proportion as a political tactic to impress upon the students their responsibility to the Zambian population and the importance of placing the interest of the country (which in practice means support of the status quo) above their own narrow interests (which are usually at odds with the status quo).

102. There appears to be a widespread view that the university is a glorified school where students absorb information imparted to them by their teachers. This is the colonial-missionary concept of the school and even amongst students has a considerable influence. The idea that a university is a place of independent and creative thought where information is analysed and interpreted rather than merely absorbed continues to elude those who have never attended a university, which is the vast majority, not only amongst the subject classes but also within the elite. In its public relations the university has been very weak and has failed to present any image of its function and role in society.

103. The difference is well illustrated by Collins and Ben-David who distinguish between those university systems which embrace a well-defined and accepted role for students in society and those which don't. In the British system there is close rapport between government and university because those who control both the institutions and the relations between them have been 'socialised' through the same universities and educational processes. In Zambia there is no congruity of educational experience between those who run the university and the leaders of the party and government. See Ben-David, J. and Collins, R., "A Comparative Study of Academic Freedom and Student Politics," in Lipset, S. M., (ed.), Student Politics (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), pp.199-252.

104. The existence of thriving student wings of political parties in the universities of Western Europe and America suggest that the university rather than being a threat to the party leaders is seen to be an important reservoir for recruitment. Thus for example in 1959 over half of the Members of Parliament in the British House of Commons had degrees. See Sampson, A., Anatomy of Britain Today (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.44.


107. When the word is used in this thesis it is as a 'status group' within the ruling class.


110. See Goldthorpe, op.cit., Chapter One, pp.1-23.

111. This term owes its origin to my colleague Morris Szeftel and expresses the students desire to enter the élites.


114. Ibid., p.4.

115. This is the definition which Shils has tended to use in defining intellectuals of the 'new states'. See, for example, Shils, E., "The Intellectuals in Political Development of the New States," in Kautsky, J. H., (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), Chapter Four, pp.195-234.


122. Ibid., p.24.


125. The analytic distinction between comparative and normative reference groups corresponds to the two functions

127. Goldthorpe (1965), op.cit.
128. Ibid., p.23.
130. Finlay, op.cit., p.51.
133. Hanna, op.cit., p.423.
139. Ibid., p.31.
140. For an analysis of the theoretical concept, 'anticipatory socialisation' see Merton, op.cit., pp.319-25.
143. Burawoy, M., Expectations of Form V Students (Personnel Research Unit, Copper Industry Service Bureau; Kitwe, 1969).
144. Ibid., p.29.
146. UZ, 4 May 1970.
CHAPTER THREE

SOURCE OF TENSION:

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY.

As a determinant of student behaviour the structure of the university social system must be awarded as much consideration as the structure of the wider social system. It is possible that the two structures give rise to dissonant status-sets and conflicting definitions of the student role. In such circumstances what social arrangements are available for counteracting the potential instability between the different status-sets and how does the individual cope with the conflict? An attempt to answer such questions will be the subject of succeeding chapters, while this chapter will be concerned to analyse the student role-status in the university social structure.

The Constitution and the Liberal University.

In exporting, transplanting and implanting education into its colonial territories Britain pursued a policy which acknowledged only one form of education - British education. This was no less true in respect of university education than of any other field of education, no less true of Africa than of India. During the crucial two decades before Independence when the education of the peoples of the colonial territories expanded at the greatest rate, it was the Asquith Report which set British policy for establishment of universities in her colonies. Ashby records the following assessment.

The Asquith Report was Britain's blueprint for the export of universities to her people overseas. In the eyes of those who have used the blueprint over the last twenty years it has become more than a mere statement of government policy; it has been elevated to the dignity of a doctrine. Policy, which should be a convenient working hypothesis,
became hardened into dogma, resistant to criticism and change. People talked of the "Asquith doctrine" and referred to university colleges in Africa as "Asquith colleges". The doctrine was a vivid expression of British cultural parochialism: its basic assumption was that a university system appropriate for Europeans brought up in London and Manchester and Hull was also appropriate for Africans brought up in Lagos and Kumasi and Kampala. There is no sign that the commission considered whether the university systems to be found in Minneapolis or Manila or Tokyo might be more appropriate. In fairness to the doctrine, let it be said that it left room for some adaptation; indeed it encouraged changes in syllabus to suit African conditions and it stressed the importance of research into African languages and cultures. But the fundamental pattern of British civic universities - in constitution, in standards and curricula, in social purpose - was adopted without demur. Colonial universities were to begin as most of the provincial universities in England began: as "university colleges" which would be transmuted into universities when they acquired charters to grant their own degrees. From the outset they were to be self-governing societies, demanding from their students the same entry standard as is demanded by London or Cambridge; following curricula which might vary in detail but must not vary in principle from the curricula of the University of London; tested by examinations approved by London and leading to London degrees awarded on the recommendation of London external examiners. And as for their social function, the colonial universities were to be completely residential, and their prime purpose was to produce "men and women with standards of public service and capacity for leadership which self-rule requires." In short, they were, as in England, to nurture an élite.

Of the new universities in the African nations the University of Zambia was one of the last to be constructed. It was therefore able to learn from the little experience of universities established elsewhere in the continent, particularly West Africa. The Report on the Development of a University in Northern Rhodesia (1963), which was subsequently adopted as a policy document by the Zambian government, contained within it recommendations which suggested departures, albeit not as significant as some would have liked, both from the
Asquith Report and the patterns of universities in British West Africa. Ashby delineates three influences which have acted to modify the Asquith plan over the last two decades.

There have been local influences arising from national needs and aspirations of the newly independent nations; there has been the influence of academics from the United States of America who believed (and in the event have convinced the British that their belief was right) that American concepts of higher education have relevance to Africa; there has been the influence of a few British academics, such as John Lockwood, who have encouraged flexibility and adaptation in African higher education.3

It was indeed Lockwood, an ex-Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, who chaired the committee which reported on the University for Northern Rhodesia. The supposed change of heart among British educationists concerned with the development of education in the colonial territories just before their political independence, is reflected in the Lockwood Report's declaration of intent.

The starting-point of our inquiry into the establishment of a university has been a two-fold conviction; first, that the university must be responsive to the real needs of the country; secondly that it must be an institution which on merit will win the respect and proper recognition of the university world.4

What those 'real needs' are is left undefined in specific terms but the two-fold conviction is translated into a number of recommendations which depart from the traditionally accepted pattern of African University education. In the belief that standards of admission should be relative to the supply of educated personnel at the secondary school stage and should not be so high as to preclude all but a tiny minority of extremely able students, the commissioners recommended that a suitable performance at "O" level of the
G.C.E. examination should be regarded as the normal entrance requirement. As a result degree courses would take four rather than three years. To facilitate a greater responsiveness to the environment and problems particular to Zambia, the restrictions involved in sponsorship from an overseas university would be removed by the immediate establishment of a fully independent institution. To assure itself a meritorious place in the international academic community, external examiners would be appointed to guarantee the University of Zambia degree as being of an internationally recognised standard. Course content, syllabi, faculties and the degree structure were all designed with a view to tackle those problems and meet those demands which Zambia would make of the University, particularly in the provision of Zambian manpower. Thus a quota system defining the number of students entering each field of study would be devised to take into account the shortages of Zambians in certain professions such as teaching. Subjects which might normally be considered as part of 'further education' in England were to be included in the degree courses. A deliberate attempt would be made to make the facilities of the nation's only university open to as great a proportion of the public as possible through correspondence courses allowing those, who could not attend the university in a full-time capacity, to study for a degree. "Summer schools" held in the vacations would complement the work done through correspondence. No distinction would be made between external and internal degrees. For the full-time students the government would provide grants to cover fees, books, residential and incidental expenses. During the academic year 1970, 79% of students were on government
bursaries, which stood at K450. Of this K180 pays for full board, K120 goes on fees, K40 is a book allowance, K3 goes to the student union, K1 goes to a medical fund, and K10 is caution money. The remaining K96 is pocket money.

The above recommendations represent 'concessions' to the manpower needs of Zambia, and in many political circles these needs are regarded as the only legitimate ones the university is expected to satisfy. The Lockwood Report, too, gives little attention to any other national needs to which the university must be responsive. Thus the constitution of the University of Zambia is modelled on the 'two tier system' of the British civic university with its Council composed of both lay and academic personnel and a Senate composed of leading members of the university community. In this area there has been little adaptation. Yet the experience of universities in West Africa suggest that some modification might assist the university to exist in harmony with the rest of society, and to remain sensitive to the prevailing political moods outside the university. It is debatable whether the political structure of the British civic university, which has grown up around the defence of academic freedom and university autonomy, is equally suited to the social and political structures of African nations. Lockwood makes some such suggestion in an article devoted to 'The Transplantation of the University'.

Even democracies in Africa are more authoritarian than in countries where they have flourished longer, and universities will probably have to rethink their position. That is why they should refuse to hark back to ideals of absolute freedom and, in taking a new stand as occupying a central role in national development, exercise a freedom of decision and enterprise which does not attract interference.
But this view finds no reflection in constitutional amendments in the Lockwood Report.

It is easy to be critical of the Lockwood Report and suggest that its recommendations do not go far enough, but the constraints under which a new university is established present severe limitations on the changes which can be incorporated. Thus the expectation of the Zambian government and the Zambian people in general that their university be of international reputation might lead any radical departure from what is commonly accepted as a Western University to be interpreted as a second-rate substitute. In this context radical adaptation would signify inferior status. Second, in view of the expense of a university and its central role in fulfilling the manpower needs of the country, the cost of experimentation would be so high as to constitute too big a risk. The third constraint revolves around the reliance, for some considerable time to come, on the supply of expatriate lecturers who will expect to find similar facilities in the University of Zambia as he would in his home university. A discussion of what should be the nature of the University of Zambia is not germane to the present examination of Zambian students and the following sections will consider the nature of the university community: its physical and social structures.

The Physical Structure of the University.

The Lockwood Report rejected the suggestion that the University of Zambia comprise a collection of the "existing colleges upgraded to university standard" and recommended that the university have its own headquarters on its own campus. It should be located near Lusaka so that it can be
integrated into the life of the capital city and be a focus of national and international activities and conferences. The precise location recommended and accepted was three and a half miles along the Great East Road from the centre of Lusaka, but a short cut across fields halves the walking distance. Until the first building had been constructed students studied at the Oppenheimer College for Social Work, now referred to as the Ridgeway Campus. The latter is next to the University Teaching Hospital and all the medical students are still accommodated and attend most of their lectures there. In 1968 the new campus was brought into operation and in subsequent years expanded until in 1971 there were 1200 students residing there with a further 300 on the Ridgeway Campus. Only very few students do not live on one of the campuses.

The main campus, though only three and a half miles from the centre is nevertheless isolated from the rest of Lusaka. Transport into town is infrequent and students normally have to make use of the taxis that run along the Great East Road. Only a handful of students have cars and virtually none have bicycles and during term-time, except at weekends when many students visit friends, relations or enter the neighbouring townships for a drink, they remain on the campus. Transport between the two campuses is more frequent and university buses are used for this purpose. The university is a self-contained community with meals, snacks, drink, stationery, books, newspapers and other incidentals all available on the campus.

Despite the words of Mwanakatwe ("...the University's staff and students should restrain their demands for better living conditions, bearing in mind that the University was not
intended to be a prestige institution which would create new and unrealistic standards of living."\textsuperscript{13} It was his government that decided to accept the Lockwood Report and to build the undoubtedly prestigious university buildings. No one can fail to be impressed by the splendour of the architecture - though many may find it aesthetically discomforting - the spacious lawns and the artificial lakes which adorn the front of the university. The halls of residence are no less comfortable, albeit noisy, and impressive, as is the library. Of the five blocks of Halls of Residence, four are for the men while a fifth block a quarter of a mile away on the other side of the campus is for the women. A series of new blocks are due for completion in 1972. Recreational facilities for students are not well provided for. There is one football pitch, a rugby pitch, four tennis courts, a bar where beer is sold in the evenings and a cafeteria open in the mornings and afternoons. More often than not dances are held on Saturday nights but being in a minority, girls tend not to attend them. There is no focus for informal student recreational and social activity, apart from the bar, as would be provided by an outdoor swimming pool or a student union centre. The lecturers' accommodation is scattered around the eastern side of Lusaka, presenting an obstacle to casual staff-student relations.

The compact and self-contained structure of the university conduces to a cohesive and closely-knit community. The few foci of activity makes communication easy and rapid. Consequently the community leaders can easily mobilise support for any particular cause or in a crisis situation, just as the community is very vulnerable to outside forces as when, for
example, the police and the army surrounded and took over the campus.

The Social Structure of the University.

The component sections of the university community — students, administration, skilled and unskilled manual labourers and academic staff — all interact on the same campus. While cohesion generally characterises relations within each group, divisions, conflict and indifference characterise relations between groups. The following discussion will confine itself to a description of the composition of the groups and an analysis of the relations between each individual group and the students.

The academic staff is nearly all expatriate, and of the expatriates only a handful are black — these coming mainly from other African countries. In addition there are a few Indians. Many are young and come out to Zambia on three to five-year contracts not long after they have graduated from their home university. The distribution of the lecturers in 1969 according to where they received their academic training is indicated in Table 9:

**TABLE 9 — ACADEMIC TRAINING OF 1969 LECTURERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. Degree only</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. Degree only</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. or U.S.A. Degree and Other Western Degree</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western Degree</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Degree and/or South African Degree</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree in Developing State and Western Degree</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree in Developing State only</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree in a Developing State and Socialist Degree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Degree</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The dominance of lecturers with only a 'Western Degree' - 72% of the total - suggests that many had relatively little experience in teaching in an African country, though a small number of lecturers had spent a great proportion of their time in Africa after receiving degrees in the 'West'.

For the majority who find themselves in an African university for the first time a period of adjustment is necessary to acclimatise to the new environment and student. Entering the university at "O" level after passing through a type of secondary schooling which develops the reproductive faculties rather than the analytical and critical faculties in the tradition of missionary education, whose content is often divorced from the experience of the student and whose medium is not the student's mother tongue, the Zambian student faces problems which do not exist for students in the "metropolitan" countries. This creates corresponding difficulties for the lecturer. The incentive to learn is also withdrawn because of the little competition amongst the students assured of good jobs after graduating and confronted with a relatively low failure rate. The lecturer for all these reasons may find it difficult to stimulate the students even if he makes serious attempts in that direction.

Whereas in his home universities, the lecturer is expected to make contributions to both teaching and in research, the central function of the University of Zambia as fulfilling urgent manpower requirements inevitably leads to a disproportionate emphasis on teaching at the expense of research. Research facilities in the natural sciences are necessarily, from purely financial considerations, less well developed in Zambia, though clearly certain branches, such as medical
research, are of central importance to the nation's welfare. In the humanities, apart from the matter of expense, different barriers obstruct the lecturer from carrying out research. The shortage of statistics, the lack of tradition and acceptability of research in the social sciences, the sensitivity to and suspicion of criticism, the impediments of race consciousness and a heritage of poor race relations, and the necessity to learn Zambian vernaculars if the researcher is to make meaningful contact with all but the tiny minority of English speakers, present formidable obstacles to the effective conduct of research. Though by no means insuperable, few lecturers are sufficiently committed to Zambia to stay there a sufficiently long time to overcome these obstacles and carry out research which might assist in planning for national development but would invariably help the lecturer to make his teaching relevant to the experiences of his students. Until such a body of knowledge and research on Zambia is available the lecturer will have to rely on foreign material less likely to interest the student. In addition to the normal teaching burden during term-time, lecturers are expected to prepare notes on their lecture courses for correspondence students and to teach these students at classes convened at residential courses during the vacations. This further reduces the time available for research. The de-emphasising of research has one consequence particularly germane to the discussion here, namely the corresponding enhancement in the importance of the student in the university community. Decisions made in political organs of the university, more than is usual in other universities, revolve around the interests of the students.
Obtruding on the traditional student-teacher relationship is the all pervasive black-white relationship which seriously affects the institutional climate in which teaching takes place. In the established universities of the colonising powers relatively little importance is attached to the nationality of the lecturer (though there have been a number of instances where political views have affected staff-student relations), but in the new universities of Africa trying to emerge from the heritage of colonial domination, colour becomes a significant factor of orientation in many contexts.

Relations between students and lecturers are characterised at most universities by apathy and uninterest on both sides. Relations between students and lecturers at the University of Zambia are particularly stiff due to the intervening factor of race. Student regard for the lecturer is characterised by the deference-resentment syndrome; deference towards his supposed erudition and competence as a lecturer and resentment towards the continued presence of white men in positions of authority. In different contexts, different students will regard the actions and views of different lecturers in a positive or negative light according to their relative emphasis on resentment and deference.

There are clear indications that different students will react in different ways to the expatriate lecturers. Some more than others will resent their presence. The first opinion poll for example suggested a spread of attitudes towards lecturers. Students responded to questions as follows,

There is too little interaction between students and teachers

76% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 9% disagreed
Lecturers are not interested in their students.

36% agreed, 36% were uncertain, 28% disagreed

The ambivalence expressed in the second set of responses suggests a spectrum of positive and negative attitudes towards lecturers, while the first set of responses represents the expectation that lecturers should make attempts to improve relations with their students. The more self-assured and academically orientated students are the ones most likely to take a positive attitude towards the lecturers, seeing them more as lecturers than as expatriates.

Students appraise lecturers not only in terms of their capacity to teach effectively, as they would do anywhere else, but also in the implicit attitudes they adopt towards the students as Africans. There are those lecturers who appear to be excessively harsh (often well-meaning lecturers who have had prolonged contact with Africans) and those who appear as excessively lenient—a form of inverted racialism common amongst those who have had little experience of teaching in an African environment. As far as the student is concerned, both these types over-identify with the 'problems of black students' either through criticism or sympathy. Both, therefore, emphasize the student's blackness as though he were a member of a backward "species" of mankind. On the other hand, the students recognize another type comprising those lecturers who are too insensitive to the difficulties of the black student.

An editorial in the student newspaper UZ summarises the position.

We think there are two types of lecturers who are no good for this place. There is the lecturer who does not see things beyond his lecture room. He is too preoccupied with dishing out principles that have to
be applied in exams to secure as many degrees for his students as possible. He fails to grasp the extra-mural bearing of his students. He succeeds in manufacturing problem-solving machines out of his students without understanding them. He therefore fails to help them think rationally.

The other type of lecturer is the one who tends to over-react. He thinks he is a modern Rhodes' mission here to solve the problems of the indigenous people. Always a trespasser, he does not realise that some problems had better be solved by the Nationals themselves. In the end his 'enthusiasm' distracts him from reality and he ends fed up with Africa and all she breeds.  

Students will stress the expatriate role or the lecturer role according to the situation. Thus in those situations where there is a betrayal or opposition to what students conceive to be their interests the expatriate role will be stressed. In those situations where support is rendered to the student or opposition to the student's enemies is voiced then the lecturer role is given emphasis. Once they step out of the very narrow definition of the lecturer role, they automatically lay themselves open to student attack in the idiom of their expatriate status.

A group of British Citizens living in Zambia last Thursday sent a telegram to Edward Heath, the British Premier, opposing a renewal of arms' sales to the Republic of South Africa. While appreciating this progressive stand taken by these Britons, we at the same time question the sincerity of the move. As British citizens working in Zambia, their primary aim is the security of their jobs. They believe that the resumption of sales of arms to South Africa is a 'hostile act towards Zambia - our host country'. However, it is also our sincere belief that the protest is a superficial one - a hypocritical move. We believe that once in Britain, these same people can be ardent supporters of Enoch Powel - the national hero of the majority of the British people. We see this protest move as a security measure to their contracts. By simple calculation, they hope the renewal of their contracts will be easy. In fact they know that the telegram will in no way sway Heath from his policy of sending arms to the Boers in the Republic of apartheid.
Most notably amongst the 'British citizens' was a group of lecturers and it was against these that the editorial was directed. Yet when the lecturers are perceived to be siding with the students against or subjected to pressure from a common opposition then they are viewed in a more favourable light. Following the university crisis of July 1971 when the university was closed and the ten member executive of the students' union suspended, two lecturers were deported presumably for instigating or supporting the students' action. After the university had reopened an opinion poll was run and students were asked to state their views over the deportation of the lecturers.

The deportation of the two lecturers was in the interest of the nation.

3% agreed, 10% were uncertain, 87% disagreed\textsuperscript{21}

This was an unambiguous expression of solidarity with the lecturers against the government. Divisions based on colour were dissolved. Thus, the manner and extent to which the racial or expatriate factor affects relations between students and lecturers varies from student to student, from lecturer to lecturer and from situation to situation. But at no time was there any major confrontation between students and lecturers.

The lack of interaction which characterises informal relations between students and academic staff, also characterises, as one might expect, relations between students and the manual labourers employed by the university. From time to time students have complained about the shortcomings of the cleaning and kitchen staff stimulating an exchange of hostilities between students and the University Staff Association.
A strike\textsuperscript{22} by the association provoked a number of letters in \textit{UZ} complaining about the 'laziness' of the association's members. The President was later reported in \textit{UZ} to have attacked students at a meeting of his association.

The President of the UNZA non-academic staff association slammed the University undergraduates for what he called "utter disrespect" towards members of staff.

Addressing his members on Friday \textit{Mr.\ldots.} referred to students as "being too conscious of themselves as if they were already graduates". \ldots. He went on to say that negotiations were under way to enable workers to have a free lunch at the university as no transport was provided to take workers for lunch\ldots.\textsuperscript{23}

The reactions in the letter pages of the following issue of \textit{UZ} were equally hostile to the staff.

This is to answer \textit{Mr.\ldots.} who said in his article [sic] in last week's 'UZ' publication that students are feeling conscious of their education. This is baseless and shameful. Does he expect us to remain silent when his men don't dust off tables in the study-bedrooms? When waiters can't serve us properly, when cooks cook poor food, what does \textit{Mr.\ldots.} expect us to do? Your men are lazy today, \textit{Mr.\ldots.} After that strike of yours, I don't see why your men should have their pay increased. Toilets go without toilet paper or fragments; we eat 'raw' eggs; knives, forks and spoons are just heaped together (not arranged as before the strike); cobwebs fill the study-bedroom ceilings\ldots.

If he continues, the relationship between students and the non-academic staff will be as "rider and horse". And of course we shall be the riders and the workers the horses\ldots. \textsuperscript{24}

Other letters were equally devoid of sympathy for the workers' case, suggesting that the students had assumed the posture and attitudes of a dominant class. Thus in the confrontations between the staff association and their employers - the university authorities - the students supported the latter.
Equally, the administration has been reported as openly supporting the students in their feud with the workers. When the 'canteen' (cafeteria) refused to sell copies of *UZ* because of the anti-worker letters it had published, the bursar was reported to have dismissed the "seller's action as bunkum, adding that the canteen did not belong to the non-academic staff association". Though at no time have the students come out in support of the staff association, the latter did extend support to the students after their confrontation with the government in July 1971. When the university was reopened the President of the Staff Association made the following remarkable gesture in a widely distributed open letter to the students:

> The Central Executive of the University Staff Association is very pleased to welcome you back to your normal studies. In view of this, the entire Executive of the Association together with its members had planned to hold a Free-Welcome Dance at the Ridgeway Campus this Saturday. But after reviewing the whole position of the other ten comrades of your Executive who are not with us today, we have found it very unfitting to welcome you at a dance in the absence of the other comrades.

Though probably a tactical move designed to attract the support of the students in their pursuit of improved working conditions, it must also be seen as an expression of solidarity with the student defiance of external oppression from the government. Again relations, generally characterised in terms of class distinctions and antagonisms, under certain circumstances, give way to solidarity.

In so far as the students did not sympathise with the workers' cause, so they became allies of the employers - the university administration. Yet relations between students
and the administration have not always been cordial. When students arrived in March 1971, for example, for the beginning of the academic year they found little organisation in the provision of accommodation and many spent their first few nights in corridors or together with two or three others in rooms meant for two. A demonstration was staged for the first time within the campus against the university authorities for their inefficiency. The Registrar came in for bitter attack and though he was black, students exploited his expatriate status suggesting that this made him unconcerned about Zambians and that he should return to Ghana from whence he had come.

More significant, perhaps, is the administration's responsibility for student discipline. The responsibility for discipline rests ultimately with the Vice-Chancellor but in these matters he is advised by the Dean of Students who mediates between the students and the administration in non-academic matters. The episode in which three students were suspended in ways which appeared to the student body as arbitrary, illustrates some aspects of the relations between students and administration. The students' point of view was presented in a circular written by the President of the students' union.

I presume most of us have been greatly concerned about the crime-penal complex especially in as far as it affects the recently suspended and expelled students. We are concerned about this not because we do not agree that the students involved may have been guilty of some misconduct, but that we strongly question whether

1. the offences committed merit the form and severity of the punishment that goes with them.

2. the decisions which were taken were based on dependable sources and a genuine review of the cases with clear cut evidence from both the
accused and the accuser at the same hearing, in person and with the incorporation of individuals such as may be necessary in the particular case to help by way of providing such information as may lead to a sane judgement of the case.

3. the governmental channels followed, be it by precedent or not, were the appropriate ones.

4. the publication of letters such as concern private individuals serves any purposeful motive at all. 30

Not only did the President criticise the arbitrary decisions made by the Dean of Students with the support of the Vice-Chancellor and the manner in which the student union executive had been by-passed, but he convened a meeting of the three governing bodies within the student community - the Hall Councils, the Council of Representatives and the Union Executive. The purpose of the meeting was to consider what action, if any, should be taken on behalf of the suspended students and what recommendations be presented to the Vice-Chancellor for a more satisfactory judicial and disciplinary machinery. All this was duly done with a list of recommendations submitted to the Vice-Chancellor to the effect that future cases of indiscipline be first reported to the Hall Councils which would then, as required, be passed onto the Council of Representatives and in the more serious cases brought before the Union Executive for consideration and recommendation. 31 In those cases where misdemeanours are reported direct to the Dean of Students without passing through the Hall Councils then the former should refer the case to the Union Executive. These recommendations for greater student participation and consultation in disciplinary matters were approved as a basis for future disciplinary procedure with but few amendments. 32
The above case suggests that the students are concerned to gain as much control as they can over decisions which directly affect them. It also points to the willingness of the administration to respect student demands for participation and consultation in university affairs. An index of student participation in university decision-making forums may be gauged from Table 10, indicating student participation on university committees.

**TABLE 10 - UNIVERSITY COMMITTEES ON WHICH THERE ARE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES.**

- The University Senate (3)
- The Student Affairs Board (8)
- The Library Committee
- The Bookshop Committee
- Part-time Degree and Diploma Studies Committee
- Public Relations Committee
- The Advisory Board of the University and the Community
- The Adult Education Committee
- The Centre for African Studies
- The Scholarships and Prizes Committee
- The Regulations Committee
- School of Natural Sciences Committee (5)
- The Long Term Revision of the Degree Structure Committee (2)

(Figures in brackets refer to number of students on the committee.)

Negotiations were going on for student representation on the
University Council, but have not yet been accomplished because such an arrangement requires parliamentary legislation. In the administration of the university, the student is accorded considerable importance and he is often consulted through his representatives before decisions are actually made. Thus, for example, before the university reopened, after it had been closed in July 1971, the Vice-Chancellor consulted a representation from the student body as to what he might say in an opening address to the returning students to cool off what promised to be a very tense atmosphere.

Because the research function of the university is relatively insignificant, the teaching function takes on a correspondingly increased importance and consequently student affairs become the pivotal concern of the university. Academic politics are cast in the idiom of the student interest. The importance attached to the student is reflected in the respect he is accorded in the decision-making processes within the university where his genuine participation is greater than would normally be found in universities. The administration and the academic staff have both respected student autonomy and the rights of the union executive to run its own affairs in its own way. There has been a considerable reluctance on the part of the administration and academic staff to interfere with specifically student affairs. The union executive has considerable influence over the running of the university, but how much influence has the individual student over the decisions made by its executive? The next section attempts an analysis of the political structure of the student community.
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE STUDENT COMMUNITY.

A discussion of the formal organs of student government is insufficient as an explanation of the distribution of influence within the student community. Therefore consideration will be given to the responsiveness of the leadership to the demands and opinions of the led, and also to the forms and extent of student participation in the government of their community. At this juncture no reference will be made to divisions within the community arising out of diverse origins relating to race, nationality or tribe. The influence such divisions have on student government will be considered in following chapters.

Institutional Mechanisms of Student Government.

All registered full-time students of the University of Zambia are members of the University of Zambia Students Union (UNZASU). Union dues of three kwacha per student are deducted at source. The UNZASU Executive Committee has twelve members including a President, Vice-President, Secretary General, Vice-Secretary General, Treasurer, Vice-Treasurer, Social and Cultural Secretary, Sports Secretary, Publicity Secretary and three Committee Members. Elections to office are normally held once a year in two stages approximately one month after the beginning of the new academic year. The first stage is a contest for the post of President and at the second stage, held one or two weeks later, the contest is for the remaining posts.

Over and above the UNZASU Executive, there is a more authoritative body - the Council of Representatives - composed
of five members elected from each primary unit of residential organisation together with the union Executive making at most thirty seven members. The Chairman of the Council of Representatives is the President of the union. The main task of the Council is to review the activities of the union executive and normally meets once or twice a year. It has the power to recommend to the student body as a whole the suspension or dismissal of any member of the union. Thus in 1971 the Council of Representatives sat to discuss the 'misappropriation' of union funds and decided to dismiss the incumbent Social and Cultural Secretary and to suspend the Treasurer from their offices. Following the government's suspension of the entire student executive from the university, the Council, at a meeting on 30th September, 1971, decided to refer the question of fresh elections to the entire student body. The Council if it is convened can act as a powerful formal check on the union executive.

Social Status of the Leadership.

The mechanisms for overturning the incumbent union executive each year and the provision, which has been used, for the Council of Representatives to dismiss or suspend members of the executive during their term of office in themselves go a long way to promoting a leadership sensitive to the needs and demands of the led. In a discussion of the structural prerequisites of democratic government in trade unions Lipset\(^{35}\) has suggested that status differentials between the leaders and the led is conducive to oligarchic government. The desire to retain high status and rewards of leadership will encourage the incumbent leadership to resist its
democratic removal through the control or suspension of elections. The greater the status differential between the leaders and the led the more determined will the former be to eliminate those 'democratic' procedures which threaten to unseat them. This is particularly true when the deposed leaders have no alternative but to return to the lowly status from which they rose. Though student leaders lose their status when they leave office, and become once more a member of the led, nevertheless the descent is not a great one. Within the student community the rewards of leadership in terms of power, prestige and wealth are relatively small. Indeed the history of the UNZASU executives suggests that leadership involves considerable risk to a university career. The first President in 1966, a student from Kenya, had to leave during his term of office and his successor also left while still in office. The next President was overthrown together with his executive for abusing his powers and establishing a close relation with government which almost led to the introduction of a student national service. 1967 witnessed the short and eventful career of Henry Chanda who was suspended from the university by the Vice-Chancellor after leading a demonstration against the Zambia Mail and writing what was interpreted in government circles as a highly insulting letter to the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, Aaron Milner. The following regime of 1968 was led by a Rhodesian who was dismissed from office by the student body for the misappropriation of funds. The same fate befell the Malawian student elected to President the following year. Only Marshall Bushe - President in 1970 - managed to stay a full year in office. The entire executive of 1971 was suspended
half way through the year by the government. Such a history might well discourage students from standing for positions in the union executive, but add to this the normal burden of academic studies which are not lightened for members of the executive, it is remarkable that there are so many contestants for the posts. In other countries to have been President of the Union is regarded by outside society as a prestigious and creditable achievement which places one in a favourable position when it comes to applying for jobs for example. In Zambia partly because of the lack of a university tradition and partly because of the low esteem and suspicion that enshrouds the graduate, such prestige is not conferred upon the ex-president when looking for employment. His position as President has only enabled him to possibly establish contacts with members of government which may conceivably afford him a favoured position on graduating. Given a relatively low status and few rewards, the member of the union executive is not likely to try and perpetuate his position in office, even if he survives for the entire academic year. Therefore democratic procedures within the student community are unlikely to be threatened by the student executive.

Participation in the Small Scale Community.

Lipset suggests that one of the guarantees of democracy in private government is high level of participation amongst the membership and in those trade unions where this takes place he speaks of an "occupational community". The frequent interaction of union members in all spheres of life appears to make for a high level of interest in the affairs of their unions, which translates itself into high participation in local organisations and a greater potential for democracy and membership influence.
The residential university, such as the University of Zambia, represents an extreme form of "occupational community" where members live, eat, work and play together all within the same confined area. This too makes for a very closely knit\textsuperscript{13} and therefore cohesive community in which many of those with whom one interacts, interact with one another. Communication between students in such a confined geographical area is easy and discussion on affairs and issues affecting the student community finds no obstacles. Since nearly all students eat at two contiguous dining halls, circulars distributed there at meal times will be read by the vast majority of the community.

Because the student community is so concentrated and because it is still a small-scale society there is no need for an administrative bureaucracy to run its affairs efficiently. Thus one of the main deterrents to democracy - bureaucracy - has not appeared in the community.\textsuperscript{14} Instead, leaders are inevitably always accessible to the led and, therefore, cannot avoid continual pressure from the rank and file to conform to the latter's demands and expectations. Unable to escape such pressure, the leadership tends to be very responsive to the led. Not only is the leadership accessible to the rank and file but its actions are, for similar reasons, very 'visible' to the community and any departures from acceptable practices are quickly brought to the notice of the entire community.\textsuperscript{15} Thus money is misappropriated not during term-time but during the vacations.

The consequences of bureaucratic administration, conducive to the development of oligarchical tendencies, are not present in the student community. There is no control over
internal communications, no censorship of views opposed to
the incumbent government and thus no formal obstacle to the
crystallisation of an oppositional group. Communication of
sentiments opposed to the incumbent leadership within the
student community can take place at the informal level through
social interaction, or at a more formal level through the
medium of circulars distributed at mealtimes, notices pinned
up around the campus or the convening of meetings. But
perhaps the most effective means of expressing opposition to
or criticising the union executive or, indeed, any other
interest in the student, university and wider societal com-

cmunities is through the medium of the independent press.

Student journalism has developed in fits and starts. The
first newspaper was the *Voice of UNZA* - printed for and spon-
sored by the student union for both internal and external
readership, which never really got off the ground until it
was revived in 1970 as a stencilled quarto size weekly. As
the Editor of the independent *UZ* claimed, being a mouthpiece
of the union executive, it would die a natural death. It
only ran for a few months. The publicity secretary of the
first student government of 1971 was also a keen journalist
and leading member of the UNZA Journalist club. He was con-
cerned to combine *The Spark* (the Journalist Club's newspaper
begun in 1969 which appeared two or three times each term in
a printed form designed to cater both for internal and external
readership) of which he was the Chief Editor, and the *Voice of
UNZA*. Eventually with the financial assistance of the univers-
ity administration *The Observer* was floated and has so far
gone into three issues. This too was as much aimed at the
wider public as it was to the student body. The price which
must be paid for a student newspaper with as polished a format and presentation as the Observer is the loss of independence and a limitation on the type of article which can be accepted. Sponsorship from the union or the university administration has frequently led to tension and conflict between the editorial board and the UNZASU executive, particularly when the executive comes under attack in the newspapers. Secondly the considerable time lag between going to press and the completion of printing (some two weeks) renders news items largely obsolete when read by the student. An external audience is essential to its success and this too affects the content. For these reasons the printed newspapers have not normally had a very long life nor have many issues appeared. However, as regards the independent press produced solely for internal readership the success of the eight to fourteen page weekly, UZ, is unrivalled. Undoubtedly the most popular student newspaper produced on the campus, priced at two ngwee and selling approximately 800 copies each Monday, UZ caters for a wide range of interests and exhibits a quality which varies considerably from week to week. It is produced spontaneously over the week-end on stencils and receives a small revenue from advertisements. It was begun in 1969 and in 1970 became an 'institution' at the campus producing some twenty-one issues. The same number appeared in 1971.

There have been occasions when UZ has unveiled union executive practices which are not wholly consonant with the student interest and invited the students to question the legitimacy of the union leadership. In one of its issues UZ revealed under the headline 'Students angered..."filthy UNZASU"', that the social and cultural secretary had been
misusing his powers. He was accused of choosing his own 'adherents' for people serving on the television programme Your University and that these people were 'not worth the job at all'. In addition UZ reported that

...twenty-one students, including three girls, are to go and attend conferences in U.S.A., Europe and East Africa. The names of the students going to these places may not be revealed to avoid embarrassment...Meanwhile Mr.....has denied that the choice of students going overseas was his own responsibility...”

Writing in the Voice of UNZA, three days later the UNZASU Publicity Secretary in an open letter to the Chief Editor of UZ warned

The role that your paper, UZ, has assumed is disastrous, divisive, degrading, unimpressive, and to say the least has fallen short of serving the students' interests,...Many members of this community - female and male - have been petitioning me to ban your paper. It would be painful for me to such a thing for I believe in the freedom of the press, and not the sarcasm, bias, abusiveness of the Press.

The UNZASU government is now asking you to change your course of journalistic manoeuvre, and we hope for this change, the sooner the better...”

Both the Chief and Senior Editors of UZ were called before the union executive to explain their actions but the meeting ended with

UZ still maintaining her complete sovereignty. The Secretary General and the Publicity Secretary remained adamant to all positive evidence substantiating the allegations...”

The following issue of UZ devoted five of its fourteen pages to some of the letters sent in supporting UZ in its 'struggle against corruption' and attacking the publicity secretary for his uncalled for tirade on UZ. In fact the Editor-in-Chief became very much a hero in the eyes of the student body, and
the UNZASU executive had little alternative but to cancel plans for student participation in foreign conferences, and to bow to overwhelming student opinion. UZ had in this instance clearly reversed an UNZASU executive decision against its will, highlighting its influence over student government. This was the only unequivocal example of a dramatic reversal in policy effected by the student press. The probability that 'malpractices' will be discovered and revealed in the press must make student government very wary of actually engaging in activities that would be regarded as illegitimate. In other words the power of the student press and student opinion resides more in precluding from the outset certain choices of action, than in influencing which of a number of legitimate modes of action is actually chosen in the decision-making process. This 'restrictive face of power' is all the more effective because of the accessibility and visibility of the leadership in the small-scale community.

Apart from the control of communication oligarchical governments tend to monopolise the chances of learning the political skills, necessary to unseat the incumbent leadership. Here again the nature of the student community makes any such monopoly impossible. One of the bases for selection to enter university rests on a person's ability to articulate his views, and there are many occasions when he can exercise such abilities in front of a student audience. Apart from exploiting the written medium of the student press and mealtime circulars, participation in student societies affords opportunities of assimilating and learning political skills. There are a wide variety of societies and associations on the campus but few have established themselves as active bodies and it
is the same people who tend to run each society. The University of Zambia Dramatic Society (UNZADRAME) is probably the strongest and most successful society on campus. It has in the past competed, with considerable success, in national amateur dramatic competitions. It has staged a number of well received and well publicised performances such as the dramatisation of Che Guevara before delegates to the Non-Aligned International Conference of 1970 and the open-air clay Chikwakwa theatre was built by members of UNZADRAME. Apart from UNZADRAME there is an active Student Christian Association which meets regularly once or twice each week. There are also the less well patronised associations and societies linked to broad academic disciplines such as the Medical Association, the Engineers' Association, the Education Association, the Economics Club, Public Administration Association, the Business Association, Geographical Association, Law Society, and the Sociological Association. Significantly there is no political association, though in 1968 such an association, with distinctive Marxist or socialist flavour, did exist but this collapsed after the departure of its key members. There is no branch of any political party on the campus and the body nearest to any consistent political gestures has been the Sociological Association which has taken it upon itself to invite prominent politicians and ex-politicians both from the government and opposition benches to come and talk to the student body on political matters of topical interest. There is also an active debating society, which naturally promotes the skill of public speaking. Holding an important executive position in any of these associations offers the aspirant leader a platform for publicity.
However, such associations do not promote their own candidates for office in the union executive to the same extent as is to be found in, for example, British Civic Universities where active participation in a political society is in some cases a sine qua non for a successful campaign for position in the union executive or student representative council. Because of the small size of the student community at UNZA candidates for office do not depend on sponsorship by some organisation. Affiliation to a particular association or commitment to a political orientation are largely irrelevant to the appraisal of candidates in the student elections at UNZA.56

Nor do these associations, partly because they are not yet established, act as pressure groups for the pursuit of the interests of their members. Though there are small disbursements available from union funds the student government has little influence or impact on the associations and their interests cannot be furthered through the application of pressure to the student union executive. Since the leadership is accessible to the rank and file and responsive to the demands and expectations of the latter and because the interests of the student community are relatively homogeneous there is little need of organised pressure groups to promote the interests of the rank and file. As a result there are no strong organisations which mediate between the student and his leaders.

Just as the union executive is accessible to influence from the led so the rank and file are available for mobilisation by the leadership. This is readily observable in the participation patterns of the student body, particularly in crisis situations. Thus overall participation in such events
as voting are relatively high. 66 per cent of the students voted in the 1971 presidential elections and 48 per cent in the 1970 elections.\textsuperscript{57} The relative low turnout in 1970 may be accounted for in terms of the historical record of 'irresponsible' leadership involving 'corrupt practices and excessive drinking' and the adverse criticism levelled against all three contestants as equally unsuited to the position of President. Student demonstrations staged outside the British High Commission in 1970 and the French Embassy in 1971 had very strong followings. An estimated 90 per cent of the student population were involved in the first and over 60 per cent in the second. Over 50 per cent of students would attend meetings addressed by eminent politicians.

Whereas under normal circumstances it is the leadership which is responsive to pressure from below, in a crisis situation, demonstration, or packed political meeting it is the rank and file which becomes accessible to 'mass mobilisation'. The structure of the student community - its cohesiveness based on common interests and its close-knittedness\textsuperscript{58} - fosters rank and file mobilisation and the resistance to the development of countervailing pressures. The absence of strong organisations, interest groups, etc. mediating between the leaders and the led militates against the expression of opposition to the majority view. In circumstances where it appears to the majority that unity is vital, minority views are not tolerated and if necessary crushed through pressures of intimidation.\textsuperscript{59}
Conflict between the Student Body and the Union Leadership.

Inherent in any leadership is an element, however slight, of bureaucratisation. Though the union is keenly sensitive to pressure from below, nevertheless other pressures are brought to bear which conflict with the interests of the student body as a whole. The existence of cross pressures contributes to the instability of the position of the President of the Union. Since the inception of the university in 1966 only one President has managed to stay his full term in office. The remainder lost their posts for any of three reasons. The first category is suspension by the university authorities for leading or partaking in public criticism of the government or one of its most senior leaders. A second group have been ousted by the student body itself for 'corrupt practices' in particular the misappropriation of student union funds. Presidents in a third category were suspended from office for entering into a tacit alliance with government leading to the advocacy of views dissonant with the student interest as perceived by the student body. Consideration of the first category will be deferred to a later chapter, while the second and third categories will be considered in turn as manifestations of the disparate and often conflicting interests of the leaders and the led.

In the eyes of the student body, the use of union funds to meet private financial obligations, while emphatically condemned, is nevertheless an established practice amongst officers in the union executive. At the UNZASU General Meetings, the item that invariably excites the most controversy and suspicion, as well as consuming the greatest time, is the
one related to financial matters. No student government is free from suspicion and at least two Presidents have been deposed for alleged misappropriation of funds. Scandals of 'corrupt executives' appear regularly in the pages of UZ. The newly elected student government of 1971, set up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate an alleged misappropriation of funds to the tune of seventeen thousand kwacha. The Commission established to its own satisfaction that there had been some considerable misappropriation of funds and was able to isolate certain members of the executive as clearly guilty of misusing union funds. (Though the Commission maintained that some seventeen thousand kwacha had indeed been lost, they were not able to discover precisely how this came about.)

So frequent have been the accusations, and in some cases they have been proven beyond doubt, that the rank and file expect each executive to 'misuse' funds and the more cynical suggest that students stand as candidates with the express intention of making a personal financial gain if elected to office.

Such a view of leaderships is not confined to the student body but prevails amongst trade union memberships, outside the university. In the country at large there is evidence that the ruled look upon the national leadership as 'lining their pockets' with public money. Leaders are indeed expected to favour their kinsmen or tribesmen in the distribution of the available valued goods. Thus 'corruption' of this kind is at once both condemned and exploited by the led and in this way perpetuated.

Interpreted as a manifestation of traditional, particularistic values by some social scientists, the Zambian justifies such practices by reference to African tradition in
which primordial or particularistic loyalties to kinsmen, tribesmen etc. are given greater emphasis and value than commitment to the wider public. But corruption is a universal phenomenon to be found not only in Zambian or other such societies but in private and public governments throughout the world. Lipset, for example, considers that corruption is a consequence 'of specific social structures where conformity to one norm necessarily involves violation of another norm'.

According to Lipset, corruption in trade unions in America stems from the conflict between the norms of achievement and democracy both, in his view, fundamental components of the value system of American society. Though this may indeed explain the source of 'corruption', it does not explain why in some situations such a conflict of norms gives rise to 'corruption' whereas in other circumstances it does not. In other words what generates a commitment to particularistic norms at the expense of universalistic norms?

Rapid upward group mobility, as when the Zambian political elite took over from the colonial government, promotes a state of anomie in which pre-existing social constraints are cast aside. The social constraints imposed on a subject group by a ruling class are no longer applicable to the emergent group, which rises into the positions vacated by the colonialists. Thus while the social constraints of the colonial era are cast aside, no new set makes its appearance to contain the behaviour of the 'new political elite'. Pressure from below and from the side are unavailable to establish a commitment to universalistic norms over and above the pursuit of private interest. Once the political elite establishes a pattern of behaviour which is readily observable as
emphasizing particularistic norms, then, being so salient a reference group, other leaderships in society award corresponding legitimacy to 'corrupt' practices.

Commitment to particularistic as opposed to universalistic norms will be governed by a balance of pressures. Amongst student leaders the pressures towards particularism may come from without in the form of obligations to kinsmen or the adoption of a particular life style appropriate to the status of a student leader or from within in the form of keenly felt personal aspirations and desires, accentuated by a background of poverty. On the other side, universalistic commitments will be pursued according to the sanctions the student body can apply to its leadership for 'misusing' public funds. In the past the student body has been able to apply no other effective sanctions but moral censure and suspension from office. The money 'misappropriated' has never been recovered.

The execution of 'corrupt' practices will be contingent on available opportunities. In the case of the student government the check-off system of contributing to union funds and the authority to dispense with that money residing within the executive offers ample opportunity for channelling money into private pockets rather than union projects.

Finally the partial commitment to particularistic norms may be interpreted as a 'reward' for a partial acceptance of universalistic norms. Thus student leaders may regard the channelling of union funds into their own pockets as an appropriate reward for the services they have rendered to the student body. This is likely to be the case in those communities where voluntary service is not acknowledged as rewarding in itself. There is indeed a significant absence of voluntary
activities amongst Zambian students in contrast to the numerous such activities which take place for example in British universities.\(^{67}\) On the other hand, the status and prestige accorded to the position of President of the Students' Union outside the university in England is very much greater than it is in Zambia where it has connotations of arrogance and elitism. The small status differential which separates the student leader from the led and its poor image outside the campus is compensated for by taking possession of some of the union funds. In this way the rewards for taking on the onerous and risky role of President of the union are extracted in a manner which may not be necessary in the context of universities in other societies.

A further significant factor in the disbursement of union funds brought to light by the Nguni Commission was the absence of a reliable accounting system.\(^{68}\) The failure on the part of executive to introduce such a system may be attributed either to ignorance or to a deliberate neglect with a view to facilitating the use of student funds for private purposes. Though 'corruption' quickly excites the indignation of the student body, the betrayal of student interests to the individual interest is in many ways preferable to a betrayal to the government interest. There have been two issues on which the student leadership has yielded to lateral pressure from government rather than succumb to counter-pressures from the rank and file. The first concerned a prospective National Service to which the student body was opposed and the second concerned the appropriate action to be taken to ensure that student bursaries were increased.

After the President had invited a group of approximately
twenty students, including the union executive, to the State House for dinner and explained to them the problems the country was facing, the union leadership and others who had been invited began to urge for the introduction of national service for students. This initiative from the leadership was rejected by the student body as a whole, and, indeed, the leadership must have been aware that this suggestion was not very popular, as an opinion poll had earlier shown.

Students should be forced to participate in a National Service of one year before receiving their first degree.

36% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 55% disagreed

As early as 1967 the incumbent President was ousted by the student body because he had been conducting negotiations with the government for the introduction of a National Service for students. In both cases the leadership was responding to the national interest rather than the narrower student interest.

The second example concerns the issue of student grants. The student body have been clamouring for an increase in bursaries for some time on the grounds that they had not changed ever since the university had begun. Negotiations with government had seemed to break down and many apparently wished to demonstrate over the issue, as early as March 1970. The student government brought into office in April 1970 set about renewing negotiations with the government. Presenting a summary of the situation, in May 1971, just before leaving office, the President said that the proposals now being considered should bear fruit but if they didn't then there was no other course of action than some form of demonstration. No
progress was in fact made and the third opinion poll revealed students' preferences as regards possible demonstrations.

When students in other parts of the world are demonstrating against U.S. presence in South East Asia then we should also demonstrate.

26% agreed, 14% were uncertain, 60% disagreed\textsuperscript{70}

If economic sanctions on Rhodesia are formally lifted by the British Government then students should demonstrate outside the British High Commission.

53% agreed, 17% were uncertain, 30% disagreed\textsuperscript{71}

If student bursaries are not increased then a demonstration should be staged outside the Ministry of Education.

70% agreed, 12% were uncertain, 18% disagreed\textsuperscript{72}

Though the demonstration over student bursaries had the greatest appeal, it was a demonstration against the French for their assistance in augmenting the South African supply of arms, which actually took place. The student leaders were very unwilling to stage a demonstration for the purposes of increasing student grants for a number of reasons, but uppermost in their minds must have been the risk they incurred from a hostile government. Student leaders are generally cautious about staging public demonstrations which express student opposition to government policy. (The two that have been so staged have ended up with student leaders suspended.\textsuperscript{73}) The bursary and national service issues represent the two most notable instances of the student leadership making voluntary concessions to 'moderate' leadership.

Though the student leadership is generally responsive to the demands and expectations of the led, this is not the view
of the latter as the first and third opinion polls indicate.

Student leaders do not represent the student body as a whole.

54% agreed, 32% were uncertain, 14% disagreed
51% agreed, 23% were uncertain, 26% disagreed

The expression of dissatisfaction reflects on the one hand the expectation of unwavering loyalty from the leadership and on the other hand the checkered history of executive officers who have been ousted for misuse of student funds or for establishing close ties with government. That only one government has survived its full term in office is as much an index of the expected devotion to the interests of the community, as it is of the unrepresentativeness of the student leadership.

In choosing their Presidents, students have elected those candidates who were the least likely to submit to outside pressures detrimental to the student interest and who were the least likely to 'misuse' union funds. This may be a partial explanation as to why, of the last four Presidents elected by the student body, three of them have been non-Zambian Africans. The status of 'aliens' - as they are referred to - is thwart with insecurity and the government has been loth to offer them citizenship rights and in some cases has refused to extend residence permits. At the university he has often been the subject of abuse for his sometimes close affiliation with white students, particularly females, and for his lack of interest in fighting for the freedom of his homelands in Rhodesia and South Africa. The Rhodesian or South African black is therefore very vulnerable to pressures from the Zambian students and a President from one of
these nationalities would be very wary about antagonising the student body. Secondly, being an alien, the Rhodesian or South African President would have less interests in establishing a close affiliation with government, than the Zambian President whose future is in Zambia and whose support could be canvassed for on a sectional basis.

Though the student community will attempt to exercise the fullest control over its executive, nevertheless as the university expands in size so the student government will be bureaucratised with increasing status differentials between leaders and led and a less accessible and visible government. Such tendencies could lead to an executive more amenable to outside pressure and private interest and less sensitive to the demands of the rank and file.

**Incompatible Political Structures as a Source of Tension.**

A leadership sensitive to the led and devoted to the pursuit of the student interest to the exclusion of other competing interests in the wider society leads to what is seen from outside as 'irresponsible' or 'selfish' leadership. The very characteristics of the community which encourage high levels of participation in student government and which sensitise the leadership to the demands and the mood of the led, and therefore do not permit the moderation of those demands, are also responsible for tensions between students and the government. Unable to compromise the student interest in competition with a host of other interest groups in the wider society, the leadership is viewed by the government as extremist and irresponsible.

On the other hand, a bureaucratised form of government
whose continued existence is not so dependent on support from
the governed and less responsive to the demands of the rank
and file is better placed to compromise the interests of the
rank and file when competing with conflicting demands from
other sections of society. In moderating the demands made on
behalf of its membership, the leadership of the bureaucratised
private government may be rewarded with admission to the rul-
ing class where its bid for continual leadership will be sup-
ported by other sections of the ruling class. In Zambia, for
example, the bureaucratisation of the mineworkers' union has
led to the emergence of a leadership less sensitive to the
demands of its membership but whose continued dominance has
been made possible through legislative action by government
(the outlawing of rival trade unions and the legislation for
one union in one industry), support from management (the intro-
duction of the union dues shop so that the leadership no
longer has to 'fight' for following amongst the rank and file
with extremist demands) and the coercive machinery of the
state (the intimidation of rival leaders). The leadership,
having little legitimacy from the rank and file, nevertheless
pre-empts the emergence of an alternative less 'moderate'
leadership more responsive to the demands of the workers and
less responsive to pressures from management and government.  

Lipset has summarised the position.

Integration of members within a trade union, a
political party, a farm organisation, a pro-
fessional society, may increase the chances
that members of such organizations will be
active in the group and have more control over
its policies. But extending the functions of
such organizations so as to integrate their
members may threaten the larger political sys-
tem because it reduces the forces making for
compromise and understanding among conflicting
groups.
The structure of the student community which lends itself to active involvement by the students in self-government and which raises a leadership sensitive to the student interest, also brings the student body into tension with the wider society in particular the government. The tension will be the greater the lower the legitimacy of conflict in that society. The examination of the Zambian political structure in the previous chapter revealed it less able and the government less willing to tolerate opposition than in those societies in which the liberal university has been nurtured. Tension between students and government is, therefore, likely to be greater in Zambia than in England. At times when the government is less prepared to tolerate opposition, becomes more authoritarian and when stress in the political system is particularly acute, then tension between students and government will increase correspondingly. Again the more sectional are the student demands, the more tension they are likely to create. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a student leadership, concerned to protect itself, resisting some extremist student demands in an attempt to avoid kindling the tension between students and the government or party.

**STUDENT OPPOSITIONALISM.**

The intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries since they acquired independence, insofar as they are not in authority, do incline toward an anti-political, oppositional attitude. They are discontented. The form of the constitution does not please them and they are reluctant to play the constitutional game. Many of them desire to obstruct the government or give up the game of politics altogether, retiring into a negative state of mind about all institutional politics or at least about any political regime which does not promise a "clean sweep" of the inherited order. 80
Shils locates two sources of oppositionalism characteristic of intellectuals in the 'new nations', the first in the heritage of oppositional politics from the colonial period and a second in the aversion to bureaucratic legal government in contradistinction to the all-embracing diffuse authority of the 'indigenous traditions'. Over and above these origins there are of course those which characterise intellectual communities elsewhere. Lipset, for example, has delineated a set of structural factors which predispose the intellectual to 'leftism' in the United States of America, including the fear of the power of 'business', absence of conservative ideologies, isolation from the elites of the country, relatively low income as compared with other professions, the feeling that he is not accorded deference commensurate with his self esteem and the questioning of the status quo which inevitably accompanies any creative process. A number of these factors can be carried over into the Zambian context.

In the wider social system, the Zambian student has little influence over decisions of major consequence, and is excluded from active participation in the political system. His status in many contexts is low as a consequence of hostile propaganda and he is not accorded the deference that he believes his superior enlightenment deserves. His economic status, incomparably superior to all but a minority of Zambians, is at the same time equally inferior to the ruling class, conceived as the dominant reference group. Of itself, the student's role-status in the social, political and economic structures of society lends itself neither to feelings of deprivation or gratification. However, once a series
of reference groups and a set of expectations are introduced he evaluates his position in negative terms.

Though the most highly educated section of society, the student is nevertheless to be found outside the ruling class. Given the importance of education in the central systems of values and priorities, the student's elevated status in the educational hierarchy, 'incongruent' with his lowly position in the social, economic and political structures, fosters feelings of intense relative deprivation in these institutional spheres. In a 'Western' society a person, in particular a student, will hold positions in the separate institutional hierarchies of roughly equal status. The structures are said to be 'congruent' and deprivation deriving from inconsistent positioning in the different status hierarchies is relatively rare.

Deprivation in the wider political system is further exacerbated by the contrast of the political structures of the university system and the wider Zambian social system. Whereas the student participates in and influences decisions made by his own student government and by the university authorities he is accorded no such influence in the wider system.

Thirdly the student feels deprived on account of the difference between his present economic, political and social standing in the Zambian society as compared to his expected future status as a member of a professional class. All three factors typical of the student role-status in the Zambian social structure, intensify the feelings of relative deprivation felt by students and intellectuals in any society. The existence of such feelings of deprivation are possibly
reflected in the student's assessment of his position in Zambian society.

Students are an elite cut off from Zambian society.

24% agreed, 20% were uncertain, 56% disagreed

Students belong to the upper class of Zambian society

28% agreed, 14% were uncertain, 58% disagreed

Compounding the feelings of deprivation and inclining the student towards 'oppositionalism' is a further factor inherent in the liberal university, namely the conflict between the 'creative process' or 'search for truth' and the preservation of the status quo. As one student wrote in the columns of UZ.

The university exists to teach and pursue truth. It faces all around it and within it untruths. The student is told that he must search for truth and finds around him the denial of truth of life and liberty of masses of people in his country. He imbibes doctrines of equality and human rights and sees around him incessant violations of human rights. He is told that the basis of scholarship is objectivity and finds that his life and that of his parents and society is based on personal pursuits and impersonal egoism not high sounding philosophies. He is exhorted to use his imagination as an instrument of progress and sees its methodical abuse in the ingenuous transformation of sense into nonsense and nonsense into sense.

The liberal ethos enshrined in the outlook of the architects of the university, its two Vice-Chancellors (Dr. Anglin and Professor Goma - both brought up in the Western tradition of university education), and its academic staff is expected to develop the critical and analytical faculties of the student and therefore opposes the status quo, leading to an assault on the surrounding society.

Orientation to the political system, the national
leadership and the national philosophy reflect the influence of the above factors on the student's outlook upon society and his position in it.

**Orientation to the Wider Political System.**

Students recorded their disenchantment with the little influence they are accorded in the wider system in the opinion polls. Their assessment of that system and those who operate it finds expression in an idiom which acknowledges the university and student communities as an implicit frame of reference. The weekly columns of *UZ* provide ample evidence of the manner in which the 'moral criticism' is cast. 88

One dimension absent in the student and university government but present in the national government is leadership access to coercive force. It was noted earlier that the first clashes between student and UNIP revolved around the latter's use of force in its card checking campaigns and that in 1966 the NUZS Annual Conference condemned such action by the Youth wing of the party. 89 Students are particularly conscious of violence at the time of elections.

> When elections take place people will be barred from bars, shops and other public places. They will be beaten and police will just look on because there is a law which allows it so long as the man doing the clobbering belongs to the right party. Afterwards, big politicians, people who should have told their trigger-happy, stone-howl ing lieutenants what to say and do, will thank the common man for fairness and peacefulness of the elections. By that they will mean that not enough skulls were bashed in the Copperbelt, not too obvious rigging or miscounting of papers was brought to light.

90

Though there are effective institutional mechanisms for
controlling the leadership on campus, students perceive no such effective mechanisms at the national level. The formal elections conducted every four years and the continued existence of a formal opposition are looked upon with scepticism, because, in the student's view, the government fails to regard them in the spirit for which they were intended.

...it is interesting to follow the steps leading to the ballot. There is the business of campaigning. That the ruling party monopolises the campaigning media is of little doubt. It is not surprising that opposition parties find themselves campaigning indoors and do without posters because publishing companies for fear of getting into trouble with government, are often reluctant to print for them. Radio broadcasts which are solely in the hands of government, do not for one moment mention opposition parties' names unless for the sake of disgracing them in one way or another. The pre-voting period is controlled in such a manner as to allow as little publicity, if any, of the opposition as possible to reach the rural areas. A very embarrassing situation comes when opposition parties are banned only a few days before polling day. Their leaders are put under arrest on the excuse that the prevailing riots were initiated by them. While this may be a desperate action, let us look at cases where governments have been silent after hearing that their youths (some older than my father) started trouble and in a bid to retaliate, the opposition members were triumphant. Some governments do not hesitate to ban the innocent opposition and find themselves in a shameful position on hearing that those alleged to have started the trouble have been acquitted in court...

The state apparatus — the forces of coercion, the mass media and the law — is crudely seen as an instrument which the ruling class manipulates to perpetuate its rule. On the other hand, student government has no access to coercion, cannot control communications or the expression of oppositional views, and has no opportunity to influence judicial proceedings as, for example, in the case of the Nguni Commission which was virulently devoted to exposing the malpractices of student government. A further contrast between student and national
government is the social distance between the leaders and the led. Within the student community rewards in terms of status, power and wealth for taking up office are small and the descent into the rank and file is slight compared with the differentials which separate the leaders from the led at the national level. National leaders, if they lose their posts, would have difficulty in finding alternative positions with equivalent power, prestige and wealth. By contrast, the student leader can continue to be active and influential in student politics even after his term in office as an informal leader endowed with experience in student government. Ex-leaders are regarded with a certain reverence and are sought after for advice. Thus the President in 1971 would consult the President of 1970 on matters of student government and on occasions, where leadership was crucial as for example when demonstrations have been staged outside British and French Embassies, it was the student leaders of previous regimes who featured most prominently. To forestall a severe fall in status, the national leadership tends to eliminate those procedures which allow the replacement of one government by another culminating in the creation of the one party state.

Sad to imagine most African governments fail because the leaders (everyone of the Messiahs) purport themselves to be their own countries' Moses who must lead the flock to paradise - indispensable ones who will insult their electorate. The insults, the despotism, are tantamount to Moses hitting the stone fiercer than was commanded. The leaders will stand on a hill and look yonder to see what they'll forego. This is after they've clung to their posts - nations never use their best brains since they are a challenge to the old folk. Leaders talk like parrots and the electorate dance. Leaders pick on the dullest brains, breed them, and so the henchmen will never let go.
The one party state is perceived as a means of perpetuating and consolidating the rule of the incumbent leadership and eliminating opposition.

The most ardent devotees of such a system are members of the present ruling party. This is not surprising. These people see in the one-party state a guarantee of permanent office and less possibility of contesting in an election where they might lose their vote to the opposition.94

Opposition to the one party state was expressed in the third opinion poll.

The time is now ripe for the declaration of a one party state.

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed95

One final contrast is between the character of the liberal university and the authoritarian political system in which it is embedded. The liberal outlook, indelibly engrained in the outlook of the academic staff and leading administrators, extols the toleration of opposed views and the pursuit of critical assessment based on evidence, unconstrained by outside pressures. The political system of the wider society, however, is less tolerant of criticism and debate, and of the pursuit of learning irrespective of where it may lead; rather it is concerned to forge a degree of unity of thought, intention and deed which in certain areas may prove to be incompatible with teaching in the liberal university.96

Orientation to the National Leadership.

Though the ruling class can be decomposed into a set of parallel élites, one of these élites - the political élite - maintains a position of pre-eminence. The student looks to
this national leadership as the distributors of power and directors of national development. In their eyes it is less the system which 'makes the leaders' but more the 'leaders which make the system'. The assessment of the political system contains more than a tinge of 'Fanonism', and the critique of the national leadership, consciously or unconsciously, follows Fanon even more closely.97

Given his present feelings of deprivation, accentuated by aspirations to enter the ruling class, if not necessarily the political elite, the student seeks to distinguish two types of leaders; those likely to favour the student as a possible recruit to the central positions in the ruling class and those likely to favour the loyal party official.

It is strange to know that the present cabinet advocates economic development and change and yet they do not want to step down for young intellectuals to take over.

It must be realised that Zambia...is entering a period of serious economic development. Therefore in order that the period is not messed up by unskilled hands...[there must be]...more new political intellectuals on the political scene.

Mwaanga of the United Nations must come back and spearhead this revolution as he is a man of high calibre. The student union can publish a list of young dynamic politicians who have the development of their fellow men at heart and make sure its influence is used to get these young men the votes they need.

I am...convinced that the old men now in office must go. The vitality in them has faded away. They must be able to appreciate this change otherwise the revolution will not be preserved and its momentum will not be sustained.

The problem with our present leadership is that it tends to remain in power by using the white man and colonialism as a scapegoat for anything that goes wrong, instead of maintaining power by constructive development projects.98

The idiom of generations is again used, this time in the interests of the students to wrest power from the incumbent leadership.
The arguments Fanon adduces in his condemnation of the 'national bourgeoisie' litter the pages of *V2*. The exploitation perpetrated by the 'native bourgeoisie has only been achieved by its colonial predecessors'.

We have heard enough scandals that have been committed by our national leaders. The nation has waited patiently for the blow that would deal with them accordingly. The memories of colonial exploitation have revived when we think of the exploitation the common man is suffering at the hands of his native bourgeoisie.

The party becomes an instrument of exploitation.

The fathers of exploitation in this country have unashamedly hidden themselves under the protective umbrella of the Party.

The legitimacy won by the leaders of the liberation struggle has now degenerated into open hypocrisy.

Would I be a nationalist if I were to condone the activities of such tin-pot heroes just because they were in the forefront of the national liberation movement? Countrymen the time has come when complacency will only number our hey days. We cannot and must not let this country be ravaged and left bare by those who talk of daylight socialism on political rostra and yet afterwards engage in nocturnal discussions of how to amass money by exploiting the common man and sending their loot to Europe for it to earn interest, waiting for them until things become hot here.

And all this is consolidated in the exploitation of the common man.

It is now common knowledge that most of our leaders own farms, where cheap labour is obviously used...These farms are not meant to benefit the common man in any way...The so-called referendum gave us back our land but now we know who it was in aid of. The common folk thought that it was a beneficial deal on their side. They rushed to occupy those farms. They were turned out by the same people who had promised them the land. The land is for anyone who can buy it, it soon became clear to everybody. And who can buy it? Of course the high bracket guys. And who are they? ...The common man is left in the cold. His position has not changed even a little bit. He in fact is glaring hunger in the face because the
little money allocated for the improvement of his small garden is being stolen by some government underdogs.\textsuperscript{102}

The common man is portrayed as the innocent victim of an exploitative race of leaders.

I speak on behalf of the silent majority who are helpless in the face of this gigantic and monolithic leviathan which rewards one according to how much hoodwinking of the masses he has done....\textsuperscript{103}

The masses are presented as duped by their 'oppressors'.

These same rich 'responsible' men want to cheat the ignorant masses by preaching Humanism and exploiting the ignorant youths to go on 'seek and destroy' missions to terrorise the masses.\textsuperscript{104}

And it is here that analyses deviate from the Fanon argument, which rests on the claim that the 'common man', the peasant and the worker are well equipped to govern themselves, that they be not regarded as children who have to be led but as adults who are entitled to direct democracy in which they themselves make decisions which crucially affect their lives.\textsuperscript{105}

The party and the government are but instruments in the performance of the popular will, directly expressed. The student, on the other hand, sees the 'common man' as helpless, ignorant, incapable of resurrecting himself, apathetic and unresponsive to his own needs. He must be protected from the outrages of the national leadership and led in his own interest by those who know better - the enlightened few. The present leadership knows nothing but exploitation, caring only for its own aggrandisement which it pursues irrespective of the cost to the nation. The 'freedom fighters' have outlived their usefulness as leaders and must be succeeded by the younger, 'enlightened' intellectuals more responsive to the 'national good' and better able to lead the people towards
the 'eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance'. The evils of the present government lie not in the system, characterised by the gulf which separates the leaders from the led, but in the leadership which mercilessly operates the system in the defence and extension of the interests of the ruling class at the expense of the 'common man'. The students, albeit inarticulately, advocate the enthronement of the intellectual and demand that the 'old guard' defer to the dynamism and prowess of the young intelligentsia, as the recruitment reservoir for the legitimate leadership.

Ideology and Counter Ideology.

An examination of the student's orientation to the official national 'ideology' of Humanism provides an interesting illustration of his perception of the Zambian society. Humanism, a variant of African Socialism, seeks to combine elements of Christianity and Socialism with a view to formulating a 'man-centred' society in which the dignity of the individual is paramount. As in the case of other African Socialisms, Humanism draws sustenance from a conception of the 'traditional' African community as a mutual aid society, in which communalism is stressed rather than individualism, cohesion rather than conflict, acceptance rather than rejection, and widely spread responsibilities rather than narrowly defined obligations. This is a society in which man was highly valued and human dignity respected. All men are equal and none more privileged than others. Such is the socialist ideal which the Humanist society must strive to achieve while at the same time adopting the technological advances of Western society to uplift the material standard and the quality
of life. Society must be organised in such a way that the 'evil' effects of industrialisation as experienced in England during the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth, nineteenth and even twentieth century on the one hand and coercive apparatus harnessed to force industrialisation on the peoples of communist countries on the other hand must be both avoided. Industrialisation in Zambia must proceed but never at the expense of the dignity of men. The common man as Kaunda refers to him must control those decisions that affect him through an apparatus of participatory democracy, such as may be constituted in industry through worker control or works committees or at the village level in cooperatives. Above all Zambia must resist any tendencies for classes to develop, and to eliminate categories such as the rich and the poor. In other words Humanism rejects the association between a 'capitalist' economy, albeit state capitalism, and the formation of social classes.

As a code of behaviour, Humanism exhorts every Zambian to be a good Christian and love thy neighbour. It deplores all forms of discrimination based on race, creed or religion according every group in Zambia a significant role in the development of Zambia. It embodies, however, beyond these general statements no explicit or implicit conception of the dynamics of social change. It awards no group in society with an historic mission to champion Zambia's future. It sees the relationship between the introduction of 'modern' or 'Western' institutions and 'development' or social change in a simplisti-
development and practical significance is illustrated in public policy, where attempts have undoubtedly been made to reduce social inequalities, to remove any traces of racial discrimination, to gain control of the expatriate owned industries and banks and to strive towards equality of opportunity. In moving towards the Humanist Society, however, Zambia has faced serious obstacles which, in the short term, could probably be only overcome by the radical reconstruction of society. It is against this background that the students' views must be gauged.

An analytic distinction may be drawn between the people who espouse the tenets of Humanism, and Humanism itself, though of course the image Humanism presents and its characterisation in public policy is dependent on its interpretation by those responsible for its propagation. Thus perhaps the most widely accepted view of Humanism amongst students is of a veil redirecting attention away from the exploitation that continues unabated in its name. This view corresponds to Mannheim's 'particular conception of ideology' which

....is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of the situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests.'

For some Humanism is merely an exercise in hypocrisy.

While on [one] side Zambia's poverty, hunger and want is the accepted rule...on the other side the humanist travels in prestigious Mercedes Benzs....

Has the philosophy of Humanism managed to work in Zambia? The answer of course is no, mainly because of the dedicated efforts of the preachers of the doctrine. I am not a good Christian, but I think that somewhere in the Bible Jesus says, or at least implies that it is of no use to tell a child that if he sins he will go to hell, when you actually commit those sins in front of him.'
Perhaps the most radical and articulate critique was offered by Masautso Phiri, who specified and concretised the feeling of many students.

Zambians and expatriates alike have discovered the happy fact of the [width] of Zambian Humanism. Vocal adherence to the philosophy, they discovered, is a good cover-up for exploitation. Or in the name of high productivity they manage to squeeze out of the Zambian worker maximum labour possible. And it is difficult to pin-point who exploits in a Humanist state since if the government can pay its junior staff as low as K36.00 a month and still extract some National Provident Fund out of him, one wonders why a privatee should not do the same.

Because we define Humanism in terms of fairness, it is fair to obtain a loan of K25,000 at the expense of the common peasant who cannot even obtain fertiliser for his subsistence. This is an illustration of the failure of externalisation - in content and in practice of Humanism and its creation. Its widths has made it open to a variety of interpretations - and in truth (apart from Dr. Zulu's book and Fortman's After Mulungushi) - no serious debate has been undertaken by either our intellectuals or the mass media for the benefit of the unfortunate common man.

That scepticism and cynicism towards the sincerity of the exponents of Humanism, is widespread amongst students is illustrated in the third opinion poll.

The leaders of the Nation follow the precepts of Humanism.

10% agreed, 19% were uncertain, 71% disagreed

Humanism has provided the students with a cudgel to attack the hypocrisy of the national leadership.

Rather than appear revolutionary, Humanism is seen to buttress the status quo. As far as the student is concerned Humanism - to use Mannheim's terminology - is an ideology rather than a Utopian construct. It does not 'tend to break the bonds of the existing order' but rather represents a set of
situationally transcendant ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents. 112

Phiri pursues a distinction similar to Mannheim's between ideology and Utopia

In an attempt to explain the lack of critical writings on the subject of Humanism—whether literary or studies—one is tempted to look at the origin of ideologies in general. There are two kinds of origins of ideologies. The first is a reaction against existing systems—Marxism is such a kind of ideology. It attempts to find solutions to problems that are affecting society at the time. They cover socio-economic as well as political problems. The second originates from attempts to fortify existing systems. The rise of welfare societies and syndicalism in capitalist societies is an attempt to maintain the status quo. Most African ideologies are in the second grouping, and they must often attempt to justify certain actions of political leaders. Zambian Humanism offers an example of such ideologies which are often dry of any practicability and its exponents seem contented that it remains so. 113

Turning to the content of Humanism, students find its two sources of inspiration, Christianity and a 'romantic' conception of traditional society, particularly disconcerting. Though many students have experienced intensive religious teaching, the more 'radical' have rejected it as the hand-maiden of colonisation and exploitation. It is seen as a Western system of thought through which the colonised people were cowed into submission. Kandeke in a 'socialist' critique of Humanism is particularly contemptuous of its association with Christianity.

Our HUMANISM in Zambia should not appear to be based too much on religion. We have had enough of the ecclesiastical empty teachings of Hebrew ontology, cosmology and metaphysics. Religion is no longer a 'unifying' force. See how the White 'Christians' in America interpret "LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR"...by lynching
the Black Christians! What is becoming of race
relations in Christian Britain? What is the
answer of Christian Germans torturing other
people in Auschwitz? The religious Moslem
northerners of Nigeria massacred like mad the
Christian Eastern IBOS (of Biafra), a couple of
years ago. The same is true of northern Arab
Moslems and Black southerners of Sudan. The
late South African premier, a Doctor of
Divinity, strongly described and subscribed to
the philosophy of apartheid which Socialist-
Humanist condemn as immoral. Can somebody tell
me the logic of orders in the Roman Catholic
Church, or the so many sects in Christianity?
In our country of Zambia, what is the story of
Lenschina and her religion; and how much
national unity are the Watch Towers promoting
in our fatherland? How does one expect a
people to be politically united when they are
so divided religiously? This is one of the
many reasons why our HUMANISM in Zambia should
not, I repeat SHOULD NOT have a religious tint

Whereas Kandeke condemns the intolerance of religious fanatics,
others have attacked the very opposite trait in Humanism; its
passivity and lack of militancy and its tolerance of the mis-
demeanours and aggressions of others. The cool and at times
insulting reception accorded President Kaunda in London and
New York when, as Chairman of the Organisation of African
Unity, he led a delegation to the Western world in a bid to
arrest the supply of arms to South Africa outraged the student
body in Lusaka. The following commentary is taken from the
issue of UZ following the President's return to Zambia.

Heath the British Premier is said to have 'sent
a group of black leaders packing'. He told KK
point blank that Britain would never be in-
fluenced in her actions by black natives who
after all had been granted independence by the
Tories. Nixon, in cahoots with the monk Heath,
flew to California instead of seeing the 'ugly
faces' of black leaders...KK surprised and
shocked us when he advised us not to hate
whites just for the stupidity of one man even
though he is their leader...We expected KK to
do what Nasser did in 1956. After he was re-
buffed by the West who refused to finance the
Aswan dam project he dramatically nationalised
the Suez Canal owned and controlled by the Western Capitalists. He told the people "let the Western powers choke in their anger". We therefore wanted KK to announce en masse one hundred per cent nationalisation of the mines, banks and other Western companies and let the capitalists choke in their rage. But to our embarrassment and shock, KK wants us to turn the other cheek. We want justice now because to go on our knees to people who insult our leaders at dinner tables and ask them for mercy is not only contrary to revolutionary ethics but also a symptom of utter helplessness. It is time we forgot our so-called western beneficiaries and look elsewhere for true friends. We are fed up of being acquisitive to western morals of toleration and "love thy enemy".115

The Humanist ideology has no revolutionary content, and indeed it harks back to a tradition which is seen as the very antithesis of revolutionary change. The romanticising of the African past as some form of idyllic existence, common to most varieties of African Socialism, is viewed as irrelevant to the needs of present day Zambia.

The long existence in the history of African liberation of the desire - preparatory or otherwise - has been the creation of an identity - a black identity. The massive poems of the negritude type are the product of an African's attempt to rediscover his self. Unfortunately Zambian Humanism rises from the embers of this spent-out force - that blacks since they suffered for centuries must now get back not only the controls of power but also the controls of wealth. And at the same time it fails to extricate the black man from the frivolous disposition of white man's luxuries. To the current exponents of Zambian Humanism it suffices that ten out of a thousand blacks own shops in what was once a white area - or that they are able to drive long mercedez benz cars - and play golf on Sunday afternoon at what once were whites only clubs. The movement of blacks to such pompously prestigious areas becomes an entry into an elitist shell for a selected few. It is similar to the desegregation process now going on in America which always leaves the grassroots to fend for themselves.116
By invoking concepts of a traditional society without classes, without exploitation and without conflict, Humanism fails to come to terms with what the student perceives to be the real and genuine Zambian society in which inequalities are glaringly obvious. He becomes increasingly bored with pleas from the national leadership that the problems inherited from the colonial era or perpetrated by the nation's enemies - both internal and external - must be held responsible for the present inequities and economic problems.

Our Humanism in Zambia should be directed at breaking down the existing false walls and privileges which are dividing our society into classes. The education system of having types of schools, or the health system of providing two types of medical services, was considered socially immoral during the struggle for independence. During the political struggle we charged that it was immoral from the Humanist point of view, to segregate people on purely racial or social grounds. We accused the colonialists of providing separate residential areas. We even accused the powers that were, of separate burial places. What is the excuse for continuing such capitalist-moral practices in Zambia?....

In our Humanism in Zambia, economic reforms should be aimed not at transferring capitalism from foreign hands into local hands, thus creating national bourgeoisie and capitalists, but at completely changing the present social structure which appears to be not different from the pre-independence structure. In order to raise a new Humanist sanctuary the old capitalist sanctuary must be destroyed, that is the law! 117

Humanism embraces all groups in society exhorting each to behave in a neighbourly way to every other. It eschews any recognition of conflicting or disparate interests, stressing the contribution of each section of society to the goals of national unity, and national development. This is presented as an unambiguous goal, no reference is made to
priorities in national development, nor to the political decisions which must be made to establish that set of priorities which will inevitably favour one group at the expense of another. Humanism gives no specific guide as to how scarce resources be distributed. It offers the student no plan of campaign in which national reconstruction can proceed, it has little revolutionary content that could be concretised in student action and it fails to appeal to any prejudices which might unleash a vigorous assault on the nation's problem. Apart from its manipulation as a shield for the protection of the exploitative practices of the national leadership, many students also perceive it as incongruent with the needs and realities of Zambian society.

Humanism is relevant to the needs of Zambia.

50% agreed, 20% were uncertain, 30% disagreed

A more negative picture emerges on consideration of the views of students taken year by year. Amongst the first years 61% felt Humanism to be relevant, while the figure for second years was 45%, for third years 40% and for fourth years 18%. No such differences appeared either between subjects or sexes, and the association between year and attitude towards Humanism in part reflects a process of increasing cynicism towards the affairs of Zambian society as they have developed over the last four years. The fourth years are likely to be the most cynical not only because of developments over the last four years but also because they have greater knowledge of political manipulations at the national level than those who have only recently left school. The older students have also been more intensively socialised into the political culture of the
university student community.

One of the main areas of congruence between the student outlook and the philosophy of Humanism is the acclamation of nationalism. In those situations where students and leaders activate the same role – the Zambian role – as, for example, they do when faced with aggression from other countries, then there is an identity of interest. The yearly occasion on which students demonstrate outside a foreign embassy for its support of the South African or Rhodesian regimes begins as a ritual of solidarity with the government, though it normally finishes as a confrontation between the students and the state as represented by the police. In asserting nationalist fervour, the students urge more radical measures than the government has been prepared to take, in nationalising the mines and sustaining an aggressive policy towards the South. The clash between extremist and moderate nationalism is a potential source of conflict between students and the government, akin to the distinction Weber draws between the 'ethic of responsibility' and the 'ethic of absolute ends'.

Having rejected Humanism as an ideology which formulates an acceptable conception of Zambian society or which offers inspiration to action, have the students articulated a 'counter-ideology' to take its place? Socialism in any of its varieties has little appeal amongst the students, and except for a tiny minority it is regarded with distrust. (Though this does not discourage students from using socialist critiques to shower abuse on the national leadership.) Indeed students oppose socialist, egalitarian ideals with the ideals of a meritocracy, congruent with their interests as students and as an incipient professional 'class'. While their antagonists
outside the university refer to them as a privileged minority — the 'favoured sons of the nation' — who should be grateful for the sacrifices made on their behalf, the students retaliate by arguing that they arrived there on merit and it is this that accords their position legitimacy. Anyone can apply to enter the university, each case will be considered on merit and those admitted will have earned the right to a place at the university. Applying the concept of meritocracy to the wider society, they deplore the practices of selection to posts based on loyalty, kinship or tribal links (though as individuals they would probably not be averse to accepting positions gained in such a manner). In their view, merit, defined in the narrow sense of formal qualifications, should play a much greater role as a criterion of entry to the national élites.

Oppositionalism and Populism.

The oppositional mentality typical of the Zambian student is no less characteristic of intellectuals elsewhere. Shils has noted the phenomenon amongst intellectuals in the new states in general and in the case of the Indian intellectual in particular. The rejection of the incumbent personnel of the Zambian political élite is with but few exceptions total, suggesting that students have never really contemplated the execution of power or attempted to empathise with the politician faced with concrete problems with solutions determined not by principles but by the exigencies of the distribution of power and wealth, and the pressure of external forces. The pursuit of total nationalisation and a militantly aggressive policy towards South Africa are not 'feasible' solutions
without sacrifices which might jeopardise the position of the decision maker. Zambia is still dependent on support from its enemies to preserve its present economic status, and has no sanctions at its command to assert itself against external oppressors. The student may embrace the greater cause and the greater ideal and be prepared to make the corresponding sacrifices, but the national leadership is more concerned to pursue moderate and less risky policies. While the national leadership castigates the students for their poor sacrificial spirit, the students regard sacrifice under the present policies of compromise as hypocritical and supportive of action they themselves renounce.

The oppositional mentality not only reflects the discrepancy between the ethic of absolute ends pursued by the student generation and the ethic of responsibility pursued by those endowed with authority but also the student's alienation from authority. Another feature - populism - has been widely associated with the intellectual's feeling of alienation. However, the politically conscious student tends to reject the resurrection of what appears to him as the very antithesis of the 'revolutionary' cause. In rejecting African Socialism, the student argues that the glorification of Zambia's past, along with the concepts of Negritude and slogans such as 'black is beautiful' not only fail to assign dignity and pride to the African but on the contrary point to the very opposite - the absence of a tradition and a distinctive Africanness. The very need to stress or re-enact a 'cultural heritage' suggests that in some way the African tradition either does not exist at all or is inferior to the alien cultures which have been imposed on the colonial peoples. Harking back to a mythical
past and the glorification of the common man is tantamount, in the eyes of many students, to an expression of inferiority to the colonialist culture of the European. The greater confidence which national leaders are seen to place on expatriate experts, and the tendency for leaders to send their children to universities abroad are but evidence of what the Vice-Chancellor referred to as the 'insufficient decolonisation of the mind'.

Though such arguments are powerful justifications for the rejection of populism, they do not explain why in many countries, not only the 'new states', intellectuals and students have come to identify with the 'common man', the peasants, and the workers. In the universities of America, and Europe a small proportion of students, albeit a vocal minority, have sought a common cause with the oppressed groups in society. The political ideology to which they have subscribed has rejected the entire fabric and structure of society and not the personnel in command positions who are regarded as 'victims of the system'. The Zambian student however has levelled his attack specifically at the incumbents of positions in the political élite. Such a stance is not incompatible with their own expectations of entering the ruling class, while an open identification with the oppressed classes of Zambian society would contradict their aspirations to positions of high status and wealth. In addition the symbols of achievement and high status - 'Western style of life' - are in direct conflict with the life style of the lower classes of society. In aspiring to positions in the ruling class, adopting 'western life styles' is part of a process of anticipatory socialisation which precludes the response to populistic calls for support
of the common man and the glorification of 'indigenous tradition'.

Populism is more likely to have support in those countries where there exists a community of students and intellectuals whose chances of entering the ruling class are slender and who, therefore, do not aspire to such positions. In such societies alienation from political authority and society in general may be assuaged by populistic acclamation. In Zambia, on the other hand, there is no such community of students and intellectuals. So urgent is the demand for manpower to replace expatriates in the administrative, technical and managerial positions that the student is assured of a place in the upper classes and intellectual pursuits are rarely followed or cultivated for their own sake. As competition increases it is likely that the students will exhibit a greater interest in specifically intellectual activities, find time to consider their role in society in greater depth and perhaps immerse themselves in a populistic culture as has happened in other parts of the world.

TENSIONS BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SOCIETY.

"Elitist" Systems of University Education.

Lipset has suggested that students, who emerge from systems of education which guarantee them a place in the nation's élites, are likely to identify with rather than oppose the existing élites.

Students may realistically expect to enter the élite and thus they tend to identify with the existing one... This is not simply a function of better intellectual and social qualifications
on admission or of better prospects after graduation. The pattern of teaching in the "élitist" systems is much more conducive to the incorporation of the student into the university community as part of the central institutional system. Residence in halls with intimate contact with teachers serving in loco parentis, smaller classes, tutorial arrangements, isolation in a part of the country not far from, but not easily accessible to, the capital city, as well as generally patrician, non-populistic, social and political culture all contribute to this result.123

It has been one of the major arguments in this chapter that the very factors which Lipset delineates as conducive to the 'incorporation of the student into the university community as part of the central institutional system' are responsible for the structural discontinuity between the university and wider social systems lending itself to functional autonomy and alienation from the 'central institutional' system.

A student's 'identification' with the existing 'élite' is dependent not only on the prospective and extant positions in the social structure but also, and this is where Lipset's argument is too simple, on both the students' and government's perception of those positions. The foregoing analysis has shown that when a considerable proportion of the incumbent élite appears to be hostile to the student, the student feels alienated from his countrymen, who in his view undervalue the worth of his education, and as a consequence he develops an oppositional stance towards the 'élites'.

The last two chapters have pointed to four structural origins of tension between students and the wider society. The first, concerning the student's future role, arose from a generalised resentment of the mass of society towards those who hold or will hold positions of power and wealth - an embryo
class antagonism - and in particular the intellectual who feels his 'superior' education entitles him to such positions in the ruling class.

Such feelings of antipathy towards students exist in most societies: what is different in the Zambian case is the existence of similar views within the political élite. It is this second source of tension which encourages the leaders to incite the led to an open expression of hostility towards the student.

In the all important selection for positions in the ruling class there are two criteria of recruitment, namely that based on experience and loyalty and that based on formal expertise. In a country which has had, until recently, an undeveloped educational system the two reservoirs from which the channels of recruitment emanate are largely mutually exclusive. Consequently the decision to favour one or other of the groups is arbitrary and governed more by the strength of the representation of each group in the core of the ruling class - the political élite - and in the respective élites to which entry is sought. This then provides the second source of tension between the students, with advanced levels of formal education but little experience, and the loyal experienced personnel with relatively little formal education. The tension is mitigated by the existence of expatriates whose departure makes room for Zambians, in particular students, to move up into the various élites. In this way some of the competition between Zambians is redirected against expatriates who are accused of clinging to their lucrative positions. Nonetheless any overt political action on the part of the students is seen by the members of the powerful party organisation as
a challenge to their control of the avenues of upward mobility through the party into the central executive. The students are excluded from active involvement in the party as students; their involvement is possible only if they begin at the bottom of the political ladder as an ordinary citizen.

A third source of tension derives from the student's present role outside the ruling class and the feeling of alienation associated with it. The student feels relatively deprived when comparing his present role-status in the wider social structure, on the one hand, with what he anticipates to be his future role-status and on the other with his present role-status in the university social structure. A fourth source of tension stems from the structural discontinuity between student community and the wider social system. A relatively democratic student government with a leadership sensitive to the demands of the rank and file is incompatible with an authoritarian Zambian government which attempts to eliminate sectional demands in favour of the mobilisation of the population towards a vaguely defined common goal, and which accords opposition and criticism a very low level of legitimacy.

**Tension and Tension Control.**

The set of tensions between students and the government or wider society here outlined all revolve around the student role-status in the university and wider social structures. The importance of that tension and the likelihood of it breaking out into an open confrontation is contingent on a number of factors related to the relative importance of the student role within the student's set of multiple roles. Insofar as
the student role-status assumes paramount significance in the eyes of the student and the government so the tension which surrounds it is likely to break out into a confrontation.

Related to the importance of the student role is the degree to which the student's other role commitments 'cross cut' the tensions emanating from the specifically student role. What are the nature and strength of the bonds which, through the activation of his multiple roles in the wider social structure, link the student to those with whom his student role-status brings him into conflict? To what extent, for example, is the student linked to the political elite through kinship ties? Where there are loyalties cross cutting one another tension in any one is cancelled by bonds of solidarity in others.\textsuperscript{125} The next chapter will be concerned to identify those roles of the student which may prevent the outbreak of a confrontation and stabilise relations with the outside world through a network of conflicting allegiances.

A third factor contributing to the outbreak of tension is the solidarity of the student community. Hitherto the student community has been considered as a homogeneous body with no significant lines of social differentiation. Insofar as their common role-status is paramount so internal divisions will be less important and their common interest as students will form a powerful unifying bond. The following chapter will therefore consider the activation of other roles, apart from the student role, which emerge from both the university and wider social structures, giving rise to divisions within the community.

A fourth correlative factor, which has already been considered, is the solidarity of the society outside in its antipathy towards the students. It was suggested that those
in the more secure positions with a university education were possibly less hostile towards the students. However other leaders, who exhibited considerable resentment, in their attempts to mobilise public opinion against the student stressed the student role-status. As far as the society outside the university was concerned the tensions were between the government or the party and all the university students and were defined in terms of the student role-status. Such an orientation differs significantly from that adopted towards workers who express sectional interests as when, for example, they take strike action. In such cases the government and party tend to define the conflict in terms of 'irresponsible leadership' rather than the worker role-status, reflecting the greater power and support for the worker in the wider society.
NOTES

2. Republic of Zambia, Report on the Development of a University in Northern Rhodesia 1963 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964). The Commission was chaired by the well-known educationist Sir John Lockwood previously Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, and who had been intimately connected with the development of university education in other parts of Africa.
5. In Zambian society outside the university and even within the university there is the belief that its sole function is to turn out 'experts' and not students with 'useless arts degrees'. The idea that a university should perform a critical or research function is alien to the thinking amongst the majority of the members of government. See, for example, speech by Mr. Chirwa, M.P. for Petauke, in Parliament.

...I come to the University of Zambia...I think it is proper that the government thought in terms of professional people at the university because the science or arts subjects that we have now embarked upon will never get us anywhere, because Zambia at present does not need these B.A. General's or B.A. What's. It needs professional people, engineers and doctors. These are the chaps we need here. The troubles will never stop on the Copperbelt, Sir, because we do not have qualified people who will take over from expatriates in those mines. We shall continue to have strikes. We shall continue to have unfounded strikes on the Copperbelt because the expatriates are proud, they have the technique. They will say, "We can march out at any time." When are we going to have our own boys? It is only the University that can provide the suitable young men to man the Copperbelt. If we had started with giving professional degrees to our men and women, I think the Copperbelt situation would have been allayed.

Hansard, No. 6, 30 March 1966, Col. 849.

6. For details of the composition of these bodies and the constitution see, Government of Zambia, University of Zambia Act (Act No. 66 of 1965) and its subsequent amendment, An Act to Amend the University of Zambia Act, 1965 (Act No. 10 of 1970).
7. For an analysis of the friction between universities and governments in Africa see, Ashby (1966), op. cit., Chapter 10, pp. 290-343.
9. Other commentators have noted the 'ambition to have institutions as similar as possible to the best to be found in Britain,' see Ashby (1964), op. cit., pp. 43-9.


12. According to statistics compiled by the Office of the Registrar, there were 104 students living off campus, 243 on the Ridgeway Campus and 1207 at the Great East Road Campus in 1971.


15. According to statistics from the Office of the Registrar, there were 205 'redirections' in 1971 which corresponds to a failure rate of 16%. Amongst first years the rate was 19%, amongst second years 15%, amongst third years 9% and amongst fourth years 12%.

16. There is a difference of course between a university staff almost totally dominated by expatriates and one where expatriates are a tiny minority.

17. Opinion Poll One, Question 25.

18. Opinion Poll One, Question 18.


22. The strike was over increased pay the workers thought they had been awarded, but which failed to appear at the month end.


25. UZ, 3 August 1970.

26. Circular from the President of the University of Zambia Staff Association to the student body, 3 September 1971.


28. Government of Zambia, University of Zambia Act (Act No. 66 of 1965), paragraph 12 states, The Vice-Chancellor shall have the power to exercise disciplinary control over the students of the University and may, for the purposes of power under this section, if he thinks fit consult any Committee appointed by him in that behalf from among the staff of the University.

29. The Dean of Students often finds himself bearing the brunt of opposition towards the administration. He assumes an intercalary position between students and administration.
30. Judiciary, Governmental and Disciplinary Machinery in the University: The Recent Suspensions and Expulsion (Circular distributed by President of UNZASU, July 1970).

31. Re-Recommendations on Procedure and Judiciary Machinery, University of Zambia (Open letter sent from the President of UNZASU to the Vice-Chancellor, dated 6 July 1970).

32. Judiciary Machinery (Distributed to students as part of the Mid Year General Report of UNZASU, 1 October 1970).

33. The Annual Report and Recommendations of the Secretary General, 1969-70 (Circular distributed to students 6 April 1970).

34. However there is provision for a graduate to sit on the University Council, see University of Zambia Act (Amendment) (Act No. 10 of 1970), Item 11.


36. There were instances of obstructionism when the 1970 executive handed over to the 1971 executive. Members of the executive, for example, refused to hand over files and records of activities of the previous year. Clearly there are feelings of deprivation on leaving office but these are small compared to larger organisations such as trade unions.

37. There is still mystery as to how and why he left the university. One source maintained that he was expelled though the writer has not been able to confirm this.

38. There is also mystery surrounding the departure of the second president; some have said it was for academic reasons.

39. To have been President of the Oxford or Cambridge Union is a stepping stone into the British establishment irrespective of the class of degree achieved.

40. Of the 12 member executive of 1970, one, the Vice-President, stood in the following elections. He became President in 1971.

41. Lipset (1963), op. cit., pp.373-77. The conclusions are based on the study of trade union democracy in the International Typographical Union, Lipset et al. (1956), op. cit.

42. Lipset (1963), op. cit., p.375.


44. Lipset (1963), op. cit., pp.359-63.

45. Perhaps one of the secrets of Bushel's success (President in 1970) was his residence on the Ridgeway Campus which made him less accessible and his behaviour less visible than the President who resides on the main campus.

46. The first issue appeared in August 1966. There does not appear to be another one until November 1963. It was then recontinued as a weekly in July 1970 until the end of the academic year in December.

47. The issues appeared in June, September and October 1971.
48. Attempts by the President of UNZASU to censure and dismiss the editor of the Observer for an article he published in the second issue were rebuffed by the editorial board who came out in support of their editor.

49. UZ, 3 August 1970.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. The Voice of UNZA, 6 August 1970.

53. UZ, 11 August 1970.

54. Ibid.


56. Indeed commitment to a particular ideological orientation which in some sense conflicts with the political interests of the student body as defined in narrow trade union terms is an obstacle to the mobilisation of support.


60. They were the Presidents elected in 1968 and 1969.


62. There have been accusations of misappropriation of funds levelled for example against the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions.

63. See for example, Burawoy, M., "Another Look at the Zambian Mineworker," African Social Research (Forthcoming).


67. There are never any collections for charity on the campus. And voluntary work does not have much appeal. Thus the local branch of the World University Service appealed to students to help build a clinic in Lusaka during the holidays. According to a report in UZ, 3 August 1970 it drew no response at all.


69. Opinion Poll Two, Question 15.

70. Opinion Poll Three, Question 20.

71. Opinion Poll Three, Question 18.

72. Opinion Poll Three, Question 19.

73. Henry Chanda was suspended in 1967. Cosmos Chola was suspended in 1971. Both were Presidents of UNZASU at the time.
74. Opinion Poll One, Question 23.
75. Opinion Poll Three, Question 16.
76. See Chapter IV.
77. This will be given more attention in Chapter IV. Figures supplied by the Office of the Registrar indicate that in 1971 there were 1281 Zambian students, 31 Asians, 64 Rhodesians, 17 South Africans and 69 Europeans.
79. Lipset (1963), op.cit., p.396.
81. Ibid., p.217.
82. Lipset, (1963), op.cit., Chapter X, pp.310-43.
84. Opinion Poll One, Question 24.
86. Lipset (1963), op.cit., p.343.
88. Aron distinguishes three types of criticism, technical criticism where one puts oneself in the position of the administrator or ruler and advocates reformist measures, moral criticism which "raises up against things as they are the notion, vague but imperative, of things as they ought to be," and ideological or historical criticism which "attacks the present society in the name of the society to come [and] which attributes the injustices which offend the human conscience to the very essence of the present order." See Aron, R., The Opium of the Intellectuals (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), pp.210-11.
89. See Chapter Two.
91. UZ, 26 October 1970.
92. So independent and beyond influence was the Nguni Commission, that one official of the student government implicated in the misappropriation was accused of breaking into the room to pinch what he possibly thought was the only copy of the report. See UZ, 20 September 1971.
93. UZ, 3 May 1971.
94. UZ, 26 October 1970.
96. The basis of the conflict may also be seen in structural terms. The liberal universities operate in a democratic manner with directives flowing up from beneath, while in
the wider political system the directives flow down from government. The structural incompatibility inevitably leads to tension.


111. Opinion Poll Three, Question 27.


113. Phiri, *op.cit.*


118. Opinion Poll Three, Question 23.

119. Hanna notes that students in their first years are more active in partisan politics which he suggests is an indication that old-timers are more professionalised. This finding is compatible with the attitudes expressed by students to Humanism, in that activity in partisan politics is probably inversely related to cynicism. The student advances through the university and at the same time as becoming more professionalised he also becomes more cynical and anti-political. Hanna, W. J., "Students," in Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. J. (eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p.141.


122. Address by the Vice-Chancellor, Professor L. Goma, on the occasion of the second Graduation Ceremony, 6 June 1970.

124. For the hostility between relatively well educated Zambians and expatriate supervisors on the mines see Burawoy (1971), *op.cit.*, pp.45-78.

CHAPTER FOUR

TENSION REDUCTION:
SYSTEM LINKAGES.
The discussion in this chapter will focus on the diverse members of the set of multiple roles which the social system awards to every actor. The first section will be devoted to the social background from which the student has emerged and the role of kinship ties as a link with the wider society. Further consideration will be given to the student's relations to other sections of society as expressed in his cultural orientations as 'purveyor of modernity' or as the inheritor of the indigenous values of Zambian society. Following which there is a discussion of the student's perception of his role-status vis-à-vis the Zambian labourers and his relationship to the party. The division of the community into two groups over the issue of affiliation to the ruling party will be examined in the light of ideological conflict within the student body. A further section will attempt to assess the significance of sectional loyalties to linguistic groups and more broadly to national and racial identities. In the next section two student presidential elections will be analysed in terms of the controversial issues they raised, the nature of and support for competing interests and the idiom in which these interests were expressed. Finally, an attempt will be made to assess the significance of the multiple roles of students in stabilising their relations with the rest of society.

**The Influence of Social Background.**

Just as Marx inflicted an historic mission upon the proletariat so other social philosophers have honoured intellectuals with a similar mission. More recently, but in the same tradition as Plato's philosopher King, Mannheim has
viewed the intelligentsia as an 'unanchored, relatively classless stratum'\(^1\) which, by embodying diverse interests in society, was in a position to synthesise the political thoughts to be found within different groups. Whereas other sections of society propagate systems of thought that reflect their position in the social structure, the intelligentsia recruited 'from an increasingly inclusive area of social life',\(^2\) bound together by participation in a common educational heritage 'subsumes within itself all those interests with which social life is permeated'.\(^3\)

There are two courses of action which the unattached intellectuals have actually taken as ways out of this middle-of-the-road position: first, what amounts to a largely voluntary affiliation with one or other of the various antagonistic classes; second, scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfilment of their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole.\(^4\)

There is some ambivalence as to which, if either, of these roles the Zambian student is expected to activate. On the one hand he is urged to forge a bridge between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' thus eliminating the evils of a class-consciousness, and at the same time to link hands with the common man in 'a noble march of determination and defiance against the enemies of progress'.\(^5\) On the other hand he is expected to 'get on with his studies and leave politics to the politician'.

Both Mannheim and the official policy of the Zambian government fail to recognise two factors. The first has already been alluded to in previous chapters and will appear again in later chapters, namely that the student body or the intelligentsia does develop interests of its own, and does
propagate an ideology which defends those interests. The existence of a 'union' and a belief in a meritocracy are witness to such developments amongst students as are the unassailable 'rights' to academic freedom and university autonomy derivative of the interests of the academic community as a whole. The second, which is what concerns the present discussion, is the myth that students or intellectuals are recruited from a diverse set of classes and groups comprising all possible points of view. Michels has emphatically rejected this notion by pointing out that university education is a privilege of the upper classes. Though he was referring to Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nonetheless studies of the backgrounds of students have repeatedly indicated differential patterns of recruitment which favour the upper classes. While Michels argues that 'every proletarian of average intelligence, given the necessary means, could acquire a university degree with the same facility as does the average bourgeois', Aron suggests that the entry of more children of workers and peasants into universities would require a change in the nature of the transmitted culture from 'the academic or bourgeois culture' to the 'popular or Marxist culture'. The experience of Peking University suggests that democratisation of university admissions does indeed entail some form of change in the university structure to accommodate students from different strata of society. However, so long as the universities select their own entrants on the basis of examinations of academic aptitude it is unlikely that students or the intelligentsia will be recruited equally from all strata of society, but on the contrary, as writers such as Djilas suggest, those from the more elevated
areas of society will secure preferential access to the university, particularly where recruitment to élite positions favours the university graduate.

Studies of the background of African students conform to a pattern in which children from the higher socio-economic strata of society are more likely to be recruited to the university than those from the lower classes. Similarly the educational attainment of parents is an influential factor in the educational development of the children. This is likely to be particularly so when the medium of examination and instruction in secondary schools and university is not the vernacular. Thus those children brought up by parents who themselves speak English are at a considerable advantage over those whose parents speak only in the vernacular. The social origins of the Zambian students confirm the trends found among students elsewhere in Africa.

The Social Origins of Zambian University Students.

For information concerning the social origins of students at the University of Zambia, it will be necessary to rely on two surveys; one conducted amongst undergraduates admitted from 1966 to 1968 and the other conducted amongst graduates of the university which includes those students who were admitted in 1966 and 1967.¹⁰ Unfortunately the results of the surveys are somewhat contradictory, as can be seen from Table 11 which also includes comparable results from Ghana and Makerere.

The discrepancy between the two surveys of University of Zambia students may be attributed to a number of factors.¹²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>Ghana (%)</th>
<th>Makerere (%)</th>
<th>Zambia (1) (Undergrads.) (%)</th>
<th>Zambia (2) (Grads.) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans and other Manual</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and Fishermen</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 8% who were chiefs.

The first survey was conducted amongst two samples. One consisted of 321 out of the 490 registration forms of Zambian students admitted to the university in the period 1966 to 1968. The second sample comprised 223 Arts, Law and Humanities' students, which produced results closely approximating the other sample. There is good reason to believe that the occupations stated by these students would be the ones stated by the entire population. However, for the survey of graduates the return was less than 20% and cannot be regarded as representative. It is possible, for example, that the older students were more prepared to respond to the questionnaire and their fathers would be much more likely to have been farmers than the fathers of the younger graduates. There is a further problem inherent in both surveys in that students asked to state the occupation of their fathers are likely to exaggerate their answer, particularly if they are acutely 'status conscious' about their background. This might account for the very low percentage of students who state they come
from a rural background, as compared with figures from the more educationally advanced countries of East Africa and Ghana.

Accepting the first survey as more accurate than the second, it becomes clear that students are disproportionately recruited from the white collar professions and occupations, that is those sections of the population familiar with the English language. It is probable that such sections were also more closely attached to the religious institutions which bore the greater burden of responsibility for educating the Africans of Northern Rhodesia. The children of parents with a religious background were advantaged on three counts. First their parents' familiarity with English, second their parents' connection with the Christian Church indirectly favoured their children as regards entry to secondary education and third it is probable that parents converted to Christianity would be more eager than most to ensure that their children received a good education.

In a society where kinship relations are of considerable significance and where in certain areas it is common for a child to be brought up by his uncle or looked after by siblings, it is important to consider not just the father's occupation but that of other close kinsmen. The survey of graduates revealed the tendency for close kinsmen, even more than parents, to have occupations in those fields which required a knowledge of English, as can be seen in Table 12. Not only are the student's parents disproportionately recruited from the professional classes but so also are his close kinsmen, or at least those close kinsmen the respondents to the graduate questionnaire chose to mention. The figures even seem to
suggest that the kinsmen are more likely to be occupied in positions requiring familiarity with English than are the fathers themselves. It is probable, however, that the respondents chose those kinsmen with whom they were most closely in touch and with whom they had most in common.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Fathers (%)</th>
<th>Close Kinsmen (%)</th>
<th>Working Population (Africans) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial and Administrative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Workers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, the graduate questionnaire does suggest that many of the close kinsmen are still very much villagers. A breakdown of the educational attainment of the same kinsmen indicates that the distribution of attainment, though at a higher level than the population at large, still spans the entire range with a high proportion without schooling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Years)</th>
<th>% No Schooling</th>
<th>% Primary</th>
<th>% Secondary</th>
<th>% Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>3 (19)</td>
<td>41 (73)</td>
<td>42 (8)</td>
<td>14 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>- (24)</td>
<td>31 (57)</td>
<td>40 (17)</td>
<td>29 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>9 (36)</td>
<td>50 (57)</td>
<td>28 (5)</td>
<td>13 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>26 (49)</td>
<td>58 (46)</td>
<td>14 (3)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>42 (68)</td>
<td>44 (30)</td>
<td>12 (0)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>67 (79)</td>
<td>33 (19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in brackets refer to national percentages.
TABLE 14 - EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF FEMALE KINSMEN* 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Years)</th>
<th>% No Schooling</th>
<th>% Primary</th>
<th>% Secondary</th>
<th>% Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>41 (67)</td>
<td>47 (5)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>14 (56)</td>
<td>36 (39)</td>
<td>39 (3)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>41 (74)</td>
<td>32 (23)</td>
<td>23 (0)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>58 (86)</td>
<td>35 (12)</td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>64 (91)</td>
<td>36 (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>96 (93)</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in brackets refer to national percentages.

The two tables stress the phenomenon referred to earlier, namely the tendency for students to be recruited from the advantaged sections of society and for university education to become a privilege of the upper and middle classes. The difference between the educational attainment of the close kinsmen and the total population in the higher education bracket is particularly wide. The gap diminishes with age corresponding to the circumstances of colonial education when severely limited opportunities did not permit the appearance of wide disparities. The first two age groups which comprise kinsmen younger than the graduate are also clearly amongst the privileged sections of society in the field of education. It might be tentatively conjectured that an educationally advanced group is consolidating its advantage through the transmission of that advantage from one generation to the next.

What of the occupations of the graduates? The responses corroborated the earlier observation that no students had entered the political bureaucracy, nor did any graduate anticipate entering full-time politics within the next ten years. Such an estrangement from the political career is reflected
also in the relative absence of any kinship relations to members of the political élite. Of the two hundred and seventy kinsmen whose occupations were mentioned only three were politicians. This suggests that the children of the political élite have not gained admission to the university through their connection with those who wield power but have had to pass through the normal channels. Nonetheless there is a widely held view that members of the political élite secure places for their children in foreign universities rather than the University of Zambia. Whatever the reason, from random observations made of the students, there does seem to be a significant absence of close kinship ties with the political élite. It is of course very possible that students tend to keep the existence of such ties a closely guarded secret in anticipation of the adverse attitudes it might elicit from fellow students. In either event kinship ties with the political élite are unlikely to act as a significant restraint on the antagonisms between students and government or on the measures taken by the latter against the former.

Kinship Affiliations.

Though kinship ties are not obviously strong in relation to the political élite, nonetheless they do provide the most enduring bonds linking students to the wider society. Along with the kinship ties, are a set of obligations which the student like any other member of society cannot afford to neglect. The obligations inherent in the 'extended family' - that of providing material assistance to the younger and poorer members - spring from the co-existence within the same family of the rich and the poor, the highly educated and the poorly educated.
Though the kinsmen of the student may be a more advantaged group as compared with the population as a whole, nevertheless it still contains within its midst members who depend or will depend on the student for material assistance. Thus the third opinion recorded that 22% of students were 'supporting' in some sense from one to three and 25% more than three kinsmen. Once they have graduated and are gainfully employed obligations can only increase and graduates are expected to ensure that their siblings, for example, pursue their education unimpeded by financial handicaps. In the graduate questionnaire 92% claimed to be supporting one or more relatives.

Though material obligations to the poorer kinsmen may be unavoidable, actual contact with the same relatives may be reduced to a minimum. In vacations, therefore, when most students obtain some form of employment, the students are likely to stay with those kinsmen with whom they have most in common. Table 15 compares the occupations performed by all the students' kinsmen with the occupations of those kinsmen they stayed with during the vacations.

**TABLE 15 - COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONS OF ALL KINSMEN WITH OCCUPATIONS OF THOSE KINSMEN AND FRIENDS VISITED DURING VACATIONS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>All Kinsmen (%)</th>
<th>Kinsmen and Friends Visited (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial and</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and Services</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Workers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Professional, managerial and administrative personnel comprise over half the friends and relatives visited in the vacations. Parents who reside permanently in the rural areas as farmers may not be visited for years at a time. Thus the graduate questionnaire revealed that only 16% of the persons visited were parents, while 36% were siblings or cousins, 19% were a parents' siblings, 16% were friends and 12% were spouses.25

There are a number of reasons why students should see their parents so infrequently and favour kinsmen and friends with backgrounds similar to their own. First there is the practical matter of gaining wage employment in the vacation which is most likely to be found in the towns. Thus only those relatively well off kinsmen employed in the towns would be able to accommodate them. According to the graduate questionnaire, of the kinsmen and friends visited in the student vacations, 42% were in Lusaka, 30% were in some other line of rail town, 25% were in some other town in Zambia while only 3% reported staying in a village.26 A second reason for the infrequency of visiting parents lies in what may be expected of the returning student. It is possible that, like the miner returning from the Copperbelt,27 the student will be expected to bring back with him the fruits of urban life, in particular gifts for his kinsmen in the village. This the student would find very difficult to afford and thus he avoids the obligation by staying away. A third reason concerns the differing ways of life in town and village and the association of 'backwardness' with village life in the minds of many students.

Such comments as the following indicate values common amongst students,
It is shameful indeed to see the most educated bunch of girls in Zambia behaving like the most uneducated group of females in the Amazon Forests. Life in the village is considered 'primitive' and unsuited to the educated person.

"The Student Between Tradition and Modernity".

Not all students reject village life as something to be avoided. Some are sensitive to a conflict between their own way of life in the university and town and that of their poorer kinsmen in the villages. The following is a poem by a Zambian graduate student.

My mother cannot play
with her grandchildren
Between her and them,
there is no communication
She cannot understand their language
They cannot understand her language
Her imagery and symbolism are of the 'primitive'
Their are of the Television and the 'civilised'
Between her and them,
there is no common ground
Between them is a deep gap

My mother feels ill at ease
Her world is not our world
Her views are not our views
When friends come
We talk of
   golf and theatre
We talk of
   Horse-riding
   sailing
   flying
   or balling
We talk of things meaningless to her
She does not understand the language we speak
and we say, 'damn her primitive'

And my mother says
She misses her food
Insisting she wants her nshima
And we tell her
   'she will, but not today'
She will eat it when we do
And that is once a week
Then she asks why count how many times
when nshima is to be cooked or eaten...
My mother is never happy
in our home
And now she won't come any more
She seems to wonder
My parents seem to wonder
My relatives, my relatives' friends
All seem to wonder
Who am I? What am I?
They all seem to ask
And they all seem to agree
He is but a black whiteman
Without the whiteman's dignity
Nor sense of belonging
A Mask...29

Ashby also refers to the rootlessness of the African graduate
subjected to the culturally biased education of the university.

There is a no-man's-land between European culture
and African culture. In this no-man's-land
thousands of African graduates pass their lives,
not assimilated to Europe yet strangers to their
own folk, insufficient in numbers to form a self-
sustaining intellectual community. One of the
urgent tasks for education in Africa is to cut
channels of communication between the intellect-
uals and the people, "to avoid the sense of
separation of the university graduate from his
much less well-educated countrymen." 30

There are two groups of people who have continually
stressed the separation of the student or intellectual from
the mass of society; namely the intellectuals themselves and
those observers who see the student only in his university en-
vironment. One commentator from the latter group notes

....some students may have developed elitist
attitudes because of the scarceness of the skills
they are acquiring, their high standard of living
on campus, and their physical isolation from the
ordinary people.31

But such conclusions stem from observations made in the univ-
ersity environment, where, as has already been noted, students
are given a responsible and influential role to play. In the
wider society where his role is of considerably diminished
importance and affording little influence, he is likely to forsake many of his 'elitist' attitudes for those in consonance with his position. While he remains on the university campus, cut off from the rest of society, he can assume what appear to be "elitist" attitudes, but once he moves into the wider society he readily adapts to a new set of role expectations. There are few Zambians who will tolerate open expressions of 'elitism', and the student is given little alternative but to assume the role-status which he is accorded by the wider social structure. The student's movement between the university social system and the wider society may be likened to the migrant who journeys from the town to the village each with its associated social structure and derivative norms. What Southall said of the migrant worker may be equally said of the student,

But the switch of action patterns from the rural to the urban set of objectives is as rapid as the migrant's journey to town. These objectives, however, are only a part of the whole set of norms with which he is forced to operate in town and his adjustment to the whole urban set of norms must be sudden on his first arrival there. 32

The indigenous intellectuals also tend to stress their separation from the mass of the people. Thus one may note the obsession amongst African writers to stress the conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern' values and the consequent alienation of the intellectual as the 'purveyor of modernity'. 33 However, it may be argued that the perceived conflict between 'tradition' and 'modernity' is largely a symptom rather than a cause of their own alienation from society, an alienation which is characteristic of intellectuals in general. As Shils has noted, the more deeply felt is the sense of alienation the more likely is the intellectual to attempt to immerse himself
in traditional culture and to glorify the folkways of the ordinary people. Paradoxically, populism characterises intellectual communities with a well developed sense of their own apartness from society. That there is little genuine populist feeling amongst students at the University of Zambia reflects the absence of a genuine intellectual community which has the time and inclination to seriously consider its own position and role in society. For the present day Zambian student whose future is secure in the civil service, industry or educational institutions there is little need for the development of the intellectual faculties, for the pursuit of truth or the consideration of the wider implications and values inherent in what he is learning.

At the same time there is an ambivalence towards certain aspects of his life and the nature of his studies stemming in part from a sensitivity to what appear to be different systems of values. This is particularly obvious when he defends his interests by recourse to a denial of the relevance of a particular value system. Thus students might argue that the use of external examiners and the adoption of standards acceptable to Western universities is a 'neo-colonial' trick to reduce the number of Zambian graduates, and that Zambian students should be subjected to specifically Zambian standards relevant to Zambian needs. However, such views do not have the support of the majority of the students who interpret the deviation from 'Western' standards as a decline in standards. The first opinion poll recorded the student views on this matter.
The University should make every effort to produce graduates of international standard even if this means failing large numbers of students.  

55% agreed, 12% were uncertain, 33% disagreed

There is more uncertainty as regards the content of the courses at the university.  

The content of university courses is not suited to the needs of the country.  

25% agreed, 32% were uncertain, 43% disagreed

Only a quarter were prepared to dismiss the courses as unsuited to the needs of the country, though the percentages varied from 32% amongst humanities students to 8% amongst medical students. The degree of ambivalence also reflects the absence of any known alternative to replace the present courses. The conclusion to be drawn is that the majority of students do indeed embrace the values which are enshrined in the liberal ethos of a Western University.  

Yet there are occasions, as in the case of standards, when a vocal minority may give the impression that they uphold the traditional values rather than those associated with 'modernity'. This is particularly prominent when specific interests are being threatened as are those of male students when female students assert themselves as equals to men. In these circumstances the male students will rally what they conceive to be traditional customs to the defence of their continued dominance.

Approximately 18% of students are of the female variety, enjoying their own hall of residence some four hundred yards away from the male residences on the main campus. The student community must be one of the few communities in the
country in which there is no official or even unofficial distinction between men and women insofar as their student role-status is concerned. In the village society there is a relatively strict division of labour which ensures role segregation between the sexes. Migratory labour was aimed at the menfolk and initially the women remained in the village to look after the children and fend for themselves. When women and families came to town, they found no wage employment and even today, for all except a tiny minority who have managed to gain some education, the prospects for employment are bleak. Unlike West Africa where one finds women employed in some form of trade, in Zambia trading is permitted only under licence which is difficult to obtain, expensive and can be restrictive in the trading activities it permits. Some women do manage to run illegal 'shebeens' - small taverns - in the townships, selling home-brewed liquor while others engage in less dignified activities, such as prostitution, to earn a little income and a measure of independence from the menfolk. In general, however, women in the towns have been dependent on the men for a livelihood while continuing with the domestic chores to which they were accustomed in the villages - looking after the house and children and possibly cultivating small gardens in the surrounding areas. It is against this background that the relations between men and women students at the university must be examined.

As a mark of her enhanced status, as well as to make her more attractive, the lady student tends to embrace the tenets of 'modernism', particularly in her apparel. Indeed, the attitude of both female and male students towards clothes are similar, both dress very smartly, the men are to be found in
suits while the women dress in the latest fashions of London or Paris. They are also influenced by the fashions of the American negro as in the wholesale adoption of Afro hair styles and Afro wigs. The great pains taken to grow their hair longer, to use skin lighteners and wigs not only make them more glamorous but symbolise the role she expects to play in society as one of the most educated women in the country. At the same time her outward appearance clearly distinguishes the female student from the majority of Zambian women in the towns and villages who move around in traditional dress.

Resenting the elevated status of the female student and the price they command because of their scarcity, the men have been given to attack the women publicly where they are possibly most vulnerable. The girls are accused of slavishly imitating 'European' habits and clothes even to the extent of lightening their skin and in so doing betraying their own cultural heritage and Zambianness.

A new organisation has been formed in Mafia style on the campus. The organisation is called the Anti-Wig League and as the name suggests the campaign is not only against wigs, but also all forms of skin bleaching cosmetics.

Progress in Africa can only be achieved if the potential mothers of the future sons of Africa are emancipated from the yoke of Western mental colonialism. The organisation will help a great deal in this by inducing the UNZA female élite to come and love their natural beauty and skin, and convince them that to be white does not necessarily mean to be beautiful. 39

The third opinion poll revealed the antipathy harboured by many male students towards certain of the ladies' fashions.

Wigs improve the looks of UNZA girls
29% agreed, 13% were uncertain, 58% disagreed 40
Skin lightening cream improves the looks of UNZA girls
33% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 52% disagreed

Mini skirts improve the looks of UNZA girls
53% agreed, 11% were uncertain, 36% disagreed

Not surprisingly the girls largely boycotted this opinion poll, absconding with the polling box placed in their hall of residence. The response to the different items reflects a greater antipathy towards those artifacts which most seek to disguise the girl's Africanness. The arts students showed a greater disaffection with the facets of modern dress and make-up than did the science students, indicating that the results reflect more than a mere rationalisation of the interests of male students. They also suggest a genuine consciousness and ambivalence towards their own denial of the 'traditional' culture and its replacement by what are, for all intents and purposes, artifacts of an alien culture.

Faced with such attacks the girls would, if they bothered to reply at all, retaliate in the name of 'modernity' and individual freedom. One of the most fashion-conscious girls on campus wrote,

There has been so much unnecessary nervous excitement about the wig and the modern woman in contemporary Africa. How acceptable is it for a housewife to wear a wig? Hasn't anybody the freedom to wear what he or she thinks is right for him or her? OR should there be an actual standard set up by those who feel they are greater than others morally or otherwise...Sociologically speaking a society has got its own culture. Culture is defined as a mode of life and is not static. Is it a shock that our women and girls have undergone socialisation...The big question is should we expose ourselves to any foreign influence? Shouldn't we choose what to copy and what to do away with?

Another suggests that since the times are changing so must
fashion.

We all believe that it is essential to maintain our culture especially if it is relevant to our present mode of living. We must also realise that as a growing country times are changing and we cannot stick to the old customs and traditions which are outdated...Wigs are in! And anybody resisting the changing trends is just making us more bold in retaining the wigs and cosmetics. It is a fact that most of the glamorous babies get the jobs without much importance being attached to their qualifications. Looks count!46

There is no indication that the male students tended to select those girls who did without the artifacts they apparently disliked. It certainly did pay the girls to look glamorous.

The second mode of attack launched by the men to justify the subjugation of the women students, claimed that they were not yet ready for their enhanced status. The women did not participate in student affairs, were apathetic to student interests, did not mix socially with the opposite sex and treated relations with men as founded in material exchange rather than love or friendship.47 In short they are unable, so the argument runs, to uphold the responsibilities and obligations that are part of their newly won status.

It is frustrating to note that over the past five years female students of this institution have taken a conservative and outdated approach to extra-curricular activities. They have preferred to be spectators on very important issues affecting the student body. Few have had the courage to attend Union meetings let alone standing as candidatea in Union elections. Participation in sport has been discouraging. Crowning it all ladies have unmeasurably been intoxicated with apathy.48

Reference to the tendency for women to move around in sectional groups are frequent, yet the same may be said of the majority of men also.
Aiming his criticism at the girls especially, M.... declared "...One sees around the campus girls walking in large groups like migratory birds around the lakes or occupying an entire table." 49

Their unsociability was expressed by the men in the first opinion poll.

Female Students show an unwillingness to mix with male students

Male Students: 63% agreed, 22% were uncertain, 15% disagreed
Female Students: 30% agreed, 21% were uncertain, 49% disagreed

Male Students show an unwillingness to mix with female students

Male Students: 14% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 62% disagreed
Female Students: 27% agreed, 17% were uncertain, 56% disagreed

Female students thought that the females were slightly more unsociable than the male students, but the male students were much more positive in their assertion of female unsociability, though this must be largely explained by a sex ratio of four boys to one girl.

While accusing them of apathy, male students will generally resist any move by the ladies to enter into active participation in student life except as girl friends or in the role of secretary. It takes a particularly forceful girl with much self confidence to break down the resistance of the men, and her own inhibitions to deviate from norms practised in the wider society. In the same way the men, while accusing the ladies of betraying their Zambian heritage by wearing 'modern' clothes, will themselves wear such clothes and also select those same girls who are the subject of criticism as their
girl friends. In the idiom of tradition and modernity, the men attempt to defend the dominant role, accorded to them in the wider society, against a social structure which does not distinguish between men and women. Nonetheless the very use of the idiom of culture suggests that it has a powerful emotive appeal amongst many students who question a wholehearted embrace of 'Western' life styles.

The adoption of Western styles of life, mannerisms and dress is not new to Zambia. Wilson\textsuperscript{52} noted the phenomenon at Broken Hill in the early forties and Mitchell\textsuperscript{53} made an extensive analysis of African urban life styles on the Copperbelt in the fifties. In his \textit{Kalela Dance}, Mitchell suggests that the African mineworker has adopted a 'European' value system as a basis for placing himself on a scale of prestige relative to other Africans.\textsuperscript{54} Thus a Western style of life becomes a system of prestige in the towns against which Africans measure their status relative to one another. Thus, it would be an over-simplification to regard the tendency for students to embrace a Western life style as simply 'imitation' of the European not only because there is a definite process of selection but more importantly because the 'Western style of life' is a symbol of prestige and high status in Zambian society. Apart from its purely functional significance, the adoption of 'European' dress, therefore, must be regarded as part of the student's desire to be identified with an upper class. This indeed is how it is interpreted in the wider society and why the 'cultural argument' is often a guise for class conflict. When national leaders call for the resurrection of 'traditional' culture and a return to the values inherent in the 'tribal community', while virulently attacking such cultural
importations as the mini-skirt, they are doing more than upholding the pride and dignity of the Zambian. They are making populist appeals to the class interests of the mass of poor Zambians. The 'ban the mini call' promulgated by UNIP leaders and championed, sometimes violently, by UNIP Youths was as much an attack on the upper classes and those, such as the students, who anticipated entry to the upper classes, as it was a genuine appeal for a cultural revival. 55

STUDENTS AND THE WORKERS.

There is a vivid contrast between the background from which the student emerges and the future he anticipates for himself. The discrepancy between the occupations of the majority of his parents and kinsmen and his own future occupation is reflected in the educational differential which separates them. As a group the students are being projected at artificially high rates from the lower strata of a colonial society into the highest strata of a post-colonial society, hitherto the exclusive domain of the white rulers. The pressures attendant on such rapid social mobility must have their repercussions on the behaviour and attitudes of the students while they undergo the transition. 56 Merton has suggested that the process of anticipatory socialisation helps the individual to adjust to his new membership group through the adoption of the norms, values and life style characteristic of the group which he is about to join. 57 This involves orientating to the new group as a positive reference group while regarding the groups from which he has emerged as a negative reference group. Thus, as has been pointed out in previous sections, the student tends
to adopt the habits and life style, in so far as his relatively small income will permit, of the professional class into which he expects to move on graduation. At the same time he is unlikely to adopt any overt sympathies for the present incumbents of the professional class be they expatriates or Zambians. The student will generally assume them to be opposed to his rapid mobility into their ranks. Yet, significantly, the only article in UZ to devote any serious attention or sympathy for the problems of another section of society concerned the teachers' strike for increased pay in 1970. The contributor, himself a fourth year student destined to enter the teaching profession, argued that the government should pay more attention to teachers as essential public servants, that their demands be met in full and that the restricted leaders be released forthwith. Sympathies towards the teaching profession should perhaps be seen in the light that some 40% of the students would become teachers when they leave university.

A very different picture emerges when consideration is given to the strike of the manual workers at the university itself. Here, clearly the strike which brought the university teaching operations to a standstill for almost a week affected the interests of the students adversely. The students expressed no sympathy for the non-academic staff, who had struck because a pay increase which they claimed to have been awarded at the end of June was not to be found in their pay packets and subsequent negotiations had broken down without any further offer being made. The students took over the operations normally performed by the workers in shifts and for the short period of the strike managed to keep the kitchen, library and transport facilities functioning normally. The students,
the administration (senior levels) and the academic staff all seemed determined to break the strike. The Vice-Chancellor, himself, applauded the action of the students in their efforts to keep the university functioning and preventing its closure. From no quarters did the workers receive support and given the condition of the labour market, their position was peculiarly weak; it was not long before the university had recruited alternative staff to do the manual labour and the non-academic staff were obliged to return to work if they wished to hold onto their jobs in a market where the supply of labour far exceeded the demand. The students were particularly contemptuous of the audacity of the workers to disrupt the university and of their leadership who 'have their English corrected by students'. The editorial in the *Voice of UNZA* expressed the views of the majority of students.

One wonders how long students are going to live in this state of uncertainty. Though the strike is not aimed at the students, they are the people who suffer most. To prove this let us review the strike.

There was a complete blackout in Africa Hall for the whole night. It seems one of the workers switched off the main switch and locked the door to the switch room, thus making Africa a real dark continent. The point is whether this was intended to provoke the students or authorities.

On the other side two halls of residence had no bed sheets as they were taken to be changed when the strike began and the workers never thought of replacing them; even though the students didn't have a quarrel with them. The result was that the students of the halls concerned had to sleep for a whole week on thorny beds...Now see who is hurt, the authorities or the students.

Last time the strike was aimed at disrupting the graduation ceremony while this time [it is] the student examinations. Are these occasions for the authorities or for the students?....

It is not out of place to mention problems incurred by the students suddenly and unexpectedly while degrees were conferred upon them as being good cooks by Mr. P...The usually victimised ladies slept unprotected.
It would be wise, and more humane for us if when strikes occur everything possible is done in order to have students' peace and harmony. With better planning the university staff association could have more control of their stray bullets. 60

The attitudes of the students towards the workers' cause ranged from hostility to indifference: no attempt was made to examine the nature of the workers' grievances or apply a principle of social justice in a framework wider than their own interests as students. The atmosphere on the campus was one of euphoria and self-congratulation at this latest manifestation of student solidarity. As the President of the union commented in his mid-year report.

The workers' strike sent the enemy [apathy] to his sick bed. We had inflicted some fatal wounds. At this period, we effectively coupled mental labour with manual labour and when mental labour marries manual labour success is their first born.

I must commend you all to fight against anyone who thinks we are book- readers only completely divorced from any manual activity. The way in which we organised ourselves was a clear indication of the fact that we are self-reliant. 61

Though initially there was a spontaneous and voluntary response to the call for hands in the kitchen, nevertheless after the first few days when the novelty had worn off the enthusiasm and numbers entering the kitchen had rapidly diminished to a handful. Only the recruitment of unskilled labourers in the meantime allowed the meals to continue. The indulgence in manual labour was a gesture which did not involve any hardship but on the contrary was both exciting and morally uplifting as an expression of student solidarity and student versatility.

Not only do the majority of students fail to sympathise with the interests of the workers on the campus, but many are inclined to assume the managerial attitudes they would associate with the Zambian political elite or the pre-Independence
white ruling class. An interesting portrayal of the emergent ideological perspectives is to be found in an article on 'filth' which received wide acclaim amongst the students.

Why is there the apparent reluctance to get any place we live in clean? Is it a deliberate move to get standards to deteriorate to their lowest so that we will be said to be failing as Africans to keep to accepted standards? Lack of supervision among the immediate personnel on campus is very evident. Those that would have devoted all their energies to scrupulous cleanliness, maintaining a close eye over the labour force, were they still under their Majesty's EMPIRE BRITANNICA, pose irrelevantly as sympathisers of African National Leaders whilst undermining the authorities by failing to supervise their subordinates....

We are aware that it is false to say that the labour force is inadequate since all loitering, basking and even virtual sleep with the privileged unsupervised labour force is all waste. We know it is all done to frustrate us. Productivity is at a low ebb at this institution since the aim is deliberately to lower standards - to AFRICAN STANDARDS! 62

What is perhaps surprising, is not that the majority of students were at best indifferent to the interests of the workers, but that there was no minority group of 'radical' students who capitalised on the workers' subjugation by the 'authorities'. Whereas in most European and American Universities the majority of students tend to be conservative and unconcerned about the problems of the poorer sectors of society, there is nevertheless a small minority, usually vocal and open in articulating its views, who identify with the working population. In Latin America such groups are likely to identify with the peasants in the villages. 63 In India, too, there are strong communist groups on the university campuses. 64
There are three key factors operating in the Zambian context, not operating in these other countries, which may largely account for the atypical uniformity of orientation of the
politically conscious Zambian student. Each has been considered earlier. First, virtually all the Zambian students not only aspire to higher positions, but do not see any major obstacles to their entering the professional classes though they may perceive obstacles to their advancement within that class. They are conscious of their upward mobility, of where they have come from and where they are going and the difference between the two. The typical radical student in the American university is likely to have been born into a professional class and to have parents who are themselves graduates from universities. The possibilities of entering into the ruling class are relatively slim and inter-generational mobility is unlikely to be significant. Their position in the professional class is relatively secure and adaptation to new roles is not the problem it is in Zambia. Those who come from a liberal professional background feel more secure and have less to lose in identifying with the oppressed classes, than the student of worker or peasant stock who is 'escaping' from that background. Thus the tendency noted for American students from the lower strata of society to be less radical politically.

The social background from which the student emerges is one facet of mobility. The other face concerns the future prospects of the graduate. In Zambia the prospects of entering positions in the nation's élites are much brighter than in a country such as America where over 15% of the population of university age attended college in 1950. Thus in practice the Zambian student is more likely to eventually move into the ruling class than the American student who is more likely to be amongst the ruled and therefore more inclined to empathise with other groups within the ruled classes.
As a student the American is more likely to see himself as oppressed in a qualitatively different way from the Zambian. First, he is one of very many more, the authorities to which he is subject are remote and impersonal, and the influence he has over them negligible. There is in other words a continuity between the student role-status in the university and wider social structures where in Zambia there is a marked discontinuity. The American student may perceive his university as a factory or as a microcosm of society as it actually is outside. The Zambian student perceives the outside society as being very different from the university and student communities; the one is oppressive and authoritarian while the other permits considerable freedom at the same time according him influence in decision-making processes. Because he does not feel oppressed by his university environment he is less inclined to empathise with those whom the social structure does subjugate. Whereas in the vacations when he takes up employment in industry or in the banks or wherever, he may identify in his worker role with the other workers, during his residence at the university his very different student role induces him to regard the worker as a 'class' beneath him. It is unlikely, therefore, that students will demonstrate as students on behalf of the workers.

The differences between the Zambian student and his coevals elsewhere may therefore be reduced to their differing social backgrounds, their disparate future role-status in society and the structural congruence or incongruence between the university and wider social systems.
Social Background and Political Behaviour.

To establish the validity of the hypothetical relationship outlined above between social background and future roles on the one hand and political orientation on the other, a study must be undertaken within the same student community to show that those from a relatively wealthy background are more likely to be radical than those from poorer backgrounds. (Only in this way can the other two variables be controlled.) Unfortunately no such study has been undertaken amongst Zambian students. However, studies have been undertaken in other countries which may suggest at least qualifications to the hypothesis.

Whereas studies of American students suggest that those from the professional classes tend to be more 'radical' than those from the poorer backgrounds, Hanna's study of Nigerian students and surveys of Indian students come to opposite conclusions. Apart from Hanna's study none of the investigations of students in African universities attempt to systematically link social background with actual behaviour or even attitudes. Goldthorpe's study, for example, considers the social origins, educational experience and problems of adjustment and occupations and attitudes after leaving college in three different chapters but fails to attempt any relations between dependent variables such as attitudes, aspirations, problems of adjustment etc., and the independent variable of social origins. Jahoda's study suffers from a similar failure. Finlay comments:

In light of Ghana's fluid social structure, it is not surprising that social backgrounds do not determine politicization. The most significant correlates of politicization are the faculty with which the student is associated and the degree toward which he is working.
Hanna, however, considers student participation in party politics, dividing the student population into 'non-affiliates' (those affiliated to neither of the major parties) and affiliates. The affiliates were divided into those who supported the Action Group and those who supported the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and each affiliate was rated on the level of his partisan activity into 'nominals', 'occasionals' and 'actives'. Hanna found that the non-affiliates came predominantly from homes in which the parent or guardian was of 'high' occupational status whereas the reverse was true for the affiliates of both groups. The 'active' members of each party were more likely to come from low status occupational backgrounds than either the 'nominals' or the 'occasionals', but paradoxically the 'occasionals' came from lower status backgrounds than the 'nominals'.

Thus there is not a straightforward linear relationship between partisanship and occupational status of parent or guardian, though the evidence clearly suggests the lower the status the more likely a student will partake in partisan activity.

Impressionistic evidence of the Zambian student politics would suggest that those with a low status background are possibly more likely to be party activists. But as has been suggested at various points, and will be given more attention later, party activity on campus is slight and there is no party branch. The focus of political activity within the student community is the student union and the union executive are largely 'non-affiliates'. It is the background of membership of the UNZASU executive and university membership of the NUZS executive which must be examined for an assessment of the relationship between political activism and social background.
The recruitment to the union executive is through elections in which the articulation of ideas in English is a prerequisite for success. This in itself favours those who come from professional backgrounds where English is spoken. On the other hand recruitment to the party requires no such facility, indeed it might be argued that fluency in English might prove to be a handicap rather than an asset. Those who seek to partake in political activity but who are precluded from access to the student union executive by virtue of their difficulties in self expression in English may be drawn to party activism.

In concentrating on 'party' politics and excluding 'student' politics Hanna is biasing his sample of student 'activists' to favour those coming from backgrounds where parent or guardian has a low occupational status. His conclusion that 'power was pursued to compensate for status deprivation' is therefore only partially valid until he examines the participants in student union politics. After all the students regarded as 'radical' and subject of studies on American campuses are not the ones who are affiliated to the national parties. It may well be that many of the Young Democrats or Young Republicans, in the same way as 'affiliates' of Ibadan, come from parental backgrounds of low occupational status while the new 'left' or active 'non-affiliates' come from higher status backgrounds.

**STUDENTS AND THE PARTY.**

There are few university campuses in Africa which do not possess a branch of the ruling party. The University of Zambia is, however, an exception in that it has never had a
party branch and political associations have had difficulty in making any effective appearance. In 1969, 1970 and 1971 there was no political society of any description. This may be partly attributed to the exclusion and partly to the withdrawal of students from the political arena. The following discussion is devoted to the attempts that were made in 1970 to establish a UNIP branch on the campus, the divisions it wrought within the student community and the reaction from outside.

The Background.

In the middle of October 1970, Simon Kapwepwe then Vice-President came to address the students in a question and answer session on the topic of the proposed new constitution. At that meeting he argued against the new proposals and at one point referred to the necessity for students to affiliate to UNIP. He came again on the 21st October to address the students at a meeting of the Sociological Association, arranged some time before, on the topic 'Students and the Party'.

You have to join the Party, organise a branch, contribute to the society because we want to survive, it is not a question of democracy, you have to survive...If we are going to survive you young people are going to have to come in, in a big way because if you don't they'll control you and this colonialism does not die it only changes its colour like a tree...From the university, from secondary schools let us go into the villages and do National Service...Students cannot regard themselves as an island. How can you then take over from me? You have to learn the hard way. You are going to be leaders in society...You must prove that you are capable. You cannot learn to swim by walking round the pool....77

Asked what was the future in the party of the student who advocates complete nationalisation of the farms owned by M.P.'s, District Governors, leaders and other elevated citizens, who
demands that schools should not only suit Mr. Skinner's children but also Mr. Mulenga's children, and so on, the Vice-President replied,

This is just what I want. If we have no people who can stand up with their hands in their pockets and point out what is wrong we will be dying slowly as a nation. Democracy can only succeed if you have got capable people to manage it. Those are the questions that you must state in the party so that the party must answer them...Don't say them outside, we want them inside the party. 78

No high ranking party leader had ever extended such a serious invitation to the students to enter the party as students. Hitherto the official policy dictated that students should get on with their studies and leave politics alone. Kapwepwe was now saying the direct opposite, that the nation could not afford to allow its students to remain outside the party.

Following this second forthright speech of Kapwepwe students, captivated by his message, began organising support for a UNIP branch on campus. An opinion poll was conducted by the Sociological Association to examine the student response to the issues raised. Finally, a few days later, in response to the NUZS President's televised announcement that the student contingent for the forthcoming UNIP National Convention must not go as students but in a private capacity, the Vice-President of UNZASU, Cosmos Chola, stated to the press

It is our firm conviction that students must be represented at the forthcoming historic UNIP national convention. 79

Mobilising Opinion on Behalf of the UNIP Branch.

For those who wished to see a Party Branch on the campus the centre of gravity of the argument rested on the 'responsibility of the intellectual' to help forge unity and national
development at a time when the country was facing enemies both from within and without. In essence such appeals followed the theme which Kapwepwe had already outlined. The debate was conducted through mealtime circulars from which a number of extracts will be taken. Perhaps the most eloquent ideological support for the formation of the branch began with a poem by Otto Rene Castille

One day
the apolitical
intellectuals
of my country
will be interrogated
by the simplest
of our people

They will be asked
what they did
when their nation died out
slowly,
like a sweet fire
small and alone....

...and they'll ask:
'What did you do when the poor suffered, when tenderness and life burned out in them?'

In less eloquent terms but more likely to resonate student sentiments, another wrote of the responsibility of the students as custodians of the nation's independence.

.....you and I as youth are the only ones who are true custodians of our independence who can realistically defend this nation. We shall not be justified to leave the guidance of the nation in the hands of the afternoon. Because to them, it is only a means by which they secure and consolidate material benefits as they are not sure of their tomorrow.

Not only must students oppose the 'afternoon generation', but they must also throw off their political virginity, dirty their hands and show that they can match criticism with an equally positive and dedicated contribution to the development of their
country. The students must set an example of how to run the country.

...we have criticised the spilling of blood during our national and local elections. Yet, we have never stood up to give an example as to how politics - though it is now referred to as "a dirty game" - should be conducted. I for one will [not] raise a finger in order to attack anybody because of differences on political grounds...I have always been UNIP and yet violence has never been my party slogan...We shall never assault anyone physically, intellectually we shall argue with everybody....82

Now was the time to show the 'afternoon' generation that the youth can indeed play an important and constructive role in the government of the country.

...you and I have previously blamed both the Government and the Party for making unrealistic decisions at times. We have also sounded loud that the "afternoon" generation is not prepared to share with the youth in directing affairs relating to the running of the nations the world over. This has led to students in universities resorting to strikes and demonstrations in order to reverse things.83

One spoke of the historic mission of the intellectuals in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as the 'cream of the nation' and the 'vanguard of the revolution'.

...We are the cream of the nation, its intellectual vanguard...We are here to postulate constructive ideas: i.e.

(a) How to best utilise the land - to increase agricultural production.
(b) Increased production in factories.
(c) The writing of new literature that will benefit the spiritual and cultural well-being of the nation.

...We have a purpose. When our nation needs us we shall try to the best of our ability to serve her, using the knowledge we have acquired at the University of Zambia.

There are students and students and students. There are progressive students who are opposed to the Establishment. A case in point is the government of North America - U.S.A. The American Government is committing acts of genocide against the heroic and freedom-loving peoples of Vietnam. Domestically it is oppressing and exploiting twenty million of her own people and more. Furthermore,
this same American Government is holding to ransom the entire world – the entire world – the con-
nuous threat of Nuclear War. The progressive
students and intellectuals of the USA are playing
a positive role in opposition to their government.
The revolutionary and progressive students and
intellectuals of Africa, Asia and Latin America
have a totally different role to play from that of
their counterparts in the Western countries. We
must constantly re-evaluate our position in soci-
ety. Our duty is to stand by the side of our
Nations and Societies in times of crisis.84

The same writer stressed the crises facing the nation through
external aggression of the powerful nations in the world.

UNIP is correctly pursuing its cherished ideals of
galvanizing the forces of progress in this
country. That Zambia is undergoing and experienc-
ing a serious and acute phase in her history, has
to be reiterated here and now. The fascist dogs
and wolves of Imperialism have already gnashed
their teeth. Ready to pounce and dismember the
body of this young and progressive nation. Can
evidence be produced to substantiate the previous
statements? YES

(i) The bombings that took place on and near
the Angola/Zambia border – Kalabo.

(ii) The bombings of innocent villagers in the
Eastern Province.

Who is responsible for these bombings? Portuguese
fascism and NATO which is supported by the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA and her allies....
The crisis that is manifesting itself is not only
particular to Zambia alone. It has assumed a
continental and universal proportion. The African
Revolution has been and is fighting a life and
death struggle against Imperialism which is work-
ing day and night to re-enslave and re-colonize
Africa and Zambia.85

Given the crisis facing the nation, the need for unity and the
responsibility of the intellectual then what practical meas-
ures are open to the student? To fight from outside the party
is divisive and doomed to failure because of the tendency for
those in power to mistake criticism, motivated by a concern
for the 'progress' of the nation, for opposition.

...to me Bishop Reed was correct when he main-
tained that you can only fight and right a system
when there is a dialogue between the resistors and
those who defend the existing system. And to be
effective, use the same platform used by those who maintain the condemned system. What I mean here is that; we can only be effective if we were in the very system in whose hands affairs of this nation have been entrusted. 86

Working through the Party might, it was argued by another, facilitate student contribution to the solution of his own as well as national problems.

There has been a growing tendency to criticise government policies or party activities without using the right channels through which these criticisms can receive practicability. I must point it out clearly, and without bias, that no matter how much we criticise in the air, little will be achieved. Why not have some people to channel grievances - national and other - through the party? We might achieve more by being constructive; let us not destroy without building something more concrete. Neither can we solve problems by refraining from politics. It is inevitable, therefore, to allow those who are UNIP supporters to alleviate some of the problems in an easier way. 87

The final argument which defended the formation of a UNIP branch on the university campus appealed to rights of free association.

The first reason is both legal and democratic: there is no clause in the national or UNZASU constitution stipulating that ZANDU, ANC, let alone UNIP have no right to form branches either on the two campuses or without...In fact even other writers from ANC and ZANDU have clearly given us the green light to go in their most emotionally directed article Our Chief Nanga, in which they said in paragraph 4: "I hope it is now clear to Mr. Chola and his friends that they are At Liberty to form a branch of UNIP on the campus PROVIDING THEY DO SO NOT AS UNZASU EXECUTIVE MEMBERS but as FREE citizens of the Republic who are dedicated UNIP members." 88

What distinguished the above arguments from their opponents' is the overriding concern with principles and ideology and the absence of the more usual character assassinations and appeals to narrow student interests. The more 'radical' elements of the student body had been stirred by the encouragement
given to them by the Vice-President's call apparently welcoming them into the party as 'intellectuals' and students. Hitherto these same elements had been silent because of the prevailing view outside the campus that students and 'intellectuals' must be excluded from the political arena. Though those who led the movement for entering the party system were disproportionately recruited from the hitherto silenced 'intellectuals', the vast majority of followers were probably those which Hanna characterised as compensating for status deprivation, and those which had been active in UNIP off the campus and who were not active in student politics.

Mobilising Opinion Against the UNIP Branch.

The articulate spokesmen for the formation of the UNIP branch stressed the student's 'civic' role as of prior importance to his 'student' role and so rejected the conception of 'student solidarity' as a means to furthering specifically student interests as opposed to national interests.

I contend that STUDENT SOLIDARITY as conceived on this campus is an ill-defined and meaningless phrase. It needs redefinition in the light of recent historical developments both inside and outside the country.89

This was made in reply to the official pronouncement of the union executive that student interests would be threatened by the formation of a branch on the campus of any political party.

Brothers and Sisters,

After careful scrutiny and analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the formation of political branches on the campus, the Unzasu Executive has decided to make its position abundantly clear on this burning issue facing us.

We are clearly and unconditionally Opposed to the formation of any political branches on this campus, this is because we can clearly foresee an inevitable and unnecessary split in the
hitherto students solidarity and this will be to our own disadvantage in the short run as well as the long run.

To this end we strongly warn the entire student body and our Brothers and Sisters who are currently playing this dangerous game of the heavy consequences which will definitely follow and engulf them.

Yours in the Students Solidarity,
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY UNZASU EXECUTIVE

The union executive in opposing the formation of an independent UNIP Branch on the campus was clearly defending its own position in the community as well as the interests of the student body as a whole. The fear was openly expressed by members of the executive. Once a branch was established on campus external relations would be governed by the branch rather than the union; communications from outside would be channelled through UNIP rather than the union.

Second the existence of a branch would facilitate access of national party leaders to the student body, interfering in student affairs and renting divisions in its midst. Divisions based on party loyalties which overlap sectional divisions based on language would be brought out into the open and undermine student solidarity. The two most prominent members of the African National Congress - Lozi speakers - produced the most provocative of all the circulars in their determination to prevent the emergence of factional politics on campus.

We Zambian Nationals of the African National Congress studying at the University of Zambia, despite our numerical superiority on the campus, and our well-oiled, well-disciplined organising ability, do not, in the interests of student solidarity and academic pursuits, intend to open a political branch on the campus under normal circumstances.

Meanwhile, we have a word to those who are completely bent on wanting to turn the democratic political system of Zambia into a hereditary instrument for amassing luxury and artificial power under the umbrella of the 'ideal' One Party State. The imposition
of a 'One Party State' through political irrationality, intimidation, and made-to-measure cheap propaganda is likely to cause political instability, economic unrest, and social distress to Zambia. This is what we want the Republic to avoid. This is our stand. And we are prepared to kick the bucket for this noble stand.

We are as Zambian as any other Zambian even though we may die pedestrians, and hewers of wood and drawers of water, for selfish economic adventurers and political schemers. We appreciate dialogue and advice. But never will we allow another man or woman, boy or girl to think for us

NEVER.91

The 'numerical superiority of the ANC' was included to provoke UNIP supporters into retaliatory remarks rather than as an accurate assessment of ANC strength on the campus. For the remainder the writers' views resonated with those of the majority of campus. The one party state was already in the air with President Kaunda's announcement that December 31st92 was to be the last date for joining UNIP. Students were strongly opposed to the one party state for the reasons given in the circular, as was brought to light in the third opinion poll.

The time is now ripe for the declaration of a one party state.

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed93

The third reason for opposing the formation of a UNIP Branch was hinted at in the ANC circular, namely the suggestion that its leaders were opportunists who were to be rewarded for their efforts in establishing UNIP on the campus with comfortable positions on graduating. Those who led the UNIP movement had 'ulterior motives' for establishing a branch.

On the 14th November, 1970, the dynamic UNIP Twig's so-called Publicity Boss...had been driven to the New Campus in a vehicle which bore no flag because he is not yet a Cabinet Minister...94
Thus the idealism expressed in the pro-branch circulars was just a cover for a crude opportunism which would place its advocates in comfortable posts in the UNIP hierarchy. This view stems more from the image of UNIP than the character of the people concerned. The following is an extract from a circular entitled The Incomplete Works of UNIP Literature

UNIP is wounded
It bleeds, now and again,
A GIANT in agony
A GIANT in decay
Keep Going
With the WOUNDED BUFFALO
Wear Yellow Skipper

Beware of Yellow Skippers
They may be
From corruption funds!
Or have you inherited...
Birthright?

This is UNIP and
This is its BRIGHT FUTURE
Keep going with UNIP
KEEP GOING
with the WOUNDED BUFFALO!
And share in the spoils
ALLELUIA: AMEN

*The yellow skippers refer to T-Shirts stamped with "Keep Going With UNIP" worn by party workers and supporters and distributed free by the party headquarters. A number were to be seen on the campus.

It was widely felt that once established, active participation in UNIP on campus would be a channel to high posts in government on graduation.

The fourth reason given by many students was the threat that once introduced onto the campus, party politics and the factionalism which might develop would jeopardise their university careers. The atmosphere would be such as to make serious study difficult and the purpose of coming to university would be defeated.
Perhaps the attitude of those opposed to the formation of the branch is best expressed by the symbolic wearing of a UNIP skipper by members of the executive indicating that one can be a good member of UNIP without supporting the formation of a student branch. Active participation in UNIP off the campus is not incompatible with opposition to the creation of a student branch on the campus. Leaders of the 'UNIP movement' labelled such characters as 'sheep in goat's skin', betraying their commitment to the party by awarding precedence to their commitment to the union.

Student Opinion.

The difference between the two groups may be summarised as follows. Those who supported the formation of a UNIP branch tended to argue that a student's civic role must take priority over the university role, while those opposed to the branch argued that commitment to the civic role and to the party is permissible only insofar as it does not infringe on the student role, student interests and student solidarity. In other words the one affirms the student as first a national and then a student while according to the other view he is first a student and then a national. That the majority of students support the second stand is brought out in the opinion poll conducted after the second talk given by the Vice-President.

In the interests of national development party politics must be brought onto campus

31% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 60% disagreed. 96

A branch of UNIP should be established on campus for UNZA students.

19% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 72% disagreed. 97
Students must be represented on the National Council of UNIP

45% agreed, 18% were uncertain, 37% disagreed.\(^98\)

While 19% favoured a branch of UNIP on campus, 31% felt that in the national interest party politics should be brought onto campus, and 45% agreed to student representation on the National Council. The results suggest that the students' desire to involve themselves in national politics is directly related to the likelihood that involvement would disrupt the 'integrity' of the student role and threaten the interests of the student body.

The Union versus the Party.

Given the desire to enter the national political arena, there are essentially two strategies which could be adopted. The first is that already outlined of working through the party - the reformist approach. The second was not considered in the debate over affiliation to UNIP but would have provided a logical counter-ideology to those who urged the establishment of a branch. Students could have argued that their contribution to national politics and national development should come from outside the party where their role would be independent of the party and their distance would permit an objective assessment of the issues. Once absorbed into the party his influence would be restricted, his autonomy limited, energies for change would be stifled and the bureaucratic pressures frustrating. The university and its student community could only be a vehicle for change so long as it retained its autonomy and freedom of action and thought.
No one brought up the argument of 'working outside the system' for a number of reasons. First the party would never tolerate an autonomous politically influential group of students who openly criticised the party. Second, the student body as a whole would be unlikely to be as sympathetic to that view as towards the one which saw the student interest as paramount. Third, most of the students who were intent on making an impact on the national political arena had backed the formation of a party branch on campus and there was no sizable section remaining which could argue for independent student action outside the party.

The debate therefore followed the classical division between party and union which so concerned the revolutionary theory of Lenin before the Russian Revolution and which was to permeate the politics of USSR for many decades after the revolution. The union pursues its own sectional interests at the expense of the national interest and must be nullified by incorporation into a party where its demands may be restraining and its behaviour regulated. In such circumstances the union becomes a 'transmission belt' for the dictates of the central party leadership rather than a pressure group for the pursuit of the workers' interests, i.e. it is transformed from an 'input' to an 'output' structure. The union will often resist attempts to incorporate it into the wider party structure where sectional interests will be stifled and dissolved into the wider collectivity embraced by the party. To the extent that the union represents a membership which is privileged in relation to the interests already represented in the party, so the union will stand to lose and therefore resist incorporation into the party.
In some cases the union will be successful in resisting incorporation into the party and retaining its functional autonomy, in others it will be unsuccessful. After a prolonged struggle the Russian trade unions were subjected, under an increasingly coercive apparatus, to party control.\textsuperscript{101} Whereas the German National Socialists were able to smash the trade union organisations in a much shorter time,\textsuperscript{102} UNIP attempts to gain control of the mineworkers' trade union have failed because of the organisational strength and bargaining power of the mineworkers as the producers of 95\% of the country's export earnings.\textsuperscript{103} The students, as has been suggested, have been equally determined to maintain their independence of the party and they too have been successful, so far, but for reasons that differ radically from the mineworkers.

**Support from Outside for the Formation of a UNIP Branch on Campus.**

Undaunted by opposition from the union executive, which itself included two and possibly three advocates for a party branch, and by the revelations of the opinion poll, the leaders of the UNIP movement continued their attempts to establish a branch. Nearly two hundred students signed up as prospective members - a figure which corresponded to the predictions of the opinion poll. In the meantime, the executive's public decision to oppose the formation of political branches on the campus had been an issue of controversy in the capital. The executive had meetings with different national leaders and party officials in Lusaka. Some seemed in favour of the formation of the branch and some against it. The dilemma for the party was an old one, outlined in the *Times of Zambia*. 
So when UNIP calls upon the students to form a branch on the campus it must be clear to the leaders that they will have to contend with the demands of the students. By letting them organise party politics a provision has to be made to allow them to occupy high positions in the party.

Some students have already declared that the whole party hierarchy needs to be scrutinised. They feel that unless some of the unsuitable people who still cling to various top posts are dropped, there will be great diversity of opinion between them and the energetic, revolutionary and radical youth....

The question now is whether the students will choose to stay out of party politics or not. On the other hand the leaders are now aware that by establishing a UNIP Branch on the campus they will be calling on the revolutionary, radical and emotional youth who understands nothing but change. 104

In chapter two it was suggested that the tendency for the party to be dominated by poorly educated party supporters, led to the exclusion of the students from the party hierarchy. In conversations with those leaders of the UNIP movement on the campus, one minister, whose background suggested he was sympathetic to the students, was reported to have said that some party leaders feared the entry of students into the political arena. In the eventuality the deputation which went to the regional secretary with the two hundred signatures was refused permission to register a university branch of UNIP. Throughout the controversy, which made a prominent appearance in the newspapers, no junior or senior minister, let alone the President, made any comment on the growing enthusiasm for a university branch of UNIP. At a meeting between the student executive and a number of other leading students at State House, towards the end of November, the President refused to comment on the issue of affiliation claiming that 'he and his colleagues were working on the matter'. Clearly this was as
delicate a matter within the party as it was amongst the students. These events were taking place in the month preceding the end of the academic year and the campaign for a UNIP branch on campus fizzled out not to be continued the following year.

The student body as a whole had been against the formation of a branch and even had a branch been formed it would seem that deliberate attempts would have been made to undermine its effectiveness. Its activities could easily have been sabotaged by the majority of students unless it had a great deal of support from outside, which is is unlikely to have secured. The difference between the miners and the students lay in the threat that the former posed so long as they were organised outside the influence of the party, in contrast to the threat the latter might pose from within the party organisation.

SECTIONAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTY LOYALTIES.

Whereas kinship ties bond students to the wider society, they do not have any impact on student behaviour on the campus. Sectional loyalties, mainly to linguistic groups, while normally not so import as links to the wider society have a significant impact on student behaviour within the university.

In terms of province of origin students represent the total population of Zambia fairly well, as shown in Table 16.

One of the problems which will be encountered in assessing the significance of sectional loyalties is the almost one to one correspondence between linguistic groups and affiliation to political party. It thus becomes difficult to isolate
the two variables, sectional loyalty and party affiliation, as distinct determinants of student behaviour. Thus students from Western and Southern Provinces are associated in the minds of the other students as being supporters of the African National Congress even though this may not be true of all of them. In the same way students of Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces are linked with UNIP, though again not every such student may support UNIP.

**TABLE 16 - DISTRIBUTION OF ZAMBIAN STUDENTS BY PROVINCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Students Born in Province</th>
<th>% Students Resident in Province</th>
<th>% Population Resident in Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 17 - DISTRIBUTION OF ZAMBIAN STUDENTS BY TOWN OR VILLAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>% Students Born in Town/Village</th>
<th>% Students Resident in Town/Village</th>
<th>% Population Resident in Town/Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka, Ndola, Kitwe, Livingstone</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Town</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Town and Village</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Informal Sociable Groupings.

Linguistic affiliations play their most influential and obvious role in the formation of friendship groups. At meal times in the dining room, students will gather together in linguistic groups: only a small minority will converse in English. Since students are not generally fluent in more than one major Zambian vernacular, they tend therefore to group according to their mother tongues. The four major language groups are Cibemba spoken by the majority of those who come from Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt Provinces, Nyanja spoken by those from Central and Eastern Provinces, Lozi spoken by those from Western Province and the Ila-Tonga speaking group from Southern Province. Within each major linguistic group there are small groups based again on common language such as the Tumbuka speakers from Eastern Province. Students from North Western Province form another category which does not easily fall into a major language group.

Students in their first year are more likely to gravitate to narrow language groups particularly when they first arrive, partly because they are not confident when conversing in English. Thus the older student and the 'mature student', who has been engaged in jobs, such as teaching, which require a certain facility in English, is more likely to mix in heterogeneous groups. As the student progresses through the university, one might anticipate the emergence of inter-linguistic friendship groupings whose lingua franca is English, but, in practice, very few of these are to be found. There are, rather, a few individuals who have no fixed clique to which they belong but who float from group to group conversing now in vernacular
and now in English. Within the language category there is still considerable room for choice of friends on the basis of common interests, subject of study, year of study etc.

Earlier reference was made to the criticism levelled at the girls for moving in 'tribal groups' and the fact that this pattern persists both amongst the men and the women. While such groupings are based on common interest, common language, common background etc., relations between sexes is based on physical attraction which does not normally recognise racial, linguistic or tribal boundaries. It is here that tension must inevitably arise between recruitment of friends based on language and recruitment based on physical appearance or other 'universal' characteristics.

...One fresher who refused to disclose his name said, "When I came here the first thing that struck me most apart from the impressive buildings was the marked tribal divisions. I could not get a girl who came from Southern or Western Provinces. The girl might be willing but all the time there is this tribal bouncer lurking around. ...This fresher's mother-tongue-interfered accent told me he was a Northerner." 107

Here is a blatant accusation against the exclusiveness of two sections of the student community for 'keeping their own girls to themselves'. The reply from the Southerners and Westerners may come as follows in half mocking tones.

We in Southern and Western Provinces are conservatives. This is true of any farming or property owning community. We are not like Northerners or Easterners. These people have nothing to lose so they are careless with their lives. We can't allow our girls to mix anyhow or else our property would be disinherit. We have strong chiefly ties which bind us to our community. We allow our men to mix as they wish, because this won't affect our inherited land and property. Apart from that, people from the North are so arrogant and they always assume they are leaders wherever they go. We can't allow domination if that is what you mean by social mixing." 108
The Joking Relationship.

The appearance of the above in the columns of UZ reflects the joking relations existing between the different 'tribes' or 'linguistic groups' within the student community. Joking relationships may govern interactions between members of groups that were either in the past or are at present outside the university in some form of tension. Thus football matches are regularly arranged between different provinces.

This coming Sunday will see the football match of the year, when students from the Western Province meet Easterners. The match will be played on the campus grounds at 4 p.m. The Lozis and the Ngonis will clash in the Kuomboka Cup Final... Commenting on the match Mr. M. [Easterner] said that the Chipata side will clobber the Lozis. 109

The realisation of the sociological significance of the joking relationship has been attributed to anthropologists, and it is in anthropological material that it has made its most frequent appearance. 110

The joking relationship is a peculiar combination of friendliness and antagonism. The behaviour is such that in any other social context it would express and arouse hostility; but it is not meant seriously and must not be taken seriously. There is a pretence of hostility and real friendliness. To put it another way, the relationship is one of permitted disrespect. 111

The joking relationship represents a dual role relationship in which one role relationship expresses solidarity while the other expresses conflict. The joking relationship reflects the recognition of the conflict inherent in one of the roles, while at the same time expressing an understood agreement between the actors that the 'solidarity role' should be given prior importance over the 'conflict role'. The common understanding over the relative importance of the two roles arises
partly out of the context in which the interaction takes place and partly out of the institutionalised role expectations of one actor for another. Thus in the case of the football match, though the Ngonis and Lozis are 'traditional' enemies in the national political arena the one lending support to UNIP and the other to ANC, nonetheless these differences are dissolved on the campus where the student role is paramount. The joking relationship enjoins two groups of actors who are enemies in one context, but allies in another. In this way the joking relationship promotes cohesion in the community by dissolving 'irrelevant' differences.

However, when for some reason the 'conflict role' assumes greater importance, the joking relationship is a disruptive rather than a cohesive social mechanism exacerbating rather than reconciling hostilities. In such circumstances the joking relationship will be used only mistakenly. When the United Progressive Party was formed in August 1971 it was associated with the Bemba speaking people who had broken away from UNIP because, it was said, their leaders had been squeezed out of cabinet office. Political animosities broke out between the Easterners and the Bemba speakers at the national level. On the campus it was clear that the UPP had some support from the Bemba students and the Eastern Province students, affected by the national political scene, regarded the Bembas with some hostility. It now became difficult to use the joking relationship between the two groups to assuage the conflict which was apparent at the national level. Thus, for example, the Ngonis from Eastern Province though they played the Lozis at football never played the Bembas.

In other words alliances and coalitions between linguistic
groups at the national level affect relations between students on the campus.

...the patterns of 'tribal-alliances' on the campus clearly reflect those at the National level. It is observed that the Bemba-speaking students are at perpetual rivalry with those of Tonga-Lozi. The Nyanga-Luvale speaking students and the rest act as self appointed mediators in the battle of Giants.112

There are a number of possible reasons why relations between linguistic groups at the national level should be reflected in similar relations in the student community. First, the existence of informal groupings along linguistic lines and the exclusiveness of some of these groups engenders a sectional consciousness, a sectional loyalty, and an identification with the fortunes and interests of the sectional groups at the national level. This same sectional consciousness and loyalty then translates itself back from the national level to the student community. The same sectional loyalty and consciousness promotes an interest in the affairs of the group outside the university out of self interest as a member of that group. Thus the fact that his kinsmen and many of his friends all come from his home province means that the construction of a car factory or a road in that area is of major concern to him. Then it is possible that politicians from his own sectional group will influence the student to support the interests of his particular 'section' in the context of the struggle for power and wealth at the national level. Thirdly identification with one's linguistic or tribal group would be promoted by the possibility of patronage from those of the same section who are well placed in government, industry etc. For different students each factor will be more important according to the
context, the particular sectional group and the contact he might have with those in influential positions who can offer patronage. In the following sections two cases of sectional cleavage will be examined. In the first influence from outside appears to be relatively insignificant in generating the split, whereas in the second the influence appears to be direct.

Conflict between NUZZ and UNZASU.

The National Union of Zambia Students (NUZZ) held its first national congress in 1964 two years before the university opened. It then represented all the existing institutions of higher education together with secondary school students. In the early years of Independence, therefore, NUZZ was the only organisation which represented the interests of the students in the country. When the university opened its doors, the University of Zambia Students Union (UNZASU) was established, though in its early years it was less prestigious to be a member of its executive committee than NUZZ. Gradually, as the university expanded, membership of the UNZASU executive grew in importance and prestige amongst university students. In the more recent years students who have failed in the contest for position on the UNZASU Executive have found positions on the NUZZ Executive, which continues to be dominated by students from the University of Zambia. UNZASU's pre-eminence in the political arena during 1970 and 1971 has eclipsed NUZZ as the leading national organisation though the former is still a member of the latter. Indeed UNZASU provided until 1971 the major source of funds for the operations of NUZZ. The other institutions of higher education affiliated to NUZZ
contributed when their financial circumstances permitted, which tended to make their support somewhat erratic.

The mother body NUZS, as with other trade union mother bodies, seemed to provide nothing substantial in return for the 30 ngwee subscriptions per member of UNZASU. There were yearly national congresses at which an impressive list of resolutions were passed but little headway was ever made in implementing them. In the early years the NUZS Executive might take it upon itself to speak out on behalf of the students of Zambia on both national and international issues and also attend conferences abroad. Other branches of NUZS might profit by the contact that was established with the executive through the occasional visits made by the latter to the outlying areas. Union officials would assist branch executives in fighting cases on behalf of certain of its members who might be threatened with expulsion. NUZS had been fighting for sometime for the re-affiliation of secondary school students, but the Minister of Education was adamant in resisting the intrusion of NUZS into secondary schools. The President of NUZS himself had appeared on television and had made one of his themes a more tolerant approach to pregnant female students. In general, however, NUZS offered very little to UNZASU in return for its contribution of several hundred kwacha and it is not surprising that, when in 1971 NUZS demanded the payment of K1,00 per member, over three times the original sum, UNZASU decided to suspend its contribution altogether.114

There followed an acrimonious exchange of circulars between the Bemba-speaking President of UNZASU, Cosmos Chola, and the Lozi-speaking President of NUZS, Mundia Matakala. The first circular announcing the withdrawal of UNZASU spoke of the
failure of NUZS to fulfil any meaningful role.

To all intents and purposes, the University of Zambia Students Union unequivocally questions the existence of the National Union of Zambian Students. We view it as a shame at a [time] when members of the wider community are directing all their energies in constructing and reconstructing the Nation, for NUZS to be undergoing "retrogressive metamorphosis".

Are students not supposed to be the most enlightened among the youth and as such are naturally the most vocal and most demonstrative? We wish to remind those that are leaders in NUZS that student status is a temporary state. If its opportunities are missed it becomes difficult to make up in later life. Students usually find themselves in a stronger position to take a detached and objective view of things.

In the light of all these therefore, the executive finds it fit to halt our subscriptions till such time that this National Student Movement shall rise up to the challenge of this Nation in the spirit of youthful conscience that is sensitive. In future, we resolve that we shall always analyse issues and situations, study various viewpoints and then define our stand and role thereafter on our own.115

The reply from Matakala was couched in various idioms. He spoke of what NUZS stood for,

This union is inspired by a tradition of victory; victory against oppression, suppression and repression; victory against propensities to dictatorship in the political system. The primary objective is to defend the free conscience of all of us, so that we may live [as] free men and women dedicated to the Solemn objectives of this nation.116

Matakala then proceeds to assassinate the character and legitimacy of Chola as President of UNZASU,

It is unfortunate that from such a 'big' man we should have so little sense...If he thinks he can dictate the withdrawal of over one thousand six hundred students from NUZS it is obvious he will go to the limbo of all naive autocrats. He says NUZS has not been vocal, yet he himself has been vocal only in delivering such 'famous' speeches as "Your Excellency, we are eating on their behalf" at State House banquets in an atmosphere of champagne and wine...The reason why Chola wants to quit NUZS is because he was humiliated
after an electoral defeat at the Seventh Annual Congress of the Union last year.\textsuperscript{117}

Finally Matakala introduces Chola's supposed affiliation to UNIP and the belief held amongst some that he wished to see a UNIP branch established on campus.

He wants to quit because in November last year he failed to drag students into his political party, and therefore failed to impress his political overlords.\textsuperscript{118}

Chola, from a position of strength, was able to counter by ignoring the personal attacks and persisting with the rationale of leaving NUZS because it failed to make any use of UNZASU contributions except to finance 'receptions and dances during the NUZS Congress'.\textsuperscript{119} NUZS has no defined policy on national projects as regards health, road services and general living standards in towns and villages. As a national union NUZS has failed to comment 'on the activities of some officials, government or otherwise, who may be retarding national progress',\textsuperscript{120} and failed to take the necessary action arising out of resolutions made at the various national congresses. On the international front NUZS is virtually unknown, and NUZS has made no attempt to establish student exchange programs with other countries etc. Chola made no reference to the political party with which Matakala had come to be associated, but spoke as President of UNZASU in the student interest. He desisted from any character assassination of Matakala. The latter replied further in a defensive vein arguing that the UNZASU Constitution stipulated that UNZASU be affiliated to NUZS, that Chola is manipulating 'the student movement to the ends of his political party',\textsuperscript{121} that NUZS is not responsible for road building, hospitals and night schools or for the low standards of living,
illiteracy, disease etc. and that any weaknesses in NUZS are as much the fault of UNZASU as they are of NUZS. Clearly Chola and the UNZASU Executive were the stronger party in the confrontation since they decide what to do with the union funds. NUZS is in effect powerless to resist UNZASU's suspension of contributions.

While Chola spoke in the vein of a unionist concerned to promote the interests of its membership, Matakala accuses him of being a traitor to those very same interests in his affiliations with politicians off the campus. It was precisely this idiom which had set the scene for an earlier battle just prior to the movement for the creation of a UNIP branch on campus. At that time (October-November 1970) Chola was Vice-President of UNZASU and Matakala President of NUZS. Matakala had been interviewed on television about student representation on the National Council of UNIP, and in his capacity as President of NUZS had said that although students may attend the National Convention they cannot do so as representatives of student bodies; they must go as independent persons. The statement had aroused considerable hostility amongst a number of politicians and the Lusaka District Governor rushed around to Matakala's room on campus demanding the retraction of the statement. Matakala refused and the District Governor rushed to the other campus to seek out the UNZASU President, Marshall Bushe, who said that since his union was affiliated to NUZS he could not make any comment without first consulting his own executive.

On Monday 2nd November, Chola - the Vice-President of UNZASU - was reported in the press as follows° 122
In a strongly worded statement, vice-president of the University of Zambia Students Union, Mr. Cosmos Chola, said: 'It is our firm conviction that students must be represented at the forthcoming historic UNIP national convention.'

The students of the university would like to remind the government and party through their union that attention should not be paid to statements made by "students who are in the pockets of small political parties," he said. Mr. Chola added that the statement issued by Mr. Matakala did not have the blessing of the entire NUZS Executive.

"Therefore the statement was dictated to him by outside elements who are working day and night to destroy our Zambia," concluded Mr. Chola.

Chola therefore quite openly defined the confrontation with Matakala in terms of party affiliations, suggesting that Matakala had, independently of the rest of the NUZS executive, decided to send no representatives to the UNIF National Convention because he was linked to the African National Congress. A circular distributed the following day defined the confrontation in similar terms.

Comrade Chola's article alleges that Mr. Matakala does not want students to be represented in UNIP's National (Convention) Council. Mr. Matakala has never at any time suggested anything of this nature. What he said, and what he will say should the need arise, was that NUZS could not join as a bloc. I do not have to remind Nanga* that NUZS is non-partisan. It embraces all Zambian students be they UNIP, ANC, ZANU, One Party State and Security Council, and even the mysterious National Revolutionary Council. I cannot think of a worse situation that would arise than if NUZS were to join the National Councils of all these parties. Neither can I think of any reasonable course other than that taken by Comrade Matakala. Students can participate in the activities of any party, so long as they do not do so in the name of any student organisation which is non-partisan. I cannot over-emphasize that not every student is a member of UNIP....

Mr. Matakala is further accused of being an agent of small political parties. I wonder is it not possible that it is he, Mr. Chola, who is in the pocket of some big political party?*

* Chief Nanga was the ruthless government minister in Achebe's *Man of the People.*
At an ideological level the conflict may be reduced to whether the student union should express solidarity with the incumbent government and ruling party or whether it should remain faithful to the diverse interests of its membership. According to their own specific interests, different groups would support either view. It so happened that the President of NUZS was associated with ANC and he therefore argued for the independence of the student movement, while on the other hand there were no supporters of ANC in the UNZASU executive and they felt it correct to express solidarity with the government. Each leader strove to use the organisation to which he was attached as a means of mobilising opinion in his favour, claiming his union as carrying greater authority. The principles he enunciated in support of his stance were purer than those of the opponent who 'was in the hands of some party'.

However, the actual source of support inevitably came from those whose interests were congruent with the particular view. Thus those from the Southern and Western Provinces who supported ANC rallied behind Matsakala whereas those who supported UNIP rallied behind Chola. That the leading protagonists came from two different organisations was of only minor significance. Given this background, the clash between NUZS and UNZASU over the contribution of funds to NUZS cannot be seen simply in the light of an institutional conflict between the affiliated member and the mother body, but must also be seen as a reflection of a rivalry between political or sectional groups. Certainly membership of a particular linguistic group or political party provided a sound basis for the recruitment of support.

Though support may be mobilised through affiliation to a
sectional, in this case linguistic group, neither party is prepared to openly accuse the other of 'tribalism'. There are a number of reasons why students may refrain from such accusations. Unless the accuser can produce uncontrovertible evidence to the effect that his rival is recruiting from sectional rather than political support, he is vulnerable to counter-accusations of deliberately creating divisions within the student community. By defining the debate in terms of sectional loyalties, the protagonists necessarily involve many more students who would otherwise have remained outside the debate. Thus, for example, if Chola had identified Matakala as a 'tribalist', he would have galvanised all those Lozis, including those who did not support ANC or even Matakala, into a group united in opposition to himself while at the same time incurring the resentment of many UNIP supporters, who were not from his own sectional group. The third factor of significance is the student attitude towards those who make 'tribal accusations'. 'Tribalism' has associations of backwardness in the minds of many students and he who makes 'tribal accusations' is likely to have a very low credibility and to incur the wrath of many students who resent such 'African' factors entering the debate. In defining a conflict in terms of sectional loyalties a student is likely to automatically lose support.

The source of the rivalry between NUZS and UNZASU, personified by Matakala and Chola respectively, was largely intrinsic to the university revolving around relationship between the affiliated member union and the mother body and the propriety of union support to a party organisation. It was at the same time cast in the idiom of roles derived from the social structure of the wider society, and it was through these roles that
support was mobilised within the student community. The ensuing division in the community derived not from social differentiation arising out of the university social structure but was imported from the wider society. In the next example not only are the lines of division within the student community externally derived but the source of rivalry is also extrinsic to the university.

The Formation of the United Progressive Party.

August, 1971 saw the official formation of the United Progressive Party led by Simon Kapwepwe. It was widely identified as a 'tribal' party drawing support from the Bemba speaking peoples. UNIP, in the Bemba areas particularly, reacted with violence, demonstrations of solidarity with the President and intimidation of suspected UPP supporters. In a first round of detentions in September, over a hundred of the known leaders of the new party were placed in detention. However, Kapwepwe himself remained free. During the first month of its existence UPP leaders had been negotiating with ANC for a possible alliance but this never bore fruit. ANC seemed content to make political capital out of the competition between UNIP and UPP for ANC support.

In July the University of Zambia had been closed by the government and the ten member union executive suspended. When the university reopened at the end of August, there was a political vacuum since the functions of the union executive had been thrust upon an interim caretaker committee composed of the presidents of hall councils. In the uncertain atmosphere of the country at large and on the university campus in particular, students began to campaign amongst themselves for support
for UNIP and UPP. UPP membership cards were being sold on campus and UNIP supporters were collecting posters which they pinned up in their rooms and arranged private meetings amongst themselves. The UPP supporters were almost exclusively drawn from the Bemba speaking group whereas UNIP support was focussed around students from the Eastern Province. A number of factors may account for the heightened partisan activity. First, the leadership vacuum lent itself to competition for political influence amongst the students and party affiliation was an obvious base in canvassing for support. Second there were politicians outside the campus in the ranks of UNIP who were keen to keep the students loyal to the government and would possibly encourage UNIP supporters to form an informal group. Similarly Kapwepwe was probably keen to exploit the oppositional feelings on campus exacerbated by the government's hostile action in closing the university by force of arms. He needed support wherever he could obtain it. More generally the university had suddenly been thrust into political prominence by the government action and for many students this had inevitably led to an intense politicization. There was only one commentary on the re-alignments of sectional groups and that appeared in the 'miscellany' column of UZ.

One observer once said that the University of Zambia is like a barometer: it reacts to outside pressure more often than not. At that time I didn't believe him, but now I do. The aftermath of the National Level politiking has a subtle but significant impact on campus social life. It disentangles the existing relations and re-aligns them in a rather peculiar manner....

UZ set up an extraordinary committee to look into this question, and make available the findings. I was appointed chairman of this committee. We were given a frame of reference which included:

1. The social relationships at the campus before the formation of UPP.
2. The social relationships at the time of the formation of UPP and thereafter.
The first to be interviewed was Laurenti a fourth year student of tribal politics.

Laurenti: "Before UPP we were our old selves with our usual rivalries. The Tonga, the Lozi, on the one hand and the Bemba speakers on the other. The Ngoni-Nyenga were the middlemen and acted as stabilisers. The others either remained neutral or aligned themselves to where they felt safe. The whites especially mixed freely with everybody, but wore more at home with refugee students. But lo! When UPP was formed everything changed. The merger talks between ANC and UPP made things worse. Those who were rivals were seen patting each other on the shoulders and congratulating themselves on the 'coup'."

The next interviewed was Hachimwene a third year student of alchemy.

Hachimwene: "It beats me, how some people can forget the 'Lozis are to blame' incident and that fateful 1967 Mulungushi. They seem to be good friends now, but I don't know how long it will last. The Lozi-Tonga women are now very free with the Bembas. The Ngoma Nyangas are stubborn now and seem to have influenced their women to be conservative. Their reknowned liberalism has suddenly evaporated."

Then I interviewed Nsombo, a typical Northerner. He is not a UPP member. This is what he had to say:

Nsombo: "We are going to remain in UNIP but shall continue to give moral support to UPP. You know, we want Railways and some development in our area. If we now merged with ANC and formed a government the railway wouldn't be built. You know ANC views on the railway. Also it is good to be stubborn. After the 'Kumwosa Kumawa' episode, the Government rushed more capital into Eastern Province and development was accelerated, see? The Tonga and Lozi chaps, because of their traditional opposition to the Government and the latter's ambition to woo them to their side, are in a good bargaining position, see? But lo, with all the unopposed seats in our area, Government will always remain assured and [consequently] no real development. But you will see now, Simon has done the works! The remaining Bemba ministers have more bargaining power than at any time before."

After interviewing these students we spent some days observing social reactions. Mixing between the Bembas and Lozi-Tongas had improved considerably while a corresponding deterioration was evident between the two 'old' rivals and the Eastern peoples. Lozi-Tongas could be seen raising
clenched fists together [with the Bemba], and they usually 'sponsor' each other at the Canteen; this apparent rapprochement was also matched by their female counterparts. Women mixed freely. However, things were slowly changing after the 'merger' talks collapsed. And we couldn't be surprised if old trends were resumed.  

Though obviously an over-simplification, this parody on the events reflects a central truth - the extrinsic sources of sectional alignments amongst the students. Perhaps the most significant reaction amongst the student body to the formation of the UPP and the subsequent detention of its leaders was the departure of nine students to fill the senior posts in the party left vacant by the detained leaders. The influence of developments outside the campus in this highly politicized context are unmistakable. Of the nine students who threw in their university career for positions in UPP seven were of Bemba origin. The other two had been prominent members of the Bushe administration of 1970 alongside Cosmos Chola who as President of the suspended 1971 union executive had earlier decided to join UPP. The two non-Bembas (one originated from Southern Province and the other from North Western Province) had been the most vocal and radical students in the Bushe administration and had been incensed by the high-handed action taken against the students as a result of the demonstration outside the French Embassy in July.

Sectionalism as a Basis of Division within the Student Community.

Kinship ties though they provide powerful linkages between the student community and the wider society, do not play any significant role in influencing student behaviour while at university. The social structure of the university does not
recognise kinship roles and kinship affiliations are too diverse for students to use them as an informal basis for interaction. The ideological schism which developed over the question of a party branch on the campus was intrinsic to the university community itself and not directly related to ongoing pressures from outside but more to the broader personality, background and general socialisation processes which students undergo before they arrive at university. Divisions based on sectionalism may be both extrinsic and intrinsic to the university community.

In explaining the ease with which politicians seem to cultivate sectional loyalties amongst the villagers Molteno draws on three variables. The first one relates to communications. He argues that the politician who speaks the language of the villager is more likely to be trusted encouraging politicians to return to their home areas for support. Second, the unfulfilled expectations of the post Independence period has given rise to a resentment towards those responsible for the distribution of the 'fruits of Independence'. The politician is then able to exploit this resentment by suggesting that certain regions have profited more than others and that his own has suffered exploitation at the hands of other sectional groups. Third the structure of the rural society as 'an undifferentiated mass' and the consequential absence of cross pressures ensures the unanimous support of sectional appeals and conduces to the unimpeded consolidation and dispersion of sectional perceptions. Put in another way the appeal of sectionalism is largely dependent on the division of society into separate homogeneous geographical units where the inhabitants speak a single common language and politicians may
appeal for their support unbeknown to the people of other regions. The reasons for the success of sectional appeals in the provinces are precisely the reasons for their failure amongst the students. For a student to publicly make an appeal to a particular sectional group he would immediately incur the opposition of all other sectional groups and lose any support he might have had amongst them. Being drawn from all sections of Zambian society and having English as a common language, the structure of the community far from being an 'undifferentiated mass' develops strong countervailing pressures to prevent the spread of sectional perceptions. Students as students are better placed to judge the extent to which economic backwardness of any province is due to the exploitation of one sectional group by another. They are more likely to indict the national leadership as a whole for the failure to develop the rural areas rather than any one sectional group. If sectional loyalties are to develop then they will do so under conditions similar to those in the rural areas which are conducive to such development; that is in groups of a homogeneous membership from the same 'section' — never publicly in front of the entire student body.

Molteno has also suggested that sectionalism has been a major cleavage in Zambian society because it is the only available form of social differentiation which may be exploited to mobilise support. The absence of consciously perceived differentiation based on class, the underdeveloped divisions based on religion and the irrelevance to aggregating support of racial divisions leaves sectional groupings based on language as the only possible basis of interest group formation. What may be said at the national level may also be said of the
student community to the extent that the university social structure does not itself give rise to alternative bases of recruitment. The absence of any strong intermediary groups, societies, associations and the insignificance of divisions based on subject of study, year of study, sponsorship etc. for interest group formation again only leaves appeals to sectionalism as a major means of mobilising support. In practice this means that the network of recruitment in the pursuit of particular goal is through friends whose loyalty can be depended upon through the threat of the imposition of social sanctions. The 'pay-offs' to the supporters once 'their' man is 'in power' are limited to influence on the decisions he makes and any privileges he can offer them by virtue of his authoritative position. In other words, because there are no 'meaningful' roles emanating from the university social structure, around which support for a goal or a person may be mobilised, a role is borrowed from the social structure of the wider society. There are occasions, however, as in the instance of the formation of UPP, when extrinsic roles achieve salience in their own right. This occurs when the university social system, rather than remaining an isolate, becomes absorbed into the wider social structure as an important object of orientation. Following the confrontation between students and government in July 1971 and the closure of the university, students felt that they had become involved in the wider political system; many had become intensely 'politicized' and thus extrinsic roles assumed a heightened significance. Realignments at the national level caused by the formation of UPP were reflected in parallel developments amongst politically motivated students on campus. In this case, which must
be regarded as exceptional, the extrinsic roles make a prior claim on the commitment of some students, such as the nine who left to join UPP, over and above their commitment to the student role as conceived in the university social structure.

A comparison between Nigerian students in Britain and the Zambian students in Lusaka is illuminating. From the study conducted by Oyeleye Oyeridan it is clear that 'sectionalism' plays a much more prominent role in the politics of Nigerian students in England. There are two reasons why this may be so. First outgroup hostility towards the Nigerian student community is qualitatively of a different order from that towards the Zambian student community which therefore stresses solidarity and commitment to the student role over and above all other roles. Second the linkages based on 'sectional origin' are much stronger amongst the Nigerian students. Oyeridan notes that in London alone there were at least '42 different unions of Nigerian students based on village, town, divisional or provincial origin' in 1966. Many of the students expected to use these unions as a base of support in political careers on returning home. The stress on such 'sectional' roles is also the inevitable consequence of living away from home in a 'strange' country where fellow 'tribesmen' may provide the only source of security and assistance in adjusting to the new environment. This would be particularly true in a disembodied university such as London which provides little campus life or even any strong focus for meeting fellow students. The University of Zambia looks after its students in a far more paternalistic manner hemmed in on one campus with everything that a student may require provided by the institution. The same differences have been noted with respect to town life. Whereas in West Africa voluntary
associations based on village, town, or provincial origin have mushroomed in the cities, in Zambia the existence of a paternallistic heritage of industrial employment has largely pre-empted the formation of any strong mutual aid societies based on provincial or tribal origins. Sectional loyalties are therefore less important to the Zambian student, and therefore unlikely to provide the basis for permanent cleavages in the student community. Nonetheless they do provide a basis of recruitment to informal groups and a means open to student leaders to mobilise support.

**DIVISIONS BASED ON RACE AND NATIONALITY.**

Differentiation according to race and nationality, as with tribe and sex, is not explicitly recognised by the university social structure. However it is a significant feature of interaction and group relations in the interstices of the social structure. Relations between races and different nationals are perhaps even more governed by extrinsic factors than relations between different 'sectional' groups. There are essentially four groups; the Zambians who comprise the overwhelming majority, the black Africans from other countries mainly Rhodesia and South Africa, the Asians and the Europeans. In 1971 their numbers were as shown in Table 18.
TABLE 18 - ETHNIC ORIGIN OF STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Origin</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% in Total Population of Zambia*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesian</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures refer to 'ethnic group' except in the case of Rhodesians and South Africans where 'country of birth' was used and this therefore includes a few whites.

Relations at the National Level.

Since Independence, the government of Zambia has pursued a policy of Zambianisation: the replacement of non-Zambians by Zambian nationals. For the purposes of Zambianisation there are two sorts of 'aliens', namely those who are doing jobs for which there are Zambians available, the vast majority of black Africans employed in Zambia, and those who are hired on a contract basis - 'expatriates' - usually white, to do jobs for which there are none or an insufficient number of Zambians. The division between the two groups, with but very few exceptions parallels the division between races. Asian businessmen are generally referred to as expatriates. Aliens cannot be promoted in their present jobs and, if they resign from employment, cannot officially gain employment. The mining companies, for example, have pursued a strict Zambianisation policy in this area and have been able to reduce the numbers of aliens employed in the mining industry gradually. Expatriates are also being Zambianised as qualified Zambians graduate from schools, universities and other institutions, but it is
possible for the expatriate to be promoted within the period of his contract. Conditions in Zambia are more favourable for the 'expatriate' than for the 'alien'; the former is needed the latter is not. Though there have been outbursts of racial hostilities, they have become surprisingly few since the early 'euphoric' years of Independence. It is possible for the expatriate to feel relatively secure in Zambia, though many feel very insecure and vulnerable to physical violence, on account of a number of isolated ugly incidents which have achieved notoriety out of all proportion to their statistical significance. The alien on the other hand feels hounded and unwanted and discriminatory practices aim to frustrate him in his job. He is much more accessible, dispensable and therefore vulnerable to pressures from the Zambians.

The Zambian government's opposition to the white supremacist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, and support for the black liberation movements have involved her in playing host to refugees, mainly black, from these countries. But at the same time as awarding them refugee status Zambia has not given them security of tenure in Zambia. They are often unable to obtain work permits and even resident permits may not be extended. The government of Zambia does not wish to encourage an influx of Africano from South of the Zambezi into its territory where they would present considerable social, economic and political problems. The insecurity of the refugee has affected black lecturers from South Africa on the academic staff of the university.

I still do not believe that the university used its full moral resources in trying to stay the order to quit in the case of Dr. B. Magubane who left in January 1970. It did not try hard to keep Mr. S. Matshiqi from leaving, a man who had put in hard
work in the founding of the School of Social Work. The Registrar might easily and comfortably say we enjoy the full protection of the University when in fact he knows, as the Vice-Chancellor himself knows, that the Department of Immigration has been merciless and come out on top.

Outside the University there are a number of South African teachers who are employed on a month-to-month basis because Immigration will not give them work permits. If the Ministry of Education values the services of these people, why keep them dangling like this? Because, quite obviously Immigration wants it this way.

Relations on Campus.

The tension at the national level between aliens and Zambians over competition for jobs is replicated within the student community. But this is only one of the factors, which makes for tension between the two groups. Zambian students have repeatedly expressed resentment towards the relatively large refugee group from South of the Zambezi who are studying at the university apparently unconcerned about the liberation of their own countries while enjoying the comfort and prestige of student status. The following is a characteristic attack on the refugee students.

The O.A.U. states shall be celebrating Africa Freedom Day yearly, playing blood curdling speeches of Nelson Mandela and other hardcore freedom fighters. But how long shall we have patience to listen to these firebrand speeches which are turned to cold as by young men and women from these countries still suffocated by the yoke of white supremacy. How long does a refugee remain a refugee? How many years should 'exiled' citizens think it is time to return home and carry on the banner to liberate themselves?

These freedom songs, these revolutionary speeches are not turned to good use. Free Africa is losing patience in paying host to indefinite streams of refugees who are not in a hurry to go back and lead revolutionary struggle. It is now fashionable for freedom fighters to declare every year 'that 1969, 70 is the year of action' when they merely mean a period of cowardly inaction, impotence and slovenness.
I suggest to host governments that;
(a) All aliens from unliberated countries be given no work-permits, because these encourage them to lead élitist lives and leave peasant masses without seasoned leaders.
(b) All student undergraduates be shipped back en masse after completing their studies.
(c) Conditions of stay be made [so] unglamorous as to make them think of home countries.

My concern here is freedom for all unliberated areas, not comfort for a cowardly élite seeking solace in shebeens and hotels. The freedom fighters have postponed the day of reckoning with white racists that home governments have only to deport our lily-livered brothers. "Forward with Uhuru" 141

Clearly there are also elements of self interest in making the refugee less comfortable in Zambia, particularly as many of them have been relatively well educated in, until recently, the more advanced educational systems of South Africa and Rhodesia.

In their replies the refugee students could not make reference to 'ulterior motives' but sought to defend themselves by reference to their own efforts in the direction of liberating their territories and the efficient machinery of a police state which makes resistance from within the country a futile engagement.

The enemy should not be overestimated not underestimated. He has all the equipment of suppresion and above all the support of the whole imperialist world. Thus, for a meaningful revolution to be carried out, the cadres have to be prepared for any eventuality. 142

To attack the refugee is to question the cause for which he is fighting and those who indulge in such attacks are influenced by 'anti-exile propaganda' put out by 'racist South Africa'. Some have called for compassion in the treatment of refugees arguing that the attitudes of many Zambians were 'unhumanistic'. 
Others refer to the UN convention on refugee status which provides for the right to work in the host country: the refugee can make a positive contribution to the development of Zambia. But this is just what the Zambian students wish to avoid.

Much of the resentment levelled at the black Rhodesians and South Africans is expressed in attacks on their habits of social mixing. Just as the Zambian students themselves tend to divide into informal linguistic groups, so too do the other sections of the community. Thus the Indians almost exclusively mix within their own group, which is itself divided into Hindus and Moslems. The Rhodesians interact with their own group and so do the South Africans. But within these latter two groups there are two opposed sections, those who will have nothing to do with whites and those who are regularly seen with whites. Though as many as 69 whites are officially registered as students, one or two do not live on the campus and those who do, apart from five or six, are studying for a post-graduate certificate of education (P.C.E.). The majority of these are married and live on the Ridgeway Campus. The PCE's, as they are referred to, are recent graduates from universities in their home countries (usually England but a few from Germany, Scandinavia and other European or Commonwealth countries) who spend a preparatory year at the university before going into Zambian secondary schools to teach for two years. During their year at the university they take special courses for two terms and a third term is mainly devoted to teaching practice. They tend to mix amongst themselves. At meals, for example, they are usually to be found obtrusively assembled on a single table. When the university was smaller there was more interaction
between them and the black students but as it has increased in size interaction has declined. The PCE's do not share any courses with the undergraduates, though they may help out in running tutorials. An air of mutual indifference towards one another has developed between the blacks and the PCE's and, with a few exceptions few relations are established.

However, it is the exception which proves to be import-
ant. Those aliens who consort with whites are as likely as not to do so with the opposite sex. Though there may only be four or five 'mixed' couples on the campus and though their membership is not representative of the ethnic groups to which they belong, nevertheless they are peculiarly conspicuous. During the academic year 1970 there were at least four 'steady' couples composed as follows; a white male PCE with a Zambian girl, a white male PCE with a Rhodesian girl, a black South African male with a white female PCE and a black Rhodesian male with a white female PCE. All these married one another within a few months of the end of the year. There were one or two other friendships between men from Rhodesia and South Africa and white girls which were of a more ephemeral nature. The animosities of Zambian students were focused on the male alien components of these inter-racial relations. The South African or Rhodesian who decided to have open relations with a white girl would be subjected to humiliating expressions of resentment and hostility to the point of total ostracism from the Zambian students. However, he would face even more painful antagonism from his own countrymen who could ill afford such a betrayal of their position in the context of an already hostile Zambian community. The ostracism only drove the man deeper into his relationship with his girl friend which gave
further fuel to the fires of resentment. In general that section of the alien student community which mixed with whites of the same or opposite sex, tended to look down on the Zambian student as being in some way inferior and consorting with whites was in their own eyes perhaps an affirmation of their own superiority. It was precisely this air of superiority (many of them were older than their Zambian colleagues) that gnawed away at Zambian sympathies, compounding other sources of resentment.

The few South Africans and Rhodesians who are seen moving with whites are exploited as typical of their nationality when the Zambian expresses his antipathy towards the group in general. How can you be serious about liberating your country when you 'consort with the daughters of your oppressors'? The Rhodesian or South African who wishes to defend his position will retort either by arguing that to counter racialism with racialism is no answer to oppression, that class oppression rather than racial oppression is fundamental to white supremacist regimes, or possibly that the discriminatory practices of Zambian girls leaves the alien with no alternative but to seek sexual relations with whites.

In principle the student population as a whole seems to be in favour of multi-racial relations between boys and girls as the third opinion poll made clear.

Intimate relations between boys and girls of different races are socially desirable.

76% agreed, 12% were uncertain, 12% disagreed 143

However, such a complicated issue as sexual relations between black and white cannot conceivably be reduced to such
In practice there is much ambivalence and ambiguity amongst Zambians towards the propriety of such relations, and to actually engage in such a relationship is categorically different from the declaration of inclinations or attitudes. Apart from psychological considerations, the social sanctions that are mobilised by the community itself and the wider society require much courage to combat. The non-Zambian Africans, at a distance from their closer kinsmen, are perhaps less subject to the powerful sanctions which would be imposed were they closer to hand. The Zambian who is seen to move with a white of the opposite sex, outside the university is immediately categorised in defamatory terms as a 'prostitute', etc., an expression of the heritage of a white supremacist colonial society. Relations between white and black, in general, exist against a background of stereotypes in which the black is regarded as a renegade and likely to betray his fellow blacks to the white as an informer, pimp, or some such ignoble role. In the wider society both white and black, find it hard to partake in a status equal relationship as required in a friendship or professional team. Changes in the social structure since Independence have not encouraged any rapid erosion of the stereotype. The university student community is exceptional in that it affords relations between black and white students on a status equal basis. Relations between black and white are unlikely to break out into open conflict, so long as the white conforms to the role expectations of the Zambian. When he deviates from the stereotype he is likely to create tension and the community will apply sanctions to pull him back into line. In practice he can articulate the student role through participation in student demonstrations,
sport, etc., while in those situations where externally derived roles are drawn upon then he must also remember he is white and must therefore not interfere, for example, in differences amongst students based on sectionalism, or in 'Zambian' politics. Of course, the distinction between 'student' politics and 'Zambian' politics is never a clear or unambiguous one. Different students would legitimate different levels of involvement depending on their own interests and their general orientation to whites. The white student can easily find himself at the centre of a dispute over the propriety of his activities. The ambiguity of their role is possibly one reason why the majority of whites chose to avoid any intense involvement in undergraduate life.

The Formation of "SMOLISA".

Relations between whites, aliens and Zambians were thrown into relief with the formation of the "Student Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa" in October 1970. In certain circles of the Zambian student community, feeling over the inactivity of the Rhodesian and South African students and their relations with white students had risen to such a temperature, that a group of Zambians launched a new movement for their Rhodesian and South African colleagues.

SMOLISA is a new revolutionary student movement being launched for channelling both moral and material support to revolutionary liberation movements in Southern Africa. It will cut across any unwarranted sectional political differences. It will work hand in hand with the National Union of Zambia Students (NUZS) for the co-operation of students in Zambia regardless of political affiliations.

The first meeting of the new organisation was addressed by a 'freedom fighter' from MPLA (The Revolutionary Movement for
the Liberation of Occupied Angola) who gave a stimulating talk on the progress and obstacles faced by his organisation. The meeting was attended by between fifty and a hundred students. The second meeting convened to discuss the SMOLISA 'charter' and to elect an interim committee. About seventy students appeared at the beginning of this meeting including two whites, one or two coloureds and Indians, a large number of Rhodesians and South Africans and the remainder (about half) were Zambians. The meeting began with speeches from a panel at the front. One of the most prominent and respected student members of ZANU\textsuperscript{146} stressed the importance of dedication to the cause of liberation and the necessity to awaken the minds of the Africans for the 'Revolution in Zimbabwe'. The Social and Cultural Secretary of UNZASU spoke of the imperative of unity and complained of the absence of members from ZAPU\textsuperscript{147} - the rival liberation group. The UNZASU Publicity Secretary attacked those critics of SMOLISA who claimed that Zambian students should first 'put their own house in order' before waging other "people's battles". He declared that Zambia could never be free until the entire Southern African sub-continent had been liberated. The Secretary General of NUZS broached the issue of membership of the organisation, warning that some means must be found to prevent its "subversion by spies for the racist regimes". He felt that it was only realistic that SMOLISA be protected from white spying for the racist regimes, "we can only allow the entry of friends [white] if they can prove they are not spies". The Secretary General had now encouraged a great deal of tension to surface. A Zambian student took advantage of the opportunity to demand to know why "white girls were only going after freedom fighters".
The only white girl present, who also happened to mix with black Rhodesians and South Africans, attacked the previous speakers for "identifying whites, and white girls in particular, with Vorster's spies, when in fact there was not a shred of evidence that they had any association with South Africa."

Another white girl who came to the meeting towards the end became hysterical at the 'racialism' exuded by those assembled, "racialism is no answer to racialism" and "whites are indispensable to the liberation movement", but she received no sympathy. One black rose to suggest that it was not the white girls who chased the freedom fighters but the freedom fighters who chased the white girls. Then Marshall Bushe, President of UNZASU, himself a refugee and active member of ZANU, declared "we are not preaching racialism but realism and that a movement dedicated to the liberation of Southern Africa could not afford to dilute the frontal assault on racism by admitting a white into its fold". Whereas the Zambians seemed to regard the white as a potential spy, Bushe conceived of the destruction of racism through a black nationalist movement with its declared enemy not the ruling class but all whites, even those sympathetic to black nationalism. Fighting against whites alongside whites was a contradiction which was bound to undermine the unity of purpose amongst black freedom fighters. The Zambians who argued that the whites represented a security threat, avoided any rampant racialism but at the same time left themselves open to the comment made later that "there are black whites as well as white whites." It seemed clear, however, that a large section of the community were for the exclusion of whites from SMOLISA, but none wished to make such a proposal. Eventually the only white male rose to propose a motion that
whites be explicitly excluded from membership of SMOLISA and that it be enshrined in the constitution. In the event four proposals were put to a single vote.

"Membership to be open to all regardless of race or creed" - 9 votes
"Membership to be open to all black students" - 17 votes
"Membership to be open to all regardless of political affiliation" - 15 votes
"Membership to be open to any student indigenous to Africa" - 3 votes

Thus the racial clause won the day though it only claimed 40% of the votes cast. At this juncture a number of students left the meeting, notably the white girl who had spoken earlier, the coloured and Indian students, black female students who moved with white males and a number of Zambian students who would have nothing to do with an organisation which discriminated on the basis of race.

The clause limiting membership to black students received greatest support from the Rhodesians and South Africans, many of whom recognised the futility of having whites in any liberation organisation. Others simply because they hated whites and saw them only as part of an all pervasive oppressive machinery. It is also possible that some were partly motivated by a desire to forge a bond of unity between themselves and the Zambian students based on racial identity. When the South African lecturer and writer, Mphahlele, defended himself against accusations from some Zambian students that he was being too arrogant in his demands for security of tenure, he appealed to a common racial identity. As a black South African he expected to be accorded privileges which were
not granted to the white expatriate. The real enemy was the white expatriate and not the black African who had suffered and was still suffering from the yoke of white oppression.

It will never be known how my heart bleeds to see university education in Zambia, after an unfortunate beginning under a Vice-Chancellor who did not have a jot of human blood in him, continue to be in the hands of a clique of white expatriates who are not interested in planning with Zambians but for them. The result? - the pathetic programmes we have in the humanities which are not intended to build up a student's self-reliance nor prepare him for a degree that will take him confidently on to higher studies. Else why should a fleet of external examiners have to come here every year? But this is Zambia's own business. I tried very hard to make it mine also these last 21 months. I failed. Because we Africans are a pitiful minority. The Board of Humanities (which is where the rot lies) will continue to make vital decisions, pass notes under tables, without any obstruction whatsoever, I could have waited for a larger contingent of black lecturers, but the threat from Immigration has meant that I had no secure base to function from. 149

Such attempts to unite separate African nationalities in opposition to whites will gain support in some Zambian circles and be opposed in others. Racial animosities are not as well developed amongst Zambian students as perhaps they are amongst refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa, as the third opinion poll suggested.

Zambianisation is being sabotaged by expatriates

49% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 27% disagreed 150

In the second opinion poll opinion was sought over the issue of membership of SMOLISA.

Membership of SMOLISA should be open only to black students

31% agreed, 16% were uncertain, 53% disagreed 151

Yet at the same time students did approve of the aims of SMOLISA
and considered the liberation of Southern Africa as a goal which Zambians must strive towards.

There is no need for an UNZA student organisation with the aims of SMOLISA

42% agreed, 14% were uncertain, 44% disagreed

Zambians must involve themselves in the struggle to liberate Southern Africa

49% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 36% disagreed

Zambia will not be free until the rest of Southern Africa is liberated

53% agreed, 12% were uncertain, 35% disagreed

The opinion polls indicate that while the Zambian student may regard the white as deliberately working against the interests of the Zambians, only a minority of Zambian students are prepared to endorse 'racialism' within the student community. While the student community gives general support to the idea of student involvement in the liberation of Southern Africa, it expects the Rhodesians and South Africans to spearhead the movement. It would be opposed to their assumption of prominent positions in the Zambian community where their stake in the status quo would lead them into competition with Zambians rather than towards the liberation of their own countries from white supremacy.

Cultural Separatism and Black Power.

Once the 'no white' membership clause had been enshrined in the SMOLISA 'charter', the organisation became a rallying centre for a handful of cultural purists, who wished to develop their own 'black culture' untainted by the interference of
whites. It was the SMOLISA group who invited Jomo Logan, an American Negro, known for his propagation of an extreme version of 'black power' and 'black cultural purity'. The first meeting was open to both black and white students. The following day the anonymous group calling itself The New Direction delivered an attack on Logan's racial chauvinism.

You [Mr. Logan] say that you follow Kwame Nkrumah, we therefore suggest to you that you read his book "Class Struggle in Africa". In that book and in many others written about Africa's past you will see how Africans (black people) were exploiting and oppressing Africans (black people) BEFORE the white man came along. If you look around you a bit closer at Africa's present you will see that still black people are exploiting black people. We are AGAINST oppression - ALL OPPRESSION. We do not wish to abolish the white master only for the black master, we seek to abolish that mentality which needs masters. We seek to abolish masterhood.155

The second meeting, convened to discuss the possibility of establishing a centre for the development of black culture, was given relatively little publicity and was intended for blacks only. The one white who made an appearance was asked to leave at the request of Logan himself, but not without some objections from other members of the gathering. New Direction brought out another circular a few days later.

On Wednesday Mr. Jomo Logan came here and committed an atrocity and in this he was aided and abetted by the people attending the SMOLISA meeting. How can one excuse the behaviour of the people at that meeting? One cannot. Mr. Jomo Logan came to Zambia the invited guest of the President of this country. He came and flaunted the principles which the President of this country upholds. What is the meaning of this? Is Mr. Logan now more powerful than the President? The meeting on Wednesday night was to discuss the "International Black Power Revolt". The poster announcing the meeting did not declare - BLACKS ONLY. Maybe that would have reminded other people too much of a certain other brand of filth. However this principle was put into practice. The only white person present was asked to leave. Indians were allowed
the dubious privilege of staying. We hope they enjoyed basking in the light, or should one say darkness of their new found identity. Of course 'Black' people were safe. There was no question or doubt as to which breed of humanity they did not belong to. Smugly they wallowed in their Blackness. It is a pity that 60% of their 'Black' women are toning their skin and wearing synthetic hair. Do we imagine that just because we are safely within the borders of Zambia no evil forces can get at us. Imperialism is confusion—--is manipulation—--is indoctrination—--is conquest of the mind... Imperialism is the sacrifice of men, women, children; Imperialism is the sacrifice of MAN. Brother Logan is part of all this. 156

Though the majority of students are opposed to racialism, they would be unlikely to adopt the above class analysis which treats colour as an epiphenomenon of a more fundamental division of societies into oppressors and oppressed. The implications of the class analysis pursued to their logical conclusion, as The New Direction pamphlet does, lead to a frontal assault on the aspirations and orientation of students to wider society. Because they openly identify with a socialist cause and condemn their fellow students for elitism and materialism, the authors of The New Direction were forced into anonymity.

The disagreement between the majority of students and those who propagate cultural separatism is similar to the debate between advocates of black power and black assimilation amongst negro students in America. 157 The Zambian student is not concerned to show himself superior to the white race. On the contrary he does not claim to be any different from whites, but expects to be treated as their equal. He does not reject whites or white culture but only those whites who consider him inferior and those elements of white ideology that assert black inferiority. The Zambian student aspires to be as "good
as" the white man, not different from or "better" than the white man. It is for these reasons that the majority reject racialism. At the same time the discussion as to why the majority reject racialism should not hide the fact that a substantial minority (31%) endorse racialism, though only very few would express their racial antipathies in public. The meritocratic ethos of the university and the tendency for opinion leaders and community influencers not to be racially motivated do not encourage any overt expression of racialism. With respect to the disparate origins of its membership, the student community is an integrative institution.

Relations between Zambian students and white students on the one hand and Rhodesian and South African black students on the other are very much influenced by role expectations derived from the heritage of colonialism and the wider social structure. Thus the white student must combine his white role and his student role and manage any tension that may arise between them. Similarly the refugee student must also satisfy expectations corresponding to both his refugee and student roles.

THE STUDENT'S ELECTIONS.

Student elections and the basis of the support for different candidates can provide a gauge as to the importance of the extrinsic roles discussed in previous sections of this chapter relative to intrinsic roles derived from the university social structure. Elections to the UNZASU Executive take place in two stages, first for the President and then for the remaining eleven member executive. For the purposes of analysis it is convenient to confine attention to the first stage alone.
Campaigning takes place in a period of approximately two weeks before polling day, normally held about a month after the beginning of the academic year.

The Election of 1970.

There were three candidates for the Presidential election of 1970; Bushe, Phiri and Tembo. Bushe, a medical student, had been very active in student politics at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as it was then called, before being forced to leave Salisbury. Phiri and Tembo both from the Eastern Province of Zambia had no previous experience in student union executives. But Phiri, in addition to being very popular amongst students, had the support of many prominent student leaders who were actively campaigning on his behalf. Most students were confident that Phiri would be returned as President. Bushe was practically unknown on the main campus, confining his campaign to fellow medical students at the Ridgeway Campus where he resided.

As is customary in UNZASU elections, the three candidates presented their manifestos before a student audience on the eve of the elections. They are then, each in turn, subjected to a critical assault from the 'convention' participants assembled to listen to them. On this occasion the students were clearly disturbed at what they considered to be the poor quality of the candidates' performances. The meeting was interrupted a number of times with demands for the elections to be restarted with new contestants. The two Zambians failed to articulate a coherent outlook on student government and the problems with which it was beset. Their failure to come up with anything original or to show signs of leadership stimulated
abusive responses from the floor. Bushe was the only candidate who gave the impression that he knew what student government was about or who exhibited any signs of forcefulness and resolution. However, he had become the subject of a smear campaign that morning, questioning his legitimacy as a candidate because of his alien status. In the election the following day the voting was as follows. 158

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bushe</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tembo</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phiri</td>
<td>191</td>
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Total votes cast - 563
Poll - 48%

The low poll reflects the perception of the candidates as low calibre and the general cynicism with which student government has come to be viewed as a result of the perennial resignation or dismissal. Bushe's victory was reported in UZ as follows.

It is widely believed that had the Sunday [election eve] meeting not taken place Phiri would have won. Bushe's oratory had rallied the flesh support Phiri had behind him and left only the latter with skeleton support. 159

The attendance at the election eve meeting must have amounted to between two and three hundred students, many of whom would have come to the meeting to genuinely make up their mind as to whom to vote for. It is they, either through voting or through influencing others, who swung the vote in favour of Bushe. The support that Bushe received from the Ridgeway Campus where about 120 medical students were residing could not have accounted for his victory.

A certain fixed vote for each candidate will necessarily come from those mobilised through a friendship network emanating from the candidate himself. Phiri's network was extensive, while Bushe's was clearly very restricted outside the Ridgeway
campus and his fellow Rhodesians. Yet Bushe won the greater number of votes suggesting that friendship or sectional loyalties do not play the most significant role in amassing votes, but rather of greater significance is the contestant's potential for leading a community of students. Both Tembo and Phiri failed to exhibit much leadership potential or an ability to defend student interests. In an article devoted to the suggestion that 'aliens be banned from standing in presidential elections' one commentator on student government wrote,

One of the reasons given for this move is that aliens cannot sincerely deal with some of the more delicate issues involving students and the government for fear of being deported. But just who are these people kidding? Some of these same people have been known to visit Freedom House, for no reason than that of familiarisation and paving the way for the future. We know such people will not spare a thing to try and achieve their cause, even if it means betraying student causes. Are they therefore any better than aliens. I would rather be led by a student who is dedicated to the student cause, irrespective of his country of origin.160

These views are probably representative of the majority of students active in student politics, allowing aliens to stage successful election campaigns. The importance of the student interest and student 'solidarity' over and above sectional differences when electing leaders to the UNZASU executive is underlined by the outcome of the 1971 student elections.

The Election of 1971.

There were five candidates for the 1971 elections and the distribution of votes is shown in Table 19. Support for each of the candidates will be considered in the light of his background, programme, campaign and performance at the pre-election convention.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 19 - PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE 1971 STUDENT ELECTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNZASU, 1970.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from out-going UNZASU Executive</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Percentage Poll - 66%
Chishala.

Chishala produced the most provocative manifesto — what he referred to as a 'socio-revolutionary programme' based on 'seven strategic steps to revolution'. First, appealing to the pecuniary instincts of the electorate, he proclaimed the most burning issue facing the university student to be the inadequacy of bursaries.

...if certain people in authority deem it their right to refuse to live below the bread-line, so it is for the university student to refuse to live below lines rejected by others. For, I contend, bursaries are not a privilege but an undeniable right for every genius and mentally equipped healthy man and woman of this country.\textsuperscript{162}

As a group whose privileges rest on merit, the students cannot allow their standard of living to fall to the level of the mass of the population so long as those who control the country's welfare — the political élite — are not themselves prepared to make any sacrifices. Yet, paradoxically, his second point calls for identification with the cause of the UNZA staff association.

The point I am trying to make here is not intended to widen the gap between the two peasant organisations but to deliberately liberate (call it decolonization) our minds from mythical thinking that workers and student interests are drastically different. We can only decolonise our minds if we all resolve that their enemy is our enemy too. They and we struggle for betterment against a common authority. That's why I feel strongly that antagonism between ourselves should come to an end by the establishment of a common platform of communication.\textsuperscript{163}

In advocating support and co-operation with the workers on the campus Chishala was violating what the majority of students saw to be the student interest, and his more equalitarian orientation must have lost him a number of votes. The remaining items were strictly in accord with student interest. He
advocated the removal of the "quota system" and a reconsideration of the system of "redirections" (the Zambian euphemism for failures). The quota system, Chishala argued, leads to students studying subjects in which they are not interested, thus increasing the number of redirections with the consequent waste of taxpayers' money. He proposes that grants to UNZASU affiliated clubs and societies be more substantial and that A-Level certificates be awarded to students who successfully pass first year courses but who have to leave for various reasons. His sixth point deals with the contentious requirement for B.A.'s entering the civil service to undergo a further year's training at the National Institute for Public Administration after graduation from the University of Zambia. Students view the move as an attempt to keep them away from positions where they may threaten present incumbents in the civil service. Chishala also attacks the thinking behind the government's declared, but never implemented policy, that 'all University graduates will in future be asked to serve in the rural areas'.

[That] is a policy aimed at initiating graduates into village environment. This might sound revolutionary to those brought up in Ridgeway, causeway, highfieldsway residences. But with more than 75% of our community coming from rural areas this move might sound unrealistic. It is criminal and unpardonable for one to refuse to accept the hard fact that most of us have already undergone "rural initiation" because we don't come from towns but villages. Therefore making a policy of rural initiation cannot be a correct one since we have already been initiated village-wise.

Lastly he advocates a 'shake up for UNZASU' by assigning specific duties to the officers in the executive.

Chishala's manifesto is an attempt to marry the more
'radical' and broader views of Zambian society of its author with the vote-catching narrower student interest. His background has a considerable bearing on his outlook. Chishala had been very active in national politics off the campus during his first year when he was associated with a militant wing of UNIP which had assumed the role of 'criticism from within'. He had also been on the editorial board of Vanguard the paper produced by UNIP Youth until it was banned following veiled criticism of the national leadership. During his first year he had been very quiet as a student, though he did come out very strongly in favour of a UNIP branch on the campus. Amongst the student electorate Chishala was known for his association with UNIP and for this reason alone his chances of winning support must have been slight from the outset. Outlining his programme at the election convention he created an uproar by opening with a reference to students as 'fellow peasants'. He never recovered from this initial tactical blunder. Attacked for his connection with UNIP as being a potential threat to the student community, he declared he would never introduce any UNIP doctrine without the support of the electorate. However, few were convinced.

His poor performance in front of an aggressive audience, failing to attune himself to the student political culture, his association with UNIP, his expressed sympathies for the working classes and his failure to make a mark amongst students as a student in his first year account for the little support he attracted.

Mumba.

Mumba was another second year student known more for his
off-campus activities than for his contributions to the student community. His manifesto was typical of those produced by other candidates expressing the belief in student identity and integrity, student solidarity, students' rightful and proper place in society, eradication of student apathy and improved relations between male and female students.  

The manifesto did little to amplify these terms or concretise his programme. Mumba's election campaign reflected the affluent life he was able to lead as a civil servant in Kitwe, on a scholarship from the City Council. Before the new academic year, Mumba held a party for students working on the Copperbelt where he let it be known that he was standing for the post of President. However, some students present resented the way he arranged the party in order to canvas for support. He staged another party on the campus and this time was accused of only inviting Bemba-speaking students. Mumba was also exceptional in that he had posters printed with a prominent portrait on each. All other candidates relied on hand written posters. Many of Mumba's posters were disfigured with scrawlings as the campaign progressed. At the pre-election convention, though articulate in English, he was very softly spoken and had difficulty in raising his voice above the hubbub. He was questioned about the guests to the parties he had thrown "had they been confined to Bembas?". Mumba replied that since he was not a Bemba himself, but a Lala, the accusation must be groundless.

Mumba's failure to attract many votes may be accounted for in a number of ways. First, he was little known for campus activities (he turned up, far from sober, to disrupt an UNZASU General Meeting the previous year). He had failed to
impress the electorate at the convention before the election where he had been attacked for his apparent sectionalism. His position in the civil service worked to his disadvantage in two ways. First, a position in the civil service leaves him vulnerable to pressure from government to betray student interests. Second his campaign and way of life suggested to some that he was more concerned to promote his own social status in the wider community than about student interests and problems.

Walia.

Walia, a third year law student, had had considerable experience in student government at his previous university in India. Unlike the previous two candidates and unlike the vast majority of the other Asians on campus, Walia had been very active in student affairs. Apart from playing prominent roles in student dramatics, tennis and table tennis, he was noted for the articulate manner in which he presented his views and proposals at student meetings. In his manifesto he promised greater participation by students in the decisions of the UNZASU Executive, improved student-administration relations and more social life in the halls of residence.¹⁶⁷ Despite his status as an 'alien' he was able to command some 11% of the votes cast - more than Chishala and Mumba together. He must have attracted considerable support from students outside his own Asian student community. His known interest and previous participation in UNZA affairs enhanced his legitimacy as a prospective President. His leadership potential, clarity and forcefulness in speech all lent further credibility to his candidature. Though his Indian background might make him less
vulnerable to a betrayal to government and susceptible to closer control from the student body, nevertheless this same attribute was seen as a handicap when handling relations with outside bodies and in appreciating and representing African student interests.

Chibala.

When the candidates were first announced it was presumed by most that the real contest was to be between Chibala and Chola. Chibala, a fourth year student, had not previously held any office in student government but had been extremely active in student journalism (he was senior editor of UZ), the student dramatic society (he had taken a leading role in UNZADRA's very successful production of Che Guevara) and in student debating. In his manifesto he called for a student community with 'revolutionary purpose', student involvement in campus and national affairs on the basis of student power, student solidarity and interaction with fellow students around the world, to uphold the UNZASU constitution, 'to persuade the Government through all channels, including the latest techniques of student action to raise grants and bursaries' and 'to render moral and material support to, and embrace the cause of, all progressive peoples revolutionary cadres and dedicated fighters committed to total freedom and independence through sacrifice and military action'.

Chibala was vulnerable to detraction on two counts. The first relates to his sectional and political loyalties. Though he himself never gave any overt suggestions of sectionalism - he was one of the few students who tended to use English as a language of communication and whose friends came from different
parts of Zambia - or party affiliation, nonetheless his name linked him to Southern Province and therefore to ANC. His campaign supporters included the two most prominent members of ANC on the campus which laid him open to accusations of campaigning on a sectional basis. However, that his close supporters were ANC does not imply that he was ANC, but simply that others might think he was. An ardent Chola supporter exploited Chibala's implicit association with ANC by openly accusing Chibala of accepting ANC sponsorship. This must have cost him a large number of votes in view of the antipathy towards leaders with strong affiliations to external organisations in particular political parties. The second detraction arose out of an article Chibala had written the previous year in the Times of Zambia arguing the case against an increase in student bursaries. Chibala's election rivals distributed a circular, This Double Dealer, in which the newspaper article was reproduced. Chibala's reply in another circular was weak.

This was purely an academic exercise. And one's convictions cannot fairly be measured in terms of what one says in a debate. ...It was some form of silent debate. In other words, my friend who wrote in favour of the increase of the bursary funds could be likened to a 'proposer'. I wrote against the motion; so I was an 'opposer'. 169

For many this was an unforgivable betrayal of the student interest which called into question his credibility as a student leader and again must have cost him considerable support.

Chibala introduced his convention speech with a rhetoric which he had customarily exhibited in the columns of UZ but which was out of place in a contest for President of the students' union.
The time for a legitimate revolution is ripe. The sort of revolution which blends progressive theory with practice, for the benefit of mankind. And mankind includes even the die-hard reactionaries who turn a deaf ear to our ideas, contribution, grievances and the like. An awful lot of these revisionists hibernate in UNZA offices, lofty mansions and on illegal farms which by right, belong to helpless peasants: the poor innocent victims. The masses! Some of professional conservatives, tricksters, and opportunists shamelessly indulge in frivolous luxury; the sort of luxury which one can only experience when using 'other people's money.' We will not continue to be hoodwinked. We are vigilant.

On a much more serious note now. Sporadic and disorganised outbursts regarding our grievances will not penetrate the solid wall of the powers-that-be.

We know this. We have, time and again, experienced it through demonstrations and the like. We must do something. We are capable of doing something. We have sufficient necessary materials: heads, eyes, ears, hands, legs. But comrades, I think, one thing, at least, lacks in us as a student body. We seriously lack initiative. The whole student body, through UNZASU, needs a drastic overhaul. Once this is achieved, the voice of the student body will be recognised and accommodated even if it is a bitter pill to swallow.170

Such a speech to an aggressive, cynical audience fell on resistant ears and Chibala's performance was a bitter disappointment to his supporters. He failed to capture the student attention despite the support he had behind him. His poor performance combined with insinuations of partisan political affiliations and of a willingness to betray the narrower student interest lost him the election to Chola.

Chola.

Chola was the only one of the five contestants who had previously served on an UNZASU or NUZS Executive. In the outgoing executive Chola had been Vice-President and the legitimacy, reknown and even popularity accorded to him in this capacity was to be the basis of his support. Before the
candidates had officially announced that they were contesting for the post of President, a commentator wrote in UZ,

It is rumoured that the outgoing executive is sponsoring one of their own colleagues for whom they will be throwing their full effort. While this is in itself not against the constitution, it must be borne in mind that there is a danger of perpetuating the same dynasty in the sense that it can lead to a dictatorial executive, due to a greater feel of power after being elected again.171

Since the Bushe administration had been the first student government to remain intact for its entire year of office, it commanded some respect from the electorate. As Vice-President, Chola had not committed any major blunders and had proved himself to be a very able assistant to the President. Both these factors must have contributed in large measure to Chola’s successful candidature for the Presidential post.

At the same time the members of the Bushe administration had a vested interest in promoting Chola’s candidacy. They were unwilling to see their influence over student affairs reduced to that of the mass of students and securing the election of their own candidate was one way of retaining influence. It is also possible, as was rumoured when revelations of the ‘corruption’ of the Bushe administration were released, that the outgoing executive had a vested interest in concealing records of its activities and what better way than through creating a President from their own midst.

Meanwhile strong rumours are circulating that the President-elect, will try to sit on any investigation that might be carried out to fish out UNZASU "thieves." One student said that this may be confirmed by the unanimous support Mr. Chola received from his fellow officials.172

But the ‘corruption’ charges were only levelled against the Bushe administration after the election of Chola to President,
and none of the contestants exploited the support Chola received from the 1970 executive.

Apart from student politics, Chola was heavily committed to the Student Christian Association in which he had been one of the leading members. As a candidate with religious inclinations, he was again unusual, but in consonance with the student political culture he made no mention of his attachment to Christianity. He did not produce any concrete manifestos but instead distributed large lettered, hand-stencilled circulars on which were inscribed the catchwords of his programme incorporating 'heightened vigilance' and 'functional dynamism' in the spirit of 'power to the people'. Chola never attempted to explain any of this political jingoism, and no one took it seriously. It had its functions however. Not only did the circulars attract attention to Chola - they were easily distinguishable from the typewritten circulars and manifestos of the other contestants - but they also gave him a label of identification. Chola equals 'functional dynamism'. In his pre-election convention address he emerged the strongest contestant. His position in the previous executive clearly gave him the necessary experience and confidence to handle the aggressive audience. He did not make the mistake of being specific in his proposals but confined himself to his collection of catch phrases. The UZ commentator wrote of his convention performance:

"Dynamic" Chola seemed to have revived past memories when he was swept to the Vice-Presidency in the last general elections. He was unmoved as regards the progress made by the outgoing executive and pledged to build and learn from their mistakes. From the overall reaction from the audience it was clear that he had come prepared. His supporters could be heard from every corner of the theatre. However, it cannot be ignored that some people are still bitter
against what seems to be a perpetuation of the present executive if he is elected. He definitely made use of his experience and questioners failed to pin him down. If the audience's reaction is anything to go by, he is very much in the race. 173

Though there were feeble attempts to attack him along lines similar to those which Matakala was to use, he was able to authoritatively brush them aside. Chola, thus presented himself as the strongest, most experienced candidate who on the basis of his record had shown his concern for student interests and who had behind him the support of a strong body of influentials in the student community.

Politics of Consensus.

Though there can be little doubt that both Chola and Chibala drew on a reservoir of sectional support mobilised through friendship networks, equally such a network was insufficient to win the election. Sectionalism cannot be regarded as the most prominent feature of student politics. The distribution of the student population amongst the four major language groups is such that no candidate can be successful without support from at least two groups which automatically precludes reliance on sectional recruitment. The very existence of three candidates drawing on Bemba-speaking support suggests that there was no sectional collusion in the nomination of candidates. In the election of the other members of the executive, where many of the candidates are unknown to the electorate sectional identification may conceivably be more important. This was certainly the view of one of the contestants for an executive post who scrubbed out his 'surname' written on the polling box in favour of one of his other names
which made his sectional origin clearer. In other cases students found themselves subject to the cross-pressures of friendship affiliation and sectional affiliation. Thus the friends of Chibala who nominated him for candidacy were often not of his linguistic group, indeed one was to be found amongst the nominators of another candidate from his own sectional group.

No other externally derived roles can be used to mobilise any measure of support. Internally the social structure of the university though it divides the student community into subjects of study, year of study, and residence halls, any decision made by the student government any policy pursued by its executive would affect all students equally. Nonetheless, internal cleavages, particularly on the basis of faculty, do provide a network for canvassing for support. But again votes accumulated in this way only provide a small percentage of the number necessary to win an election.

The only ideological cleavage to appear on the campus concerned the formation of a branch of UNIP. But the students who favoured a branch and a wider conception of the student role only represented a 20% minority insufficient to win an election.

Chola did not win the election of 1971, nor Bushe the election of 1970 because he represented the interests of any one section of the student community. Both won the election contest for President because the electorate judged them as the candidates most likely to promote and defend the student interest. The student community is relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated and there exists a considerable unanimity on what constitutes the student interest. The election of leaders
in the community reflects the processes of consensus politics. Under such circumstances the personal characteristics of the contestant are the most important features in determining his success at the poll. Any attempt to appeal to the interests of a particular group are doomed to failure so long as that group represents a minority. So long as there are so few differentiated sets of interests a coalition between groups in the promotion of presidential candidates is not feasible.

Apart from the aforementioned absence of any interest differentiation which may be derived from the university social structure, at least four other reasons help to account for the value consensus over what constitutes the student interest. First the small size and geographical concentration of the community results in a closely knit network of relations which is conducive to conformity to a common set of values. Sanctions are easily mobilised to bring deviants back into line. Thus accusations of 'tribalism' or 'political partisanship' are effective forms of social control in the same way as 'witchcraft' accusations operate in rural societies. Such mechanisms of social control, found in relatively homogeneous communities where a value consensus already prevails, also assists in the maintenance of that value consensus. Second the development of cleavages based on linguistic groups - the most important 'source' of informal interaction - is offset by cross cutting associations based on subject of study, year of study, hall of residence, participation in social, intellectual and sporting activities, etc.

Equally important in the promotion of value consensus is the perception of out-group hostility. The existence of a powerful outside force imposing severe constraints on
acceptable behaviour means that there are few policy options open to the student leadership. Where there is little to no room to manoeuvre debate over decisions to be made or action to be taken is a redundant and futile exercise. For this reason alone there is little likelihood of cleavages and value dissensus developing.

The feeling prevalent amongst students of a hostile outside society has given rise to 'student solidarity' and the formulation of an ideology of 'meritocratic elitism' corresponding to their bonds of identification. Any group which either is or perceives itself to be under pressure from outside will strive to promote unity within its ranks through a coherent ideology which identifies itself as different from and superior to the 'enemy'. The resurrection of religion and tribalism and the doctrines of racial purity are typical responses to out-group hostility.175 For the Zambian student community superiority through the "enlightenment" of university education performs the same function. But where the 'beleaguered' group does not possess the power to enforce compliance with the precepts and implications of the ideology upon the hostile out-group, conflict is exacerbated by the perpetration of an exclusivist ideology. Indeed what becomes an instrument and rationalisation of in-group interests becomes a justification for enhanced out-group hostility. Thus the formulation of 'meritocratic elitism' provides the party and government with ready made excuses to use coercion in stemming student opposition. It becomes less legitimate to oppress a student community which conscientiously proclaims and acts in accordance with the very value system which those outside espouse but blatantly violate. This is more the position of
the students in the West, for example those who were active in the civil rights movement and the American campus 'revolts'.

**ROLE CONTINUITIES AND TENSION CONTROL.**

This chapter has been devoted to a consideration of the roles of the student apart from his student role. These roles, derived from the wider social structure, do in some cases provide linkages between students and the society outside the university. Thus kinship ties play an important part in binding the student to particular groups in society in a system of mutual obligations and responsibilities.

In certain situations other extrinsic roles can become important in linking students to the wider society. Thus in confrontations with 'enemy' nations students, government and all other sections of society are bound together through their common role as Zambian nationals, or as members of the black race. Sectional affiliations can become important when in the wider society there are open cleavages between different groups, as when the predominantly Bemba supported UPP was formed.

Except in the unusual circumstances of the university being absorbed into the political arena of the nation, externally derived roles are only activated insofar as they do not conflict with the student role. Where they do conflict the community imposes heavy penalties on those who continue to disregard the obligations attendant on the student role. Where the role conflict is irreconcilable, as in the case of the departure of nine students to join the UPP, the student is forced to decide which role relation to sever. In practice, those linkages with the society outside which are strong are
also the ones which were least likely to conflict with the student role and the interests of the student community, and least likely to rend divisions within the community.

Nevertheless the various sections on the chapter have also shown that externally derived roles do affect student behaviour in the university community. They do so by direct interference through ties with outside groups, and through identification with outside interests. But more importantly extrinsic roles are used by participants in the political and social processes of the community. Thus in mobilising support election candidates will inevitably draw upon friends and fellow members from their linguistic groups. In the conflict between NUZS and UNZASU representatives of each side made use of the political loyalties of students in canvassing for support. Equally extrinsic roles may be manipulated to enforce the norms current in the student community and to confront deviants with powerful sanctions. Those who appear to deviate from acceptable behaviour are accused of being 'tribalists' (only rarely since this may lead to further disunity) or 'stooges of government' or where aliens or whites are concerned it is sufficient to draw attention to their colour or nationality. Just as whites are potential 'spies for Vorster', subversive elements, or supporters of black oppression, so the aliens are 'freedom fighters cohabiting with the daughters of their oppressors', 'self interested cowards', etc. As with witchcraft, the accusation resonates the prejudices of the community, while its very nature precludes the accused from being able to disprove the accusation. To defend himself the accused can only recant his supposed "sins" and reaffirm the community values, or keep silent. To do otherwise often leads
to a greater conviction within the community of his guilt.

The purpose of this chapter was to examine those members of the set of multiple roles which were likely to offset the tension which existed between the student community and the wider society in particular the party and government. Though role continuities do play a part in student life they are immediately dissolved in favour of the discontinuous student role when the community is threatened from outside, or when forces emerge which threaten to divide the community. Divisions intrinsic to the student community are very weak and so the rejection of roles extrinsic to the student community leads to the reinstatement of cohesion and solidarity. In conclusion, the tension revolving around the student role is not in any significant way minimised by the existence of other roles cross cutting the tension. The student role assumes paramount significance at those times when it is most threatened by the tension with the society outside. If the system of multiple roles fails to mitigate, and in some cases exacerbates the structural tension between students and society, what social mechanisms ensure the persistence of relative peace?
NOTES.

2. Ibid., p.139.
3. Ibid., P.140.
4. Ibid., p.140.
5. Address by President Kaunda at the occasion of the first graduation ceremony of the University of Zambia, 17 May 1969.
10. The survey of undergraduates was completed by examining the records of registered students at the University of Zambia. Subramaniam, V., The Social Background of Zambia’s Higher Civil Servants and Undergraduates (Paper presented to the University Social Science Conference, Nairobi, December, 1969.) The survey of graduates was conducted by the writer. See Appendix II, Graduate Survey.
12. For reasons delineated in Appendix II the survey of graduates is likely to be misleading and much less accurate than the survey of undergraduates.
13. See Subramaniam, op.cit., Table 3.
14. Since the survey was of postal questionnaire type and there are no statistics which would help to ascertain how representative the response was, one cannot conclude that it was in any way representative.
15. Students are reluctant to talk about their background and it would have been exceedingly difficult to conduct a survey amongst students to reveal their social origins.
17. Figures for father’s occupation come from Graduate Survey as do those of close kinsmen. (Number of close kinsmen involved was 275). Figures for working population came from Government of Zambia, Statistical Year Book 1970 (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, 1971), Table 4.19, p.60.
19. Ibid.
21. A reference to this was made by the Vice-Chancellor in his address on the occasion of the second graduation ceremony of the University of Zambia, 6 June 1970.
27. See, for example, Watson, W., Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958).
33. One has only to look at the African literature of Ekwensi, Ngugi, Achebe, Soyinka and others to see how obsessed is the African intellectual with what he perceives to be a conflict between tradition and modernity.
35. Opinion Poll One, Question 20.
36. Opinion Poll One, Question 16.
37. Ibid.
38. In 1970 18% of students were female in 1971 the figure rose to 22%. Figures supplied by the Computer Centre of the University of Zambia.
40. Opinion Poll Three, Question 11.
42. Opinion Poll Three, Question 12.
43. While 51% of 'B.A.' students disapproved of wigs, the figure for 'B.Sc.' students was 46%. While 40% of 'B.A.' students disapproved of mini-skirts, the figures for 'B.Sc.' students was 31%. As regards skin lighteners, 50% of 'B.A.'s disapproved while 51% of 'B.Sc's' disapproved. Opinion Poll Three, Questions 11, 12, 13.
44. Many, of course, argued that the male students behaved in an identical fashion. They too used skin lighteners, wore flared trousers etc.
45. UZ, 21 June 1971.
47. Among other things the female students were accused of choosing boy friends off the campus who were well placed in society with much money to spend on them.
49. UZ, 26 April 1971.
50. **Opinion Poll One, Question 10.**
51. **Opinion Poll One, Question 11.**
54. Ibid., pp. 11-18.
55. The end of 1968 and beginning 1969, witnessed the most outspoken attacks on mini skirts. Mini skirted women in Lusaka and other towns were reported as being molested. Since then there has been another revival of the debate between the 'traditionalists' and 'modernists' in July 1970. Valentine Musakanya, then a Cabinet Minister, was given a popular reception at the campus when he was invited by the University Sociological Association to talk on "The Dangers of Cultural Conservatism," 14 July 1970.
59. At a meeting between the Minister of Education and the students after three leaders of the teacher's union were detained, students attacked the Minister repeatedly and bitterly for action taken and his failure to sympathise with poor conditions in the teaching service. It should be noted that a number of students had been teachers before they entered the university.
60. Voice of UNZA, 10 July 1970.
67. See Lipset, S. M. and Bendix, R., *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966), p.41. Typically the writers only refer to white Americans, for which the percentage given was 20%. This translates into a figure greater than 15% when black Americans are included.


71. Goldthorpe, op.cit.


74. Hanna, op.cit., Table 1, p.419.

75. Hanna, op.cit., p.441.

76. The writer has not come across one such case.


78. Ibid. Answer to questions. Tape recording.


82. To Those who are still Reasoning (Circular distributed 4 November 1970).

83. *Men and Women of Intelligence Listen!* op.cit.


85. Ibid.

86. *Men and Women of Intelligence Listen!* op.cit.

87. To Those who are still Reasoning, op.cit.

88. Ibid.


92. This announcement was widely interpreted as signifying the inception of the one party state. Talks with the leader of the opposition never came to anything and the declaration was postponed.


100. For an analysis of such a transformation as it affected the Zambian mineworkers, see Bates, R., Unions, Parties and Political Development (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).

101. See Deutsche, op.cit.


103. See Bates, op.cit., Chapter 7, pp. 126-165.

104. Times of Zambia, 5 November 1970. The decision was as subsequent events made clear not a choice for the students as it was for UNIP.

105. Figures on students are from Subramaniam, op.cit., Table 1. Figures for population of Zambia are computed from Statistical Year Book 1970, op.cit., Table 1.2(e), p. 3.

106. Subramaniam, op.cit., Table 1, and Statistical Year Book 1970, op.cit., Table 1.2(b), p. 4.

107. UZ, 1 June 1971.

108. Ibid.


111. Cited from Radcliffe-Brown in Frankenburg, op.cit., p. 63.

112. UZ, 28 June 1971.

113. Every President of NUZS has been a student from the University of Zambia. In the executive elected in October, 1971, of nine officers, five were from the University of Zambia. None of the three committee members were from UNZA.

114. The announcement of the proposed increase was made at a meeting addressed by the NUZS President to the University of Zambia students on 21st August, 1970.

115. UNZASU and NUZS (I) (Circular distributed 26 May 1971).


117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. UNZASU and NUZS (II) (Circular distributed 28 May 1971).

120. Ibid.

121. National Union of Zambia Students (II) (Circular distributed 1 June 1971).

122. Though Bushe was President of UNZASU on sensitive matters related to specifically Zambian politics the executive preferred that he, for his own sake, left statements of this nature to his Vice-President.


124. Our Chief Nanga (Circular distributed 3 November 1970).

125. These merger talks came to nothing but were exploited politically by both ANC and UPP. The Lozis in ANC had defected from UNIP because they had not received what they considered a fair share of the fruits of independence including representation in Cabinet.
126. ANC who pursued a policy of rapprochement with South Africa akin to President Banda of Malawi saw no need for the Tan-Zam railway being built by the Chinese, to facilitate the transport of goods to Tanzania and lessen dependence on supply routes to the South.

127. The 'Kumodzi Kumawa' (1968) - 'Unity in the East' movement - was partly a response to the Bemba victories at the Mulungushi Conference of 1967, which diminished the strength of leaders from Eastern Province in the UNIP Central Committee.

128. The clenched fist is not only the symbol of black power but in Zambia the symbol of student power and Kapwepwe adopted it as the symbol for his own United Progressive Party.

129. UZ, 18 October 1971.
131. Ibid., pp.20-6.
133. Ibid., p.27.
134. Figures provided by the Office of the Registrar for 1971. Figures for the Zambian population as a whole Tables 1.4 and 1.5, are from Statistical Year Book 1970, op.cit., Table 1.4 and 1.5, p.6.
135. Apart from the large number of whites in all the important positions prior to independence, Asians dominated many sections of trading and business, while black Rhodesians, Malawians, Tanzanians, Angolans and South Africans were prominent as clerks and supervisors.
136. There are some black expatriates, for example, at the University but often they are not accorded the prestige of white expatriates.
137. In 1967, 18.3% of workers on local conditions of service were 'aliens'. (Figures from the Copper Industries Service Bureau,) Since labour turnover on the mines is very low at around 6%, the displacement of aliens has had to be a very gradual process.
138. The number of racial incidents in the years immediately after independence were relatively numerous because of the persistence of colonial-racial attitudes and the vigilance of UNIP. Since then UNIP activity has declined.
140. UZ, 11 May 1970.
142. UZ, 22 June 1970.
143. Opinion Poll Three, Question 28.
144. One interesting psycho-analytic analysis is offered by Fanon. Fanon, F., Black Skin White Masks (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), Chapters Two and Three, pp.41-82. The entirety of the book is relevant to the discussion of racial divisions in the student community and has probably more to contribute in this area than a sociological analysis.
145. SMOLISA (Circular distributed 7 October 1970).
146. ZANU is the Zimbabwe African National Union led by the restricted leader, Ndabaningi Sithole. ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union) is the other African nationalist party, led by Joshua Nkomo. Both parties are now banned in Rhodesia.
147. ZAPU is the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union led by the restricted leader Joshua Nkomo. Both ZANU and ZAPU are now banned in Rhodesia.
148. Article 5, of the Charter of the Students Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa says, FULL MEMBERSHIP shall be open to any black student who subscribes to the purposes and aims of SMOLISA regardless of party affiliations: Definition of BLACK - ANYONE WHO IS NOT WHITE e.g. Africans, ASIANS, and mixed RACES (Coloureds).
149. UZ, 11 May 1970.
150. Opinion Poll Three, Question 22.
152. Opinion Poll Two, Question 19.
153. Opinion Poll Two, Question 17.
155. For Internal Publication in UNZA - New Direction Publication 1 (Circular distributed May 1971).
156. A New Direction Publication (Pamphlet distributed 28 May 1971).
158. UZ, 20 April 1970.
159. Ibid.
160. UZ, 19 April 1971.
161. Data was collected from manifestos, observations, discussions with candidates, and Electoral Commission, Presidential Elections Results (Circular distributed 13 May 1971).
163. Ibid., p.2.
165. Chishala, op.cit., p.3.
166. Mumba, S., Election Manifesto (Distributed May 1971).
167. Walia, G., Election Manifesto (Distributed May 1971).
169. Chibala, M., Bursary Issue (Distributed May 1971).
171. UZ, 3 May 1971.

176. See, for example, Lipset and Wolin, *op.cit.*, and Wallerstein and Starr, *op.cit.*

177. For an analysis of role conflict and the social mechanisms available for articulating a set of role relations even though they tend to make incompatible demands on the role incumbent see Merton, *op.cit.*, pp.424-34.
CHAPTER FIVE

TENSION MANAGEMENT:

MAINTENANCE AND DISRUPTION OF EQUILIBRIUM.
In the previous chapter the set of role continuities linking the student to the wider social structure were found to be inadequate as mechanisms for conflict resolution. This chapter will return to concentrate on the role discontinuities arising out of the discrepant student roles in the university and wider social structures. The student role in the university structure will be referred to as his university role and his role in the wider society as his civic role. Given the structural tensions revolving around the student, the role discontinuity may be looked upon as the social mechanism which prevents the outbreak of conflict. However if the role discontinuity is violated by the activation of roles appropriate to one social structure within the boundaries of the other, then, as this chapter will seek to show, either certain individuals are compelled to dissociate themselves from one of the roles or an open confrontation becomes inevitable. The following sections will be divided into the various ways in which the role discontinuity may be violated first within the wider social system and second within the university system.

**ARTICULATION OF THE UNIVERSITY ROLE IN THE WIDER SOCIAL STRUCTURE — I**

Whenever the student articulates his university role in the wider political arena outside the university he simultaneously violates the role discontinuity. However, there are occasions, as when the university and civic roles overlap, when this violation does not, of itself, lead to a confrontation but on the contrary becomes a symbolic expression of solidarity with Zambians throughout society. No more clear an
example of this is the student demonstration in support of government policy, which has become an annual student event.

**Ritual Protest at the Intersection of Civic and University Roles.**

The demonstrations staged by the Zambian student are distinguished from those in Western countries and indeed in countries the world over by their tendency to support rather than oppose government, despite the prevailing oppositional attitudes. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the government will not tolerate opposition, and any blatant form of demonstration opposing the government can be easily suppressed, so long as the student population is relatively small. This was the case in the two protests that have been made by students about the conduct of national affairs, to be discussed in following sections. Second, demonstrations on behalf of oppressed sections of the Zambian community are unlikely to have much appeal to the students. Their future role as members of a ruling class preclude many demonstrations which might be staged in other countries where the supply of graduates is plentiful and therefore career prospects relatively bleak. Then there is simply a question of the value of openly expressing disloyalty and opposition to government in a situation which requires unity. A demonstration of students against the government is very easily exploited by the white supremacist regimes south of the Zambezi as illustrations of the incompetence of African rulers. Fourth, there can be little doubt that students feel a bitter resentment towards the British, in particular, and the "rich world" in general for their blatant hypocrisy in purporting to be friends of Zambia while aiding and abetting her enemies to the South. That
explains the tendency for students to stage demonstrations outside Western foreign embassies.

A final reason relates to the latent function of the demonstration as the permissible articulation of the student's university role in the wider society. It can be regarded as a ritual response to the tension which exists between the student and the society outside. Students have almost annually demonstrated in solidarity with the government's policy over Southern Africa because of, rather than despite, the oppositionalism and tension between the two.¹ Not only is the demonstration an affirmation of solidarity with the government, but it is an affirmation of student solidarity itself. This is what the President of the Union said of the 1970 demonstration against the British High Commission protesting against the resumption of sales of arms to South Africa.

This sent Mr. Apathy to his perpetual place of rest. But that was not the significance of the occasion. First we wanted to show how deeply concerned we were with the satanic alliance between Heath and Vorster and their arms deal. Our opinions and feelings towards this alliance were recorded here in our own country, neighbouring countries and overseas. Telegrams and private letters to this effect poured into the UNZASU offices, a filmed interview between myself and the British Panorama rocked the British Televisions, equally so on our local TV. Britain even sent some small man to come and interview me on the same issue and I maintained our stand not only with threats but with deep conviction. "Come what may, what the hell does the Commonwealth serve us," I used to tell them, "You are rich because Zambia is poor."

Comrades, I wish I had telepathed Comrade Burnham's quotation, "It is better to die on your feet than beg on your knees," and this should be our guiding principle.

Letters even poured to the State House about our demonstration and some of the students know it. Of course there were [some] from misguided individuals in Britain and I was called on to [go] to the State House to look at some of these letters. I have shown a copy of one of these to some students here.
Where is our contribution and impact not felt? Who says UNZASU is non-existent?
Where now lies apathy - in the grave yard of course. But you have heard of people dying and resurrecting, apathy seems to belong to the same category. We need to shoot at him relentlessy, probably apathy never dies but only hibernates and springs to action again when adverse conditions are over.  

The demonstration therefore enjoins students together be they white or black, Zambian or non-Zambian and enjoins the students to the government in opposition to outside enemies.

Thus of the six demonstrations which have taken place between 1965 and 1970 five were in support of government policy towards Southern Africa. In November 1965 students demonstrated outside the British High Commission following the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Rhodesia. In April 1966 students again protested outside the British High Commission over the shooting of seven 'African freedom fighters' of the Zimbabwe African National Union. At this demonstration students hurled stones through the windows of the High Commission. (As was widely commented at the time the High Commission was only a stone's throw away from the Ridgeway Campus where the students resided.) There was a confrontation with the police and eighty eight students were arrested and herded into cells. Police animosity towards the students rose to such heights that a tear gas cannister was exploded in one of the cells and students had to break windows for fresh air. Two students were injured and taken to hospital and others cut and bruised. However, all students were released the same day and proceedings were dropped. In November there was another demonstration - this time peaceful - outside the High Commission in protest against the first
anniversary of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. October, 1967 witnessed the first protest against the government — the "Chanda Affair" — and soon afterwards there was another peaceful protest over the British Government's handling of the Rhodesian situation. In the years 1968 and 1969, perhaps as a reaction to the government reprisals during the Chanda episode, there was a lull in student protest. But, in July 1970 virtually all the eleven hundred students resident on the two campuses crossed the fields to protest outside the British High Commission where a violent demonstration was staged in protest against the British Government's intention to resume arms' sales to South Africa. Five students were badly beaten, arrested and later released. On the campus, the protest was widely hailed as a victory for student solidarity.

Two moves to stage demonstrations against United States presence in South East Asia, one in 1970 and another in 1971, proved abortive because of lack of support from the student body. Clearly "US Imperialism" is of much less significance and relevance than "South African Imperialism." Equally, one may attribute the students' reluctance to demonstrate over "Vietnam" or "Cambodia" to the failure of the Zambian government itself to make a clear stand over these issues. Such a demonstration against the American government would not have the same ritual significance as one against the British High Commission.

Interestingly the demonstration is not only a ritual for students but also for the police. The articulation of the university role in the wider political system, even though it is not incompatible with the student's civic role, is
nevertheless an occasion when the police are licenced to express their resentment towards the students in physical combat.\textsuperscript{4} At other times the police must conform to the norms of discipline associated with their role in society as custodians of law and order. But at the time of the student demonstration they may legitimately attack the students and renounce their passive role.

Thus at the intersection of the university and civic roles, both the student and police partake in what is normally proscribed behaviour but which in the ritual context becomes acceptable to the Zambian society as a whole. In so doing as Gluckman has written,

\ldots\ldots this particular ritual, by allowing people to behave in normally prohibited ways, gave expression, in a reversed form, to the normal rightness of a particular kind of social order.\textsuperscript{5}

Thus the demonstration not only affirms the social order through enjoining students and the rest of society in a common expression of solidarity vis-à-vis a hostile outgroup, but it also affirms the social order through the implicit acknowledgment that it is only at the intersection of the two student roles that political action in the national arena is permissible. The purpose of the ritual of protest "is to unite people who do not or cannot query their social roles".\textsuperscript{6} Thus quite clearly not all demonstrations are manifestations of ritual protest and indeed only those which do not violate the role discontinuity can conceivably be so regarded. Where the participants question the social order and violate the discontinuity between civic and university roles by acting in the public sphere in accordance with norms derived from the university system then the protest is no longer 'legitimate'.
Illegitimate Articulation of the University Role.

The incident involving a verbal clash and threatened physical combat between students and UNIP Youth arising out of an exchange of words in the press between the President of NUZS and two cabinet ministers was recounted in the second chapter. In that instance the Minister of Education privately warned the student leaders of the consequences of using the press to air their grievances, the student leaders eventually made a public apology and UNIP were requested to climb down from their resolve to march on the campus. The student leaders had invaded the national political arena in their university role and inevitably brought on a collision with the party. The conflict was resolved by confining it to the representatives of the students and UNIP Youth while the government played a brokerage role.

The second incident in which a student moved out of the university community to make pronouncements and take action out of keeping with his civic role has come to be known as the 'Chanda affair'. The episode seems to have been triggered off by a student from Libala Secondary School who wrote a letter to the Zambia Mail entitled 'Immorality at Varsity Campus on the Increase'. This was followed up in the next issue of the Zambia Mail with further correspondence from students at the university corroborating and rebutting the views expressed in the original letter. On the 3rd October, a few days after these publications in the Mail, the students led by their President, Henry Chanda, staged a demonstration outside the office of the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, Mr. Aaron Milner, to protest over the
publication of letters which were "scandalising, taunting and distorting the face of the University of Zambia". 7

Chanda reading out his address to Milner said,

University students would not stand idle as our national institution is being hurled to the ground by the Zambia Mail's scurrilous attacks from its supposedly free for all columns. 8

Having got no joy out of Milner - he had issued the students with a scolding speech about their intolerance of the freedom of the Press and showered contempt on them for suggesting the removal of the expatriate editor of the Zambia Mail - the students marched to the Mail offices. There they were met by police. Carrying placards 'Yankee editor scum', 'C.I.A. controls the Zambia Mail', etc., 9 they demanded to see the editor and when he appeared one student is reported to have read out an abusive letter which urged the editor 'to go back where you came from'. 10 Returning to his office, the students began throwing stones and tomatoes.

The following day Chanda wrote a letter to the Times of Zambia addressed to Milner,

The letter... calls Mr. Milner's speech "Your expatriate drafted speech." The speech was so undiplomatic, un-UNIP and un-Ministerial that every reasonable Zambian was led to make a decision that if that is all the qualities that are needed of a Minister in Zambia then Zambians would do better in national progress without Ministers," the letter said.

The letter warned: "A single spark can start a prairie fire, and from my own knowledge of laws of social progress...a fire will be inevitable in Zambia if you and your renegades continue your present reactionary policy." 11

It was at this juncture the President intervened to demand a 'full and public apology' for the insults to the common man and himself perpetrated by Henry Chanda. He demanded that the
Vice-Chancellor make a full inquiry into the affair.

As Chancellor of the University I must apologise to all those humble men and women in the old villages of Zambia who contributed to the building of the University. I am convinced this is not the type of student these humble men and women wanted the University to produce...These are the men and women who fought for independence and as a result of gaining that independence, the University was built. These young people do not seem to appreciate that. They not only insult the common man, but they insult me as President of Zambia, elected by the people. They say that the people have elected the wrong person, who appoints Ministers who do not know what they are doing. I take this very seriously indeed.12

The same day the UNZASU executive with the exception of Henry Chanda apologised to Milner for the insulting letter sent to him by their President. The Vice-President was reported as saying

The executive was not consulted about the writing of that letter. We apologise for the embarrassment that has been caused. This letter was written without consideration of the national interest.13

While President Kaunda was making his statement, and the student executive, apart from Chanda, were making their apology, there were demonstrations of hostility towards the students from UNIP supporters on the Copperbelt. The Times of Zambia reported the following day.

In Chingola hundreds of chanting men and women marched along the streets demanding the immediate expulsion of Mr. Henry Chanda and all students who took part in the demonstration and writing of the letter.

All Copperbelt UNIP regions resolved to send delegates to present the demands to President Kaunda. The delegates from Kitwe, Chingola, Bancroft, Chibuluma and other regions left yesterday afternoon for Lusaka. They were expected to meet the President later in the evening.

Other resolutions included; the Government
should rule that those students who are expelled are not accepted for employment anywhere in Zambia.

The Kitwe meeting said some of the students had foreign backing and that to stop them from going out of the country travel documents should not be issued to them.

Mr. Katakwe [UNIP youth regional secretary] said he would be carrying a spear to symbolise his intention to fight foreign intrigues among students. "We died for this freedom and we are not going to let small stupid students spoil it," he said.

Mr. Paul Chapuswike, the Kitwe regional secretary, said that it was "nonsense" for the students to talk about "expatriate-written speeches because we still need expatriates in various forms." Even the university depended on expatriates, he said.14

In Lusaka UNIP supporters had threatened to march on the campus and in Ndola the regional secretary for UNIP spoke of Chanda and 'his fellow malcontents' as being 'puffed by the Chinese diplomats.'15 A few days later the Vice-Chancellor announced the expulsion of Henry Chanda from the University and the Times of Zambia published an extract from a letter of apology written by Chanda to President Kaunda.

The Context of the Chanda Affair.

As is characteristic of most sections of the more privileged strata of Zambian society, the students are very sensitive to public criticism particularly where it concerns their moral and sexual lives. The letter which appears to have precipitated the clash with government attacked the students for ignorance, laziness, unwillingness, inability to run their own affairs without the assistance of expatriate lecturers, and also the following paragraph,

Immorality at the campus is on the increase. There is a scramble for girls and there have often been fist fights as a result. There
is no sense of academic realisation and most students think that the university is a holiday resort where they have freedom to drink excessively and attend dances every night. 16

In view of the students' 'rejection' of their social background and their assumption of a Western life style any criticism which remotely suggests that they have not yet 'graduated from village life' is particularly humiliating. African sexual habits and attitudes at the cultural level tend to be very different from the cultural prescriptions, though not necessarily practices, of the Western world as portrayed in films imported into Zambia. 17 Not surprisingly, students may be sensitive to criticisms which suggest they fall short of Western norms of respectability.

The second feature of the students of 1967 relates to their emergence as a political community. In 1967 the enrolment at the University of Zambia was some five hundred students and a community with definite political interests was beginning to emerge. Many of the students then enrolled had been very active in the struggle for independence and were unwilling to fall in line with the government's policy of 'student depoliticisation'. Chanda himself it must be noted was, at twenty six, older than the average student and had been active in the political movement in Northern Province in 1961 known as the 'cha cha cha'. He had been expelled from school as a consequence of his involvement. 18 He too, together with his brethren now in the ministerial ranks of government, expected a share of power and the 'fruits' of independence, but he, like every other student, was told to get on with his studies. Another factor contributing to the intense politicisation of Henry Chanda is his family background. One of his uncles
(paternal) is Simon Kapwepwe then Vice-President of Zambia. Safeli Chileshi, an eminent politician and community leader in Zambia, the first Zambian mayor of Lusaka and holding many honorary public positions is his mother's brother.¹⁹ For more than one reason then Henry Chanda suffered from feelings of intense political deprivation. His leadership of the demonstration and the writing of the letter must be accounted for partially in terms of his feeling of alienation and frustration as President of the Students' Union. His action echoed in exaggerated form many of the sentiments of the students as a whole.

Chanda's response to alienation from the political arena was to thrust his university role onto the wider society and in this way violate the established norms which constitute the role discontinuity. An alternative response would have been to import his civic role into the university system and subvert the role discontinuity "from within." This was precisely the response of the previous President, also a Zambian - thirty one year old, ex school teacher - Enoch Chikamba. His affiliations with government were close and therefore suspect amongst the students until eventually after nearly foisting a national service on unwilling students through supposedly behind door dealings, he was removed from his post together with the rest of his executive. Chanda and Chikamba responded in diametrically opposed ways to the same problem, namely their isolation and exclusion from the national political arena and the overt hostility and tension between students and the rest of society. The problems faced by Chanda, Chikamba and any other Zambian President of UNZASU are not experienced by the non Zambian. The chances of a
Rhodesian or South African of upholding the norms of behaviour prescribed by the university and civic roles in their respective systems of action are greater than for the Zambian, subject to a conflicting set of pressures.

**Reaction to Chanda's Defiance of Government.**

In the wider society the move by the students against Milner and then the *Zambia Mail* offices was given a very hostile reception. They had quite clearly moved well outside the area where civic and university roles intersect to the extent that UNIP officials were attacking students for their anti-expatriate slogans. (The same officials who would, two years later, be demonstrating against Chief Justice Skinner, and claiming that the only 'good white man was the dead one'.) The reaction of the public was predictable, but the response of the students was less so. In the eventuality, their sally forth into 'forbidden territory' was followed by an equally hasty retreat onto "home ground." On October 3rd the demonstration was held and on October 4th Chanda handed his letter into the *Times of Zambia*. On October 5th the remainder of the executive apologised to Milner for the actions consummated so far, while dissociating themselves from the letter sent and signed by their President. Chanda did not have the support of his executive when he needed it most, and the student body though it may have sympathised with the sentiments expressed in the letter was not prepared to openly back their President. While Chanda persisted in violating prescribed student behaviour in the national political arena, his base of support - the student body - had reaffirmed its willingness to conform to established norms and were already recanting their
'indiscretion'. Chanda was removed and the event served to sharply delineate and re-enforce the boundaries between civic and university roles. This is borne out in the events of the following two years which were characterised by relative peace with students rarely making public statements or partaking in demonstrations. Student politics were turned inwards and focused on the frailties and 'corruption' of succeeding executives led by non-Zambian Presidents. Only in 1970 were students to emerge out of their silence and inactivity under the leadership of Marshall Bushe. However, it is to the following year, 1971, when again a Zambian President was elected together with an all Zambian executive, that the chapter next turns.

**ARTICULATION OF THE UNIVERSITY ROLE IN THE WIDER SOCIAL STRUCTURE - II.**

The ostensible precipitating factor of the student demonstration outside the French Embassy on July 7th, 1971 was the decision by the French government to permit the manufacture of Mirage jet fighters on South African soil. The July 7th demonstration had a curtain raiser on July 2nd, when a handful of students studying French handed in a protest note to the embassy officials. As was normal when mass demonstrations were to be staged, the announcement was not made until late in the evening of the previous day. In response to the Secretary General's demonstration proclamation over a megaphone, the following light-hearted conversation was recorded outside one of the halls of residence at 10 p.m. on July 6th.
A: "What's this noise?"
B: "Demonstration"
A: "For what?"
B: "Against the French Embassy."
A: "What have they done?" [Jokingly]
B: "I don't know."
A: "Better a demonstration against the misappropriation of funds. We want to buy more arms but they've [UNZASU Executive] stolen our money."
B: "Where are the freedom fighters?" [Reference to Rhodesian students]
A: "I'd hand them over to Smith."

Such was the banter between students on the eve of the demonstration. The jovial atmosphere persisted the following morning when students assembled to begin their march to the French Embassy. But many students were genuinely incensed by the latest French act of aggression, in view of the promises of President Pompidou to President Kaunda, after Kaunda, in his capacity as Chairman of O.A.U., had been snubbed by both Nixon and Heath.

**July 7th.** A short time before the demonstration moved off the President and Vice-President of the students' union set out to obtain a permit for the march from the Officer Commanding, Lusaka Division of Police, Mr. Magai. They had assumed that the granting of the permit would be a mere formality but in the event Magai refused to grant the permit before the two students had received prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹ In the technical sense the demonstration which took place was illegal.

Over a thousand students marched along the Great East Road into town, towards the French Embassy, which, unlike the British High Commission, is situated in the centre of Lusaka. The UNIP Regional Secretary was to be found shuttling students to and fro from one end of the column to the other, mingling
with the crowd and complaining that had he been informed beforehand, he would have brought out UNIP supporters to swell the ranks of the demonstrators. When the advanced sections of the crowd arrived in town, the pace accelerated to a brisk march and as they turned into the road of the embassy the leaders were unable to hold back the surging zealous students. There was a string of some ten or fifteen police officers at the end of the road, who were, as far as the students were concerned, not to be trifled with. The few who had brought stones with them unleashed them at the Embassy building – already evacuated – and then rapidly fled back down the road up which they had come. Recouping courage they staged another assault on the Embassy; this time they were greeted with a series of tear gas cannisters shot into their midst but this did not halt a further avalanche of stones, hurled through the largely glass building in which the Embassy was situated. The French flag was ripped down from the flagstaff while the police, clearly unprepared for the onslaught, were too few to offer any effective resistance. The events that followed have been described as a 'running battle between student and police'. For almost four hours the police pursued the demonstrators around the town, firing tear gas cannisters indiscriminately at anything which looked remotely like a group of students, other cannisters being fired aimlessly into the air, and even into the public market. Many shoppers and passers by were overcome by tear gas fumes invading all corners of the town near to and distant from the scene of the original demonstration. Fifty six people were arrested, of which five were not students. A number of students were badly beaten up by baton-wielding police and
one student was shot in the thigh. This was the shock revelation of the day; the commanding officer, Magal, had used a pistol in circumstances where it appeared that neither himself nor any of his men were in danger. It was after this event that students began to take a particularly belligerent attitude towards the police, who responded with renewed zeal. The police became increasingly uncompromising even when the Registrar and Pro-Vice-Chancellor came to the scene with the promise that the students would withdraw if they were given the opportunity to hand in the petition to the French Embassy. While negotiations continued between officers and the two representatives of the university, the police continued to prosecute provocative action in the neighbourhood. Exploding tear gas cannisters forced the rapid withdrawal of the Registrar and Pro-Vice-Chancellor. The exchanges between police and students fizzled out in the early afternoon. In the evening the fifty six arrested during the day were released on police bond by the Vice-Chancellor. Mumba, the student who had been shot, was being operated on in hospital. A medical student witnessed the removal of the bullet lodged in Mumba's buttocks.

A number of peculiar features explain the behaviour of the police. First the demonstration was illegal, a fact which the press until very much later conveniently omitted to mention. Whatever the reasons the students had not been given a permit. Second the police were quite clearly unprepared for the demonstration. They had not alerted sufficient numbers of men to form a cordon around the Embassy to ensure that the demonstration did not erupt into a violent riot. When the students arrived at the Embassy it was to all intents and
purposes undefended. Third, the police trained under a
colonial administration to enforce 'law and order' were un-
sure of their role in the case of a student demonstration in
support of government. Before independence they had only
been confronted with demonstrations opposed to the colonial
government and their role in such instances was clear. Their
role in a pro-government student demonstration becomes even
more ambiguous when private property is being seriously
damaged, since officially the government is supposed to offer
protection through its police force to all foreign embassies.
Fourthly demonstrations, apart from those organised by UNIP,
do not occur frequently and the police, unaccustomed to deal-
ing with student demonstrations, have not learnt how to deal
with them effectively. Finally, and this may explain some of
the excesses perpetrated against the students, there is the
resentment which exists between the police and the students.
As a Sunday Times correspondent wrote,

In previous demonstrations notably the "high court
case" which resulted in the resignation of the
then Chief Justice, James Skinner, the police
acted with remarkable restraint. That the demon-
stration at the high court was by members of the
Zambia Youth Service seems irrelevant.

But on a higher level, the difference is worth
considering. Is it possible that the attitude of
the police towards the student is psychologically
that of an ill-educated man towards the so-called
"high-brow?" Is it not possible that the police
even unconsciously, act against the students be-
because they (the police) never had a chance to go
to university?24

The action taken by the Zambian police against the Zambian
students is typical of that of police action towards students
the world over and therefore the generalised resentment amongst
the population for students everywhere has greater explanatory
powers than the reasons specific to the Zambian situation.
July 8th. The national press could have hardly given a more propitious tribute to the students and hostile reception to the police action. The front page headlines in the *Times of Zambia* read "Battle of Lusaka: Students Storm Embassy" with photographs of police firing tear gas cannisters. The editorial, while agreeing that the use of tear gas was 'the accepted and traditional antidote to any such demonstration', saw the use of firearms and the presence of 'rifle wielding policemen' as a dangerous and unwarranted development. The editorial ends by bending over backwards in support of the students.

We believe that their show of indignation at the French action is shared not only by the Cabinet, but by many citizens of this country. It seems, therefore, that our policemen are either uninformed about Government political thinking on the internal front - or that they don't really care about the aspirations of the Government and people.

For had they acted in accordance with Government sentiments, we would not have witnessed the shameful clash yesterday, which we can only describe as "a police riot."

In retrospect, it appears to us that whenever students in Zambia express their feelings over certain issues, the police make it well-nigh impossible for them even to hand over a petition to the authorities concerned.

Politically and physically our policemen need some re-education in the best way to handle an innocent demonstration by unarmed students. 

The *Daily Mail*, more often than not belligerent towards the students, led their front page with "Student Shot in Jets Protest", pictures of angry policemen arguing, others aggressively manhandling defenceless students with batons raised, and a picture of Mumba lying out prostrate. In the first half of its editorial, the *Mail* concentrates on the imperialistic and aggressive policies of the French government. The second half, agreed with the *Times* in concluding that much of the
violence perpetrated by the police was unnecessary and 'the whole performance of the police from the beginning up to the end left much to be desired'.

The Regional Secretary of UNIP for Lusaka region announced that UNIP would conduct its own demonstration. UNIP's Lusaka office attacked the police action as "un-Zambian, un-UNIP, un-Humanistic and very unlike the way the police should protect people." The Party also announced that it fully supported the student's demand for the sacking of Magai whom the Regional Secretary accused of acting "like a personal representative of Pompidou in Zambia".

Jubilation at their moral victory hung over the university campus. Lectures were cancelled as students prepared to stage a demonstration of sympathy for the fifty one students arrested the previous day and due to be charged in Lusaka Magistrates Court. However, the arrested students never reached the court; when they arrived at the police station they underwent what amounted to an identification parade and seven had their bonds renewed for their appearance before the magistrate the following week. When the assembled crowd outside the Magistrates Court heard the news, some turned to go home but a small group barred their colleagues from entering the buses and urged them to march to the Government Secretariat half a mile away to demand a public audience with the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Lewis Changufu. The idea received an enthusiastic endorsement and about eight hundred students moved into the grounds outside the Secretariat. There they patiently waited the outcome of negotiations for the appearance of the Minister. Unbeknown to most students lorry loads of police armed in riot kit were lying in wait behind the Secretariat.
But the protest was peaceful and relaxed. After approximately an hour the Vice-Chancellor himself made an appearance and he was cheered as he moved through the crowd onto the roof of a landrover which had been turned into a speaker's platform. It seemed as though he had been called by some one in government to remove 'his students' from the Secretariat. He told the gathering that he had been assured that they were only going to attend the proceedings at the law courts and was surprised to find them at the Secretariat, clamouring for the Minister of Home Affairs. He suggested that they consider carefully before they take any action and that action taken on impulse was not always in their best interests. He further urged them to draw up a petition, to work through their executive, and to return to campus for lunch. The students began shouting at him to stand down which he was eventually forced to do and an annoyed student - Mundia Sikatana - rose to address the students. He thanked Professor Goma for obtaining the release of the detained students the previous evening (great applause) and also for his advice.

We all understand your position and recognise that you as our Vice-Chancellor have earned your position through merit. But this is a very serious issue which cannot be left unresolved. At the same time we must pledge to Professor Goma that we are here on peaceful grounds that this is a non-violent meeting. We must also thank the press; the Times because it always reports the truth, the Mail because as a government paper its condemnation of its own police suggests how brutal they must have been. We must all stick around here until someone comes out and is prepared to talk to us. We have been preparing a petition on your behalf....

The petition, after condemning the violence perpetrated by the police the previous day, particularly the use of a firearm, included the following points: that the government make
crystal clear its stand on arms sales to South Africa, that
the Officer Commanding Lusaka police, Chadwick Magai, be
removed from his position, that the whole police force be dis-
ciplined and the students on police bond be released uncondi-
tionally. Changufu received the petition but said he could
not comment until he had received a report from the police and
the hospital superintendent concerning the injured student.
With this the meeting had reached an anti-climax, but the
students had made their position clear and returned to the
campus. The demonstration chant had moved on from "Pompidou
down" to "Hang Magai High",

July 9th. Headlines in the Times read "Students turn wrath
on police" in the Mail, "Police Action under Fire". The Mail
editorial again reviewed the police behaviour on the Wednesday
and welcomed the proposed investigation into the incident. It
reiterated its support for the students,

...we hope something will also be done by the
Ministry of Home Affairs to give the police
political education so that they know who are
the friends of Zambia and who are not. ...If
the actions of a stupid government in Europe
threaten their future security in Zambia, the
people of Zambia including the police should
congratulate these youngsters when they take
action which exposes the evil intentions of
such a stupid government. They should not in-
stead be treated like common criminals. They
should be treated like responsible future
leaders of this nation.31

At this stage, adulation from press, from politicians (even
those who might normally resent the students), from commenta-
tors on radio such as Vernon Mwaanga (Zambia's representative
at the United Nations) had reached its peak. Only the Presi-
dent remained silent,
July 10th. On this day President Kaunda broke his silence with a statement made from State House. The Mail opened for the third successive day with a headline relating to the incidents of July 7th., "Gun Fired in Demo" and the Times -"'Leave things to me,' KK warns students". The actual press release included the following remarks.

I fully recognise the deep feelings the Zambian people share with me, the Party and Government in our opposition to the sale of arms by some Powers, France included, to South Africa.

The country will, however, remember that on my return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore early this year I told the nation that I wanted the problems between Zambia, the minority regimes that surround us and the big powers which back them by such acts as sale of arms or commissions for arms manufacture under nefarious permits, left to me to handle in the best interests of the Republic.32

He said this at the same time as confirming that a firearm had been used against the students.

The incidents of this week have left a black mark on the record of the Republic which must not be allowed to re-occur.33

The statement proved to be the turning point in relations between students and the government. The students were now piqued because, unlike all the other politicians and the mass media, the President made no attempt to congratulate the students or even condemn the police, only regretting the events of the last week. Secondly, as the statement was portrayed in the Times of Zambia it appeared that the command 'leave things to me' was directed at the students, and was widely interpreted as a faint criticism of the action taken by the students in protesting against the French. Thus it appeared that whereas all sections of Zambian society had applauded the students and deplored the police behaviour, the President by contrast
appeared to be censuring the students. In reality, his statement when read in full suggests he was issuing a warning to other prospective demonstrators, such as the Lusaka UNIP supporters, to abandon their plans. It was not necessarily hostile to the students.

**July 11th.** In an article in the *Sunday Times*, the correspondent reiterated the views of the editorials in the *Mail* and *Times*, referring to the incompetence of the police and their lack of restraint in dealing with the students. He also spoke of the attempts by State House to restrain publicity relating to the bullet fired at Mumba and the efforts to "white-wash" the episode.

It was in response to the President's Press statement which appeared in the papers on Saturday, that the UNZASU executive met on the Sunday to discuss the next move. It appears that it was decided to write an open letter to the President and it was this letter headed "Where are we going?" which was to reverse public opinion. It is reproduced in full below.

*Your Excellency,*

*We view it as our obligation to the nation to express our views on your statement on the arms' sales to South Africa issue.*

*We feel that the arms sales to South Africa issue is one that is going to shape a lot of events in the future in this part of the world to a great extent. Most of these events are inimical to the well being of our beloved Republic. We consider it an issue that involves not only the lives of Zambians but also those of whose cause we in Zambia have been championing. It therefore becomes imperative for various sections of our nation to react positively to this monstrous act of injustice which the imperialists have calculatingly been meting to us. We feel that it is not fair for one man, how great he may be, to bear the responsibility of fighting this injustice. We feel that this is a people's fight.*
It is a common and accepted principle that every nation must identify its friends and its enemies, and to isolate and have no dealings with its enemies. Your activities so far with the racists South of the Zambezi are not consistent with this principle. We believe there that the people of Zambia should be given the opportunity to make their sentiments felt on this issue, rather than leave it to you alone. The lives of the four and half million Zambians and other peace-loving people in this part of the world are in great danger.

Your Excellency by indirectly condemning the students' demonstration you are also condemning all the people of Zambia on whose behalf we were demonstrating, especially UNIP, the Trade Union Movements and the Press media who have openly expressed support. Sir we were demonstrating in favour of Government policy, but now it appears there is no Government policy in this particular direction.

Sir, you have in the past communicated with the enemy. Does it not occur to you therefore that you are asking too much of us and the Zambian nation as a whole by saying "leave things to me"?

Our role in this nation cannot be overemphasised. Our convictions and feelings ought to be communicated to the rest of the nation; and this we shall perform according to the best accepted manner.

The University of Zambia students demonstration on Wednesday, the 7th of July, 1971 served to point out our convictions on the issue at hand.

It is proper and fitting that in the light of the above, your Excellency be called upon to explain in detail to the nation why you deem it fit that the nation leaves everything in your hands.24

The letter was signed by the ten members of the UNZASU executive. The student body only became aware of its existence the following day.

There can be no simplistic reason why the letter was written and sent. The most common explanation is that the students, riding on a wave of popularity, were outraged by the President's failure to pay a tribute to their 'valour.' But this ignores the context and background of the student
executive and student politics. First, a feeling of resentment towards the President and the party had been building up since the beginning of the year as can be seen by proliferation of attacks on government in the pages of \textit{UZ}. Apart from the failure to pursue a vigorous policy either towards external enemies or foreign owned enterprises, the increasing militancy and violence in the country perpetrated by party supporters was a source of bitter discontent.

The composition of the executive also provides insight into the possible influences conducing to an open expression of opposition. The previous student government - the first to survive a full year in office - had been successful in building a more respectable and powerful image of the student union. The new executive had a greater sense of their own potency as a result of their enhanced image both within the university and outside: this was particularly so after the successful demonstration outside the French Embassy. Since 1967, student executives had been led by non Zambian Presidents who were likely to avoid confrontations with government. However the 1971 executive was all Zambian and its feeling of alienation and exclusion from the national political arena must have been keenly felt, as was the case with previous Zambian Presidents. (Chikamba had been removed by the students for his close connections with government, while Chanda had been removed by government for his belligerence towards the government.) The oppositional sentiments within the executive were possibly compounded by the high proportion of Bemba-speaking members. Of the ten members who signed the letter, only one had no links with Bemba-speaking population. And this was at a time when a new political party - the United
Progressive Party — with predominantly Bemba-speaking support was about to be formed. Though there is no evidence that any of these students were supporters of the UPP faction within UNIP at that time, nevertheless it is highly likely that they sympathised with those of their own sectional group who bore a grudge against what they perceived to be the practices discriminating against Bemba-speaking politicians. Yet, the members of the executive could hardly be regarded as 'radical' in any sense of the word — though they were radicalised by the subsequent events. By comparison, the previous executive contained students who were very much more 'politicised' and 'radical'.

Internal politics must have contributed further influences impinging on the executive. The record of the Chola administration in its first two months of office had done much to tarnish its image. First there had been the confrontation between himself and Matakala, the President of NUZS, ostensibly over UNZASU contributions to NUZS. Since Chola and the majority of his colleagues on the union executive were of Bemba-speaking background, they had fewer qualms about making a stand against Matakala whose support was mainly from the Lozi students. However, there was resentment in many quarters of the community towards the dominance by the Bemba-speaking students in the union executive. When it was discovered that K17,000 appeared to be missing from UNZASU funds and that this money must have disappeared the previous year while Chola was Vice-President there was a move to suspend Chola from office until a commission of inquiry had cleared him of 'corruption' charges. It was urged that the Vice-President — a Tumbuka from Eastern Province — take Chola's place in the meantime.
The student body was deeply angered by the alleged misappropriation of funds and Chola's implicit association with their disappearance. Their anger was compounded when two members of the new executive were also suspected of misusing union funds since they had assumed office in April. At a meeting of the Council of Representatives convened to discuss the evidence, the Social and Cultural Secretary was dismissed and the Treasurer suspended from office. At the time of the demonstration, the popularity of the Chola administration was at a low ebb and conceivably it was partly with a view to restoring its reputation that the demonstration was staged. But the executive did not play a prominent role in the demonstration. Chola and the Vice-President only appeared later in the morning when the students had scattered and the majority of arrests had been made. In fact the demonstration had been largely led by members of the previous year's executive and other influentials within the student community. Of the seven students charged with riot only one - a committee member - was from the executive. It could be argued that the union executive had not made much political capital out of the successful demonstration and in writing the letter to the President they hoped to gain the initiative and improve their standing amongst the rank and file.

July 12th. The newspapers had little to say on the demonstration and the events which had followed. There was an interesting report in the Daily Mail that Changufu, the Minister of Home Affairs, had accused it - the Mail - of failing to tell the truth about the student-police clash. Of particular significance was his complaint that the statement issued by the
President on Friday night and appearing in the *Mail* on July 10th was not reported as being prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The letter prepared the previous day by the UNZASU executive was delivered to State House during the day and a few hundred copies distributed at lunch time to the student body. Quite clearly a number of students were outraged at the 'petulance' of the executive; others had grave misgivings about the repercussions and must have been somewhat shocked and surprised not quite sure how to react. Those who were familiar with the party and the practices of the government and President when faced with opposition of this nature feared the worst particularly as regards the signatories.

Many rumours circulated around the campus about meetings with the President until the evening when the executive was summoned to the Ministry of Education where they assembled together with the Minister of Education, Nyirenda, the Minister of Home Affairs, Changufu, and the Vice-Chancellor, Goma. These three men attempted to persuade the executive to withdraw the letter and reminded them of the unpleasant consequences if they refused. After the executive had been given time to meet in private to reconsider its decision the student leaders refused to make any concessions. Instead, they demanded to see the President and insisted on sending the letter to the press. The government ministers assured the students that the President would not see the students under any circumstances until they retracted the letter and apologised. Whatever divisions and misgivings had existed in the executive, at every juncture in the proceedings they presented a united front. The meeting ended with nothing resolved and
the letter went to the press.

**July 13th.** While the *Mail* made no mention of the letter, the *Times of Zambia* devoted two front page columns to the content of the letter and an editorial which set the tone for the onslaught to come.

It is time the students at the University of Zambia took a long hard look at their role in this country.

Their petulant outburst yesterday, accusing the President of 'inconsistency' towards issues in Southern Africa, is symptomatic of the confusion and occasionally deliberate double-think which our favoured sons and daughters at the nation's premier seat of higher learning specialise in....

We sympathised with the students when they were harassed with excessive vigour by the police during last Wednesday's demonstration against French arms sales to the Nazis of the seventies.

But consider how the issue has been deflected since then. The righteous indignation felt by students at the latest example of French hypocrisy turned into a verbal onslaught, narrow in scope, on the police. Now it has become an ill-informed, malicious attack on the integrity of a leader chosen by our elected representatives....

The sheer arrogance of their words should sound an alarm-bell in the minds of responsible people. While we defend free speech in our open society, and shrink from advocating murderous repression of student opinion as practiced elsewhere, harsh charges must be backed up with facts.36

The atmosphere on campus was a mixture of expectancy and uncertainty. The day began quietly enough. But events began to follow one another in rapid succession. The union executive was summoned to Freedom House - headquarters of UNIP - by Fines Bulawayo, Secretary for Publicity and a prominent UNIP politician. They were issued with an ultimatum to make an appearance before 5 p.m. The students refused to go, fearing, probably quite rightly, that they would be molested by UNIP supporters. They preferred to remain on campus where
they were relatively safe. As the Secretary General of UNZASU retorted, "If they want to meet us they should come over to the university and meet us here." Chola had asked Bulawayo over the telephone if the venue of the meeting could be changed and Bulawayo, after first refusing, then himself 'phoned up to say that he would be prepared to meet the executive at the Secretariat. They were all prepared to go in the middle of the afternoon when a mob of students collected in the car park and, after much argument, dissuaded their leaders from departing. The students argued that the matter could not now be handled by the executive but had reached such proportions that every student was affected and any move by the leadership must be endorsed by the entire student body. A general meeting previously arranged for 10 p.m. was now brought forward to 7.30 p.m. Until then there would be no dialogue with UNIP or Freedom House. Failing to meet the appointed deadline of 5 o'clock, Bulawayo had no hesitation in mobilising the entire UNIP propaganda machine against the students. He called for nation-wide demonstrations to begin the following day.

We shall stop at nothing. The ten students must be made to understand that the party is supreme in this country and it cannot therefore tolerate insolent behaviour against its Secretary General from a handful of misguided, ill-informed students from the university. Though it is conceivable that on reading the letter the previous day, some students would have wished to dissociate themselves from its contents, as the reaction from Freedom House became increasingly uncompromising so the student body closed its ranks behind its executive. UNIP leaders had unleashed hostility not specifically at 'ten irresponsible
leaders' but at 'those arrogant students.' The call for nation wide demonstrations against the students only served to entrench their defiance and solidarity. Finally the responsiveness of the executive to rank and file advice during the day erected a bond of common destiny between the leaders and the led.

Tension mounted on the campus as the students watched the 7 o'clock nation news on five communal televisions situated in the halls of residence. It was clear that the students had unleashed the wrath of the party. After the news approximately eight hundred students packed into the largest lecture theatre to attend the mass meeting convened to review the latest developments and discuss 'the next step'. If there was any opposition to the action taken so far, the nature of the meeting was such that it would not be able to express itself. The assembled students gave Chola's introductory speech and resumé of events to date an ovatious applause and unanimously endorsed his action. Prominent students rose to support Chola and his executive, to criticise the government and attack the President. At no time either before or since had the students felt so free to speak out their resentment of the party and the political elite. "It was time some of these politicians went," said one. Another spoke in condemnation of the President, "He is not omnipotent, the nation had matured politically and now was the time when other bodies could be consulted freely over such issues as foreign affairs." "We are not the 'favoured sons and daughters', none of us are favoured. We got here on merit. If Bulawayo wants he too can join us by sitting for the mature age examinations." (Roars of laughter and applause. Bulawayo is considered on campus.
to be a typical UNIP politician, 'unenlightened' and poorly educated.) Most of the meeting was devoted to a consideration of what to do next, but there seemed only one conceivable course of action - to defend themselves against the promised march by UNIP to the campus. It was widely feared that UNIP Youth or the Zambia Youth might, egged on by zealous politicians, use the opportunity to make a violent assault on the students. The meeting closed at about 9.30 p.m. and about one hundred students were asked to work out the defence of the campus. Chemistry students were hard at work all night manufacturing petrol bombs in the laboratories; piles of stones were collected in the residences and on the roofs, and hose pipes were held in readiness. Most students never slept that night, not knowing what to expect, while others working through the night prepared for the confrontation of the next day. There seemed no doubt in students' minds that UNIP would invade the campus. If there were students who opposed these moves then it was inconceivable that they should voice their misgivings.

The state of siege had not reached the proportions of the barricades in the Latin Quarter of May 1968, but the preparations, implements, tactics, etc. bore a remarkable resemblance. The euphoric relief that now, at last, there was to be a showdown with the symbols of oppression - the Parisian 'Flics' (police) and the violent vigilantes of UNIP. The atmosphere of liberation and excitement, which overwhelmed the students of Paris behind their barricades, had its parallel that night on the UNZA campus. The student body had merged into a spiritual oneness.
July 14th. The front page headlines of the Times read, 'Massive Protest Called Against Students' and the Mail wrote, 'UNIP - Student Showdown Today'. The Mail published an editorial from which the following extracts have been taken.

There has never been any individual (apart from John Vorster, who had his own wicked motives), including the leaders and officials of opposition parties, who has gone so far as making such uncalled for insulting remarks against the President as these students....

But the support for the cause of their demonstration and the sympathy over the rough treatment they got from the police did not give them the mandate to insult a Head of State who, more than any other person, has not only done a lot for the country, but has also put his own popularity at stake by allowing his government to spend lavishly on those young men and women when their own brothers and sisters are starving in the villages and going without respectable dress.

Their insults, which have been given great publicity overseas, have only had the effect of giving fuel to the enemies of Zambia who are now looking at the university as their main target for operations, against the State of Zambia, if they have not yet made their way there already through a handful of mealy-mouthed students....

It should be impressed upon the university students that there is always a limit to what society and a nation can tolerate. And in a democratic society, it is important that people disagree without being insulting. When those without even the means to stand on their own start hurling out insults freely to even those who feed them, this is not only biting the finger that feeds, but it is downright base ingratitude.40

At the same time both newspapers published extracts from a statement made by Aaron Milner, Secretary General to Government, on the previous night. He makes the distinction between constructive criticism and 'unconstructive criticisms and distorted information which could only be identified with a group of irresponsible individuals seeking cheap publicity.'41 After endorsing the President's consistent efforts in making
a clear stand on Southern African issue as witnessed by the Non-Aligned Nations Summit, his leadership of an OAU delega-
tion on the issue of arms sales to South Africa and his renown in this regard throughout the world, he is quoted as saying

It is important to observe in this regard that last week's student demonstrations, although reflecting a popular sentiment, were illegal in that no permits were obtained from the competent Government authorities.

Mr. Milner has further said that while Government appreciates the need for students to take a fuller part in the political life of this country, it cannot, nevertheless, allow a small group of irresponsible and intellectually arrogant young people to be writing highly insulting letters to the Head of State...it will be more unfortunate for the people of Zambia to begin questioning the relevance of producing an elite which will be out of touch with national realities...42

This is the first reference to the illegality of the demonstration of July 7th, and marked the beginning of attempts by the government to justify its action by reference to the law.

Everyone had risen early and the dining room was crowded at the unprecedented hour of 7 a.m. All exits and entrances to the university were blocked and barricaded. Students stood guard only allowing staff and the one or two hundred students from Evelyn Home College who had arrived in solidarity, to enter. The students had taken over every building on the campus. Others had gone to town in overalls to mingle with the UNIP demonstrators gathering in the centre of Lusaka outside Freedom House. The marchers set off from Freedom House to walk to the university. There were about six hundred people involved, of which a great number were women; some even carrying children on their backs. This was certainly not a UNIP Youth brigade as the students had been anticipating. Students mingling with the crowd, came away with the impression that the
majority of participants were unclear as to why they were demonstrating. With the exception of the leaders, Fines Bulawayo and the Minister of State at Freedom House, Ali Simbule and possibly a few regional officials, there seemed to be little anger amongst those marching. A few banners and posters bore the inscriptions 'University is not Parliament', and 'We shall not allow a state within a state'. During the morning a number of Ministers attempted to reach the Vice-Chancellor but the students refused them permission to enter the university grounds.

When it became apparent that were the demonstrators to enter the university there would almost certainly be bloodshed, the Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Sikota Wina, arrived with a message for the demonstrators from the President. They were to hold their gathering at Mulungushi Hall half a mile away from the University and there they would be addressed by their leaders and hand over a petition to the Vice-Chancellor. The UNIP petition, which is reproduced in full in the Appendix,

PLEDGED UNIP's unqualified support for President Kaunda and his Government.
REFUSED a "student government."
DEMANNED the closure of the university forthwith.
DEMANNED the expulsion of the entire student executive and that they should not be re-admitted.
DEMANNED that future students should make a pledge not to engage in activities detrimental to the welfare of the nation. 43

Earlier, during the morning, three circulars - What are we doing? (No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3) - produced by two PCE's and another European outside the university were distributed amongst students. 44 The first advised the students to rethink their political role outside the university, to understand
their responsibility and to predict the consequences of any
such activity. The second suggested that 'we' haven't thought
about the needs of the country, that 'we' should study 'other
student political thinking' before committing 'ourselves to a
situation which will increase the distance which has to be
travelled when trying to communicate between people whose ex-
periences and expectations are very different'. The circu-
lar questioned the advisability of attacking people angered
by 'our woolly statements' rather than committing 'ourselves
...[to] achieving a democratic and egalitarian society in
Zambia'. The third circular suggested that by 'fighting
our Zambian government...This is exactly what Vorster wants...
we have played into his little trap'. In other words the
students were now indirectly giving support to Vorster. The
ideas behind the circulars, perhaps consonant with the liberal
backgrounds of students operating in a society where student
protest is an accepted practice, were at variance with the
assumptions of the political culture of the Zambian student
community. At the time of their distribution, they were
largely ignored, their patronising style was unlikely to have
struck a sympathetic note. However, Manase Phiri - a student
broadcaster for Radio Zambia - read them out at lunch time
over the air in a weekly programme devoted to the university,
indicating, so he said, that the open letter to the President
did not have the support of the entire student body. The
students on campus were, however, furious at this betrayal of
student solidarity. As far as they were concerned, this was
just what the government was waiting for, namely signs of a
rift in the community between the leaders and the led. Until
that moment there had been no suggestion that the executive's
action did not have the backing of the entire student body. When he returned to the campus at 2 p.m. Manase Phiri was brought before a gathering attending a meeting on the lawns in front of the library. Before he was allowed to justify his action, he was set upon and savagely beaten up by the crowd. Fortunately he was not too badly hurt and was soon rescued by the university security officials. The PCE's responsible for writing the circulars had made themselves scarce sometime ago. These were the lengths to which the students were prepared to go to present an unbroken solidarity in defiance of the government and party.

Earlier the UNIP demonstrators who had presented the Vice-Chancellor with the petition turned back to town after being addressed by a number of politicians. The campus began to return to normal; students came down from the barricades and the rooftops. There was a sense of anti-climax as though nothing had been really settled between the party and the students. No one had any cause to believe that the events had come to an end, but no one anticipated what would be the next move. No students guarded the campus that Wednesday night, indeed most were very weary from the activities of the previous night.

July 15th. At 4 a.m. students were awoken by a din resonating through the halls of residence. Police in full riot kit of helmets, shields and batons were pouring into the student residences hammering on doors with their truncheons. Still half asleep those who dared to venture out of their rooms were terrified at the spectacle, particularly as only a week previously the same police had violently assaulted them in the streets of Lusaka. It became clear that despite their ominous
apparel they were not there to precipitate a blood bath but simply to get students out of their rooms and onto the lawns outside the library. Once there they were herded into a group and surrounded by police armed with rifles, quite clearly ready to use them at the slightest provocation. But the students were not in a provocative mood. Hundreds of armed para military troops had encircled the campus to make quite sure no student managed to escape. The shocked community listened in silence to Mundia Sikatana, one of the most respected students on campus, sound words of warning that the armed forces were quite prepared to use the weapons at their disposal. He read out the government press statement which he had been handed by the police.

The University of Zambia has been closed. Students have been dismissed and no teaching functions will take place until the beginning of the second semester on 30th August, 1971.

Announcing the closure this morning, a Government spokesman has said that Government has taken this painful action after receiving and considering disturbing reports of indiscipline and lawlessness among students at the University Campus of the University of Zambia.

The arrogant and highly insulting letter sent to His Excellency the President, the breakdown of order in which the life of the University has been seriously and adversely affected and widespread intimidation of the majority of students loyal to the Government have made it abundantly clear that the deteriorating situation should not be allowed to continue.

The spokesman said that the ten members of the Executive Committee of the University of Zambia Students Union who signed the letter dated 11th July, 1971 to His Excellency the President will not be re-admitted when the University re-opens on the 30th August, 1971...

The rest of the students will be required to apply for re-admission to the University. Re-admission will not be automatic. Each application will be considered strictly on its merit.

On being re-admitted each student will be required to sign a pledge to devote all his or her time and
energies to the pursuit of his or her studies and not to engage in any acts calculated to undermine either the University authority or the Government.

Students wishing to be re-admitted to the University of Zambia should, as soon as possible, get into contact with the appropriate University authorities so that application forms can be sent to them without delay.

The spokesman appealed to the students, in their own interests, to disperse peacefully and in a decent manner befitting the society of which they are members. No student should create any trouble for the majority who value this national institution.

He also appealed to the public to remain calm and maintain absolute discipline. Under no circumstances should any student be molested following the closure of the University. He emphasised that the majority of the students have been genuinely mis-guided and should be given a chance.48

Students were then asked to return to their residences to pack their bags. Initially this was done under police supervision but when it became obvious that students were in no mood to resist, the police relaxed their surveillance. It is hard to imagine what else the students could have done against armed police and para military troops, but the cumbersome manner of the take-over through military intervention provides an insight into government thinking and perceptions of the students.

The newspapers of that morning were printed too late to carry the story of the closure of the university and focused their reportage on what the Times referred to in its front page headline as 'The Day of the Demos'. Under another headline, 'Country goes on march for KK', the Times reported on the nation wide demonstrations staged by UNIP supporters in Kitwe, Mufilira, Luanshya, Chingola, Livingstone,Gwembe, Choma, Monze and Kazabuka. A new element had now entered the attacks on the students and the university, namely the reference to
'subversive foreign influences'. Thus at Mufulira, the District Governor, was reported as telling the gathering of '2,000' UNIP supporters that the actions of the students' union had been masterminded by foreign influences at the campus.\text{49}

At Gwembe the District Governor was reported as suggesting that foreign lecturers should be dismissed from the University of Zambia and replaced by UNIP lecturers.\text{50}

As regards the demonstration in Lusaka, the \textit{Times} reported that 4,000 had marched to Mulungushi Hall whereas a more accurate figure would have been six hundred. The \textit{Mail} carried the front page headline, 'Close UNZA, demands UNIP', and like the \textit{Times} gave prominence to a number of pictures of the Lusaka demonstration with the caption, 'Marching in Silent Anger'. In its middle pages, the \textit{Mail} carried more photographs of the Lusaka demonstration this time with the caption, 'We rule, you learn'.

The editorials of the two papers also approached student defiance from a new angle. The \textit{Times} referred to the majority of students as 'gutless wonders' puppeteered by student demagogues.

And while they [the majority of the student body] are about it, they might ask whether the job of student leaders is to organise campus activities, or is it to publicly express, unmasked, opinions on behalf of the majority? Are these leaders, in fact, de facto MP's? And if they're not, why is it that they did not fully study the claims of Vorster and the White Paper issued by Mr Wina, and then put the issue to the student body for decision?

What manner of adolescents are these - the ones we're paying for?

Why did a majority of students sit there like a bunch of gutless wonders while a few puppeteers, for motives of their own, pull the strings.
Whose decision was it to rush about smashing property? Could it be an immature emulation of the sort of thing that has happened overseas.....

Too much of the students' letter is drivel, and misses the most important point of all. It is that there are powerful financial interests (this is not the place to name them) who are doing their best to force Zambia and Tanzania, into a grotesque capitulation of their independence. Is that what the students want? 51

The charge against the student leaders is ignorance and irresponsibility, while the editorial accuses the rank and file of failing to dictate terms to its leadership. In practice the opposite was nearer the truth: once the letter had been delivered it was the majority which dictated the pace and direction of events. The executive became redundant as mass participation emerged as the driving force behind the behaviour of the student body. The editorial, in absolving the majority of the students, was attempting to drive a wedge between them and the leadership, albeit unsuccessfully. The editorial in the Mail was propaganda of a more vicious nature. Its tenor is represented in the following extracts.

With all this generosity from the government and the members of the public, one would have expected that these young men and women would have spent more time on preparing themselves to give more to the country and less on composing badly-written statements insulting those who provide for them.

Last year, the campus was a place of embarrassment to the government and members of the public when reports were received and substantiated, that a handful of local students, egged on by foreign students, had established a hippieland at the campus in which young men and women indulged in sex orgies which went on into the daily [sic] hours of the morning as the participants drugged themselves with marijuana and danced naked on the campus roof tops....

Although the pocket money they now get is by far more than the salary of the farm and
factory workers;* they have been asking for more because their present allowance is not enough for their unending rounds of drinking sessions....

And when they are forced to cease haunting the town bars because their funds have run down, a great deal of their time is spent in listening to arm-chair politicians and fifth columnists who have found their way at the University, not to teach what they are paid for, but to preach subversion. ....

The events of the last week, involving insults to the leadership of the nation should give the government a golden opportunity to move fast and rid the campus of those foreign forces of destruction which have been moving into one African University after another, leaving in its wake from Ghana to Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and now in Zambia, a load of trouble. 52

*The writer of the editorial is under the mistaken impression that students receive K425 pocket money each year when in fact the actual amount is K95, which compares with a figure, used by Sikota Wina on another occasion, of a national per capita income of K186.53

There is no evidence that the accusations against the students have any validity - they merely replicate the type of criticism over which students became so annoyed before the eruption of the Chanda Affair in 1967. The reference to foreign subversion represents a development which was to be hotly pursued in the following days. It was to be another tactic to absolve the 'favoured sons and daughters' from guilt and to explain away a genuine confrontation, with structural origins, between two sections of the Zambian society, undermining the national goal of unity of purpose and action.

The Mail also reported that two Rhodesian students, purporting to represent foreign students at the campus, had handed in a note the previous day dissociating themselves from the letter written by the executive. When this was found in the Mail these same two students were brought before the gathering amassed outside the library, and subjected to a
torrent of abuse for their betrayal of the student body - all the more acrimonious because of their alien status. Were it not for the menacing presence of hundreds of armed police and troops, there is little doubt that they too would have been assaulted and beaten up. The students knew that any crack in their solidarity behind their leadership would be exploited out of all proportion by the government to show that the action taken was masterminded by a small minority who imposed their will on the majority.

As the morning advanced so the police guard relaxed its surveillance and students were no longer being herded into the police lorries and carried off into town. After a series of deputations to the Vice-Chancellor, who had now arrived on the scene, and discussions with the Minister of Education, it was agreed that students should each receive £30 to finance their return home and that foreign students be allowed to reside during the extended holiday at the Ridgeway Campus. The atmosphere earlier in the morning beset with tension and anxiety was now noticeably easing and even giving way to joviality. Students were to be seen chatting to their somewhat embarrassed 'cousins' or 'old school friends' now in the uniform of police officers, assembled to carry out the evacuation of the campus. Rumours were circulating, still widely accepted, that the cabinet had been bitterly divided over the closure of the university and that at least three ministers, Kapwepwe, Nyirenda, Mwanakatwe and possibly a fourth Mudenda had opposed the majority decision of the Cabinet.
UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.

The divergence (escalation) or convergence (diminution) of the confrontation between two competing groups engaged in open conflict will depend on three variables. They are: first, the tension existing in the societal social structure in general and between the two groups in particular; second, the nature of the initial violation and counter-violation of the social order precipitating confrontation, and third, the stabilising elements tending to return the system to an equilibrium where tension and unimpeded role articulation can coexist. In this section, the events leading to the closure of the university will be examined within the framework of this paradigm with a view to a comparison with the Chanda Affair.

Tension in the Social Structure.

In an earlier chapter attention was accorded to the nature of the political system, the legitimacy of conflict and the expression of opposition. The tensions within society were contained through an authoritarian political system dominated by the political party. Tension inevitably increases in the social structure when strong opposition groups threaten to break out of the social order. At such times overt opposition becomes less legitimate. Coinciding with the series of confrontations between students and government just described, was the threatened appearance of a new party led by the popular leader amongst the Bemba-speaking population Simon Kapwepwe. Tension surrounding the possibility of a new Bemba dominated party had been rising ever since that sectional group had lost
its previous dominance in the Central Committee of the Party and the formulation of a constitution expressly designed to avoid a repeat of the Mulungushi Conference of 1967. Already there were two ex ministers, Chimba and Chisata, from the Bemba-speaking population axed by President Kaunda waiting in the wings to return to national politics. Though the country had to wait another month after the closure of the university before the UPP was formed, many knew of the party before the students demonstrated at the beginning of July. Thus when students were airing their opposition to the government and party, tension had already risen above its normal level.

The tension which exists between students and the government or party has been considered in chapters two and three. But there is evidence that the tension between the university and the government had also been on the increase for some time. Only a month before the disturbances on the occasion of the third graduation ceremony the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, speaking of the pressures confronting universities in contemporary Africa made the following prophetic remarks concerning 'the unripe, uncongenial and sometimes risky environment'.

The proper growth and development of a new university and its efforts to be responsive to the real needs of its nation can be seriously impeded by mistaken or negative activism; but growth of a politics of intimidation and confrontation; an atmosphere charged with prejudice and distrust; ignorance of what a university is about and how it functions; outside interference; and instability in the nation. It is, therefore, important in evaluating the progress and performance of the university, to be aware of the intensity, presence or absence of these constraints.

...students and university administrators have come under fire for allowing members of opposition parties to address meetings at the campus. And yet such opportunities can help to show the emptiness of some or all of the claims made by those who oppose ruling parties. Students and their teachers will not easily be fooled by the political buffoon of
whatever following. Where the public or ruling party is against such "invasions" of the campus by those with dissimilar beliefs, several questions arise. Does society want to encourage conformity, regimentation and passivity? Are students to be encouraged to model themselves on their present leaders, some of whom have failed miserably to solve the problems of their country, or are they to be given opportunities to grow and to mature, to decide for themselves what beliefs they will hold, what traditions they will respect and what they will discard? 56

The number of politicians, in some way opposed to UNIP, had recently addressed meetings on campus, usually at the invitation of the Sociological Association. From the beginning of the academic year, 1970, until July, three leading politicians from ANC, one ex-minister and opponent of the present government, five different government ministers including three appearances from Kapwepwe, had addressed meetings on campus. Those addressed by the opposition spokesmen tended to be better attended and were given publicity in the national press. Naturally the ovatious welcomes and freedom awarded to opposition politicians at the university campus rankled with the UNIP politicians. The students for their part were possibly inspired by the oratory of the opposition spokesmen who ridiculed the government and spoke of the trends towards 'Messianism'. 57 But they were also genuinely disturbed about the nation's developing policy towards South Africa, and the uncovering of what appeared back door dealings with Rhodesia, as in the maize fiasco, and the revelation that Kaunda had been in correspondence with Vorster unbeknown to the Zambian population. 58 Whatever the contents of the letters, as far as they were concerned there was room for suspicion. In 1970 Zambia had staged, at great cost to itself, the Third Summit of the Non-Aligned Nations. The construction of an entirely new conference hall
and palatial residences for the visiting heads of states was greeted with unrestrained cynicism from the student body who could see no advantage to be gained from the event except as a publicity stunt for the President. His later trip to Europe and America where he was unceremoniously cold-shouldered by Heath and Nixon was greeted with indignation on the campus compounded by the President's passive response to the insults levelled at him and his people. Students were dissatisfied by the general lack of vigour in his dealings with other nations. Movements towards the one party state, always a possibility, were in the air and UNIP was as active as ever in deploying its coercive machinery to compel deviants to conform to UNIP rule.

That students were acutely conscious of the arbitrary powers of African governments is no better illustrated than by their reaction to the steps taken by President Mobutu against Congolese students commemorating their six colleagues shot dead a year before. Significantly the only UZ editorial in its three years of production to be devoted to events in another country not directly influencing Zambia was a hard hitting attack on the Mobutu regime.

And so President Mobutu once again has resorted to dirty dictatorial tactics of closing Lovanium 'Varsity' and ordering the students to enrol into the army. Like a colossus the mad Mobutu, murderer of that Congolese patriot and African hero Lumumba, went ahead to sentence 16 students who refused to be drafted into labour camps to 10 yrs. imprisonment. What bullshit! Those trumped-up charges of students plotting to kill him are outbursts of a frightened tyranny. We feel it is time African students condemned the wanton murders committed by the Mobuto gangsters. Must our brothers and sisters die in cold-blood with us gloating over their pool of blood? No fellow students. The time has come when students in droves and drabs, with ranks closed go ahead and castrate reactionaries like Mobutu and the globe-trotting Emperor Haile
Selassie who are constantly urinating on student progressive plans. The time for complacency is over and such leaders who are willing tools of imperialism must be made mince-meat of once and for all.  

Ironically, this appeared just one month before similar events were to overtake the University of Zambia. Then, Zambian students would have even greater justification for joining the Congolese students in a bond of solidarity, but even at the time of writing students at UNZA were conscious of the oppressive and insecure political atmosphere of their own country.  

At any time the tensions within the social structures and between students and the party impose severe limitations on legitimate opposition, but in July 1971 there were indications that tensions were unusually high and relations particularly strained. What might have been legitimate at another time would now be considered illegitimate by government, and the reaction to oppositional sentiments, publicly expressed, was likely to be more severe.  

**Stabilising Forces.**  

In the previous chapter the various associations and ties which link the student to the wider society were considered for their potential to contain and resolve tension. It was found that their role in this connection was minimal; links to the government and party where they existed at all were tenuous and offered little scope for restraint of student or government behaviour. However, a body with strong connections both with government and the students would provide an apparatus of countervailing forces which might help restore equilibrium to the relations between conflicting groups. One such
intermediary body and probably the only one is the university administration and academic staff. In this section an attempt will be made to assess the impact of the academic staff and administration to articulate a brokerage role in the dispute between students and government after the students had been dismissed and the university closed.

Whatever pressure was exerted behind the scenes, there was no public statement from either the administration, senate, university council or academic staff until the 21st July, one week after the closure of the university and two days after a deportation order served on two lecturers. Indeed until the deportation order, the events and initiative was entirely in the hands of the students and party. Officially, at least, the government did not consult the Vice-Chancellor over the closure of the university, the expulsion of the students or the signing of the pledge. This appeared to be a case of direct and unimpeded interference by the government in the running of the university and clear cut example of the violation of what is referred to as 'university autonomy' as enshrined in the University Act. Though the university senate met after the government intervention and before, its decisions and discussions have never been made public. It appears that the university council, the supreme governing body which in any case meets very rarely only began its deliberations after the deportation order on July 24th. At no time did either the academic staff or the administration attempt to influence student behaviour except on the occasion the Vice-Chancellor attempted to persuade the students to leave the Secretariat on July 8th. Nor would the students have taken much notice of what a member of staff or administrator had to say. It has
been the policy of the university authorities and staff to respect student autonomy and only as a last resort do they make any efforts to influence student behaviour. Thus as an intermediary group between student and government the university administration and staff had little bargaining power with the students.

Its bargaining power vis-à-vis the government was, if anything, even less, as is illustrated in the events following the deportation orders served on the two lecturers. The academic staff could not believe, as could not the students, that Etherton and Horne, perhaps the two lecturers who had contributed most to the university, who had been a major guiding hand behind the success of UNZA dramatics, were to be deported. Many who knew them, both students and staff, were incensed. Though they were two of the few lecturers who had known students outside the lecture room in extra curricular activities, there is no shred of evidence that they influenced the students in any way at any time since July 7th. Indeed when it came to political matters not only would the student totally ignore anything any expatriate had to say, but Etherton and Horne were likely to be so pro-government that their views would be rejected out of hand. In practice, of course, there was no conceivable opportunity for their influence to be exercised. Yet these were the lecturers served with deportation orders, presumably for the role they played in the events leading to the closure of the university. 61

Following the announcement of the deportation order on July 19th an academic staff meeting was convened and in the afternoon a senate meeting also sat to discuss the closure and now the deportation orders. As a result of the senate meeting
the Vice-Chancellor telephoned the President who was then touring Northern Province to arrange a meeting. The two met the following day in Mbala, unbeknown to the press. On July 21st the Vice-Chancellor reported to a meeting of the entire academic staff on his meeting with President Kaunda. At this meeting Professor Goma said the President had agreed to request the Minister of Home Affairs to extend the deportation order by a period of seven days. He also said that the President would meet a delegation of academic staff on Saturday, July 24th and address all the members of the academic staff on Sunday morning. Following this meeting between the Vice-Chancellor and the entire academic staff a statement was released to the press reflecting the views of those assembled on the closure, expulsions and deportations. Whatever the actual text of the press release, it did not receive a very happy interpretation in the press the following day. Headlines in the Times were, 'UNZA threatened. Now the staff have their say' and in the Mail 'Lecturers issue warning...UNZA's Future in Danger'. The Mail editorial, however, made the views of the party admirably clear.

It is most regrettable that when the lecturers and professors at the University decided to break their silence on the University issue yesterday, their statement was far from reassuring the nation that they would help bring the situation back to normal at the campus.

What was the nation given instead? A feeling of disquiet among the academic staff about the expulsion of a group of students who had insulted the President; disquiet about the requirement that those returning sign a pledge stating that they would concentrate on activities for which the tax-payer pays for during their stay at the University, and disquiet about the deportation orders issued on two members of the academic staff....

Whether those deported are University lecturers, medical doctors, engineers or surveyors is immaterial. It is government's prerogative to keep in
the country only those she wants to keep. We do not think it is fair for other busybodies to tell us how to run the country.

We feel it ill-behoves intellectuals and academics to toss around veiled threats, which are tantamount to blackmail, with naive statements that the University hangs in the balance. Who is intended to be kidded? This University will go on and will be run as those who finance it want it to be run in the interest of the nation as a whole. This is an indisputable fact and one of which those who want to blackmail us into believing otherwise should take full note.62

These views sum up the bargaining strength of the university community, as subsequent events bear out.

A delegation from the academic staff did meet the President on Saturday, July 24th and this was followed by a meeting between the President, accompanied by the Minister of Education, Mr. Nyirenda, and the Chairman of the University Council, Mr. Phiri, and the entire academic staff. The press was deliberately barred from the meeting. Nevertheless, both newspapers carried front page stories the following morning on the meeting: the Mail under the headline 'Staff talk it over with KK'63 and the Times under the headline 'No comment - but UNZA smiles'.64 In fact the President had given the academic staff considerable grounds for optimism. He said he would look into the deportation orders, while postponing them for a further seven days. As far as the expelled students were concerned, 'it was up to them', which was widely interpreted as meaning that following a public apology he might be prepared to lighten their punishment.

For four days silence reigned but at midnight on Thursday (July 29th) the President summoned the Vice-Chancellor to State House and informed him that there would be no concessions from government. On the contrary the two lecturers were to
leave the country by July 31st which was three days before the President's extended deadline. They eventually left on August 1st. The newspapers' publication of the possibility of concessions to the academic staff may have so irked party politicians that they forced the President to reverse any goodwill he may have felt towards the academic staff. Between the conflicting demands of the party and the university there is no doubt which is the more decisive.

The propaganda disseminated by government in justification of the closure of the university is an equally potent example of the weakness of the university before the essentially government controlled press agencies, and the virtual monopoly over information related to government action. In a lengthy speech to parliament, five days after the closure, Milner, Secretary General to Government referred the House to a number of factors concerning the closure of the university. He stressed that the original demonstration outside the French Embassy was illegal and that it broke into a riot before the students reached the Embassy. (The latter point is of doubtful validity.) As regards the atmosphere on the university campus on the day previous to the closure Milner says,

The stubbornness and parochialism of the student leaders was not received with acclamation from all quarters of the student body. The majority of students felt embarrassed...On Wednesday July the 14th, terror had gripped the Campus. The majority of students had been completely subdued by a small noisy and lawless group...The real problem was what was happening on Campus itself. Student leaders had completely lost control of the situation. Ugly incidents of violence against fellow students were increasing. Two of them were badly beaten up for holding opposing views. Intimidation was rife and a reign of terror was the order of the day...
At another point in his speech he makes the comment

Information had been received that the students on the 14th July had planned to march on the Administration.67

Towards the end he makes veiled references to outside influences which presumably account for the deportation of the two lecturers.

If in this matter student leaders, or some of them had fallen prey to influences from outside, let me say this: Our students, indeed all Zambians, should desist from taking advice on crucial issues, from people or groups of people who in the final analysis will not be answerable. When the dire consequences of shortsighted actions and attitudes come, as they always will, such advisers and friends will not suffer with us. Indeed, the students of the University of Zambia, more than anyone else, should be able to appreciate the seriousness of this wisdom.68

All these factors, which Milner presents as contributing to the closure of the university, in a direct or indirect manner, have an air of spuriousness. On the following day the Mail front page headlines were 'Students Planned to Take Over'.

University of Zambia students planned to take over government offices on the day the university was closed, Secretary-General Mr Aaron Milner told the Mail yesterday. But, he said, he never believed they would have overthrown the government, or achieved anything.69

Such a statement was nowhere included in Milner's address to parliament and cannot be regarded as having any more validity than some of the other statements made by Milner and the story of the balloons which was included in President Kaunda's letter to the Vice-Chancellor. According to the Times the letter said

that students had released balloons filled with explosive gas. Two people were injured when the balloons exploded.

Sources at the university campus said the closure, and subsequent actions, stemmed from the balloon incidents.70
The 'ideological counter attack' assumed two forms. First a direct attack on the students (following an equally and biased outspoken assault on the police) as arrogant and ungrateful parasites. After the closure the government, concealing the existence of a genuine breach of confidence between students and government, attributed student defiance to a set of irresponsible, privately motivated and externally influenced leaders who incited and intimidated the majority of innocent students into an expression of anti-party sentiment. The source of the confrontation lies more in the subversive activities of expatriate lecturers and not in the structural tension between students and government. Thus the reason for the closure is not the letter signed by the ten member executive, nor the determination of the students to make a stand against the party but an apparently purely technical matter; the (supposed) breakdown of law and order on the university campus.\(^7\) The university was powerless to counter the propaganda created to justify the closure, the expulsions and the deportations. Just as the academic staff and administration had no influence over student behaviour they had equally little influence over governmental behaviour. As a stabilising factor tending to restore equilibrium its effect is slight.

The Powerless University.

In explaining the tense relations between universities and the state in Africa, Ashby writes,

What is sometimes overlooked in Africa is that in Europe - even in Britain - and in America it is the conventions, not the constitutions, of university government which provide the real safeguards for academic freedom...When universities are exported, these conventions are unlikely to be exported with them; and this has been the cause of some difficulties in the universities of tropical Africa.\(^7\)
Why have the conventions not taken root in Africa? What ensures adherence to them in countries where they have taken root? The answer in both cases revolves around the more fundamental element of the power of the university. There are good reasons to believe that the university is more influential and has greater sanctions at its command in England, for example, than it has in Zambia.

There are a number of factors which contribute to the university's weakness. First, the academic staff are nearly all non-Zambian and white; their contacts with the government are tenuous if they exist at all, while their links with the party politicians who are the most hostile towards students are virtually non-existent. There is no opportunity for either side to attempt to reach an understanding of one another's position. Given the isolation of the academic staff and indeed the students, when faced with an attack they have no contacts upon which to draw to mount a 'resistance movement'. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, though he is a Zambian, has spent much of his time in universities abroad, and is possibly more a scientist than a politician. He brings with him the traditions of the liberal university as his valiant defence of the university revealed. However, his long absence from the country and his scientific interests have diminished his chances of establishing support for himself and his institution in political circles.

The lack of sympathy between the members of the university and the political elite is compounded by the low levels of education amongst members of the latter group. In Britain the members of the university student body, teaching staff and administration are often no better educated than the political
elite and indeed were often colleagues together in the same institutions. Consequently their common background makes for a mutual understanding of one another's problems. The relations in Zambia between the university and the society outside is thwart with misunderstanding and antipathy. The situation is not ameliorated by the existence of disparate channels of mobility into the various elites. Leaders in the military, administrative, governmental, economic and party elites have all moved through different avenues of recruitment, unlike other countries where they nearly all pass through universities. Thus for the majority of the members of the ruling class the University of Zambia has no particular significance except possibly as a threat to their own incumbency. Certainly there is no core of university graduates within each of the elites which, acting as 'an old boy network', might exert influence on behalf of the university. The few graduates which are to be found in the ruling class are from universities outside Zambia and have little or no connection with the University of Zambia.

Bargaining power of a section of Zambian society outside the ruling class is largely dependent on their indispensability to the smooth running of the state. In this respect the mineworkers, for example, are very much more powerful than the students, and the government would be very wary of dealing with the miners in a reckless manner. This is because the mineworkers control the nation's economy. The students, on the other hand, have no such sanctioning power. As the centre for the training of skilled manpower to diminish the nation's reliance on expatriate manpower, it is conceivable that the university has some bargaining power. In practice, however,
the government is not so unhappy with the status quo where expatriates perform crucial roles without assuming any political influence. The young graduate is not likely to accept a politically impotent role in his new job. He is likely to provide a threat to Zambians in supervisory and administrative positions where the expatriate employed on short term contracts is more interested in the pecuniary benefits of his job. As Professor Goma has said,

Many of Africa's key men are surrounded by foreign advisers, some of them being the same old colonial civil servants now under a different guise. The great majority of the academic staff in African universities is still made up of expatriates. Among these are those who are still dominated by colonial attitudes. Their role at these universities, besides being paternalistic, is to try and influence and guide things and students for purposes not always in the best interest of the African country concerned...Then there are some Africans in our universities, schools, the civil service, industry, and other sectors of our societies, who are worse in their attitudes than some of the worst expatriates. Their main interest is to preserve their prestige, to earn their income and hence preserve the status quo.74

Not only are their vested interests in government which show some reluctance to allow the graduate to progress as fast as he would like, but there is also an unwillingness to take advantage of the teaching personnel at the university as 'experts' in their respective fields.

In the matter of expert advice, the African governments and countries do not make full use of the expertise concentrated in their universities and colleges. The reasons for this...would seem to be insufficient decolonisation of the mind and the consequent uncritical adulation of foreign experts and know-how. The work of local specialists is often not seriously appreciated or demanded by Government and the various sectors of the national economy. Instead specialists are brought in (from abroad) at very great expense to produce, in a few days, reports that are often worth next-to-nothing. In some cases, the advice that the visiting so-called experts give today may be identical with what the local expert has been saying for years, but has never been listened to.75
The attitude which the Vice-Chancellor refers to as 'insufficient decolonisation of the mind' is a particular example of provincialism, and has wider applicability than merely ex-colonial territories. The consequences, however, are clear. The university becomes more isolated and even less able to apply pressure or mobilise countervailing forces when it faces an assault from the party.

The University Council, the supreme governing body of the university, appears also to have relatively little influence as a countervailing force as against the pressures brought to bear by the party. The members of the council tend to be representatives of the world of education rather than the political sphere. The Chairman for example, Mr. David Phiri, is a graduate from Oxford University and a Director of Anglo American. Like the Vice-Chancellor his background leads him to sympathise with the ethos behind the liberal university and the preservation of university autonomy. He has probably little sympathy for and receives little from the majority of party leaders.

Such are the inevitable problems of an isolated, indispensable institution structurally discontinuous with the total society. When its members violate the precarious segregation of institutionally prescribed roles and wider civic roles, on which equilibrium rests, the university can do little to restore the system to normalcy.

Violation and Reprisal.

A state of social equilibrium between students and government presupposes the segregation of university and civic roles into their respective social structures. A violation of the
role discontinuity by enacting a university role in the civic sphere or by imposing a civic role in the university sphere leads to a chain reaction of reprisal and counter violation.

The first demonstration outside the French Embassy, though it was a violent assault on the unprotected building, was heralded both within the university and outside as a heroic act, well within the bounds of legitimate student behaviour. Situated at the intersection of university and civic roles it served as a ritualistic cementation of solidarity between students and government. The reprisals of the police, in many ways understandable but nevertheless unrestrained and disorganised, became the subject of public consternation. A certain amount of 'student bashing' on such occasions has become an established ritual, but the use of a firearm signalled the first move outside the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. The tributes showered on the students in the mass media forged a heightened student solidarity and triggered off a spontaneous demonstration of protest, this time against 'police brutality'. Student action was already moving out towards the boundaries of legitimate behaviour, now extended by a wave of public support. The government was to grant no concession to the student demands, on the contrary the President in failing to congratulate the students on the courage of their demonstration indirectly questioned its legitimacy.

At this point student spontaneity reached a climax. Unbeknown to the majority of students but nevertheless in sympathy with their sentiments the ten member student executive wrote an open letter to the President attacking the manner in which he was governing the country. The first reaction was shock at the 'temerity' of the student leaders compounded by
realisation of their seriousness when, in the face of pressure from the Minister of Education, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Vice-Chancellor, they unhesitatingly refused to retract the letter or make any apologetic gesture. To publicly criticise the President of Zambia is to discredit the most sacred national symbol, the embodiment of Zambia and the United National Independence Party - an unprecedented event in the history of the nation. Retribution could only be damnation. Reprisal from the party was to be unrestrained.

Essentially there were two modal responses from the student body to the action taken by their leadership. Either they could have dissociated themselves from it through the insurrection of a counter leadership from the plentiful supply of informal 'influentials' within the student community, or they could endorse the sentiments in the letter by mobilising support behind the executive. After the initial impact, and discussion the informal leaders and the rank and file spontaneously absorbed the executive into its midst and stood as one. This was the second shock which UNIP had to countenance, epitomised by the refusal of the student executive to meet UNIP politicians.

Reprisals from Freedom House were swift. The students and not just the student leaders were the enemy of the nation. This put the final touches on the consolidation of student solidarity. Dissent within the student body would, from now on, be stifled, if necessary through intimidation. Minority interest would have to bow to majority rule. The escalation of the confrontation was inevitable as both sides were recalcitrant in their opposition. The precarious division between civic and university roles had been shattered. Students had
launched into the civic sphere in the unbridled capacity of their university role. The party equally had reacted by threatening to use coercion to force the civic role on the students now that they had entered the national political arena, while others threatened to compel them to retreat into their isolated university existence. The matter was resolved in favour of the government by the non violent closure of the university, after a ritual condemnation of the students through country wide demonstrations and the ritual reaffirmation of the public's faith in the nation's most sacred symbol of unity and integrity.

The events are diagramatically represented in figure one. Student protest becomes significant as a catalyst for change when it enjoins, supports, resonates or detonates contemporaneous unrest and dissatisfaction in the wider society. If the student executive, moved by the public tributes to their 'valour' outside the French Embassy, felt it had widespread support in the nation then it underestimated the authority of the party and the widespread resentment that underlies attitudes towards students in many influential circles. Though possibly trade unionists may have been in sympathy with the sentiments expressed by the students, they were not in a position to give any support to the students nor capitalise on their defiant stand. The most they could be expected to do, was to refrain from condemnation of the students. Certainly the series of nodal points of student oppositional action were sufficient to allow any other oppositional group to make its appearance. The student body by itself can never bring about social or political change without support from outside; it can however detonate support from other groups at the nodal
Defiance of Party and student solidarity.

Publication of letter to President.

Propaganda against police and student protest against police brutality.

Armed intervention and closure of university.

Nation wide demonstrations and propaganda against students.

President's non-commital reference to student demonstration.

"Police brutality."

Demonstration outside French Embassy.

Unstable Equilibrium

STUDENT VIOLATION OF ROLE DISCONTINUITY

GOVERNMENT VIOLATION OF ROLE DISCONTINUITY

--- Boundaries of normative (acceptable) violation of role discontinuity, (relative to tension in social structure).
points of its own defiance of the state. Thus the workers of France exploited the determination of university students to overthrow the Gaullist regime, for their own ends and the prosecution of the 'May Revolution of 1968'.

Comparison with the 'Chanda Affair'.

Whereas the events leading to the closure of the university represent a divergent or escalating confrontation, the 'Chanda Affair' represents a convergent or diminishing confrontation. The points of difference are worth considering. The initial demonstration over the letters published in the Mail did not receive any approval from the wider society or mass media, on the contrary the media showed much disgust for the student action. Thus, Chanda's letter, which followed, not only embittered an already hostile public opinion, but also failed to attract the support of either the remainder of the student executive or the student body as a whole. The hostility expressed by the press and the Presidential demand for an apology was therefore focused not at the student body but at its leader Henry Chanda. Though he may well have expressed the oppositional sentiments in his letter the students were not prepared to confront the government over this issue. Instead the student executive deliberately betrayed their President in dissociating themselves from his action and apologising to Milner for any embarrassment he may have been caused. Rather than launching out into the civic arena, the students recoiled back into the university arena reasserting their conformity to the established norms of student behaviour. In this way, only Chanda himself suffered from the temporary violation of the discontinuity between university and civic roles. The events are portrayed diagrammatically in figure two.
FIG. 2 - DIMINISHING CONFRONTATION - OCTOBER, 1967.

Unstable Equilibrium

Apology from student executive but not from Chanda.

Condemnation from UNIP; Presidential demand for public apology.

Letter to Milner signed by Chanda

Condemnation by Milner and Press.

Demonstration outside Milner's and Mail offices.

Scurrilous letters published in Mail.

--- Boundaries of normative (acceptable) violation of role discontinuity (relative to tension in social structure).

Unstable Equilibrium

STUDENT VIOLATION OF ROLE DISCONTINUITY

GOVERNMENT VIOLATION OF ROLE DISCONTINUITY
The Dynamics of Unstable Equilibria.

The equilibrium in which the university system normally rests is unstable for three reasons. First the structural conditions for equilibrium are rigidly defined and impose severe constraints on legitimate student behaviour. These constraints are analytically described by the discontinuity between civic and university roles and the small arena of social action over which these two roles intersect. In societies where university and civic roles intersect over wider arenas of social action, student behaviour in public and university spheres is less restricted and equilibria more stable. Second, tension in the social structure is such that any violation of equilibrium conditions is sensitively recorded. The social structure responds to the slightest 'aberration' by propagating a series of 'perturbations' through the system of interactions between different groups. These perturbations may converge or diverge according to the nature of the initial and subsequent aberrations and the countervailing pressures brought into play. Third, the social forces tending to dampen perturbations and restore the system to equilibrium are weak. Following a violation of equilibrium conditions a chain reaction develops throughout the system whose destabilising tendencies are difficult to contain with only weak countervailing forces. The university system is not enmeshed in a set of cross cutting ties and associations which lock it into a position in the social structure and from which it may deviate only slightly. On the contrary it is a disconnected and relatively powerless institution tenuously integrated into the wider social system. Thus the unstable equilibrium is described by the sensitivity of the social structure to departures from equilibrium conditions, the precise and confining definition of those conditions, combined with an absence of strong stabilising forces tending to restore the system to equilibrium.
Short of permanently closing the university, the onus was now on the Zambian government to re-establish a working relationship with the university under conditions which would nurture peaceful co-existence. It was to be on the government's initiative, possibly in consultation with representatives of the university, that these new conditions would be defined. In the next chapter, the discussion will turn to the response of interested parties to the events of July just described. The analysis will first dwell on the response of the students, and then it will revert to a consideration of the response of the government in the light of steps taken by other governments faced with a similar set of problems.
NOTES

1. This is what Gluckman in another context might have referred to as a ritual of protest. Gluckman, M., Custom and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), Chapter V, pp.109-36.

2. Image of UNZASU (Mid Year General Report of the University of Zambia Student Union, 1 October 1970).


4. In this sense the police the world over are similar in behaving like the Zulu women who once a year are encouraged to reject their submissive role and take on the role of the man. This is an accepted and legitimate practice, just as police brutality so long as it does not overstep certain limits is similarly encouraged by the society at large.


6. Ibid., p.134.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


17. The films shown every Friday at the campus are usually of the cheaper American variety, and are very popular amongst students.


19. Ibid.


21. This was revealed in court at the trial of seven students charged with riot on July 7th, 1971.

22. It is interesting to note that students have never demonstrated with UNIP Youth or any other UNIP organisation even over issues in which their interests are apparently identical.

23. This was revealed in court at the trial of the seven students charged with riot.


26. Ibid.

27. Daily Mail, 8 July 1971.

28. Ibid.

29. Undisclosed source.

30. Recollections of the writer soon after the speech.


33. Ibid.

34. Where are We Going? A Letter to President Kaunda (Circular distributed 12 July 1971).
35. The only evidence of annoyance was the tearing up of a number of the circulars on which the open letter had been reproduced.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
44. They represent an interesting difference of opinion as between the liberal student from England and the Zambian student.
45. What are we doing? No. 2 (Circular distributed 14 July 1971).
46. Ibid.
47. What are we doing? No. 3 (Circular distributed 14 July 1971).
48. Zambia Information Services, Closure of the University of Zambia (Distributed to students 15 July 1971).
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
53. Wina, S., The University and our National Interests (An address to the University Sociological Association, 6 May 1970; Zambia Information Services, Background No. 41/70.).
54. This is a rumour which is still so widely believed that it might bear some approximation to the truth. It is certainly the case that the Minister of Education never made any speech condemning the student, yet as Minister of Education this should have been his responsibility. Kapwepwe was known to have had sympathy for the students and his subsequent recruitment of students from the university campus for his new party suggests that he too was probably opposed to the closure. Mwanakatwe as a previous Minister of Education and Mudenda as a product of the University of Cambridge may be regarded as having sympathies for the students.
55. The writer was aware of the probability of the formation of the new party some two months previous to the July events.
56. Goma, L. K. H., The Pressures on a Developing University in Contemporary Africa (Address by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia on the occasion of the third graduation ceremony, 5 June 1971).
57. Sipalo, M., Democracy in Theory and in Practice in Independent Africa (Address to the University Sociological Association, 13 October 1970). It was Sipalo who coined the phrase 'messianism.'

The appeal is no longer to the reason of the citizen, but to his gullibility. A more recent phenomenon in Africa has been the emergence of what Max Weber has called the "charismatic leader" - the era of Messianism has arrived in Africa. He is the expression of the general will. He is the be-all and end-all of everything.
Sipalo’s address was so widely acclaimed that the student union was compelled to reproduce 500 copies of his speech. Sipalo was Minister of Agriculture in the UNIP government until he lost his seat in the 1968 election.

58. For details of the exchanges between Vorster and Kaunda see, Republic of Zambia, Dear Mr. Vorster.... (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, April 1971).

59. UZ, 14 July 1971.

60. See the Government of Zambia, University of Zambia Act (Act No. 66 of 1965). All powers as regards the administration and government of the university are constitutionally in the hands of the University Council or the Senate.

61. The only indication that the lecturers were being deported for their supposed involvement came in a paragraph from Aaron Milner’s statement to parliament on the closure of the University of Zambia.

......if in this matter student leaders, or some of them, had fallen prey to influences from outside, let me say this: Our students, indeed all Zambians, should desist from taking advice on crucial issues from people or groups of people who in the final analysis will not be answerable....


64. Daily Mail, 26 July 1971.


67. Ibid., columns 133-5.

68. Ibid., column 135.

69. Ibid., column 137.

70. Times of Zambia, 2 August 1971.


72. One does not have to look far for a similar analysis of student opposition. For example the protest demonstration by South African students, see The Guardian (U.K.) 12 and 13 June 1972. For an analysis of American students which attributes American student ‘radicalism’ to professors who ‘teach alienation’ and to a few malcontents see Hayakawa, S. I., "Alienation is being Taught by Professors," reproduced in Wallerstein, I., and Starr, P. (eds.), Confrontation and Counterattack (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp.439-41. This statement by the President of San Francisco State College bears a remarkable resemblance to the suspicion voiced by party leaders towards expatriate lecturers.


74. Though in 1971 a handful of leaders, who were instigating strike action, were put under restriction, the government has generally feared the power and organisational strength of the mineworkers and the party has failed to gain control of the mineworkers’ union. See Betes, R., Unions, Parties and Political Development (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), especially Chapter Seven and passim.

75. Address by the Vice-Chancellor at the Occasion of the Second Graduation Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 6 June 1970.

76. Ibid.

77. See Seale and McConville, op.cit.
CHAPTER SIX

THREE MODAL RESPONSES TO TENSION.
The principles of interaction and legitimate articulation of the student's university and civic roles have been discussed in previous chapters. Prior to the events of July an unwritten concordat, acknowledged by both government and students, delineated the norms of behaviour in different situations. The conventions enshrined in the concordat were temporarily abridged by the government intervention and closure of the university. This chapter will be concerned to examine the nature of the concordat which was established following the reopening of the university. What changes were wrought in the balance between civic and university roles and in the areas of their respective arenas of action? What alternatives were open to the government in defining the relations between civic and university roles?

**STUDENT RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION.**

The chapter begins with a recapitulation of the principles of role articulation within the university social structure and the uncertainty concerning the relative importance to be accorded to different roles following the reopening of the university.

**Limitations on the Civic Role.**

What Gluckman wrote of the Zambian mineworker may be equally applied to the Zambian student.

...An African townsman is a townsman, an African miner is a miner. We may anticipate that as soon as Africans assemble in towns and engage in industrial work, they will begin to form social relationships appropriate to their new situation; they will try to combine to better their conditions in trade unions, and associations of law-
breakers will emerge as well as friendly and burial societies, and so forth. Of course, these Africans continue to be influenced by many factors arising outside of the urban situation; the rapid growth of towns and their own inexperience of towns, the constant move of African labourers between tribe and town and between towns and the tribal culture and life from which they come, as well as customary linkages and hostilities between different tribes. But even these tribal influences operate now in an urban milieu, and not in a rural milieu. The urbanized African is outside the tribe, but not beyond the influence of the tribe. Correspondingly, when a man returns from the towns into the political area of his tribe he is tribalized again - de-urbanized - though not beyond the influence of the towns. 1

Replacing townsman by student, urban system by university system etc., and extending tribal linkages to include a much wider range of externally derived roles, the above passage adequately summarises the previous chapter. Put another way, within the university system, the civic role will be activated only where university and civic roles are compatible. When the civic role is activated in a situation where it is incompatible with the university social structure or interests of the student community then severe sanctions are applied to the 'deviant' individuals to ensure conformity to established norms. This was apparent in the accusations of political partisanship, close links with government, 'spying' etc., which so abound any election contest. In a closed, small scale, community sanctions are inescapable; students are easily subjected to embarrassment and if necessary ostracised for their failure to conform to the norms of the student community. In extreme cases when the student is not prepared to relinquish overriding commitment to a civic role in the context of the university social structure then he will sever relations with the student community, amputating his university role. When student interests are ambiguous for one reason or another,
'deviance' is less well-defined and behaviour, which under normal circumstances would be penalised, is now considered legitimate.

Limitations on the University Role.

The discontinuity between university and civic roles is dependent on the insulation of the university social system from the wider social system. Where the two systems overlap and intersect incompatible demands on student behaviour are resolved in favour of the system which is both able and desires to impose the severest sanctions.2

The boundaries of the urban and rural systems of relations are not always clear but reveal themselves as sharply defined in a specifically industrial setting. When strike action is called for, the tribal representatives are openly rejected in favour of a strike committee.3 Different circumstances pertain in the case of the university system which, in accordance with the 'Western tradition', retains a well-defined boundary insulating its activities from the outside world. The third chapter illustrated the extent of the insulation of the university system by virtue of its geographical isolation, the detachment of the university from wider societal problems, the inability of the world outside to appreciate the problems of the academic, the propagation of the ideology of academic freedom and university autonomy and the disparate and conflicting interests of the academic community vis-à-vis the wider society. The nature of the university system therefore strengthens the discontinuity between university and civic roles.

So long as oppositional attitudes were confined to
internal channels of communication, that is to the student press consumed internally, to applause for campus speeches of opposition politicians, to angry replies to visiting government ministers, to circulars distributed at meal times and to informal debate and discussion, so the role discontinuity was not violated and neither government nor party intervened. However, when the result of the articulation of the university role is deliberately propagated out of the university system into the wider system, as in the case of the open letters sent by Chanda and the 1971 UNZASU executive, the university role may be "over extended." The difference between the hostile political commentaries in the columns of UZ and the public expression of opposition in an open letter to the President by student leaders is clear. But the legitimacy and consequences of the expression of opposition in the area spanning these two extremes is less obvious and open to dispute. The section next turns to competition within the community arising out of the ambiguity of the consequences of the extension of the university role.

**Competing Role Allegiances.**

During the period between the closure of the university on July 15th and its reopening on August 30th, the United Progressive Party was formed. UNIP was now presented with a challenge to its supremacy and the country faced the possibility of a political schism. In those areas where the UPP was anticipated to have support, UNIP's activities tended to be particularly militant. In the event, UPP never managed to achieve the following some had anticipated but UNIP nevertheless perceived it as an 'enemy' not to be trifled with. When
the university reopened it was still not clear how much support the new party had, since widespread intimidation disinclined its followers and sympathisers to reveal themselves. The challenge of the UPP, the known oppositionalism to government coupled with the apparent popularity of Kapwepwe on the campus and the resolute defiance of the government leading to the closure of the university were all good reasons for party politicians to encourage the development of a UNIP cell amongst the students. Staunch supporters of UNIP, either out of motives of opportunism or idealism, greeted the new circumstances as requiring the consolidation and mobilisation of support amongst their fellow students.

The closure of the university and the memories of the spirit of community and liberation during those few 'glorious' days when the students had become deeply embroiled in the national political arena, and had defied the strength of the party had a lasting impact. They returned disenchanted with what had happened, expecting a stricter surveillance of their activities and a drastic curtailment of their freedom of expression. In his welcoming address to the students the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, stressed the importance that university life should return to normality. Though the editor of UZ was initially doubtful whether the publication of the paper would be resumed (he had earlier received a note from the Registrar to the effect that student publications would all be banned) nonetheless it was not long before it reappeared. But, there was no commentary on the events which had come to pass since the last issue.

A number of students had become intensely politicized, though many more wanted nothing more than to be allowed to get
on with their studies and prepare for their examinations unhindered by politics. The community had become more polarised into "politicized" and "anti-political" students.

One further circumstance lent itself to the intrusion of externally derived roles into campus life, namely the leadership vacuum left by the expulsion of the ten member UNZASU executive. After initial uncertainly it was decided that the Presidents of Hall Councils (elected in a two stage electoral process by the students living in each hall of residence) would be called upon as an 'Ad Hoc Committee', to perform the functions of the union executive. They accepted this new role and from amongst themselves elected a chairman to act as President. Since they were appointed to their new positions and had not offered themselves as candidates in an election, they felt justified in pursuing a very moderate and conciliatory approach towards the government and university authorities. They were not there to make a political stand but to simply take care of the day-to-day running of UNZASU affairs.

Five analytically distinct groups emerged against this background, a UNIP cell composed mainly of students from Eastern Province, a UFP cell composed mainly of Bemba-speaking students, a group of strong independents who, though disaffected, refused to be intimidated by the government, the party or any other extraneous 'power', a group of 'unionists' whose concern was the narrow prosecution of student interests and the return to peaceful relations with government, epitomised by the Ad Hoc Committee, and finally the majority who wished to be left alone to get on with their studies and successfully complete their degrees.

The UNIP campaign was led by Kamoyo from Eastern Province.
As Social and Cultural Secretary in the Bushe administration, he was continually at the centre of controversy. At that time he had been one of the most prominent opponents of a UNIP branch on the campus, asserting that loyalty to UNIP was compatible with opposition to a campus branch of the party. It was widely reported, when the students reassembled after the reopening of the university, that Kamoyo had been in close contact with State House, and some went so far as to accuse him of divulging the names of prominent leaders during the July events. How true this is, is not clear but amongst students it was widely believed. As a result Kamoyo yet again became the centre of controversy and suffered a spate of vituperative abuse. It was not long, however, before he was campaigning for student participation within UNIP, gathering around him a group of fellow UNIP followers almost entirely recruited from Eastern Province. Meetings were arranged with politicians off the campus and large UNIP posters, printed in response to the creation of UPP - 'UNIP IS POWER' - were distributed to students. Kamoyo, now in his fourth year, was not eligible for office in NUZS but at the Eighth National Congress held between 1st October and 3rd October, 1971 Kamoyo and his supporters secured a large following and of the five UNZA students elected to the executive three were known UNIP stalwarts, one was a supporter of UPP (the President) and one was an 'independent'. There is no way of accurately estimating UNIP's support on the campus but it could not have been large, particularly as the cell was confined to students from Eastern Province.

While Kamoyo was campaigning on behalf of UNIP, a number of students were actively supporting UPP. UPP cards were being sold freely but not too openly on the campus. There was
little doubt that the party received considerable support from the Bemba-speaking students. After the first round of detentions, nine students gave up their studies to fill some of the vacant posts. Of these nine, seven were Bemba-speaking, one from Southern Province and one from North Western Province. Cosmos Chola, the expelled President of UNZASU, led the group and the two non-Bembas had been colleagues of his when he was Vice-President in the Bushe administration. These same two (one had been Secretary General and the other Publicity Secretary) were known for their idealism and 'radicalism' towards national and student politics. Both had been particularly disenchanted with the government's response to their sincerely felt hostility towards the French. On the day before their departure these same two students were comparing the Zambian government unfavourably with the apartheid regime of South Africa. Their joining the UPP was an expression of extreme distaste for the way the government had handled the students. Their departure did not stimulate any particular reaction from the students, but inevitably brought them yet again into the limelight of the national political arena. It was further cause for UNIP politicians to begin another assault on the students, but by now the students were inured to such attacks.

A third group - the 'unionists' - wished merely to preserve the student body intact and protect it against a repeat of the incidents of July. They disapproved of the use of the campus as a recruiting ground for UNIP and UPP. The Ad Hoc Committee, entrusted with the role of UNZASU executive, attempted to steer a diplomatic course seeking assistance and advice from the administration and academic staff. They, for example, gave one lecturer - Robert Molteno - a platform to
address students on the restructuring of the university proposing such changes as the dispersal of students and staff among the community, bicycles for students, loans instead of grants, community service, and university self help scheme. Molteno was given a rough handling by the assembled students who were not impressed by his suggestions. Nevertheless the report was widely distributed by the Ad Hoc Committee both within and outside the University. This was part of their conciliatory public relations role.

The fourth group comprised the strong independents who felt that party politics had no role to play on the campus and that students should not be intimidated by government or pressures, but retain their self respect through freedom of thought and expression. Thus some students were eager to invite Milner and Bulawayo to address the student body, whereas the Ad Hoc Committee and other 'unionists' expressed the fear that such a meeting might have the unfortunate consequence of attracting more wrath from the party. In fact the Sociological Association invited both, but failed to receive a reply from Bulawayo while Milner, keen to come, was too busy at the time. It was an opinion poll which most clearly revealed the divergence of opinion on campus and the ambiguity of the situation the students now found themselves in.

The Politics of Withdrawal versus the Politics of Confrontation.

With the opening of the University the Daily Mail discon- tinued its assault on the student body until the nine students joined the United Progressive Party on September 23rd. This was the occasion for further abuse to be thrown at the students, particularly by the head of the government news agency (ZANA),
who was frequently called upon to assault the "enemies of
the nation" on radio or television. The press was less con-
cerned about the students and more concerned to highlight the
opportunism and unscrupulousness of Kapwepwe. However, the
Mail did write in its editorial,

Now he has attracted students who have been accused
of hurling worse insults on the leadership in the
country...If these are the people that he now ele-
vates in his party, does it ever occur to him that
the bulk of the decent people that really matter in
this country are beginning to ask what type of a
leader Mr. Kapwepwe is that he appears to attract
only the scum of society.4

UNIP officials began to suspect that the university campus had
been 'subverted by UPP'. Thus on the next day the Daily Mail
reported the Chililabombwe district governor as having thrown
out a challenge to the students that,

.....they should come out into the open and make
their stands known. And speaking of the students
who have already declared their support for UPP,
he said: "If they think they can withstand the
force of UNIP, let them come, we are ready for
them."5

The press report was followed by a story that proved to have
significance in the events to be recounted below.

Yesterday a five-man delegation representing
students loyal to UNIP called on the district
governor for Lusaka Urban, Mr Justin Kabwe, and
assured him that the actions of the students who
resigned on Thursday were not in any way represen-
tative of the views of the majority of students at
the campus.6

The two factions representing the two parties had now commit-
ted themselves to their political allegiances and were each
being reported in the press as representing the students in
general. At the same time students had also taken sides in
yet another national political debate, that of the legality of
the detention of the UPP leaders. On the 28th September, the
University Law Society Chairman, Mundia Sikatana, was reported 'as coming out in open support for the Law Society of Zambia' in their wrangle with the Attorney General.

Mr Sikatana made a scorching attack on the Attorney General and accused President Kaunda's legal advisers of being misleading and causing ridicule to the Head of State. He exonerated the country's Law Society, to which the university branch is affiliated, and said they were correct in demanding that United Progressive Party detainees should be brought before a court of law to prove their guilt.7

It was against this background, and the inevitable distortions and conclusions which the press drew that two students, Burawoy (a white) and Phiri, decided with encouragement from many of the student leaders who remained on campus to run an opinion poll to make unambiguously clear where 'the students stood'. The questionnaire which was distributed on Tuesday, 28th September contained questions relating to the UPP detentions, popularity of UNIP in the country, national support for the government's closure of the university, the objectivity of the press, the deportations of the two lecturers, relations with South Africa etc.8 Everyone on campus knew the response would indicate an extreme disaffection and was therefore opposed by certain groups, particularly the 'unionists' and the UNIP cell. The strong independents and the UPP supporters had a vested interest in the revelation of just what was the prevailing student opinion.

The issue was simple and clear. Following the closure the students could adopt one of two stands. On the one hand they could submit to the power of the party either by imposing a voluntary censorship on strongly held views (unionists) or by making positive efforts to link up with UNIP and work through the party organisation. On the other hand they could
continue to oppose the government by either joining and campaign for UPP or ANC or they could remain committed to their university role in making pronouncements in areas bordering on the national political arena. This real issue was clouded in the wrangle that followed the distribution of the opinion poll.

The organisers of the poll anticipating militant opposition and reprisals from within the student body, placed the polling box in the library next to the security guard and distributed the questionnaire to each room. Hours after the distribution both students received threatening notes pushed under their doors. Burawoy for example received the following:

No whites should take part in the affairs of either UNZA or Zambia. Don't you ever learn from the deportation orders served to those who over-indulge? Keep out! Keep Quiet! Isn't it enough just allowing you to stay in Zambia? Be warned. For all we know you could be a racist agent sent over here to create unrest.

Phiri received similar notes accusing him of being a "stooge." Kamoyo came round personally to remonstrate with him to cancel the opinion poll. It was already clear at this early stage that the campus was seriously split. At lunch time on the following day (Wednesday) a circular was distributed.

The opinion poll published by Messers Burawoy and Phiri makes a lot of us wonder as to what the intention of the questionnaire is. These two gentlemen have taken it upon themselves to assess the student feeling on National matters. What upsets us is that while we would like to accept Mr. Burawoy's intention as genuine curiosity, we are of the opinion that such information could be very disastrous to Zambia if it got into the wrong hands.

The opinion of the UNZA students means such a lot on the Zambian political scene that it would be very unpatriotic of us to allow these two gentlemen to assess it.

We have observed with increasing interest that some foreign students have made it their
business to pilot the feelings of the UNZA student. This is reminiscent of the circular published by certain P.C.E. students just before the closure of the University in June. One student got clobbered for reading it over the radio as the opinion of the students.

Our advice to you Mr. Burawoy is don't go around doing Molteno Reports. You will only make yourself very unpopular. Leave us to deal with our domestic affairs the Zambian way. When and where we need foreign advisors we have never failed to say.

Cancel the Opinion Poll.\(^{10}\)

In casting doubt on the intentions and integrity of Masuatso Phiri, the writers of the circular were courting the opposition of many students. This is probably why the circular went unsigned. For Phiri, a fourth year student of English was both popular and respected on the campus. His intellectual eminence was unquestioned and he had made many contributions to Zambian writing. Though he had never been active in internal student politics, he had always figured prominently in student demonstrations over Southern African issues. In 1970 he was severely beaten up by the police and at the time of the opinion poll he was still on trial, along with six other students, charged with riot. Phiri was particularly well-known on campus for his activities off the campus in producing plays together with other citizens of Lusaka - not just students - which were then taken on tour of the provinces. Unlike the UNZA dramatic society which was centred around the university, Phiri believed in taking drama to the people and in forging links between different sections of Zambian society through the re-enactment of cultural activities. Though he had been a strong supporter of UNIP, he now pursued the independent line of a 'socialist' intellectual. The accusation that Phiri was a stooge or that he was deliberately trying to undermine the
student interest had very little credibility amongst those who knew him.

Burawoy, too, had been active in student life. He was known as the chairman of the Sociological Association which had been responsible for inviting a variety of politicians to the campus, and for the conduct of opinion polls. None of these opinion polls had been disruptive and there was no overt reason for questioning the motives behind the present one. His legitimacy amongst the student body had been enhanced by involvement in the events leading to the closure of the university and he, too, was still on trial together with Phiri for riot outside the French Embassy. He was a regular contributor to the columns of UZ, and none of his articles had caused any controversy. However, he was a white student and this always gave room from suspicion in the minds of many. Students had to decide whether Burawoy was to be regarded primarily as a student or primarily as a white. In any event, mobilising support through appeals to the racial prejudices of the student community was a potentially powerful tactic. Racial prejudices were stronger amongst potential UNIP supporters and unionists than amongst the independents. It was natural for those opposed to the opinion poll to exploit the racial status of one of the conductors.

Since Burawoy was so vulnerable to attack, he kept silent and Phiri produced the reply - "To Hell with Campus Eyes" - for distribution at dinner that evening. He was deliberately provocative, determined to make an issue out of the opinion poll.

The student body will by now be aware of the opinion poll we are conducting. The reasons for conducting the poll are
a) Press comments as to what student opinion is and the suspicion enshrouding it.

b) The departure of nine students to join UPP and another number reported as having visited Freedom House.

We have not claimed to be conducting an official poll - never. But we believe that the decisions made by the nine and also the twelve do not necessarily portray student opinion - hence the poll.

The accusation that we are in no position to conduct a poll is utter rubbish. Such an accusation can only be made by people who benefit from the secret meetings with D.G.'s while masquerading as champions of students. Their fear is that the poll might reveal that they are not leaders of students as they claimed, and that the assessments of student opinion they present to Freedom House is not what they say it is.

If the authors of the lunch time circular feel strongly about student opinion - why don't they come forward and help to project the true student opinion? Why should they assume the know all attitude of the ignoramus?

For their benefit the poll will go on - the number of questionnaires is steadily growing and this regardless of their unjustified comments - or is observation in reverse?

"K" and your "vicious clique" why can't you sign your names for all to see?  

Masautso Phiri

Phiri accused Kamoyo of writing the circular, which had the required effect of bringing the dispute out into the open.

There was an issue to be debated and better do so in full view rather than through notes pushed under doors. The following day at a meeting of the Council of Representatives convened to discuss the Nguni Commission findings on the misappropriation of union funds, the election of a new student executive and an additional item - the conduct of the opinion poll - was included. Neither Burawoy nor Phiri attended that meeting but the participants, mainly "unionists", decided that if the poll was carried through, before publication the results should be submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee for censorship. The meeting resolved that in future any individuals wishing to run an
opinion poll should first seek permission from the student union. Kamoyo had not secured the cancellation of the poll which still continued and he therefore replied to Phiri's last circular the following evening at dinner time.

I am not the author of yesterday's circular but I strongly support the comrade who wrote it.

Unfortunately, Masautso Phiri spelt a lot of unnecessary inference to innocent people in his circular, "To Hell With Campus Eyes."

Since this unholy alliance of Masautso Phiri and Mike Burawoy is not prepared to take heed of what some of us feel about the dangers of this opinion poll, the consequences will not affect the two, but the entire University. One wonders why Masautso and Mike Burawoy want this Opinion Poll, and for whom are the results, and what are they? There seems to be some mysterious significance which they contrive to explain to the students. Masautso is just being used by Mike Burawoy. For Masautso and those who don't know Michael Burawoy: this gentleman is a Jew born somewhere in Eastern Europe during the Second World War. His parents moved and are now living in Manchester England. Where he was educated nobody knows, but all I know is that, in 1968, from June to December, he worked as a journalist in South Africa and yet he tells us that he has a first degree in Sociology. How can a sociologist work as a journalist for a South African paper? There is indeed some inconsistency in his statements. He is now twenty-three (23), doing some dubious courses for an M.A. If he is really twenty-three (23), when did he do his first degree, since he spent most of his time working in South Africa? Who is sponsoring him here? Nobody knows! He spends most of his holidays running up and down our country doing research, which results we never see. He lives in P6/II. Let's be aware!

We all know as students what our answers are to questions in the questionnaire but what has this chap with a dubious background got to do with them? Whose interests is he serving?

These two sadistic and self-styled gentlemen, instead of spending their time in the showers, have continued to incite their fanatics to denounce me daily in public, heaping pious insults upon me and charitably consigning me and my colleagues who belong to UNIP, to Freedom House and State House. We are mere UNIP followers. We know how you have tried on campus by giving us such names as 'informers', 'eyes', and all the rest. We are none of these dear Masautso. You are telling cheap lies. Who is an informer? Those who work for foreign governments, or those who belong and work for their
government and their country?
I should care very little for anything they might say were it not for their cunning in making enemies for me among men and women I respect in this University and enticing into their ranks, genuinely good people whose confidence they shake by creating hostility and suspicions on campus. You have done enough damage to my name comrades. Sit down now and find time for a shower.

All students know that your Opinion Poll will bring more trouble for this young institution. You are domestic reactionaries who want to destroy the peace that is coming on the Campus now.

I agree with yesterday's circular. Cancel the Opinion Poll. We want peace and stability in the University now!

Yours,
Kamoyo*12

This was not the first time that Kamoyo had instigated a smear on a political opponent; he had been responsible for making allegations against Chibala for ANC sponsorship, which cost Chibala many votes in the 1971 elections. Kamoyo had also been active in the formation of SMOLISA, publicly attacking aliens for their associations with white girls and supporting the 'no white' clause in its constitution. The anti-semitism, expressed in the circular derived from a visit he and two other students made to North Korea to attend a Youth Festival. The participants from other countries, including a number from Arab countries, influenced Kamoyo in identifying Zionism with Imperialism. There was no doubt that ever since rumours had been circulating that Kamoyo was in contact with Freedom House and State House, he had suffered much abuse and possibly lost friends. Phiri was not the only one who had attacked him as betraying the student community. In view of his opposition to party politics on campus less than a year previously, his present associations with the party signified, to most, opportunism rather than idealism. In his circular, therefore, he did not try and capture support through an
appeal for loyalty to UNIP; that was sure to alienate the majority of students in view of the prevailing disenchchantment with the party and the government. Rather he appealed to the interests of the student body which was being threatened by a student with a dubious background and a subversive influence if not a spy for Zambia's enemies.

Kamoyo had issued the circular to Burawoy and Phiri earlier in the day, giving Phiri sufficient time to write a reply which appeared along with the attack at dinner time.

Thanks for coming out in the open. Perhaps we might now breath under this oppressive atmosphere. Now Mr Kamoyo, why don't you tell us why it is so important for you as an ordinary member of UNIP to go about compiling lists of who-belongsto-what on this Campus? For whose benefit can such an exercise have?

It seems you do agree that there are some problems on this Campus and there is truth somewhere hidden in the labyrinth of this our fledgling community. And this truth has made it so important for you to compile this list, spy on your fellow Zambian students, get their sentiments and opinions and transmit them to Freedom House. Or whenever some D.G. comes to visit you pass it on - a true Humanist and revolutionary - isn't it?

You have self-styled yourself as a chief spokesman of UNIP students on this Campus and like father like son you have seen it fit to blacklist those that don't belong to UNIP or hold ideas like myself that you think are bad to the growth of a humanist nation. Congratulations!

Your charge that I am being used is utter rubbish. This is just childish racial sentiment. How many whites are in this country as advisers of one sort or another, not to me, but to ministers etc. and some of them give advice which is not in the interests of this nation? Burawoy and myself are just working together as students and in as long as your university allows anyone to join it - there will be contact between black and white. And as a UNIP member you should know that Humanism does not discriminate man because of his colour or are you telling us that the philosophy has since been abandoned for a much milder form of racialism?

Your denial that you did not write the circular is rubbish because you yourself came to my room as a spokesman of the many people who had approached you voicing their disagreement over the poll -
since this and the letter from the vicious circle (the handwriting which you recognised) are one you have taken it upon yourself to reply on their behalf.

And lastly, we have not at one time refused anyone interested in the poll and its results to come and work with us – and the truth, which you fear so much my revolutionary friend Kamoyo will then be unveiled for you and everyone else to see. And perhaps, with it, all the Campus eyes will burst open – such a revelation will go down to solving the many fears and problems that we all have.

Masautso Phiri

Phiri was recruiting support from a large section of students opposed to racialism. He continued to attack Kamoyo as a renegade who had committed the highest form of treachery — an informer for the party and government. He accused Kamoyo of opportunism and betraying principles for which UNIP stands, namely non-racialism. He appealed to his audience to regard Burawoy as a student and not a white. The two circulars appearing simultaneously nullified one another. But, since the opinion poll was supported by the more senior and influential statesmen of the community, Kamoyo was showered with abuse, so much so that he never distributed a further circular he had already had duplicated.

The campus was clearly divided over the issue and the balance of opinion was held by the 'unionists' whose views varied according to what they felt might be the repercussions of the release of the results of the poll. Since the university reopened at the end of August, the government had not made its attitude towards the students and the university apparent. There seemed to be two realistic alternatives: it could either recontinue its previous policy of laissez faire enforcing a discontinuity between the student's university and civic roles while upholding the isolation and exclusion of the university
from national affairs. On the other hand the government could seek to incorporate the university within the party apparatus and keep a closer surveillance of students through the party. In the latter case the loyal UNIP supporters would consolidate their position on campus with support from outside and possibly a number of the unionists would join them. In the event of the government continuing with a policy of non-intervention, previous divisions within the student community would be restored. UNIP would have support amongst a minority while common interests would unite "unionists", "independents" and supporters of opposition parties. However, so long as the government was ambiguous over its university policy, the campus was destined to remain in a state of unresolved division.

The Re-emergence of Oppositionalism on the Campus.

The exchange of circulars ceased but the poll continued and the results were eventually published the following Thursday without censorship by the Ad Hoc Committee. The analysis of the response was probably the most significant feature to emerge from the poll.

459 replies were received which represents a poll of 31%. This is 10% lower than the poll conducted earlier this year by the Sociological Association. If we assume that the 'apathetic' 59% who failed to reply to the earlier poll also failed to reply to the recent one, then we are left having to explain the 10% reduction. We believe that this comprises two groups. The first and smallest has deliberately tried to sabotage the poll. The second and larger group genuinely believes that the public expression of student opinion will result in further 'interference' from outside.

The poll for men was 33% while that for women was 19%. Whereas in previous polls first years gave the highest percentage poll, followed by second and third years with fourth years offering the lowest poll, this time the pattern was reversed.
27% of first years, 30% of second years, 33% of third years and 37% of fourth years responded. The normal tendency for B.A.'s to poll in greater numbers than the B.Sc. students was particularly pronounced. Whereas 31% of B.A.'s responded, the figure for B.Sc.'s was 18%. Medics as usual polled high at 51% followed by law students (44%), engineers (36%) and finally social work students (33%). Should anyone wish to query our analysis then they are at liberty to come and inspect the questionnaires.

We do not claim the poll is necessarily representative of the whole student body. But the low response does suggest a growing fear in our community.

Masautso Phiri
Michael Burawoy

Just as we noted earlier fourth year students were the most cynical about Humanism, so they now appeared as the most eager to express their disenchantment with government. They are disproportionately represented in the group of "independents", suggesting their greater socialisation and commitment to the university student role. In chapter three emphasis was laid on the structural discontinuity between the university and the wider society. It was also suggested that students are very sensitive to this structural discontinuity, using their university role as a reference point for feelings of relative deprivation towards their civic role. The results of the fourth opinion poll highlight the discrepancy in orientation to the university and wider social systems.

The university is in need of radical reform

46% agreed, 23% were uncertain, 31% disagreed

Our society is in need of radical reform

81% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 10% disagreed

Response to the latter statement is a reflection of the disenchantment with the action of party and government. This
was revealed more starkly in student reaction to specific acts of "repression."

The detention of UPP leaders is justified

7% agreed, 13% were uncertain, 80% disagreed\textsuperscript{19}

(This response reaffirmed the view that few strong UNIP supporters had polled.)

The deportation of the two lecturers was in the interests of the nation

4% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 87% disagreed\textsuperscript{20}

The majority of the population approved of the closure of the university

5% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 87% disagreed\textsuperscript{21}

After the university had reopened there were rumours that the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Goma, was to be replaced by a 'politician' as a result of his defence of students and academic staff in their protest against government action.

The Vice-Chancellor has failed in his duties as leader of the university community

5% agreed, 11% were uncertain, 84% disagreed\textsuperscript{22}

Nor did the students think that the government was much more popular in the wider society than it was on campus.

The government represents the will of the people

13% agreed, 19% were uncertain, 68% disagreed\textsuperscript{23}

UNIP has the support of the majority of the people

18% agreed, 29% were uncertain, 53% disagreed\textsuperscript{24}

Not half of those who polled could say that any party had their
support, suggesting the existence of a strong independent group.

Neither UPP, ANC nor UNIP has my support.

40% agreed, 11% were uncertain, 49% disagreed

Nor were students particularly happy about the image of them projected by the government and press.

The student body did not support the actions of the ten member UNZASU executive committee which led to their expulsion

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed

The President of UPP has subverted the campus

11% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 74% disagreed

The press in its recent statements and editorials has painted a true picture of the university and student life

4% agreed, 4% were uncertain, 92% disagreed

As regards the student role in the national political arena the responses were as much in favour of participation as they were in the first opinion poll.

Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians

11% agreed, 8% were uncertain, 81% disagreed

As students we should be given more opportunities to influence political decisions at the national level

80% agreed, 9% were uncertain, 11% disagreed

Students who tend to disagree with these statements, however, are also less likely to have responded to the questionnaire.
Perhaps the most interesting reversal of attitudes caused by the events of July concerns government policy towards Southern Africa. At the end of May students seemed to be against dialogue with South Africa.

Dialogue with South Africa will improve the welfare of non-whites there

25% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 51% disagreed

In the fourth opinion poll a somewhat different but related question was raised.

Zambia should pursue dialogue with South Africa

43% agreed, 24% were uncertain, 33% disagreed

On the assumption that the same students responded to the two polls and the first poll indicated opposition to dialogue, then it is fair to conclude that there was a reversal in student opinion. Another statement provides further evidence to support such a conclusion.

Students should in future refrain from demonstrating in support of declared government foreign policy even if they sympathise with that policy

56% agreed, 6% were uncertain, 38% disagreed

This contrasts vividly with the response in May to the statement,

If economic sanctions on Rhodesia are formally lifted by the British government then students should demonstrate outside the British High Commission

53% agreed, 17% were uncertain, 30% disagreed

Indeed when, in December 1971, the British Foreign Secretary appeared to have come to a compromise with Rhodesia over the
latter's status and the Pearce Commission was appointed with a view, it was felt in many circles, to ratifying the lifting of sanctions, no demonstration took place outside the British High Commission in Lusaka. Students were now not only chary of demonstrating but had no wish to make a show of solidarity with the government policy. They questioned the sincerity of the government's policy towards Southern Africa because, while engaging in an ideological offensive, it continued to trade and deal with the regimes South of the Zambezi. There was no sympathy for the government's predicament of being unable to extricate itself from economic ties with the South. The students now felt that efforts in this direction were not worth pursuing, if they did not involve a total severance of links with white supremacist regimes.  

Zambia should begin to trade freely with regimes South of the Zambezi

66% agreed, 15% were uncertain, 19% disagreed

Even if the attitudes expressed in the opinion poll did not represent all, they nevertheless represented a sizable proportion of the student population. How was the government going to respond to such expressions of oppositionalism?

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY.

Though the Sociological Association had made a formal invitation to President Kaunda many months ago, it was clearly at the express wish of the President himself that he came to talk to the student body, the day after the publication of the opinion poll. (The two events were entirely unrelated.)
The address contained two points of interest, in the context of the relations of government and university. First, the President distinguished between criticism and opposition. However, criticism is not the same as opposition; the first is a legitimate function of the Universities, while the second can easily belong to a different world and requires different methods and instruments.38

The distinction is very fine, easily abused, and inevitably drawn by the government and not by the students. Perhaps a more precise statement of the same idea is included in the second point.

....during the freedom struggle, we who were directly involved, were careful not to be put out of action for ever untimely. It was necessary to know just how far to go and still remain at large. This was part of an effective strategy. I should think that students can consider themselves to be in a somewhat similar position.39

Already in the address the tenor was one of conciliation. His response to questions served to confirm beyond doubt that the government wished to re-establish relations as they existed before the July events, with the university enjoying a measure of autonomy and academic freedom so long as 'criticism' or 'oppositionalism' was kept within the university arena and not given public expression in the form of an open challenge. Kaunda pointed out that both sides had learnt from the experience and now knew much better where each stood. When the President had finished his address, the questions which he confronted were neither sympathetic nor politely worded. Students demanded to know why he had detained UPP leaders, why it was that his party was intimidating and victimising those who were suspected of supporting UPP. Why was it that the
university was closed by the government, when according to the university act this was the responsibility of the Vice-Chancellor? How could students play a constructive role in the nation's development when they are forced to sign a pledge which prevents them from engaging in any activities of a political nature? Why does he allow the press to continue to hurl untrue and scurrilous insults at the university and its student body? There were also direct accusations from the floor that the President was developing a personality cult around himself, that he only refused life presidency to enable him to say how great a democrat he was. However he felt inwardly, outwardly he showed few signs of irritation, never used threatening language and conducted the meeting with a keen sense of humour. He took a great number of insults without throwing any back. Though the students were very far from satisfied with his replies, many of which were very evasive, nevertheless their antagonism towards him and the government was not increased by the exchange. The government was not bent on imposing its will on the students; rather it sought to appease their hostility.

The invitation of the Minister of Education one week later served to cement the conciliatory approach of the President. At the time, on tour in Southern Province with the President, Nyirenda was given 'special permission' to return to Lusaka for the purpose of talking to the students, indicating his own and the President's concern for a renewal of dialogue. Asked to speak on academic freedom and university autonomy, Nyirenda delivered an address he had given to the Christian community two years previously. Always sympathetic to the interests of the students and the university, he spoke of the necessity of
upholding academic freedom so long as it was "within the bounds of the law." Confronted with a barrage of questions over government policy, related and unrelated to academic freedom, Nyirenda seemed to suggest that the cabinet had no alternative but to bow to the dictates of the party in closing the university and expelling the ten students. He verged on the apologetic when referring to the action taken by the government.

We had problems in July... A new institution such as the university is bound to have troubles with the public. This is a healthy situation. What happened in July is a blessing in disguise... What happened in July cannot now be defended in cold logic... We closed the university because we thought that if it were left open there would be more disturbances... It was difficult for people involved to make rational judgement. We meant well. We were not anti-university. We were only concerned with restoring normalcy. Those sad events are gone, we know where we belong now. They were symptoms of growth and of a new university.

Possibly as a gesture of goodwill, Nyirenda announced what appeared to be major concessions over the bursary issue. He said that over and above the existing student bursaries, a system of loans would be introduced and that the bonding of students to government employment would be relaxed.

Expecting a very hostile reaction in the press, students were pleasantly surprised to find that while the Daily Mail never even referred to the opinion poll, the Times of Zambia on the Monday after the President's address (the Monday before Nyirenda's address) published the results on the front page under the headline 'Nothing Pleases Students at UNZA' and in its editorial adopted a particularly conciliatory tone. Referring to the President's willingness to 'chart a new course in his relations with the students', the Times of Zambia editorial
commented,

... the now-famous "insulting" letter which precipitated the crisis between the students and the President would not have been couched in the curt language that it was had there been more communication between the two much earlier on. 41

Commenting on the opinion poll, the editorial continued,

... there is absolutely no reason why their voices should not be heard. Their status should not be used to silence them... 42

And marking a complete reversal in opinion the editorial ended as follows.

The major stumbling block to a meaningful relation, or even a dialogue between the Government and the students, seems to be the rather dogmatic attitude of UNIP. This intolerance seems to be born out of the party's conviction that since the university was created with the "common man's" hard-earned cash, its beneficiaries have no right whatsoever to bite the hand that feeds them. To us, this is a quite paradoxical attitude. Admittedly the University of Zambia cannot expect to enjoy the same privileges as other institutions, given the different circumstances. But a more tolerant attitude by the ruling party and a lot less sabre-rattling from its more junior officials could, we believe, make for a much healthier relation between the students and the Government. 43

The following Sunday, the Sunday Times devoted a long and sympathetic article to the opinion poll and the issues it raised. 44

These events had their inevitable repercussions on campus. Though Kamoyo continued with his campaign for UNIP support his interests in common with the 'unionists' were becoming ever more tenuous. With the peace overtures from government, the unionists, supporters of opposition parties and independents now formed the dominant coalition. Corresponding to the government's desire to relax tension on campus, it became increasingly apparent that the UNIP cell had very little support from the party outside. 45 Nevertheless the government could
have decided to exploit the existence of enthusiastic UNIP supporters and attempted to incorporate the students into the party. In this way it could ensure for itself greater control over the political life of the students and lessen the likelihood of any further assaults on the government in public. This was action pursued by Ghana's government following a similar confrontation with the university.

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: OLIGARCHICAL INCORPORATION.

The Zambian government has throughout its tenure of office striven to respect academic freedom and the university's autonomy. It has been able to do so because the university has not, except in the one or two instances already cited, challenged the legitimacy of the government in public. Both students and staff have upheld the norms of behaviour which ensure adherence to their university roles only within the university system. But the equilibrium thus achieved has always been a precarious one, which may inadvertently break out into open conflict if the tenets of the role discontinuity are transgressed.

Nyirenda, the Minister of Education, has on occasions valiantly defended the university's autonomy and freedom from outside influence. The President himself made clear the extent to which he and his government would be prepared to protect the university from outside interference in its affairs.

There are various ways in which the freedom of the university can be defined, but let us remember that this freedom can never be absolute. No university, for example, remains uninfluenced, or should remain uninfluenced, by its previous history and by the tradition of the country in which it lives. The universities of France and Germany
live with governments which exercise a great
deal of control over the appointment of staff;
such as is not the case with the universities
of Commonwealth Africa. Even so, the univer-
sities of France and Germany, and those who
teach in them, would insist that they have
academic freedom. Oxford and Cambridge became
universities open to all, without religious
test, by Act of Parliament. Few would argue,
these days, that Acts of Parliament which open
universities to all restrict the freedom of
those universities thereby. Thus, you will
see that to rule out government's intervention
in all situations relating to the university
would be unrealistic..."46

The President then goes on to endorse the rights of the univ-
ersity to determine its own teaching methods, curricula,
research publications, etc.

Having endorsed these freedoms without which
this and other universities cannot flourish, it
is equally incumbent upon the university to en-
sure that these freedoms are used in the service
of the nation, and of humanity, because freedom
in the university world implies responsibility -
and heavy responsibility.47

He continues by suggesting that the freedom of the university
must not be used as a licence to irrelevancy - "everything
that is taught should pass the test of relevance."48 The free-
don entails an obligation to be responsive to the needs of the
society and the responsibility to pursue truth in an honourable
and unbiased manner. In other words academic freedom can be
subverted from within as well as from without the university.
When that freedom is abused from within, as it is in the
party's eyes, when the students attack ministers or the Presi-
dent, then the government is entitled to intervene to enforce
the obligations of the academic community. But these have not
been mere words, the Zambian government has been exceptional
in its willingness to uphold the university's freedom to govern
itself. Other African governments, faced with similar tensions,
have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to eliminate them through the erosion of the autonomy of the university. The following discussion focuses on the relations between the University and Government of Ghana under Nkrumah.

Structural Discontinuity between University and Society.

The University of Ghana was established in 1948 as the University College of the Gold Coast bound in a special relationship to the University of London which awarded graduating students with University of London degrees. Its constitution replicated, not that of the British civic university, but the Cambridge model which granted the junior academic staff greater participation in its running. Only in 1961, when the University College became a fully fledged university awarding its own degrees, did the constitution revert to the two-tier system of the civic university. Like Zambia, therefore, the constitution of the University of Ghana was inspired by the 'liberal ethos' of the British civic university which jealously guarded its academic freedom and right to self government.

In its situation and physical structure the university closely resembled its Zambian counterpart, being placed at a distance of some eight miles outside Accra and concentrated on a lavishly provided campus. In 1961 there were 700 students which rose to 1,238 in 1965. Africans constituted 13 per cent of the total teaching staff in 1959 but 47 per cent in 1965. In this respect the University of Ghana has been less dependent on expatriates than the University of Zambia. With successive enrolments students have come from increasingly diverse backgrounds. Whereas in 1953 25% of students'
fathers were from the agricultural or fishing occupational group, the figure in 1963 was 39% and in 1966 was 42%. The corresponding figure for Zambia in 1969 was 16% and one might reasonably expect this figure to increase with the expansion of secondary school education.

Though there is little information on the organisation of internal student politics, there are suggestions that the division of the students into separate self-contained and largely independent halls of residence as in Cambridge, may have undermined the cohesion in the community and accounted for what appear to be lower levels of politicisation. Nevertheless in general the university system was structurally discontinuous with the wider society, in that within the university system directives for action tend to flow up from below while in the wider society they tend to flow down from the government. Consequently a government has great difficulty in imposing its wishes on the university. In other words, its constitutional processes of government are functional to its autonomy. In the case of Zambia the government made little to no attempt to control the university and therefore the incompatible structures, for the most part, resided in peace.

However, Ghana was less willing to allow the university similar freedom and adopted a series of measures which sought to bring the university under its control. Before discussing these, it will be necessary to examine the tensions prevailing in Ghana during the Nkrumah era.

Tensions between the University and Society.

Though Ghana is very much more advanced in terms of output from the educational system than Zambia it is still short
of indigenous manpower in many fields. There is, for example, competition for high positions in the civil service, between loyal supporters of the party and well qualified graduates. The organisational conflict between channels of recruitment based on experience and loyalty and those based on expertise is severe, if not so severe as in Zambia. As Finlay et al. note,

Predictably, well-qualified university graduates often found themselves passed over for better civil service positions, which appeared to be reserved for Party stalwarts, regardless of qualification.\textsuperscript{55}

Another feature, closely resembling the pressures UNIP exerts on the Zambian government, is the ascendancy of the regional officials of the CPP, recruited through the party machine to central positions,

However, at a level somewhat below the top leadership there was in Ghana, as in other African countries — especially in some of the ex-French territories, a group who had had much less contact with the colonial rulers, either as antagonists or collaborators. Their vision was not blurred, they claimed, by friendship with the whites who were still victimising the people of Africa. This revolutionary group percolated up through the ranks of the party. Few of its members entered Parliament and became Ministers, with the consequence that their names were little known to the outside world. Many of the Cabinet members, however, were either amiable nonentities or else moderates whose authority was being eroded behind the scenes. As the political and economic problems of independence inevitably grew in number and intensity, so the tougher party members began to seek increasingly radical solutions. The genuine problem of separate regional loyalties engendered an obsessive fear of deviance, while the continuing presence of their previous 'exploiters' aroused suspicion that the white man was behind every act of opposition. The College was a doubly obvious focus of distrust on account of its autonomy and its preponderating European influence.\textsuperscript{56}

Describing the attacks made upon the university by the Party in the press and in public speeches, Curle delineated five
main components. First, the freedom of the university was considered, "a ruse on the part of a group of selfish neo-colonialists to maintain themselves in luxury at the expense of the Ghanaian tax-payer."\(^{57}\) Second, the isolation of the university from the affairs of the country made it an 'ivory tower'. Third, the vast expense of the university was being considered as ill-spent resources. Fourth, the London degree (before 1962) smacked of 'academic imperialism' in which standards were deliberately raised too high or syllabi not geared to African needs. Finally, too many students were pursuing "useless and irrelevant" arts courses.\(^{58}\) All these arguments have been met earlier in connection with the university of Zambia, though they have never been officially endorsed by the government as they were by Nkrumah.

**Student Oppositionalism.**

The main object of resentment was the political attitude of the students. Few of these were Government supporters. They tended to be politically inactive, being exceedingly keen on their studies, but they had become too deeply imbued with attitudes of scholarly objectivity to be able to accept much of the C.F.P. propaganda; they were too liberal in outlook to tolerate the gradual erosion of civil liberty to which its anxieties had driven the Government; and like most students, they were against the 'establishment.'\(^{59}\)

In their attitudes towards the government and the party Zambian and Ghanaian students closely resemble one another, as indicated in Tables 20 and 21. In view of the circumstances of the fourth opinion poll, the Zambian figures should be compared with the 'non-party' figures for Ghanaian students. Similarities are to be found in attitudes towards the official ideologies, Humanism and Nkrumaism, "only 13% used affirmative
TABLE 20 - GHANAIAN AND ZAMBIAN STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARTY

The CPP/UNIP has the support of the majority of Ghanaians/Zambians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Don't Know/ Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghanaian Students.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Supporters</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalents</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Party</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zambian Students.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 21 - GHANAIAN AND ZAMBIAN STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Government represents the will of the people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Don't Know/ Uncertain (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghanaian Students.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Supporters</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalents</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Party</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zambian Students.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
terms in defining Nkrumaism, 19% were negative, and 53% were largely neutral;"62 while 50% of Zambian students thought that Humanism was relevant to the needs of the country, 20% were uncertain and 30% thought it was irrelevant.63 Amongst Ghanaian students 80% were opposed to a one party state,64 while the figure for Zambian students was 81%.65 Again under Nkrumah, only 5% of students felt that the protection of civil liberties was good or excellent.66 Correspondingly only 7% of Zambian students agreed that the detention of UPP leaders was justified.67 As with Zambian students, the Ghanaian students showed high congruence with the government over issues of foreign policy.68 Contrasting with the Zambian student, the Ghanaian student tended to desire withdrawal from the national political arena. Thus in 1966, after the military coup, 71% of the students "felt that they should dedicate themselves to their studies."69 Though both student bodies were not active in national politics it appears that whereas the Ghanaian students voluntarily withdrew, the Zambian students felt excluded.70 This may reflect the differing tactics adopted by the party towards the students and the university.

Nevertheless there have been political demonstrations by Ghanaian students. In November, 1965, virtually the entire student body protested against the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of Independence. But in the main, student activism has been directed against the CPP particularly in response to pressures exerted on students after 1962. In late 1963, students sent a note to the government protesting at the dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.71 There was no response from the government but at the beginning of January 1964, shortly before the referendum for the one-party
state, the government issued deportation orders for six expatriate staff. Students protesting against the orders were violently dispersed by the police and the government closed the university for seventeen days, officially to allow students to return home to vote in the referendum. It was widely assumed to be a measure to disperse student opposition.

After the referendum the CPP supporters marched on the campus and shortly thereafter five student leaders were arrested and detained. Students again protested at government action in 1965, this time by calling for a two minute silence at a meal time in honour of the opposition leader Danquah who had died in detention. Further student arrests were made as a result. However, before 1961 students were quiescent politically and were not prepared to suffer penalties for deviant political behaviour. But as the government and party sought to interfere increasingly with university life so the students responded with anti-party protests. In Zambia, circumstances have been slightly different. With relatively little government intervention, students have been responsible for political initiatives.

**Bringing the University under Party Control.**

The differences in relations existing between government and university in the two countries must be observed against the wider political systems. In Zambia, though the party is dominant in many spheres of life, it has nevertheless failed to incorporate all institutions and bodies under its wing. The mineworkers for example, always a powerful force, have successfully resisted attempts by the party to take over their trade union. There still exists an opposition party — the
African National Congress - and the political system has spawned two further parties with sectional appeal, though both were banned within a year of their formation. The large numbers of expatriates in key positions in government, business and industry have also managed to avoid any direct integration into the party structure and their activities are largely unhindered by party activists. While Zambia retains a more "pluralist" structure, Ghana, from the early years of independence, has turned organisations and associations mediating between the masses and the political élite into agents of the party for the effective transmission of directives from the government. The intolerance of opposition outside the party was extended to the university. Though its incorporation into the party was never achieved the CPP did devise other ways of controlling both the behaviour of the academic staff and the students.

The first attacks came in 1959 from the President himself on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPP. But Curle prefers to refer to these as

...skirmishes of a reconnaissance party testing defensive strength, than actual assaults. It is likely, of course, that any yielding on vital matters by the College would have been taken advantage of, but the Government was not ready at this stage to risk a head-on collision by enforcing its mandates. Instead, it planned to assemble an international commission on higher education in Ghana. This, it was hoped, would remove from the Government the odium of responsibility for reorganizing the College, and particularly for determining its character as a University. However, as might have been expected, relations deteriorated steadily. In the first place, the ingenuity of the College in dodging Government attacks caused increasing annoyance. But more importantly, as political tension developed in the country as a whole, so the College appeared as a growing threat to national unity.
The first act of intervention followed in May 1961 after the Commission's Report. Nkrumah in a memo to the Principal declared 'all appointments of members of the academic staff will automatically be terminated.' Justifying his action by reference to the change of status from College to University, Nkrumah was able to remove those lecturers felt to be the least desirable. In the event only six appointments were actually terminated but a precedent had been created. Under a new constitution providing for two-tier system of government, Nkrumah brought the university under the direct influence of the CPP with the appointment of CPP supporters to the University Council.

In 1962 the government continued to intervene in university affairs. The Cabinet informed the university that since there were more places at the university than students to fill them, separate entrance examinations for the university would be discontinued. Later Nkrumah announced the abolition of English as a compulsory subject for obtaining a West African school certificate. The government autonomously decided to lift the faculty of agriculture from the university and attach it to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.

A further example of intervention and perhaps the most significant was the creation of 'special professorships' which turned out to be CPP professorships. The professors were not responsible to the university authorities but directly to the head of state who appointed them. In 1964 six members of the academic staff were expelled and Nkrumah instructed the Vice-Chancellor to appoint three named Ghanaians as heads of departments. This the Vice-Chancellor – Conor Cruise O'Brien – refused to do.

Other instances of intervention followed, such as the creation
of a committee to inspect all publications found on campus and the 'Presidential Command' to remove the institute of education from the university forthwith. In all these matters the supreme governing body of the university, the university council, supported Nkrumah's directives. The Council in other words rather than defending the autonomy of the university became an agent of the government.

The student body was subject to surveillance and control from the party through more direct channels, namely a CPP branch on campus. Party organisers stepped up their efforts to enrol students into the CPP as the government launched its offensive against the academic staff. The students resisted the efforts of the party organisers who became hated members of the community. On the morning of 26th February, 1966 when a military coup d'etat took place jubilant students turned on the CPP activists and sacked their offices.79

The independent student organisation, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) condemned Nkrumah first for interference in the judiciary (dismissing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1963) and then over the deportation of lecturers in 1964. CPP activists supported from outside preempted the oppositionalism of the NUGS by creating their own rival Ghana National Students' Organisation. This effectively took over from the NUGS when the leaders of the latter organisation were removed or detained.80

In 1964 control of the student body through CPP organisations increased. As Finlay writes,

New assaults on Legon included developing Party cadres at the university, establishing CPP student publications, requiring all entering students to take a two-week "orientation" course at the Ideological Institute, announcing that
all scholarships would be reviewed annually on the basis of good performance and good conduct, and, with great fanfare, "inaugurating" (reconstituting) CPP branches in the universities... By 1965, the Party had organised an espionage system at the university using paid Party plants... A CPP university was in the offfing, but on February 24, 1966 Nkrumah was ousted from power....

In these and other ways the government sought to control the university and stifle it as a potential locus of opposition. This they had done but at the expense of the disaffection of students and staff. The students at Legon, so disenchanted with CPP activities only desired to withdraw from politics, and to remove CPP influence from the campus. In Lusaka because UNIP activity on the campus was insignificant, and because the government largely respected the independence of the university, students were more motivated to enter the national political arena and were dismayed at their exclusion.

Apart from the overall tensions in Ghanaian society and the development of the 'party of solidarity' which encompassed and brought under its control every major organisation and institution, there are at least three other reasons why the government should have taken repressive measures against the university. First, the opposition party in Ghana comprised a large number of the nation's intellectuals, while the CPP particularly in its early days comprised 'a marginal and decidedly non-intellectual sector of Ghanaian society'. Thus intellectuals, students included, were identified as members of the opposition, to be penalised accordingly.

Second, the University of Ghana had been in existence for ten years prior to Independence and it was therefore a colonial creation. Since independence it had shown no signs of transforming itself and was therefore viewed as a locus of
neo-colonialism. The University of Zambia was on the other hand established after independence and was therefore seen as a Zambian creation untainted by colonialism. The third reason which might explain the differing responses to their respective universities is one of chronology. The University of Zambia, being one of the last of the new universities in Africa, was able to profit from the experience of the older ones. Its constitution, course structure and admission qualifications showed significant departures from what had been previously accepted as the norm. It was also aware of the sometimes disastrous consequences that had befallen universities which had been subjected to undue intervention, and in this it was possibly influenced by the experiences of other African governments.

RESPONSE TO TENSIONS: STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION.

The tension between the university and wider society springs from the structural incompatibility of the two social systems. The existence of an institution governed from below in a form approximating to a pluralist democracy embedded in a wider society characterised by a more or less authoritarian system of government from above, cannot but lead to tension. The tension is all the more critical where the incongruence is the greater. Compared with Zambia, Ghana's political system was more authoritarian under Nkrumah while, until 1962, the university operated with a replica of the 'democratic' constitution of the University of Cambridge.

The two governments responded to the structural incompatibility in different ways; each was an attempt to manage the
tension which sprang from the university system. The Ghanaian government chose to regulate the functioning of the university by seeking to contract the arena of the university role and expand the arena of the civic role. In other words it tried to impose the civic role in an arena of social action which hitherto had been the exclusive domain of the university role. The Zambian government, on the other hand, chose to isolate the two arenas and perpetuate the structural and role discontinuities. By minimising interaction with the society outside, the two incompatible structures could thereby co-exist in relative peace. In both cases, however, the tension which sprang from the structural incongruence was not removed.

Neither government attempted to break away from the concept of the liberal university. At least on paper the governments accepted the principles and thinking which typified the British civic university with its associated concepts of academic freedom and university autonomy. Above all neither government effected a restructuring of the university. The nearest approach to this, in the case of the University of Ghana, was but a superficial tampering with the system, which met with stubborn resistance from the university personnel. Yet there are alternative ways of administering, governing and organising a university more in consonance with the society outside. For an example of such a restructuring of the university, one might look at the socialist model as conceived in China.

The Chinese Model of the University.

Since the birth of communist China, Mao and other leaders have awarded the university student a role which differs from the role of the Zambian student in two respects. First,
the students, and the youth in general, have been urged to attack and openly criticise party leaders. The following are the words of Lin Piao at the Peking rally which received teachers and students from all over China in August 1966.

The Red Guards and other revolutionary organizations of the young people have been springing up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. They take to the streets to sweep away the "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits - Tr.). The Great Cultural Revolution has already touched on politics and on economics. The struggle (to overthrow those persons in power taking the capitalist road), the criticism and repudiation (of the bourgeois reactionary academic "authorities" and the ideology of the "bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes) and the transformation (of education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base) in the schools have been extended to the whole of society....

....Young revolutionary fighters! Chairman Mao and the Party's Central Committee warmly acclaim your proletarian revolutionary spirit of daring to think, to speak up, to act, to break through and to make revolution. You have done many good things. You have put forward many proposals. We are greatly elated, and we warmly support you! We firmly oppose any attempt that is made to suppress you! 84

Speeches of support and acclamation of youth had been made previous to the Cultural Revolution of 1966. In May 1956, for example, Mao Tsetung called on students and intellectuals to,

"Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend." In announcing a general relaxation of political supervision, Lu [Ting-yi] promised the intelligentsia "freedom of independent thinking, of debate, of creative work; freedom to criticize and freedom to express, maintain, and reserve one's opinions on questions of art, literature or scientific research." 85

The second distinctive feature of China's approach to youth and the students is the importance accorded to the integration of the students into the rest of society.
The majority or the vast majority of the students trained in the old schools and colleges can integrate themselves with the workers, peasants and soldiers, and some have made inventions or innovations; they must, however, be re-educated by the workers, peasants and soldiers under the guidance of the correct line, and thoroughly change their old ideology. Such intellectuals will be welcomed by the workers, peasants and soldiers. How should we judge whether a youth is a revolutionary? How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice.

Traces of these sentiments are to be found in the speeches of President Kaunda but students have never been given the opportunity to take them seriously. They have never been directly encouraged to partake in a national service and to integrate with the workers and villagers. Nor have they been encouraged to criticise the national leadership. Indeed, whenever they have done so publicly they have brought the might and wrath of the party upon their heads. Students have not been welcomed into the party, rather they have been positively excluded from the political arena.

The development of the 'hundred flowers' campaign is of significance to the Zambian situation since it illustrates the potential inherent in the student movement for playing a significant political role. The students were slow to respond to Mao's call for the denunciation of the three evils within the party: bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism. When the first attacks were launched, they were against the party's treatment of intellectuals and the failure of the party to live up to its ideals. Once the movement had gained momentum the criticism knew no boundaries and the way of life of the party's leaders and the acquisition by them of special privileges became objects of reproof.
In short, the main thrust of the students' criticism was directed against the Party bureaucracy, which many felt had been transformed from a revolutionary organization into an elite club. The Soviet model of education, which was current in China at that time (1956), was denounced both in terms of its institutional structure and course content. The nature of the criticism emanating from students at Peita (Peking University) was similar to the criticism already noted in Chapter Three as being typical of the Zambian student. The comment Nee makes about Chinese students could be equally applied to the Zambian student.

Though most Peita students criticized the Party from the standpoint of egalitarian ideals, they had not come to terms with their own intellectual elitism. The very same students who had criticized Party elitism opposed the work-study program which called on intellectuals to combine manual labour with mental labour.

It is important to note that the same attitudes towards the 'lower strata' and menial work appears to have been as present amongst Chinese students as it is amongst Zambian students. In view of the activities of the students of China ten years later this is significant.

The students' criticism was mainly reformist in character and as the purpose of the campaign had been to elicit a critique of the party, Mao agreed with its content. However, there was fierce opposition to the students from the party cadres themselves.

Though Mao, Chou, and Lu called for a new policy toward the intelligentsia, many Party cadres, feeling their positions threatened, were slow in relaxing political control.

In China, where intellectuals historically have had a high degree of access to political power, the student criticism of the Party can be interpreted as a bid to wrest political power from
the hands of the poorly educated Party cadres, many of whom had been workers and peasants. Political power would not be transferred to the masses under such a dispensation; rather it would be returned to its "rightful holder," the lettered elite. Small wonder that middle- and lower-level cadres and even many of the high-ranking Party officials so strongly opposed Mao's policy of "blooming and contending." 91

The parallels with Zambia are obvious, as the second chapter clearly showed. Though there have been suggestions that the President and some of his ministers - those least likely to be challenged by students or intellectuals - have been eager to allow the students the freedom to criticise, in practice Kaunda has had to favour the poorly educated party loyalists. In his attacks on corruption and the development of a privileged class founded on political power, Kaunda has never utilised the oppositional sentiments and critical faculties of the students. Indeed, he was not even prepared to give an official stamp of approval to the more 'radical' students' request for the formation of a UNIP branch on the campus, despite the encouragement it was awarded by Kapwepwe who was then Vice-President. It was Kapwepwe who recognised the student's potential as a nucleus of criticism which, incorporated into the party, may help to reveal and undermine the abuses of political power within the party bureaucracy. But it appeared that the President had bowed to the power of the party loyalists at the middle and lower levels in excluding the students from the national political arena.

Having used the students to attack the entrenchment of the party bureaucrats, Mao took another step, this time attempting to eradicate the traits of student elitism. Clearly it was of no use to replace one set of bureaucrats
by another set equally concerned to protect and further their own interests. He recognised that the bulk of the students came from bourgeois backgrounds and were unwilling to comply with the work study programs which sought to integrate mental and physical labour. Accordingly, in 1957 Mao launched the 'Great Leap Forward' which, as far as the universities were concerned, meant the democratisation of enrolment to embrace students from worker and peasant origins and a greater student participation in the wider society. Students greeted the new gestures, which gave them a significant role in national development, with enthusiasm, but the professors and administration at the universities resisted the new moves. Initially the impact was considerable, but gradually the Peita University bureaucracy managed to restore the university to its previous bourgeois practices. The university party committee came to stress professional criteria and political activity declined. The students reverted to their previous careerist orientations and neglected revolutionary enthusiasm. Students recruited from the worker and peasant classes felt intimidated and intellectually inferior. Increasingly admission criteria stressed performance in entrance examination at the expense of party record or class position. Consequently the enrolment of students from worker and peasant families fell sharply from 66.8% in 1960 to 37.7% in 1962. As in Zambia the attitudes of the students was largely determined by the orientation of those outside and the structure of the University itself. The party bureaucrats, now entrenched within the university, supported either the bourgeois concept of university education or the Soviet model which stressed the production of experts rather than revolutionaries.
Complaints about falling standards justified the creation of 'elite' schools which in turn stimulated criticism from the more 'radical' students at the university. Observing developments amongst students and the retrenchment of the party bureaucracy in the university, Mao launched the Socialist Education Campaign in 1962 which catered for student participation in the consolidation of the collective economy in the countryside. But this too failed to achieve much against resistance from officials in the party. Amongst the students, outspoken and ardent supporters of the Maoist view of education were few and weak. As 1966 approached, however, Mao gave strong moral impetus to the more 'radical' student elements. A clear confrontation emerged at the University of Peking between the administration and university party committee and the more 'left' students. Each accused the other of being anti-party and betraying the revolution. When Mao intervened on the side of the few students who had attacked the administration it was they who soon won the support of the majority. There was, according to Nee, widespread relief at the subsequent relaxation of oppression and intimidation which characterised the reign of the now deposed university party committee.

During these days, Peking University was transformed. Students who had been afraid to talk to one another began to express their deep feelings; they began to think about their education, the quality of their lives, and the forces that controlled them. A new sense of solidarity began to grow.93

The students were jubilant at the success of their 'rebellion' and warmly welcomed a work team sent by the Municipal Committee of the Party. The work team, however, seemed determined to restrain the students, and protect the discredited officials of the university. To this end it held 'struggle
sessions' against the more radical students. The party bureaucracy was again trying to control and restrain the students, eliminating them as a potential threat to their interests. But in July, Mao again came out in support of the 'radical' students criticising the operations of the work teams. The work team was forced to leave and the students were once more allowed to develop their own ideas, to control their own lives and to plan for the Cultural Revolution in which they were to be awarded such a prominent role.

In the struggle between the party bureaucrats and the forces of change, Chairman Mao allied the students to the latter. Each time the students confronted the party as in the 'hundred flowers' campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the entrenchment of the party in the university followed by its overthrow and the attempted return to party control through work teams, the party was repulsed through the intervention of Mao. It was only his support that averted the strict surveillance of the students by the party. Given their oppositional character and alienation from the political processes Mao could rely on the students to attack the party bureaucracy. At the same time, they constituted a vanguard for a mass movement of criticism from workers and peasants directed at the party leadership. The students were able to articulate and canalise the grievances of the lower classes but only after they had been accepted by the workers and peasants. Integration with the soldiers, workers and peasants was bound to meet with resistance, and in an attempt to offset this Mao promulgated the concept of student re-education. It would be the lower classes who would first teach the student the elements of their existence. Only when the student was familiar with
the life, experiences, and problems of the common man, could
he impart his specialist knowledge and skills for the develop-
ment of the nation. Such was the theory, at least.

In so integrating with the masses, the students effect-
ively challenged the monopoly of the party bureaucracy as the
only channel through which workers might express grievances
and the party leadership issue directives. By sending students
into villages and factories to encourage the workers and
peasants to make their views known direct to the leadership,
Mao was undermining the strength of the party cadres. Instead
of the party cadres threatening the leadership by virtue of
its monopoly of popular support, as appears to be the case in
Zambia and Ghana under Nkrumah, it was now the top leadership
which was threatening the party bureaucrats. The monopoly of
the latter was being undercut by the activities of the students.
The Cultural Revolution provided a form of political control
from below to counter the bureaucratic entrenchment of control
from above. In those nations where the toleration of opposi-
tion is severely limited, the led have little power to regulate
the behaviour of their leaders. The model of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution indicates a possible way in which control
from below can be instituted through the entry of the student
into the political arena.

The accuracy of the above account may be questioned. How-
ever, its importance for this essay lies less in its accuracy
than as an alternative model of the student role. While the
Zambian government chose to exclude the student from the poli-
tical arena, and the Ghanaian government to include him so as
to control him, the Chinese leadership appears to have integ-
rated him into the society at large. The university arena has
not been isolated or contracted but transformed and expanded into the furthest corners of society. The structure of the university has been albeit for a short period integrated into the society at large. Unlike Zambia and Ghana, the political executive in China did not regard the students as a threat, but quite the opposite; they were seen as allies in attacking the bureaucratised party machine.

Three "Ideal Types" of Control.

The three types of response which have been considered so far represent three different agents for regulating student behaviour. When students integrate into the wider community, they are subject to control from the mass of the people and from constraints the social structure imposes on the role they assume in the national arena. Such a form of societal regulation precludes any overriding control by the party. The Chinese case suggests further, that the students move outside the influence of all but the very highest levels of the party bureaucracy. The second response to tensions stems from the perception of the students as a threat. The party mobilises its coercive apparatus to weed out opposition from the student organisation implanting its 'own men' in positions of formal leadership. Severe sanctions are applied to students who deviate from the party line, and for the purposes of 'purging' deviants a party branch is set up on the campus. Rival organisations which contain the seeds of opposition are suppressed in any of a number of ways. The university itself is controlled through similar techniques of infiltration of reliable party stalwarts into the teaching staff and onto the governing body usually the university council. Such a series
of measures has the effect of eroding the autonomy of the
university but without fundamentally altering the structure
of the university and the methods of instruction. Ghana was
not an altogether successful case of oligarchical incorpora-
tion, and a more successful example would be Castro's Cuba
where similar friction between university and state resulted
in governmental control of the university.\textsuperscript{94} The third res-
ponse, to be found in Zambia, is to leave the control of the
students and the university largely in the hands of the univ-
ersity authorities. In this third case the autonomy of the
university is acknowledged as legitimate and respected. The
different agencies of social control are mutually exclusive
in any one situation, that is 'societal' control precludes
control by the party and the university, just as party control
precludes societal and university control and university con-
trol largely precludes party and societal control. Each ideal
type response may be associated with a particular type of edu-
cation. Thus the structural integration solution tends toward
a political education and the training of experts, as in the
Soviet model, is de-emphasized. Oligarchical incorporation is
compatible with a professional education in which the university
is regarded as a technical or professional college responsible
for imparting knowledge and skills. At such an institution
lecturers become teachers of 'value free' (it is not here con-
tended that some such education can actually exist) skills and
the critical and research functions of the university are
relegated to insignificance. In the third case of structural
autonomy, the liberal conception of the university is upheld
so that the university is encouraged to perform other roles
apart from teaching, while ideological purity is regarded as
inimical to its effective operation. Such a response would regard the research functions, critical potentialities of an academic community, intellectual and 'cultural' development as essential tasks of the university.

THE LIBERAL UNIVERSITY IN A 'TENSE' SOCIAL SYSTEM.

The government of Zambia has imported a liberal university in the Western tradition with a 'liberal' constitution and has taken pains to respect its liberal ethos and conventions. Confronted with an environment hostile to the university, however, the government has not been able to guarantee the necessary preconditions for the successful pursuit of the goals for which the university was intended.

Tensions in the social structure do not accord legitimacy to opposition, and any emergence of opposition or criticism is regarded as a threat and therefore severely punished. The danger that free discussion and expression of critical views will elicit sanctions from the party and the ostensible powerlessness of the university community discourage that interaction and free discussion conducive to the development of a coherent intellectual outlook, to the creation of ideas and the pursuit of research. Not only do students feel constrained in their discussions and debate, but the issues within the purview of their influence are very limited. Because their civic role is so insignificant by virtue of their exclusion from the party and because the issues which arise out of their life within the student community have little relevance to events outside the university, debate of a more fundamental ideological nature is absent. Where there are no issues around
which debate may crystallize so ideological and intellectual development is stunted. Equally, the shortage of graduates in the nation and the resulting absence of competition does not warrant any consideration of the deeper significance of their role and status in society.

Conscious of his powerlessness, the student's disenchantment is compounded by feelings of severe deprivation on account of his estimation of the worth of his education. First he feels that his superior enlightenment entitles him to a greater participation in national affairs. Secondly his position at the summit of the educational hierarchy is at variance with his relatively lowly position in the political and economic status hierarchies. Such incongruity inevitably gives rise to intense relative deprivation particularly where education is officially regarded, as it is in Zambia, as the major key to upward mobility. Such feelings of deprivation further disincline the student to participate in many of the nation's activities where his skills might be of use, particularly in the area of ideological, intellectual and 'cultural' development.

The exclusion of the students from the national political arena is part of a more fundamental alienation of the academic community from the central value system, to which the liberal university is normally intimately connected. There are a number of reasons for this estrangement each associated with the peculiar circumstances of transplantation. First the academic staff are foreigners associated with previous colonial rulers; they have not grown up with the Zambian government during the independence movement; their background, experience and consequently values are very different from those of the
political élite. The lack of empathy between the lecturers and the political élite and the distrust many of the latter have for the former combine to divorce the academic staff from the central value system. Indeed so severe is the estrangement that more confidence is accorded to 'experts' imported from the 'metropolitan' countries often with little familiarity and interest in Zambia. By virtue of the structural constraints under which they live, their background, their expectations and their feelings of deprivation and oppositionalism the students are equally divorced from the central value system. It is unusual for students to be directly linked to the generation of societal values but they are normally linked indirectly through their lecturers' proximity to such values. In Zambia, however, it is the political élite who fulfil the role of intellectuals,

infusing into the laity attachments to more general symbols and providing for that section of the population a means of participation in the central value system...They are above all concerned with its more intensive cultivation, with the elaboration and development of alternative potentialities...96

Shils makes the important point that

All these needs [satisfied by intellectuals] would exist even if there were no especially sensitive, enquiring, curious, creative minds in the society. There would be intellectuals in society even if there were no intellectuals by disposition.97

In the Zambian context the task of developing, generating, and elaborating the central value system is performed by a group which has both political and economic power but whose potentialities and background severely constrain the development of a coherent ideological core of societal values. Their failure in this direction only further estranges the student who not only feels unable to commit himself to a value system so devoid of
intellectual vigour but also considers himself better able to contribute to ideological development than the political elite. The student responds to his exclusion from direct links with the central value system by voluntarily withdrawing into a negative and uncreative oppositional mentality. The two elements of the exclusion withdrawal syndrome feed on one another to intensify alienation. Yet this is by no means inevitable. The Chinese Cultural Revolution illustrated the potentialities for students to reformulate, albeit with the assistance of a political directorate, elements in a central value system. In that case 'exclusion' gave way to 'liberation' and correspondingly withdrawal gave way to inclusion. The exclusion withdrawal syndrome was transformed into a liberation inclusion syndrome in which the twin components stimulated one another to carry the students ever nearer to and more influential over the central value system, until political forces accumulated to resist their advance. But such a discontinuous reorientation to the student, a structural transformation of the university and a redirection of its aims are unlikely to take place in a country where the student is perceived as a threat and the university enshrouded in suspicion and distrust. In such countries there are two options open to the government. Either awkward and clumsy attempts will be made to incorporate, using coercion if necessary, the university if not under the wings of the party then under its surveillance, or the university will be deliberately isolated from the national political arena, and its autonomy, under certain conditions, respected. In the latter case the liberal ethos may exist at a formal level but in the absence of a set of auxiliary conditions it will not fulfill many of the functions normally associated with the Western university.

2. It is possible that a violation of the role discontinuity will be connived at by government, as was the case when the opinion poll to be discussed later in the chapter was published.


6. Ibid.
8. See Appendix Two.
9. Note received under Burawoy's door.
11. To Hell with Campus Eyes! (Circular distributed 29 September 1971).
12. re: Opinion Poll (Circular distributed 1 October 1971).
16. Hanna discovered a similar discrepancy between the attitudes and political activities of the more senior students and of those recently arrived at the university. He concluded that the old-timers were more 'professionalised', since they were less likely to engage in partisan politics. This finding is not contradicted by the observation that the fourth year students at UNZA were more strongly independent than the newcomers. Indeed the two findings complement one another, insofar as socialisation into the university role increases commitment to the university role and diminished commitment to partisan politics. Hanna, W. J., "Students," in Coleman, J. S. and Rosberg, C. G. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p.441.
17. Opinion Poll Four, Question 7.
20. Opinion Poll Four, Question 8.
22. Opinion Poll Four, Question 5.
23. Opinion Poll Four, Question 16.
24. Opinion Poll Four, Question 17.
27. Opinion Poll Four, Question 14.
29. See Opinion Poll One, Questions 12 and 13.
30. Opinion Poll Four, Question 11.
31. Opinion Poll Four, Question 12.
32. Opinion Poll Three, Question 25.
33. Opinion Poll Four, Question 22.
34. Opinion Poll Four, Question 23.
35. Opinion Poll Three, Question 18.
36. An ethic of absolute ends was being pursued as opposed to an ethic of responsibility. Few students appreciated the economic arguments for trying to steer as independent a course as possible from economic servitude to South Africa. Though there are rewards in the short term for an extension and expansion of trade links with South Africa in the long term such a course of action could be disastrous for the economic development of the country. Opinion Poll Four, Question 21.
37. Kaunda, K. D., Reflections on Our Common Tasks (Speech by His Excellency the President to the Sociological Association of the University of Zambia on 8th October, 1971).
38. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
45. One of the indications of the little support Kamoyo and his fellow UNIP supporters had was the continued presence of Burawoy on campus. If Kamoyo had any influence with the party the evidence he had compiled against Burawoy (together with the latter’s close association with the sociological association which had been responsible for bringing opposition speakers onto campus, his sponsorship by the South African based, Zambian Anglo American and his activities in the July 7th demonstration), would have ensured his deportation.
46. Kaunda, K. D., Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of the First Graduation Ceremony of the University of Zambia, 17th May, 1969.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. For the description of this erosion on the continent of Africa see Ashby, E., Universities: British, Indian, African (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), Chapter Ten, pp.290-343.
51. Finlay, op.cit., p.52.
53. So long as secondary education was limited to a very tiny proportion of the student population of the relevant age, so it tended to favour those who came from particular sorts of background in which English was widely spoken.
54. Finlay, op. cit., p. 54.
55. Finlay et al., op. cit., p. 80.
57. Ibid., p. 231.
58. Ibid., pp. 231-2.
59. Ibid., p. 236. It would be difficult to regard the Zambian student in quite such terms. Scholarly objectivity and liberal outlook are probably weaker in the character of the Zambian student than they were for the Ghanaian student.
60. For response to "The CPP has the support of the majority of Ghanaians" see Finlay et al., op. cit., Table 8, p. 95. For response to "UNIP has the support of the majority of the people" see Opinion Poll Four, Question 17.
61. Finlay, et al., op. cit., Table 8, p. 95, and Opinion Poll Four, Question 16.
63. Opinion Poll Three, Question 23.
64. Finlay et al., op. cit., p. 82.
66. Finlay, op. cit., p. 64.
67. Opinion Poll Four, Question 15.
68. Finlay et al., op. cit., Table 5, p. 82.
69. Finlay, op. cit., p. 66.
70. The more authoritarian patterns of government of the CPP and its presence on the campus must have disinclined students to enter the national political arena and to withdraw from any association with politics. The more isolationist and alienative policies of UNIP and the absence of a branch on campus must account for the feelings of being excluded current amongst Zambian students.
71. Finlay et al., op. cit., p. 73.
72. Ibid., pp. 73-4.
73. Ibid., p. 74.
74. "Pluralist" is used in the sense Mertons defines it - "the...conception of pluralism which holds that associations can (and in the doctrine of pluralism, should) mediate between individuals and the larger society and polity." Merton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 368.
76. Curle, op. cit., p. 236.
77. Ibid., p. 238.
80. Finlay, op. cit., pp. 54 and 59.
82. Ibid., p. 56.
89. Ibid., pp.17-8
90. Ibid., p.15.
91. Ibid., p.18.
92. Ibid., p.41.
93. Ibid., p.60.
95. A leading spokesman of the Zambian student union was reported as saying that the vote ought to be limited to those with education and who make positive contributions to the national economy. In the survey of Ghanaian students, "Sixty-one per cent felt that highly educated people were best equipped to solve political problems, and twenty-four per cent believed that illiterates should not be allowed to vote." See Finlay et al., *op.cit.*, p.87.
97. Ibid., p.29.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION.
In previous chapters two sets of 'key' variables have been identified. The first revolved around the concept of role discontinuity, and the second emanated from the idea of 'structural tension'. The following sections will attempt to outline some conclusions and broaden the application of these concepts.

**ROLE DISCONTINUITIES.**

Two types of role discontinuity have been considered, namely that which spans time, processual role discontinuity, and that which spans arenas of action, situational discontinuity. In the former case the discontinuity derives from the widely differing status of the student's kinsmen of the parental generation and the anticipated status of the student himself. The processual role discontinuity is associated therefore with a rapid upward mobility both in inter generational and intra generation terms. This is inevitable where the national ruling class is still reliant on expatriate manpower. Educational establishments akin to those of the former colonial power, erected to rectify the manpower shortage, have given rise to a number of unanticipated consequences reflected in the structural discontinuity between the university and the political organisation of society. The student role is segmented into two discontinuous parts; the civic role and the university role. Structural discontinuity between universities and the wider society in Western society is less pronounced because the structures of Western and Zambian societies are so different. Second, structural discontinuities are more easily tolerated in societies where structural tension is more relaxed.
Processual Role Discontinuities.

In combination these two types of role discontinuity account for many of the characteristics which distinguish the Zambian student from his counterpart in other parts of the world. In consonance with their rapid social mobility students tend to choose as positive reference groups those in positions which they anticipate filling on leaving university. At the same time the students view themselves as being in competition with present incumbents of the posts they expect to fill. Indeed it is the very awareness of such a competition which leads the student to a firmer embrace of those outward symbols of high status characterised by a typical life style and value system. Such a process of anticipatory socialisation is all the stronger because students expect resistance to their upward mobility from present incumbents of the ruling class. In the same way the orientation to the lower classes as a negative reference group reflects the continuing close connection to the lower strata of society. The assumption of a "Western", urban style life while rejecting village existence as 'primitive' and the adoption of a corresponding set of Western values and standards reflect the inescapable and irrevocable primordial ties and their attendant obligations.

The contrast with European or American students is in this context vivid. For the 'Western' student typically comes from a more middle class background and typically expects to enter the middle or professional classes. That only a minority are upwardly mobile in the inter-generational context influences the choice of positive and negative reference groups. The adoption of the lower classes as a positive reference
group in purely political terms as well as in style of life is a feature characteristic of those students with liberal professional backgrounds, who are the least likely to be upwardly mobile.² For such students the process of anticipatory socialisation has little significance and their disenchantment with the wider society inclines them towards an identification with oppressed groups. Unlike those students who are 'escaping' from their poorer backgrounds, such students have greater security and less to lose by adopting the style of life of the lower classes: despite their identification with other sections of the population they remain bourgeois. The adoption of different reference groups is reflected in the American contrast between black students and those who incarcerate themselves in an apolitical subculture. The latter reject the very goals and values which the negro strives to achieve, just as the Zambian student resents the white student who moves around in disreputable attire.

When a group is projected from the lower into the higher strata of society, friction between those moving up and those whom they threaten to replace, challenge or relegate in status is unavoidable. Even though Zambians in the ruling class were not intended to be threatened by the creation of a university, nevertheless such a consequence has been inevitable as students have appeared in positions which directly or indirectly challenge fellow nationals. Where the expatriate had been no threat to the senior Zambian administrators and political élite, now the ambitious Zambian graduate, stimulated by heightened expectations and an exaggerated view of the worth of his education, is knocking on the doors of those who are well placed but poorly qualified. Where graduates as a group are not
upwardly mobile and where senior posts are occupied by persons with as good as or better educational qualifications, expectations are in accord with actual prospects and so frustration and friction is of little significance.

Situational Role Discontinuity.

Where upward mobility for the student is rapid, there is usually a shortage of university graduates and a small indigenous university. Also, where there are few students, the structure of the university being less bureaucratic can more easily afford opportunities for student participation in decision making. In the British model of university education directives tend to flow upwards from the academic staff and at the University of Zambia students also initiate change and partake in decision making processes. The student community itself operates on a democratic basis with strict controls over leadership activity and yearly elections. The governing bodies of the university are often more responsive to pressures from below rather than from above or the side. This encourages the view within the political élite of the university as an oppositional body. As a result the student is barred from the national political arena not only because he may be a threat to the party official whose position rests on loyalty, but also because his oppositional outlook would be a disruptive influence. Similar tendencies to resist student involvement in local party politics are to be observed in England but at the national level deliberate attempts are made to recruit prospective party officials from the universities. Thus at Oxford and Cambridge, for example, there are active Labour, Liberal and Conservative Political Clubs which provide a reservoir of 'talent' for
recruitment to the national parties. The different patterns of recruitment to the national political arena may account for the 'oppositional' orientation, so pervasive amongst Zambian students, but which is confined to small groups in other countries.

The student is sensitive to the discontinuity between his political role in the university system and his role in the civic arena. Whereas he is positively orientated to the university political system, he is negatively orientated to the wider political system, resulting in a withdrawal into a negative and unproductive oppositionalism. The exclusion withdrawal syndrome feeds on itself, with exclusion leading to withdrawal which in turn justifies further exclusion. The discrepancies between his civic and university roles on the one hand and between his social origins and his future prospects as a member of a ruling class on the other do not incline him towards a rejection of the 'system' which potentially has much to offer the student, but towards a rejection of the leadership which controls and profits from the 'system'.

Where discontinuities of both kinds are less pronounced students will regard structural and role continuity as being more important. In the large universities of Europe and America the bureaucratic and sometimes authoritarian administrations often controlled by sources of finance with vested interests in the status quo epitomises, in the eyes of the more sensitive students, the power structure of wider society. The university replicates a factory not merely in terms of its bureaucratic organisational structure but also in the division and conflict between students and 'governors' akin to that between workers and management. The university recreates in
a mild form the oppression to be found in the wider society. That oppression is related less to the evil disposition of those who control and profit from the system and more to the system itself which permits such oppression. As the students of Berkeley discovered in 1964 the university is no sacred institution free from external control but activities within its bounds were subject to similar regulations as those outside its boundaries. The continuity between student roles in the civic and university arenas gives rise to an attack on the structure of society rather than those who merely operate the system. Unlike the Zambian students, and to an increasingly lesser extent the British students, the American graduate has little prospect of upward mobility into the ruling class. He is, therefore, more likely to attack the system which does not provide employment commensurate with his education than the rulers who are themselves victims of the system. The Zambian student, on the other hand, questions the legitimacy of the incumbents of the ruling class because he himself intends to and expects to eventually enter that ruling class.

The role discontinuities of both kinds tend to encourage the development of a group solidarity. The differences between civic and university student roles tend to differentiate the student community from the rest of society. The development of a separate identity is further enhanced by the small numbers, and physical structure of the university. The prestige accorded to the educated among many circles of the Zambian population encourages a strong commitment to the student role over and above other roles which are less rewarding. The rapid mobility with which students are being projected into high status positions and the resentment they perceive to surround their
mobility also intensifies group solidarity and a common outlook. In America or Europe by contrast the student role is much less rewarding, and structural features combined with large numbers tend to create dissensus rather than cohesion. Commitment to the student role is frequently overridden by commitment to other roles, though their common identity is exploited in the more radical student political movements.

Kornhauser has suggested that discontinuities in social processes give rise to mass movements. The role discontinuities to which this essay has been directed contain the seeds of a potential 'mass movement'. Both situational and processual role discontinuities lead to a weakening of ties between the student and the wider society. There are few countervailing forces restraining 'extremist' behaviour. Ultimately the most powerful deterrent to deviant and disruptive behaviour is physical force, but dependence on government sponsorship is also a powerful deterrent to oppositional activities. It is largely because of the tension in the social structure that the violation of expectations by a weak group evokes a response from the political elite which other governments would regard as illegitimate.

The regulative mechanisms which sustain the cohesion and solidarity of the student community are more social than coercive. A value consensus and well defined student interest arises from a common position in the social structure and the perception of out group hostility. Deviant behaviour is easily regulated by virtue of the cross cutting ties within the community which generate conformity to community values. The structure of the community itself does not give rise to any structural forms of division; those that do exist are largely
imported from outside. Cohesion has thus a strong voluntaristic component, with the emphasis on an identity of outlook and interest, rather than compliance with externally imposed norms. On the other hand the group as a whole is held in place in the wider social structure more through coercion than social mechanisms such as cross cutting linkages. The significance of role discontinuities lies in the difficulty of moderating behaviour through social sanctions, and the resulting need to use coercion as a regulative mechanism. The concern with student oppositionalism must not blind one to the obvious interests the students have in maintaining the status quo as prospective members of the ruling class. Underlying the dissensus between students and the government there is a more fundamental consensus reflecting the privileged positions they hold in the Zambian society.

TENSION IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

The idea of structural tension has been introduced at several points in this essay as a heuristic device rather than a well defined concept. In the context of the political system it is closely related to the legitimacy of opposition. Where tension is greatest so is the inclination to suppress opposition. It is also linked to the phenomenon of succession in which the successor confronts on the one hand resistance from those displaced and on the other the unfulfilled expectations of those who helped to unseat the old regime. What emerges is a system of group tensions and an atmosphere of distrust where change and criticism, not to speak of opposition, are viewed as threats. When there is a structural
tension between groups, deviations from expected and sanctioned behaviour leads to a chain reaction of disequilibria. Whereas where there is less tension deviations are more easily absorbed and cushioned by the social structure. The violation of expectations can be dealt with under two headings, first the perception of such violations and second the presence or absence of countervailing forces.

Perception of the Violation of Expectations.

Given the tensions existing in the social structure at large, and between the students and the party in particular any violation of the expectations embodied in the role discontinuity is perceived by the party as a threat to its status and power. As a result the violation is defined in such a way that questions of the legitimacy of the issues raised by the students are by-passed. This is the function of explanations which rely on generational conflict or emotional and irrational outbursts. To suggest that in voicing their views students are 'biting the hand that feeds them', is equally effective in avoiding the content of those views. Above all to see student protest in terms of power alone is tantamount to denying the students any right to voice sentiments in public that are not strictly in accord with the official sentiments of the party.

Gouldner distinguishes three different types of conceptions of the causes of tension. The 'naturalistic' view regards tension as inevitable and rooted in the nature of things, epitomised by the explanation that relies on 'generational conflict'. The 'utilitarian' view sees tensions as generated accidentally due to ignorance, bad communications etc.
In the third, 'voluntaristic' conception, tensions are attributed to someone's intentional violation of expectations. Each conception gives rise to a characteristic form of reaction. The response in the first case is to allow things to run their course and to view the tension as cathartic. It is natural and healthy that students should rebel against the older generation, it is part of the process of moving from one stage of life to another. In the utilitarian view the appropriate response is re-education, the facilitation of communication and exchange of ideas. (There should be closer contact and more dialogue between students and government.) The voluntaristic conception of tension elicits an aggressive response in which the violator is held responsible for the deviation and punished accordingly.

Because the party viewed the student expression of opposition as a 'threat' it was natural for it also to see the actions of July 1971 as a deliberate challenge to its supremacy. It is only a small minority in the party who tend to view confrontations between the party and students as 'naturalistic' or 'utilitarian'. It was inevitable therefore that the oppositional sentiments of the students when expressed publicly should evoke an aggressive response from the party. In defending itself against what it perceived to be a threat to its power and status, the party decided to 'stop at nothing' in showing the students how powerless they were. This was the party's defence against an apparent threat from the students. But as Gouldner points out, 'defences against threats are...threats against defences' and an escalation of threats and defences is almost inevitable, when both parties regard the action of the other as illegitimate. During the July events, students
felt that they were morally right to defy the aggression of UNIP and what they perceived as the emergence of a presidential dictatorship. Indeed the students regarded the very extremism of the party reaction as confirmation of their own moral rectitude. If the only way the party could retaliate was through the mobilisation of its coercive apparatus, and if it was not prepared to consider the issues raised by the students then the students were encouraged to view their argument as morally, ideologically and factually sound. Convincing of the legitimacy of their criticism they refused to retract or retreat.

One way of de-escalating the confrontation, once each side was convinced of its own legitimacy and of the other's illegitimacy, was to redirect aggression against a third party. In the case of the Chanda affair this was an easy matter since it was quite clear that Chanda had taken an initiative from which the remainder of the executive was able to dissociate itself. The executive itself seemed to question the legitimacy of Chanda's action and by using Chanda as a 'scapegoat' the conflicting parties were reunited. However, in the events which precipitated the closure of the university in July 1971, the students took great pains to ensure that no scapegoat was made available to the government. No divisions appeared between leaders and led and students were prepared to use force to squash any attempt to manufacture such divisions. The academic staff and foreign students had not been involved in the events at all. The 1971 executive was unusual in that it was composed entirely of Zambians and there is no trace of any lecturer having influenced student political behaviour. So, even assuming the party wished to de-escalate the conflict, there
were few opportunities for finding a scapegoat. Eventually, of course, the government faced with restoring normalcy and reducing tension between students and the government attempted to focus the responsibility for the conflict on the UNZASU executive and two lecturers. But since the students had expressed no grievances towards either the lecturers or the executive, but on the contrary had applauded their action in the first case of leading the opposition and in the second case of supporting the students, the use of the scapegoat was not altogether effective in reducing tensions or appeasing students.

Of the three types of orientation to tension referred to earlier none perceive tension as an unintended consequence of the coexistence of incompatible social structures. If instead of viewing the students as a threat, the party had recognised the incompatibility of their own demands for a quiescent and supportive student body with the nature of the liberal university they had established, then the escalation of tension may have been avoided. But this would have required structural modifications to the university. Such action is rarely taken because the unanticipated consequences of alien institutions imported to satisfy a specific set of needs are rarely recognised. The party prefers to explain student opposition in terms of a conspiracy theory, and as a consequence the structural sources of tension remain.

As a rider to the above analysis of tension, the concept of 'student revolt' can now be examined. It is normal to regard the 'student revolt' as a specifically student phenomenon. But from the above it is readily seen that a student revolt must have two ingredients, oppositional activity from the student and a particular type of reaction from the government.
It is as much the latter as the former which defines specific forms of student behaviour as comprising a 'student revolt'. Student behaviour must be perceived as a threat by those who control power before it is defined as a 'student revolt'. The greater the perception of threat the more likely it is to be defined as a 'student revolt'. At the same time the greater the structural tension the more likely a given action will be regarded as a threat. Therefore the concept of student revolt is relative to the tension in the social structure, and forms of behaviour which would be regarded as legitimate in one society would be regarded as illegitimate and constituting a revolt in another society. Thus in South Africa an orderly and peaceful demonstration would be regarded as a severe threat, while in England it is a more or less natural occurrence and in India part of everyday university existence. A letter insulting the Queen or the Prime Minister along the lines of that written to President Kaunda would be ignored in England, while in Zambia it precipitated the closure of the university. The contrasting responses reflect the different tensions in the social structure.

Contrervailing Forces.

Once expectations are violated by a group are there any forces that can be brought into play to restore normalcy and prevent the escalation of tensions? Perhaps the most important factor to consider in this connection is the distribution of power. If it is the stronger party which violates the expectations of the weaker then conflict is unlikely to escalate, unless the weaker responds by violating the expectations of the stronger. By definition the more powerful group does not
have to fulfil the expectations of the weaker and the latter is unlikely to risk the penalties of violating the expectations of the stronger. Nevertheless the Zambian students did defy the party even though there was little to prevent the party from mobilising its coercive apparatus against the university.

In those situations where the distribution of power is perhaps slightly more equal, as can be the case between workers and management, one group may be dependent to a greater or lesser extent on the co-operation of the other group. Thus in a strike both management and workers tend to lose, though management is better placed to defer gratification and therefore appears as the stronger party. In the case of the Zambian students, the closure of the university would have an immediate impact on the students but for the government, if they were to be adversely affected at all, the impact would be delayed for a considerable time.

One of the interesting observations made by Gouldner is the change in the informal relations between management and workers in the gypsum plant he studied. In the era of stable industrial relations the supervisor-worker role relation at the plant gave way to friendly informal relations in the community. Those opposed in one structural relationship were united in another. Such cross cutting ties or what have been referred to here as role continuities were important in diminishing tension on the plant arising from the structural opposition of workers and management. With the replacement of a number of supervisors by outsiders cross cutting ties were reduced, tensions became difficult to regulate and resolve and the outbreak of a wild cat strike was inevitable. In the same way role continuities, though they did link the student to the
wider community, nevertheless were too tenuous to restrain the action of either students or party.

Under what circumstances do role continuities restrain and possibly help resolve conflict? A tentative answer might lie in those circumstances where neither the social structure nor the participants regard the role relationship which generates tension as more important than ones which evoke solidarity. The feuds amongst the Plateau Tonga are resolved because kinship relations between different tribal sections bring into play forces operating to reduce tension. Such forces rely on the equally strong commitment of members of the feuding groups to kinship relations with both groups. The structural context of the tensions does not force the incumbents to award prior commitment to one or other kinship bond. The situation is very different however when the structural context of the conflict does not recognise role continuities. While the structure of a tribal segment recognises as legitimate the kinship affiliations of its members to an antagonistic segment, the structure of industry does not formally recognise bonds of solidarity between management and worker outside the industrial arena. In the same way the structural nature of the conflict between students and government regards kinship and tribal bonds as irrelevant to the conflict. The conflict between tribal segments is defined to be between groups which are united through kinship ties, whereas participants in the conflict between students and the party do not invoke any ties of solidarity. Another variable of some significance is the distribution of power. Where it is relatively evenly distributed and a conflict might lead to the infliction of severe losses on both sides, role continuities and cross cutting ties
are likely to be invoked to offset the escalation of conflict. Where it is unevenly distributed then the stronger side would be perhaps unwilling to compromise and therefore deliberately resist the mobilisation of linkages binding the opposed groups together.

Tensions which arise between two groups out of the illegitimate breach of expectations may be healed through the intervention of a mediating third party. In the theory of pluralism it is the associations, unions and voluntary organisations mediating between the individual and the ruling class which prevent the outbreak of conflict and ameliorate tension between rulers and ruled. In the present context representatives of the university administration and academic staff were in potentially conciliatory position having both contact with government and students. However the lack of influence the administration had with either the party or the students and the vulnerability of its predominantly expatriate membership to hostility combined to make it an ineffectual mediating force. In other contexts the leadership of the group in conflict with the ruling class may be prevailed upon to perform a mediating function. Thus in industry the bureaucratisation of trade unions and the co-option of union leadership into a ruling class provides conditions well suited to conciliation and the moderation of tension. However in the case of tension between Zambian students and government there was no possibility of conciliation since the executive was more responsive to the student rank and file than to the national government. So much so that it was the action of the leadership which precipitated the tension between students and the party. In Gouldner's study, the official union leadership amongst the workers did not view
the wildcat strike as legitimate and it was an alternative clique closer to the workers and more distant from management which emerged to lead the strike. Amongst the Zambian students there was no such breach in the ranks of its leadership during the July events. The solidarity of the students stems from the structure of the community and the orientation of society outside discussed in previous chapters.

A TENTATIVE MODEL OF THE ZAMBIAN RULING CLASS.

Any society, except the stateless, can be divided for analytical purposes into a ruling class and a subject class. The ruling class may in turn be divided into a number of parallel elites - status groups within the ruling class. The elites may be connected through overlapping membership, overlapping functions, common patterns and channels of recruitment, etc. Personnel may circulate between different elites and promote a common identity as part of a ruling class rather than particular elites. The elites may be integrated where the membership shares a common background which endows the ruling class with a legitimacy based on a supposed superior ability to rule. The institutions through which the elites rule - the judiciary, the government, the party, the military establishment, and the economic enterprise - may be functionally integrated into a whole, or on the other hand may be in a state of open competition and functionally autonomous. In the one case the elite may be more responsive to lateral pressures for cohesion within the ruling class, while in the other the elite may be more influenced by institutional pressures from below. Referring to a ruling class stresses the cohesion,
linkages and functional integration of the different élites, while the concept of ruling élites tends to stress functional autonomy, competition and segregation of élites.

Amongst the ruling élites, there is usually a pre-eminent élite which is responsible for political initiatives and has greater control over the distribution of values. Such an élite will also function as a reference group for other élites, sub-élites and indeed the subject classes. This core of the ruling class, usually the political élite, is often distinguished by the concentration of charisma in its authority. Outside the ruling class there are what may be referred to as sub-élites whose proximity to the ruling class makes that ruling class an object of aspirations and its incumbents an object of opposition. Just as the ruling class will propagate an ideology which purports to legitimise its authority so the various sub-élites will propagate counter ideologies to justify absorption into the ruling class. Each sub-élite will direct its attention to the core of the ruling class to the extent that there exists such a core controlling access to all the élites. While sub-élites may compete for representation in the ruling class and influence within the central core, the subject classes rather than demand entry to the ruling class tend to pursue the decentralisation of power and redistribution of the values in society. Thus a distinction between Zambian students and Zambian workers lies in the former's concern to gain access to the ruling class and the latter's pursuit of the re-allocation of values away from the ruling class.

It is tentatively proposed that the Zambian ruling class is a relatively unintegrated amalgam of disparate and relatively unconnected élites. What unites them is their common
interest, of which they are conscious in varying degrees, as components of a ruling class. Such a conclusion is inferred from a superficial glance at the various élites, their background and social origins and the overt crises in which different élites are found in opposition usually to the political élite.

First representation in the core of the ruling class and in the government cabinet is drawn almost without exception from the party élite. There is very little representation from the military and from the economic directorate. Though attempts have been made, in practice there is very little exchange of personnel between the civil service and the party and therefore the civil service too has relatively little representation in the political élite. For those who are barred from access to the central core there are a number of modes of response. One is to stage a coup d'etat, which has been accomplished with surprising ease in many of the new nations. The ease may possibly reflect the functional autonomy of the military élite as well as the declining legitimacy of the political élite. A second response is to create an alternative centre of charismatic authority which will attract a greater following. Religious movements of the messianic kind have such a potential but are normally easily suppressed by the government as was the case of Lenshina and her followers. The resignation of an important political leader with acknowledged charisma and the establishment of a new party which initially must draw upon sectional support as in the case of Kapwepwe's United Progressive Party and Mundia's United Party, poses another threat to the ruling party's monopoly of charismatic authority. Withdrawal from the political arena and into an
unconstructive oppositional mentality as in the case of students and intellectuals is another possible response. 9

The second reason for the emphasis on division and competition between élites lies in their disparate backgrounds, origins and racial composition. Thus, the economic directorate is largely white expatriate which in itself militates against trust and co-operation. Yet, one of the remarkable facets of post independence Zambia has been the recognition by both government and the mining company personnel, who hold the strings of the Zambian economy, of their common interest. Overt friction between the two has been reduced to a minimal level and the spirit of co-operation is reflected in the extremely rapid, uncontroversial and cordial manner in which the two parties agreed to the terms of the nationalisation of the mines. The contrast with, for example, Chile is vivid. In consonance with such a spirit the mining companies have invited Zambians onto their Boards of Directors and pursued a Zambianisation programme with the vigour of good public relations. Yet at bottom the distrust of one racial group for another and the feeling that the Zambians are being manipulated by outside interests beyond their control prevent the cementation of ties and exchange of personnel between the economic and political élites. Where racial composition does not interpose barriers to co-ordination, differential patterns of recruitment do. In the second chapter two patterns of recruitment into the ruling class were outlined, one resting on expertise and formal education and the other on loyalty, experience and popular support. The latter channel was through the party while the former passed through the educational system. Recruitment to the political élite has become increasingly
monopolised by party loyalists while in the civil service the tendency is to recruit 'expertise' from the university. The military recruit through yet another channel, very often involving training overseas, or in-service training for those who leave secondary school after taking their O-levels. The economic elite is recruited from a totally different background overseas. In countries such as England recruitment appears to follow disparate channels at a much later stage in the individual's career, usually after he has left university.

Heterogeneous racial composition and multifarious recruitment patterns into the ruling class encase and segregate the different élites so that there is little overlapping membership or inter élite mobility. Apart from a few 'rejects' from the political élite who entered the economic élite, and the insignificant mobility from civil service into the party élite, the ruling class is rigidly compartmentalised into its constituent status groups. Segmentation and immobility conduces to responsiveness to the institutional 'logic' or structure of the individual élite rather than to the overall interests of the ruling class. Thus where institutional pressures conflict with those of the central core of the ruling class, a particular élite group may extend priority to the former rather than the latter. The judiciary, the economic directorate, the military may be more influenced by the rule of law, the rule of profit and the rule of the army than the rule of a 'class'. Thus, judiciary crises, friction between expatriate business and the party and coup d'etats are commonplace in the new nations. The friction is all the greater when the institutions through which the various élites operate are imported from countries where institutional structures are compatible with
the wider social structure. An analysis similar to that which
has been undertaken for the university in previous chapters
revolving around role continuities and discontinuities may be
extended to other institutions whose structure is in some way
incompatible with the wider social structure.

Though the university may be regarded as an integrating
institution in the sense that it draws into its fold a member-
ship recruited from diverse origins, nevertheless it is not an
integrative institution in the sense that it is not firmly
anchored into the social structure through a set of role con-
tinuities and functional linkages. The segregation of élites
suggests also that their associated institutions tend to be
integrating rather than integrative. Leadership of such insti-
tutions under circumstances of autonomy are likely to be either
far removed or close and responsive to the rank and file. Thus
functional autonomy and the absence of significant cross cutting
ties and linkages between different élites and institutions are
both a cause and a consequence of a social structure thwart
with tensions.

In conclusion three stages in the development of group
tensions may be postulated. In the first stage structural in-
compatibilities, reflecting the unanticipated consequences of
relatively autonomous institutional transplantations, lead to
friction with the dominant core of the ruling class (the politi-
cal élite). Tensions in the social structure give rise to per-
ceptions of friction as intentional oppositional activity which
are therefore treated as a threat. In the third stage the
political élite attempts to suppress the threat. In the absence
of strong countervailing forces institutional resistance leads
to the escalation of confrontation.
NOTES

1. It must be added as a note of caution that it is only to the extent that values are not determined by immediate structural constraints, that they may be regarded as formulated in response to the exigencies of village life.


5. Ibid., pp.174-5.

6. Ibid., p.177.


APPENDIX ONE.

The purpose of this appendix is to explain the fieldwork procedures, the reason for their adoption and to clarify the role of the writer in the community. The introduction suggested that one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory nature of the studies of students was the methodological approach which, as often as not, relied on surveys of student opinion and secondary source material. The survey, however useful it may be at the hypothesis testing level, has a limited capacity to stimulate new insights and develop new theoretical frameworks. The construction of a survey may be regarded as a means of data collection which presupposes some theoretical orientation.

Participant observation, on the other hand, is more fruitful at the level of generating hypotheses and identifying relevant problems. The very closeness of the research worker to his 'social reality' stimulates the marriage of theory and empirical investigation. Rather than force a theory onto his data, the participant observer allows his theory to emerge out of his data. There were a number of other reasons why the writer favoured this approach. First the student community was sufficiently small, 'visible' and closed to be explored through participation in its daily life. Second participant observation seemed to be the best, if not the only way, to overcome barriers which confront the 'stranger' in any community in the form of suspicion and the self-conscious inverted racialism present in the mind of the writer. The latter's experiences in South Africa and on the Copperbelt of Zambia, where racial stratification is reinforced by a coincident
stratification by class and authority, had given rise to a
distinct unease with regard to social or informal relations
with Africans. The University of Zambia afforded a unique
opportunity to cultivate status equal informal and friendship
relations between white and black students.

Third any other approach to the student community through
surveys or secondary sources would be either sabotaged by the
students themselves or remain at a distance from the social
reality in which the students existed and behaved. Response
to interviews and questionnaires could never be regarded at
their face value, as faithful representation of student opin-
ion, when the student was uncertain or suspicious as to the
purpose of the inquiry. It was the same element of suspicion
compounded by the writer's racial status which was largely
responsible for his decision not to disclose the fact that he
was studying the student community except to his closer
friends. As a white he could integrate into the community;
his status as a student permitted this. However if it were
known that he was also a participant observer, doubts would
have been raised about the propriety of his presence and mis-
givings expressed over the use to which he would put his data.
A community which perceives the surrounding social environ-
ment as hostile is likely to be particularly conscious of the
efforts of a white student to examine its inner recesses.
Much of what the writer was able to carry out legitimately
would have met with resistance had it been known that he was
also using the students as a subject for his thesis.

Many sociologists would, however, agree with Frankenburg.
If the observer cannot participate with the
knowledge and approval of the people to be
studied he should not be there at all. The
observer has a positive duty to be open that his intentions are to observe, to report and to publish an account of what he sees in print...It is a cardinal principle of scholarship that no researcher has the right to make impossible the studies of those who will follow him.

There is no simple reply to Frankenburg, but in following such "professional ethics" one runs the danger of engaging in "academic prostitution." For the sociological inquiry can never be "value free", it must always have implications for change and the status quo. In preparing the ground for those who follow, the sociologist is inclined to support the existing 'powers'. To conceal information that has been gathered through some form of deception is not simply ethical but also becomes an ideological crutch for those who are hostile to change. Too often studies undertaken in the new nations hide unpleasant truths and flatter whoever is in power through a distortion or misrepresentation of the facts. The matter of ethics and the role of the sociologist may be unambiguous to Frankenburg in his Welsh village but cannot be dismissed so glibly in a discussion of the more complex facets of a political system in a 'tense' social structure. The sociologist, at all sensitive to his role, must spend a high proportion of his life painfully examining his motives, wondering about the propriety of his study, the use to which his results might be put and the distortions he introduces by virtue of his own ideological background, his sponsors, his career and the circumstances of the study.

As far as this study is concerned the writer was regarded by all but a close circle of friends as a participant white.

and not a participant observer. Just as the participant observer never seeks to hide his observer status, so equally the writer never sought to absorb himself into the community as an "ordinary" student but always as a white student. Indeed his whiteness proved to be the basis of friendship and comradeship between himself and many other students. As Gouldner's team forged a bond of identity with the workers at the gypsum plant through their GI status, so the writer was able to exploit latent hostilities toward whites to establish a joking relationship with black students. In this way he was able to bleed many of his informal relations of a tense- ness and anxiety which handicaps those who try to ignore their whiteness. Which of the two statuses - "white" or "student" - was the more important depended on the situation. Behaviour that deviated from the expectations associated with his student role were attributed to his "whiteness". For example, the writer failed to attend the student demonstration outside the British High Commission in 1970 because he had to spend the day on the Copperbelt. This absence was interpreted as indicating a greater commitment to white role than student role, and his credibility declined for a short time. The next year participation in a demonstration led to his arrest and trial for riot which now attested to his pre-eminent commitment to the student role. Outside the university he was often greeted as a student by people whom he did not or only dimly recognised and who certainly would not have greeted him on the campus. Thus outside the university black students would orientate toward him in his student rather than white status. When the

writer tried to over-emphasize his student role at the expense of his white role, by possibly over-identifying or over-contributing, he aroused resentment and suspicion. What were good intentions were interpreted as the opposite when he violated expectations and deviated too far from the white 'stereotype'. As one commentator noted, to integrate into a black community you have to be "a bit of racialist", at least toward those who do not know you as a friend.

Participant observation (closed or open) is thwart with many other problems apart from the question of ethics. First as a means of verifying hypotheses it is necessarily weak. At best it provides a set of 'quasi statistics' from which inferences may be drawn. Second, detachment from the social processes is difficult for the participant observer who becomes immersed in the affairs of the community he is studying. While involvement may lead to a deeper understanding of behaviour, it can equally lead to an over-identification with the subjects of inquiry and the consequential adoption of the 'folk theories' current in that community. Thus there was always the tendency for the writer to accept at its face value the exaggerated importance students attached to their 'superior' education. He was fortunate in having access to a continual discussion with colleagues or supervisors who were less involved and more detached from the situation.

Third the sociologist's involvement in the social processes he is observing may in itself introduce an artificial modification of behaviour. This is the "uncertainty principle"

in sociology, viz. the nearer the observer is to the processes of social interaction the more 'distorted' and 'unnatural' they become. Thus for example the writer's position as Chairman of the Sociological Association afforded him a unique opportunity to see how students in a society committee operated. Yet he was never sure how they would have behaved were the Chairman a Zambian, in other words how much his own colour and personality affected the behaviour of other members of the committee. But, by distancing himself from social interaction within the community, the sociologist is unable to specify precisely which principles operate to stimulate a particular social outcome. Gouldner has recognised the same 'problem' in a more general manner and concludes that the best the sociologist can do is to achieve a heightened self awareness in the pursuit of what he refers to as a 'reflexive sociology'. The 'problem' is of course ultimately insoluble, as in quantum mechanics, and must be regarded as a datum of research technique. Frankenburg makes a virtue out of necessity when he makes the interesting point that the observer may prove to be a catalyst in bringing hitherto latent conflicts to the surface.

A further objection may be levelled that the observer by his participation may change the situation he is studying. This I think is a question of sensitizing the observer to the changes he may make. I do not think a single observer in, say, a village or a tribe is going to change custom and practice built up over years or even centuries. If he does this is something that needs analysis. What is more likely to happen is that he may prove a catalyst for changes that are already taking place.

4. For those wishing to initiate themselves in the mysteries of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a non mathematical explanation is to be found in, for example, Whittaker, E., From Euclid to Eddington (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), pp.143-8.


Thus when the writer rose to propose that the membership of SMOLISA should be open to blacks only, he was expressing the sentiments of nearly half of those assembled but which remained latent for fear of creating a serious schism amongst the participants. Being less sensitive to community pressures he was well placed to bring the issue out into the open. In the event the fact that an outsider (a white) proposed the motion did not prevent a number of students walking out when the motion was passed.

Frankenburg makes the related point that the community will deliberately force the outsider in this case the sociologist to make decisions which if made by a member of the community would be disruptive of its unity. The aggression and hostility generated by the conflict is then focussed on the outsider and the community retains its solidarity. This happened to the writer on a number of occasions. The fourth opinion poll brought to the surface a serious division of student opinion concerning the community's orientation towards the government following the closure of the university. The aggression and hostilities of rival factions were redirected against those running the poll, particularly the white outsider. In this way the community preserved its integrity. Here the sociologist had not been forced to take the initiative, but earlier experiences indicated the tendency for students to elect outsiders to executive positions in university organisations. The election of 'foreigners' as President of the Students' Union has already been alluded to and analysed. A somewhat startling experience of the writer which is worth considering was his election to the post of Chairman of the Sociological Association. Soon after arriving on campus he
attended the annual general meeting of the University of Zambia Sociological Association which was attended by fifteen people, including a lecturer, a white student (the writer) unknown to all but the lecturer and the secretary of the association. Much to his surprise (naivety) the white student, who had been silent, was nominated together with an elderly black student, equally unknown to those assembled, as candidates for chairmanship. In the voting the white student received ten votes and the black student two votes (one of which came from the white student). At that time a racial explanation of the voting seemed to be the most appealing, but on reflection the event has close parallels with Frankenberg's experiences in his Welsh village where he was similarly elected to assistant secretary of the Football Club, and often found himself in the chair.

It was always the stranger who took the initiative which brought hidden conflicts into the open. This was because they were not as immediately sensitive to informal opinion as the others. Their unpopularity was also to some extent insulated. It was not so likely to spread to other social activities in the village. 7

As Chairman of the Sociological Association the stranger could be made the focus of aggression if the Association suffered a decline or if conflict broke out concerning its activities. The white was also above many of the factionalist intrigues that abound in any closed community and is perhaps seen to be more likely to pursue the interests of the association rather than use his position as a launching platform for the protection and prosecution of some other personal or community interest.

7. Ibid., p.23.
Yet on other occasions in equivalent circumstances, the writer was discouraged from holding office. Every week, for example, he would spend a number of hours typing out columns of *UZ* (since he was one of the few students who had a typewriter) and when asked he would contribute a feature article. Yet he was never offered a position on the large editorial board. This represents the obverse orientation to the outsider, that he should assist (when asked) and help to keep the community 'machinery' in good working order but he should not "interfere" (guide action and make decisions) in Zambian student affairs. Strangers must not attempt to run the affairs of the community. Such norms are reinforced by the stranger's racial status, if he is white. The two orientations to the stranger are the two sides of the same coin.

The other explanation of the orientation of the Zambian student towards the white student places greater stress on the racial factor and what has been referred to as 'the bwana complex', with its associated belief in white supremacy. The behaviour of the Zambian students in the two examples would then exemplify on the one hand the belief that the white student would make a more efficient, dedicated and responsible chairman and on the other an explicit reaction to the prevailing tendency for whites to dominate. The situation and the participants determine which of two types of explanation is more pertinent. Such situations of intimate involvement undoubtedly provided the more penetrating sociological insights, in terms of which events observed at a distance could be interpreted.

A fourth consideration is the predisposition of participant observation to generate characteristic types of
explanation and theoretical frameworks. Concerned with behav-
ior that is observable, the participant observer in a particu-
lar community or group tends to confine his investigation to
behavior enacted within the context of the community to the
exclusion of behavior enacted outside the community. He
therefore tends to portray the community as more 'closed' and
'isolated' than it really is, simply because his technique
creates the practical difficulty of exploring behavior and
its determinants external to the community. In short the study
is predisposed towards a closed system analysis. The short-
coming has been recognised of late, particularly in the field
of industrial sociology where external influences, hitherto
ignored, have now been explicitly incorporated into the 'open
systems' approach. In this essay interaction and inter-
relationships of the students in the university community with
the society outside have been explored through the concepts of
role continuities, role discontinuities and tensions in the
social structure. To do this effectively it was necessary
to live with students outside the university and this was
accomplished during vacations.

Because of the drawbacks associated with any particular
 technique of sociological investigation it is common to adopt
a variety of techniques each compensating for the inadequacies
of others. The writer was particularly fortunate in having
access to various sources of information including student
newspapers, opinion polls, surveys, spontaneously produced

8. For an example of the open systems approach see Goldthorpe,
J. H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J., The
Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour
9. For a slightly different approach see the very interesting
book by Mayer on migrants to town. Mayer, P., Tribesmen
or Townsmen (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961).
circulars and tape recordings of meetings. But the interpretation of all these other sources was inspired by insights from participant observation.

It was through the Sociological Association and in his capacity as Chairman that the writer in collaboration with other members of the executive was able to conduct the three opinion polls with a legitimacy and success which would have been impossible were he to have attempted to have done so by himself. The opinion polls were normally thought up rapidly and spontaneously and no pretensions to scholarly objectivity will be made on their behalf. For one interested in statistical analyses, they might provide a field day. Here no attempt has been made at a complicated multivariate analysis because in the opinion of the writer the quality of the questions, and the little that is known about the sample and between the attitudes expressed and those felt do not warrant such a treatment. In such an assessment of opinion one is not only faced with a problem of statistical representativeness of the sample but also how representative the responses were of the actual opinions and attitudes of the students. In what light did the respondents treat the opinion poll? This for example is a crucial factor in the fourth opinion poll which at the time it was carried out many felt the results might bring about unfortunate consequences. The statements themselves were short and often carelessly phrased. The possible responses were limited to agreement or disagreement and therefore to a certain extent the answers received were pre-ordained. Such is an inevitable consequence of questionnaires in general, but particularly those which are pre-coded. The opinion poll can of course be easily used as a political tool for this reason.
Indeed it must be confessed that some of the statements included in the fourth opinion poll were deliberately phrased in such a manner as to elicit certain attitudes which the conductors knew to exist in the community. The significance of the fourth opinion poll lay less in the results which were 'expected' but in the conflict which revolved around its legitimacy and the attempts to suppress it.

Nevertheless the opinion polls do help to illuminate and illustrate the opinions and attitudes comprising the student political culture. Those statements which gave rise to extreme opinion i.e. where the 'uncertain' were few and the 'strongly agree' or 'strongly disagree' were many, elicited a response which was probably a close approximation to actual feelings. Throughout the essay the results of the opinion polls have been used to exemplify divisions in the community and to elaborate and confirm observations made by the writer.¹⁰

The opinion polls also afforded the writer with that involvement in community affairs which was so necessary to really come to grips with student behaviour. For example, in conducting the second opinion poll he was able to gain a much deeper understanding of the controversy over the formation of a UNIP Branch on campus. For as it turned out the opinion poll was of considerable assistance to the union executive in legitimising its stand against the formation of party branches on campus. A similar involvement in the student newspaper UZ made it possible for the writer to gain a deeper appreciation of student opinion and attitudes. He was able to listen to

and argue with other members of the editorial board over issues raised in the current production and in this way was able to assess the significance which should be attached to the reportage and articles. Being a friend of the Editor-in-Chief, the writer was also able to assess the impact of editorial policy on the content of the paper. In the main body of this essay the other newspapers produced on campus have not been cited. There are three reasons for this. First, the writer was not familiar with the editorial boards of those other papers and could not witness the selection and doctoring of articles. Second, such newspapers tended to lead an ephemeral existence, appearing irregularly whereas UZ, almost without exception, appeared every week. Third, UZ was spontaneously produced, intended for a specifically student audience and prided itself in taking a strongly independent posture vis-à-vis the UNZASU executive. Other papers were produced for external as well as internal circulation and also usually depended on union or university sponsorship for their continued appearance. They were therefore less reliable reflections of student opinion.

Perhaps the most spontaneous form of writing was to be found in the mealtime circulars which always appeared with the emergence of any controversy whose outcome might affect the students' interests. They provided a running commentary on the important political events on campus. Throughout the essay they have been continually drawn upon to illustrate the different viewpoints co-existing in the student community.

Holding a position in the UNZASA committee also enabled the writer to arrange social research projects in the vacations. It was at these times that student behaviour outside the
university could be closely observed. In the long four-month vacation of December 1970 to April 1971 a research team of four members, including the writer, lived and worked together in a single house kindly provided by Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines at Kitwe. It was at this time that the reaction of the community outside the university toward the student could be assessed at first hand.

On the assumption that the role and status of the researcher is an important influence on the results and conclusions he arrives at, this appendix should help the reader assess the significance of the observations presented in the main body of the thesis. In conjunction with the preface and the appendix which follows a complete picture should emerge in terms of which it is possible to evaluate all the data included in the work.
APPENDIX TWO.

For data on the student population at the University of Zambia, the present essay has depended on three opinion polls conducted by the University of Zambia Sociological Association, a further opinion poll conducted in collaboration with a fellow student and a survey of graduates undertaken by the writer himself. The writer was intimately involved in the framing of questions, distribution and analysis of the completed questionnaires of each inquiry.

The format of each opinion poll was similar. A letter expressing the reason and purpose of the poll served to introduce the questionnaire overleaf. The questionnaire took a very simple form. The first three questions related to sex, year of study and degree course, while the following questions were framed in the form of a statement to which respondents had to say whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were uncertain, disagreed or strongly disagreed. For each statement and question concerning the student's status in the university the respondent had to enter an appropriate number in a box provided on the left hand side of the page. The coding was simple and presented with each question or statement. The completed questionnaire was therefore pre-coded and passed straight on to the computer department for punching onto cards. The data cards were fed into the university computer with a programme specially designed by the writer for the analysis of such questionnaires. The print-out produced tabulations of the responses to each question by sex, year of study and degree course. The questionnaire would only take a few minutes to complete since it merely involved placing appropriate numbers in about twenty
five boxes. After the questionnaires had been collected it was then only a matter of two or three days before the results could be distributed to the student body.

In the following each opinion poll will be considered in terms of the circumstances of the inquiry, the statistical representativeness of the sample and the response of the entire sample to each statement. (In the original analysis variations in response by sex, year of study and degree course were considered and where significant they have been incorporated into the main body of this essay.)

Opinion Poll One.

This was the first opinion poll conducted amongst the students at the University and the President of UNZASU wrote a covering letter asking for the co-operation of the student body. It was he argued a means of assessing student opinion which would help him and his new executive in their term of office. The questionnaires together with the covering letter were distributed and addressed to each individual student on 5 May 1970 and the polling boxes placed in each hall of residence were taken away three days later. Of the 1,050 (approximately) questionnaires distributed to resident students, 649 were correctly completed and returned, which represents a response of 62%. As regards sex, year and degree course the sample was fairly representative of the student population.
TABLE 22 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL ONE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Student</th>
<th>Percentage Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Year</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Year</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Year</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Year</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the reasons for the relatively high poll was the topicality of the questions but perhaps more important the novelty. The results are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll One.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. The standard of meals in the dining room is poor and should be improved.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The amount of food available at meal times is inadequate.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The official hours of visiting friends of the opposite sex should be extended.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Female students show an unwillingness to mix with male students.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Male students show an unwillingness to mix with female students.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between May 5th and May 7th, 1970.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. The student body should make public its views on national issues.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The student body should make public its views on international issues.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Student grants are so inadequate that they affect the quality of work.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Students should be given the option of receiving government loans to be repaid after leaving University.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. The content of University courses is not suited to the needs of the country.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. There are too many lectures.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Lecturers are not interested in their students.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The present system of assessment places too much emphasis on end of year examinations.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The University should make every effort to produce graduates of international standard even if this means failing large numbers of students.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Students receiving government grants should not be given the opportunity to choose the courses they wish to study.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. The facilities for sport and recreation are inadequate.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Student leaders do not represent the wishes of the student body as a whole.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Students are an elite cut off from Zambian Society.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. There is too little interaction between students and lecturers.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Students demand too much from a society to which they contribute little.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The government is entitled to allocate graduates to jobs in accordance with the manpower requirements of the country.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Opinion Poll Two.

The second opinion poll was conducted at the request of a student member of the Board of Studies concerned to inquire into the role of the personal tutor. The request came at a time when two controversial issues were being discussed amongst Zambians, namely the relationship between students and political parties and the formation of the Student Movement for the Liberation of Southern Africa (SMOLISA). Questions four to eleven inclusive were accordingly devoted to the issues arising out of the role of the personal tutor and have little relevance to the discussions in this essay. The last nine questions are therefore the only ones to be reproduced here.

The questionnaires were not distributed individually to the students on this occasion but were made available at the entry desk to the library and the officer on duty ensured that students took only one questionnaire. It is therefore unlikely that students would have filled in more than one questionnaire. The poll was begun on 22 October 1970 and the questionnaire finally collected one week later. The response this time was much lower, with only 351 questionnaires returned. This may have been because of the method of distribution, or because the novelty had worn off or because students were busy preparing for examinations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Student</th>
<th>Percentage Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Year</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Year</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category of Student</td>
<td>Percentage Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Year</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Year</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. + Social Work</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figure for medical students is low because the questionnaires were not distributed at the Ridgeway Campus where the medical students live.*

The results of the second opinion poll are reproduced below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of Opinion Poll Two*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. In the interests of national development party politics must be brought onto campus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. A branch of UNIP should be established on campus for UNZA students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The Zambian student has not yet discovered himself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Students should be forced to participate in a national service of one year before receiving their first degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Students must be represented on the National Council of UNIP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Zambians must involve themselves in the struggle to liberate Southern Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Zambia will not be free until the rest of Southern Africa is liberated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between 22nd and 29th October, 1970.
19. There is no need for an UNZA student organisation with the aims of SMOLISA.  
   Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  
   %    %    %
   42    14    44

20. Membership of SMOLISA should be open only to black students.  
   Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  
   %    %    %
   31    16    53

Opinion Poll Three.

The third opinion poll was conducted in the next academic year. Again a number of topical issues were introduced. One of these revolved around the controversy that was raging at the time over culture and the wholesale adoption by certain sections of Zambian society of Western forms of dress. The girls had had to bear the brunt of the attack and in the questionnaire they were also the focus of implied criticism in that the questions concerning dress referred to them alone and omitted any reference to male attire. As a result the girls boycotted the opinion poll taking possession of the polling box placed in their hall of residence. The questionnaires distributed to each student were with a few exceptions only returned by the male students. The results therefore only reflect opinion amongst the men. In introducing the questionnaire an opinion poll committee of the University Sociological Association appealed to the student body to respond so that others, confronted with an articulated student opinion, may be forced to take student views more seriously. The questionnaires were distributed on the 26 May 1971 and collected four days later. Of the 576 responses, 545 were from male students and 31 from female students, this corresponding to a 44% poll amongst the men and an 11% poll amongst the women. The following table compares in more detail the sample and the population of students by year of study and degree course being pursued.
TABLE 24 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL THREE.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>B.A. &amp; Social Work</th>
<th>B.Sc. &amp; Agricultural Science</th>
<th>Medicine</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Sample (No.)</td>
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<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A few responses fall outside the scope of this table e.g. fifth year medical students, P.C.E.'s etc. Those first year students who claimed to be studying for law, medicine or engineering degrees have been placed in the B.Sc. or B.A. categories.

The results of the analysis of the male responses alone to the third opinion poll are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll Three.*

4. How many brothers, sisters, relatives, etc. are you supporting financially?

53% are not supporting any, 22% are supporting 1-3, and 25% more than three.

* University of Zambia Sociological Association, The Results of the Opinion Poll Conducted Amongst Resident Students Between 26th and 30th May, 1971.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The quality of food in the dining room is satisfactory.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Students should have a greater say in the running of the University.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>In the third, fourth and subsequent years, students should not be redirected.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The academic wardens are necessary for solving academic problems.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Rooms should be allocated to students before they arrive on campus.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Students should stop playing music in the halls of residence after 10 p.m. Monday to Friday.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Wigs improve the looks of UNZA girls.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Mini skirts improve the looks of UNZA girls.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Skin lightening cream improves the looks of UNZA girls.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The money from the defunct medical fund should be used to finance some student project.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>There should be a beauty contest for UNZA girls.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Student leaders do not represent the student body as a whole.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>The President of UNZASU should be given a free academic year to concentrate on his duties as President.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>If economic sanctions on Rhodesia are formally lifted by the British Government then students should demonstrate outside the British High Commission.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>If student bursaries are not increased then a demonstration should be staged outside the Ministry of Education.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>When students in other parts of the world are demonstrating against U.S. presence in South East Asia then we should also demonstrate.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Zambianisation in the country is going ahead too fast.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Zambianisation is being sabotaged by expatriates.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Humanism is relevant to the needs of Zambia.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Students belong to the upper class of Zambian society.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Dialogue with South Africa will improve the welfare of non-whites there.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. The time is now ripe for the declaration of a one party state.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. The leaders of the nation follow the precepts of Humanism.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Intimate relations between boys and girls of different races are socially desirable.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Opinion Poll Four.**

The fourth opinion poll was the only one not conducted under the auspices of the Sociological Association. Instead it was conducted by two individuals and the circumstances of the inquiry are elaborated in the main body of this essay and will not be repeated here. The questionnaires were distributed to each room and collected in a single polling box placed in the library. The 459 replies received represented a poll of 31% and a more detailed analysis of the statistical representativeness of response is given below. (The poll for men was 33%, while that for women was 19%).
TABLE 25 - RESPONSE TO OPINION POLL FOUR.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Degree Course</th>
<th>B.A. &amp; Social Work</th>
<th>B.Sc. &amp; Agricultural Science</th>
<th>Medicine Law</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>1448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample (No.)</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>422</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Population</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A few responses fall outside the scope of this table, e.g. fifth year medical students, P.C.E.'s etc. Those first year students who claimed to be studying for law, medicine or engineering degrees have been placed in the B.A. or B.Sc. groups.

The results of the opinion poll are reproduced below.

Results of Opinion Poll Four.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. The ad hoc committee should give way to a popularly elected executive.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Vice-Chancellor has failed in his duties as leader of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university community.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. The majority of the population approved of the closure of the University.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The University is in need of radical reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. The deportations of the two lecturers was in the interests of the nation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. The student body did not support the actions of the ten member UNZASU Executive Committee which led to their expulsion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. The student executive was right to apologise for their actions which led to their expulsion.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 30    | 16        | 54       |

11. Students should get on with their studies and leave politics to the politicians.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 11    | 8         | 81       |

12. As students we should be given more opportunities to influence political decisions at the national level.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 80    | 9         | 11       |

13. Students wishing to engage in party politics during term should leave the campus.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 33    | 14        | 53       |

14. The President of UPP has subverted the campus.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 11    | 15        | 74       |

15. The detention of UPP leaders is justified.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 7     | 13        | 80       |

16. The Government represents the will of the people.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 13    | 19        | 68       |

17. UNIP has the support of the majority of the people.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 18    | 29        | 53       |

18. Neither UPP, ANC, nor UNIP has my support.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 40    | 11        | 49       |

19. The Press in its recent statements and editorials has painted a true picture of the University and student life.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 4     | 4         | 92       |

20. Our society is in need of radical reform.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 81    | 9         | 10       |

21. Zambia should begin to trade freely with regimes south of the Zambezi.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 66    | 15        | 19       |

22. Zambia should pursue dialogue with South Africa.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 43    | 24        | 33       |

23. Students should in future refrain from demonstrating in support of declared government foreign policy even if they sympathise with that policy.

    | Agree | Uncertain | Disagree |
    |-------|-----------|----------|
    | 56    | 6         | 38       |
Graduate Survey.

The questionnaire was sent out to graduates by post to addresses provided by the Office of the Registrar. Of the 246 graduates of the University of Zambia, 48 responded by returning the questionnaire. This represents a response of approximately 19%. However, since there are no known characteristics about these graduates which overlap with the questions contained in the questionnaire, it has not been possible to discover how representative was the sample. The response rate is low for a number of reasons. First some graduates had left no address with the university and since some of the addresses were now out of date an unknown number of graduates never received a questionnaire. Almost twenty questionnaires were actually returned to the sender because the graduate was unknown at the given address. The response was also low because this is in the nature of the postal questionnaire; the only reason for completing the form was to assist someone to complete his M.A. studies. Finally some of the questions raised may have aroused suspicions amongst the respondents even though their replies were anonymous. It has been the experience of the writer that students are often very sensitive in replying about their background and this was why such questions were automatically ruled out of the opinion polls. In the manner of response, particularly the section on the social origins of UNZA graduates, students tended to be very lax about the manner in which they completed the section and it would be foolhardy to draw any firm conclusions from an analysis of that section. The letter addressed to the graduate and the response form are reproduced below and a few of the results have been cited in the main body of this essay.
President Hall,
UNZA,
P.O. Box 2375,
LUSAKA.

7th. October, 1971

Dear Graduate,

As part of my M.A. programme in sociology at UNZA, I have chosen to try and trace the progress of UNZA graduates since they left the university and to discover what section of the community they come from. With this in mind, I am sending out a questionnaire which I am hoping you will be kind enough to complete and return in the stamped envelope.

The first part of the questionnaire deals with employment subsequent to leaving the university and your hopes for the future. Once I have collected this basic information, I may follow this up with a number of interviews in an attempt to delve more deeply into the employment problems experienced by UNZA students.

The second part deals with relatives and the relationship you have with those you know best. The third part deals with your activities while you were a student which is then followed by a fourth part concerned with social origins. In a society where not only the nuclear family but also the extended family is important, it becomes necessary to go into the background of a wide selection of relatives. Hence the reference to brothers, sisters, parents, aunts, uncles and grandparents.

The questionnaire you submit will be anonymous and I will give the Secretary of the Graduate's Association copies of my findings. I would be very grateful if you would return the questionnaire at your earliest convenience.

Hoping for your cooperation,

Yours faithfully,

(Michael Burawoy)
MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR UNZA GRADUATES

1. In what year did you graduate? __________________________

2. What degree do you hold from UNZA?
   (B.A., B.A. + Educ., B.SC., etc.) __________________________

3. What bursary, if any, did you hold while at UNZA? ______________

4. How old are you? __________________________

Employment

5. What jobs have you held since leaving university?
   First Employer __________________________ Job __________________________
   Second " __________________________ Job __________________________
   Third " __________________________ Job __________________________
   Fourth " __________________________ Job __________________________
   Fifth " __________________________ Job __________________________

6. Did the Government 'direct' you to your present employment? ______________

7. Would you prefer to be employed elsewhere in another job? If so, what job and where?
   __________________________________________________________________________

8. Would you prefer to be employed in the public or private sector? Why?
   __________________________________________________________________________

9. What do you hope your occupation will be in ten years time?
   __________________________________________________________________________

10. What are your three best secondary school friends doing now?
    Occupation__________________________ Employer __________________________
    Occupation__________________________ Employer __________________________
    Occupation__________________________ Employer __________________________
Kinsmen

11. Where you are now living are you the head of the household? ________

12. Who else is residing with you? (Relationship of members of household to yourself.)


13. What commitments (material, financial, etc.) to your relatives have you accepted since leaving UNZA?


14. While at UNZA which three people did you most frequently stay with in the vacations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(to person stayed with)</td>
<td>(of person stayed with)</td>
<td>(Where you stayed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student Activities

15. While at UNZA did you ever hold any position in NUZS or UNZASU Executives? ________

16. Were you in the committee of any society on campus? If so, which?


SOCIAL ORIGINS OF UNZA GRADUATES

Could you please fill in the following form stating the occupation (making this as precise as possible), educational level and approximate age of your closest kinsmen as indicated. Under the column for education enter in the boxes provided the appropriate number taken from Code A and under the column for age enter the appropriate number taken from Code B, (if still alive).
CODE A: 1. No education, illiterate 2. No schooling but literate 3. Some Primary education up to Standard VI or Grade VII 4. Some Secondary education or post primary professional training 5. Some higher education i.e. beyond Form V.

CODE B: 1. 0-10 years; 2. 11-20 years; 3. 21-30 years; 4. 31-40 years; 5. 41-50 years; 6. 51-60 years; 7. 61-70 years;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAVE THIS COLUMN BLANK</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIFE/HUSBAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROTHERS (Full Siblings)</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX THREE.

The Petition Presented by UNIP to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia on 14 July 1971
(Taken from the Daily Mail, 15 July 1971)

WE, of the United National Independence Party, do hereby submit to you, Mr Vice-Chancellor, this Petition in protest against the students of this University in general, and the Students' Union Executive in particular, for the arrogant and insulting letter sent by them to His Excellency, Dr K.D. Kaunda, Secretary-General of the Party and Head of State of the Republic of Zambia.

President Kaunda is not only a leader of the 4 million people in this country, for whom the students purported to speak; he is the father of this Nation, popularly elected to be their spokesman, and to lead and guide them at all times.

He is not only the symbol of our independence and freedom, he is the symbol of authority vested in this sovereign Republic, he is a symbol of this Nation's collective identity and a mirror through which we can see ourselves as Zambians. Therefore, an insult against him is an insult against the Nation as whole. Disrespect for him is disrespect for this Nation as a whole.

We, of the United National Independence Party, as the Party in power, regard it our duty to express our love, admiration and respect for our National Leader whom the students, constituting a minute fraction of 1% of our population, have chosen to insult with arrogance without precedent.

We are grieved by the decision of the students which is unparalleled in Africa, if not in the world and, therefore, we condemn it unreservedly.

We regard the letter as blatantly disrespectful and a deliberate insult to this Nation and its Leaders. We regard the attack on the President as an attack on authority in Zambia, on the Party and Government and the People as a whole.

We resent and take great exception to the decision of the students to express their misguided feelings in the name of UNIP and the people of Zambia. We regard their action as a blot on this Nation's character.

We are profoundly shocked by the arrogant and immature exhibitionist behaviour of the students and their readiness to fall prey to foreign influence purporting [sic] to be championing the cause of liberty and academic freedom. We regard their ill-advised action as an abuse of this freedom.
Zambian Humanism postulates respect for age and authority as a fundamental precept. This is a vital legacy bequeathed to us by our ancestors. Under the banner of the United National Independence Party and its dynamic leadership, we mean to foster and preserve this heritage for posterity. It is a vital guarantee for the maintenance of a stable and decent society in this turbulent world.

We in the United National Independence Party know that education is a debt due from us as a ruling Party, to the future generation in this Nation, some of whom are privileged to be on this Campus. We are aware of our obligation to give education to each and every Zambian child. Our determination in this connection is reflected in the educational policies of the Government. We are proud, therefore, of this University as the highest institution of learning in the land— a cherished goal for many a child.

It is to satisfy the insatiable thirst for more knowledge to prepare this generation of students for the difficult future ahead that the Party and Government have spent more than K50 million of investment in capital and recurrent expenditure since 1965 to improve this Campus.

This is a symbol of our commitment to the youth in our Nation. Education is free throughout our Republic. Every student on this Campus is on a Government bursary by the grace of the United National Independence Party. We know that at the opening of the current semester, students demonstrated against lack of adequate accommodation. This implies more expenditure on improvements and expansion. Government has an ambitious programme of expansion of this University in order to increase the intake. We are proud of all this. But improvements need money from public funds—from the supporters of the Party and Government. Students have asked for increases in allowances. We know they have asked President Kaunda and yourself, Mr Vice-Chancellor, for favourable consideration.

While all this is being done in their favour to prepare them for a better and more assured future in this Nation, the students of this University have sought to undermine the authority of the Party and Government. They have sought to "kill the goose that lays the eggs."

This is a people's University, built out of contributions from poor people in villages and many other well-intentioned people of this country and elsewhere in the world. The considerable cost in money, energy, time and manpower is justified by our belief in the goodness of education. We, believing in humanism, feel strongly that education should be firmly directed toward the development not only of the mind, but, above all, of character.

Sound character cannot be achieved if spiritual development and the importance of respect for age and authority are neglected. We do not want this University, the pride of our Nation, to turn out physical and mental giants who are spiritual and moral pygmies.
We are given to understand that the students at this Campus have expressed the desire to be more directly involved in national affairs and development. We welcome this initiative. These young people are part and parcel of us. They are members of our society, they are our children. They are not a peculiar breed; there is nothing special about being a University student.

Therefore, while we welcome their desire to play a role in this Nation, we wish to state in unequivocal terms that this will not extend to hurling gratuitous insults at National Leaders, particularly our Secretary-General and leader of this Nation.

President Kaunda, the Party and Government owe the students nothing; on the contrary, it is the students who owe our Leader, UNIP and Government a debt of gratitude for free education in a free society. There are thousands of young and loyal Zambians, eager to learn, who would have liked to achieve the highest degree of academic accomplishment at this Campus but whose places were taken by the arrogant and ungrateful minority who have insulted this Nation.

We, members of the United National Independence Party, and the Nation as a whole will not stand idly by and see the authority of the Party and Government undermined and insulted with impunity by people for whom we have made sacrifices in money and other resources. The accusations made against President Kaunda, the deliberate distortions of his statement to satisfy their foreign mentors are malicious, intolerable and more than enough to provoke a saint, more than enough to try the patience of Job. We, therefore:—

FIRST: refuse government by students;
SECOND: demand the closure of the University forthwith;
THIRD: demand that the entire Executive of the Students’ Union and other ring-leaders be not re-admitted to the University;
FOURTH: demand that in future, every student admitted to this University must make a declaration not to engage in activities designed to undermine the authority upon which this Nation rests;
FIFTH: accept the students’ desire to participate in national activities, but believe that complete devotion to their studies will increase their contribution more to the growth of this Nation than emulating the behaviour of students elsewhere in the world.

In submitting our Petition to you, Mr Vice-Chancellor, we are aware that the majority of students at this University are innocent and law-abiding citizens. We appeal to them not to follow sheepishly the advice of those few who wish to destroy not only this institution, but the Nation as a whole by joining the fifth column anarchists and foreign agents. We want this to remain in perpetuity a people’s University and not a
centre for subversion against a people's Government.

We ask you to convey this Petition to the entire Student Body.

SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION
UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY

For and on Behalf of the Demonstrators,
July 14, 1971.
Freedom House,
LUSAKA.
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