Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science

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Pure science has been waiting in the wings for the storm of public sociology to pass. Thus far, the storm has not passed. Instead, it has shown unexpected force, bursting through old, poorly built levees. The army corps of pure scientists has finally entered the battle for sociology, but they have arrived too late, and their technology is inadequate and outdated. Their attempt to rescue sociology has an air of desperation. The three papers of Turner, Brint, and Boyns and Fletcher defend what the latter call the Strong Program in Professional Sociology (SPPS)—a program of dispassionate science and value-neutrality —but they do so, ironically enough, with a torrent of acrimony and recrimination, passion, and politics. They protest far too much, precisely because, as I shall argue, the time for SPPS has passed—if it ever existed—and necessarily so. In the contemporary world a sociology hostile to values, politics, diversity, utopias, and above all to publics no longer makes sense—if it ever did. It can be defended only by violating its own premises.

My response to these critics draws on the other papers in this symposium, but I begin by outlining the paradoxes of the Strong Program in Professional Sociology. Then, in the second section of this essay, I show that SPPS is not the universalistic project it claims to be but a specific response to the early development of American sociology. In the third section I show how SPPS belongs to a historical period, second-wave sociology, that has now been transcended. The fourth section turns to the essays of Jeffries; Putney, Alley and Bengtson; Bonacich; and Chase-Dunn. Rather than resurrecting a past already superseded, these four essays point to the future, toward a third-wave sociology that integrates public sociology into our discipline. In their different ways they call on us to be accountable to rational and deliberative publics, such as communities of faith, the elderly, labor movements, and transnational organizations. In contrast to the first three, these last four contributions view engaging with publics not as a threat to professional sociology but a source of its vitality. Moreover, their diversity effectively counters the claim that Marxism is the true face of public sociology. The fifth and last section of my response engages the paper of McLaughlin, Kowalchuk, and Turcotte who reformulate my four-sociology matrix (policy, public, professional, and critical) by excising the critical dimension. I end, therefore, by defending critical sociology—the independent discussion of values and assumptions—as an essential accomplice of

public sociology. Critical sociology is integral to third-wave sociology as the latter takes on the challenges of unconstrained market expansion.

I. The Strong Program in Professional Sociology (SPPS)

In *Backlash* Susan Faludi not only reveals the social basis of opposition to feminism but also exposes its "blame-the victim" ideology according to which the women's movement is inherently self-defeating. Feminism, its critics claim, failed to deliver on its promises not because of entrenched opposition to its goals, but because women cannot cope with and do not desire their new won freedoms. In similar fashion the defenders of SPPS argue that public sociology will inevitably undermine its own goals. By putting a political foot forward it will undermine sociology's already precarious legitimacy among publics who are suspicious of moralizing. David Boyns and Jesse Fletcher go so far as to assert (with precious little data) that public sociology only masquerades as science, hiding its true identity as Marxism (assumed to be the antithesis of true science). Rather than building unity, the defenders of SPPS suggest, public sociology will bring down the whole house by further fragmenting and dividing our discipline. Far better, they argue, to retreat from the public sphere and insulate sociology so that its still immature science can develop a unified and coherent body of knowledge. Only then can it be deployed to influence people who really count, policy makers in the halls of power.

Of the three papers advocating SPPS, Jonathan Turner's is the most uncompromising. Calling for a linkage between professional sociology and policy sociology in a model of social engineering, he would have us use "sociological knowledge to solve problems that clients bring to us" (p. 40). Having vilified public sociology for its divisiveness, although again with precious little evidence, Turner himself proposes to split our discipline in order to sustain the purity of his social engineering. On the one side would be scientific sociology (or "social physics" as he prefers to call it), practiced by enlightened, objective experts, working away at the laws of society; on the other side would be the "activist sociology," the infidels practicing public sociology. He labels them "extremists," "ideologues," "inflammatory dogmatists," subject to the "tyranny of political correctness," "storm troopers" "manning the barricades," "signing petitions," and "shouting their morality." Who are these anonymous apostates? Do they include the public sociology contributors to this symposium: Vincent Jeffries? Norella M. Putney, Dawn Alley, and Vern L. Bengtson? Chris Chase-Dunn? Edna Bonacich? Innuendo and invective stand in place of the empirical examination of actually existing public sociology. One can only marvel at the irony of wild and unsubstantiated accusations coming from the pen of a devout believer in objective and dispassionate science.

Empirical examination of actual public sociologies would distinguish the normal from the pathological forms of sociological practice, pointing to the ways public sociology degenerates into populism or vanguardism. Without any evidence Turner simply reduces public sociology to its pathological forms and then pretends that this is the only form public sociology can take. In short, he first pathologizes the normal and then normalizes the pathological. Not content with this sleight of hand, Turner then accuses the apostates of "attack dogmatism," that is of making precisely the same error but in reverse, that they reduce professional sociology to the "tyranny of scientism" (p. 36). Here again evidence is missing, simply pointing

a finger at supposedly hapless graduate students misled by unnamed and irresponsible faculty.

The point of the exercise is inescapable: having demonized public and critical sociologies, Turner is justified in expelling these vile bodies from the community of scientists. To put it in more neutral language, from Turner's point of view, the positive pole (the instrumental knowledge of professional and policy sociology) is in irreconcilable antagonism with the negative pole (the reflexive knowledge of critical and public sociology). In this Manichean view, one pole or the other must reign supreme: if the former then sociology is saved, if the latter it is doomed. My effort to hold them together in a single organic division of disciplinary labor is utopian.

But who is the utopian now? What is this pure science at the heart of SPPS? We do not hear a great deal about its principles, but we do know that it abjures any values. So much so that Turner himself rejects the theories of alienation in Marx, anomie in Durkheim, and bureaucratization in Weber as inaccurate evaluative representations of reality. He extends his assault on the canon to include both Merton and Parsons, accusing them of deploying normative concepts and thus violating the norms of pure science. Habermas's notion of undistorted communication, the telos of language, is condemned as pure philosophy unrelated to sociology that must only deal with what is, not with what might be or should be. In Turner's view concepts that reflect "moral biases ... almost always miss the point" (p. 33). They cannot be scientific, which would rule out such methodological devices as the ideal type. This radical empiricism, as Max Weber demonstrated long ago, is a futile exercise. To develop concepts that exactly mirror the infinite manifold of the concrete world is an impossible task. The essence of science must lie in simplification and thus the use of concepts that are necessarily one-sided, and in the case of the social sciences one-sidedness is driven by their value orientation. Social science without values is impossible.

Steve Brint's critique of public sociology is more measured. Like the others he criticizes public sociology for wrapping political activism in non-partisan clothing. My call for a joint endeavor of all four sociologies will encourage rather than prevent conflict; instead we must build up professional sociology as the moral and not just the structural core of the discipline. He departs from Turner, therefore, in recognizing the importance of one particular set of values—the moral passion that underpins the scientific enterprise. In other words, moral passion is necessary to produce value-neutral science, value-neutral research. But is Brint able to sustain such a position? Against my own valorization of civil society he argues, quite persuasively, that civil society contains both constructive and destructive forces. Remonstrating against the view of civil society as a harmonious, spontaneous defense of humanity, equally he insists that states and markets cannot be painted as evil incarnate. No less than civil society they too contain their progressive moments, promoting public welfare. His sociology, therefore, is no less imbued with values than my own. The question is, therefore, which values makes more sense today?

In my rejoinder below I argue that Brint's ecumenical view of the moral equivalence of state, market and civil society reflects a period that has been superseded,—the period of second wave marketization, when states defended society against markets, when state regulation of markets did promote greater welfare for all. Today, however, state and markets are in collusion, jointly promoting the

commodification of everyday life and the privatization of all things public. These circumstances require a fundamentally new approach to sociology—third wave sociology —that valorizes civil society above state and market. To defend the Strong Program in Professional Sociology today is not so much utopian as ideological, in Karl Mannheim's sense of the word, that is seeking to restore a regressive form of sociology. Like all ideologies SPPS did have its progressive period when it was indeed a forward-looking utopia (when Turner was a graduate student!). To this earlier period we turn first, before analyzing its subsequent degeneration.

II. The Genesis of Pure Science

The Strong Program in Professional Sociology is based in the notion of pure science in which theory arises from careful interrogation of data. Pure science presents itself as a natural and universal form of science, obscuring the conditions of its existence as well as the historical circumstances out of which it emerged. In American sociology the rise of pure science harkens back to a bygone era, the birth and consolidation of professionalization, stretching from the First World War to the 1960s. It is a reaction against the early antebellum sociology that defended slavery, and more emphatically against the crusading social reformers of the postbellum period who proposed all manner of cooperatives and communes to protect labor from the tyranny of markets. But pure science was also a rebellion against the grand speculative science of the successors to nineteenth-century social reform, the Social Darwinists of early twentieth-century American sociology (Lester Ward, William Graham Sumner, Franklin Giddings, and Albion Small). SPPS rejects the unity of science and morality that pervaded all these early periods.

Professional sociology has long insisted on the separation of science from morality, the turn from speculative to pure science—a social physics based on the empirical world. Sociology's contribution to the world, in this view, can consist only of laws induced from systematically collected data. This was the objectivism of the second generation of American sociologists—William Ogburn, Howard Odum, Stuart Chapin, and others. Their claim was not that sociology should be a science for science's sake but rather that it should be applied to the world through the mediation of the state. Ogburn after all presided over the research for President Hoover's 1933 Committee on Recent Social Trends; Samuel Stouffer was commissioned by the government to do his famous study of the American Soldier. After World War II, sociology was increasingly funded by the federal government and private foundations, developing important expertise in such areas as education and market research.

This policy research produced its own reaction in the formation of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in 1951, critical of sociology's close connection to elites. Even as this insurgent organization was critical of dominant interests, and focused on the problems of oppressed and marginalized groups, it was still a sociology linked to the state and in particular to its welfare apparatuses. Throughout this period, from the New Deal until the Civil Rights Movement, the idea of an articulate public remained dormant within sociology, having been buried by Walter Lippmann and then by the 1950s sociologists of mass society. Professional sociology's engagement with the world beyond was largely restricted to clients who could afford its expertise.

To be successful in the policy world it was important that sociology develop a coherent and unified science and this indeed was the project of post-World War II sociology, whether that unity was defined by theory (e.g., structural functionalism) or method (the application of new statistical techniques). It aimed to present a common front so as to more effectively influence policymakers. Unlike economics, however, it did not have that *sine qua non* of effective policymaking, namely the monopoly of knowledge over a well-defined object, which, in the case of economics, was the market economy. The idea of society remained as elusive as the systems analysis of structural functionalism remained short lived. In the final analysis sociology failed to construct a characteristic entity over which it had privileged, expert knowledge, and around which it could build unity. Without such an entity policy sociology could not compete with economics or political science and the unity to which SPPS aspired remained illusory.

What then is our discipline of sociology? If it is not defined by a distinctive object of knowledge then how do we define its unity? I argue its unity is defined by a "standpoint"—the standpoint of civil society—or rather the standpoints of civil society, since it is far from being a unified, homogeneous entity. Civil society was an invention coterminous with capitalism, arising to protect human community from the tyranny of the market. So long as commodification was held in check by the state, sociology could also collaborate with the state, but when the state itself turns against civil society, sociology has to concentrate on cultivating its relation to civil society, to the associations and movements that compose it. This, then, becomes the epoch of public sociology.

III. Three Waves of Sociology

To develop this perspective of sociology I draw on Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* that has become a canonical text in the contemporary era of neoliberalism. Polanyi's understanding of the capitalist market—its political requirements, its destructive tendencies, its ideological representations, and the counterformations it inspires—lays the basis of a theory of civil society and its successive constructions within sociology. He provides the tools for a theory of sociology and its periodization, entirely absent from SPPS that cannot understand the conditions of its own possibility precisely because pure science eschews reflexive knowledge.

Karl Polanyi studied the origins, reproduction and consequences of market expansion from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. In a chain of elaborate causality he ties together the most micro processes to the most global forces. He puts to rest the mythology that markets are self-created and instead shows their dependence on the nation state, both in their origins and their reproduction. His most original contribution, however, lies in the analysis of the way markets sow the seeds of their own destruction by commodifying the uncommodifiable. Labor, money, and land are fictitious commodities, which lose their use value when they are subject to exchange. When labor is commodified—purchased by capital on a piece-meal basis only to be expelled when it is no longer needed—then it can no longer perform its function in production. It no longer generates the spontaneous consent and creative participation so necessary for capitalist production. Similarly, subjecting money to exchange means that its value is

continually fluctuating, creating havoc for capital that requires a predictable context within which to organize production and make profit. Finally, the commodification of land—and we might generalize to the environment—destroys its capacity to sustain human life.

In his analysis of first-wave marketization of the nineteenth century Polanyi focuses mainly on society's self-defense against the commodification of labor. Here he refers to the emergence of the factory movement to regulate the length of the working day, the trade union movement, the spread of cooperatives, and the Chartist Movement. For Polanyi Robert Owen—both his theory and his organization of the self-regulating community at New Lanark—epitomizes the creation of an industrial society against the market. In postbellum United States there were similar self-sustaining communities promoted by social reformers bent on protecting society from the market. This was indeed the era of utopian sociology.

If first-wave marketization was *national* in origin but prompted *local* reactions, second wave marketization was *international* in origin, prompting *national* reactions. Second-wave marketization begins with the expansion of imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, interrupted by World War I but moving forward with renewed energy during the 1920s. The pegging of currencies to the gold standard proved too much of a liability to national economies which sought to insulate domestic markets from the devastating effects of international trade. This was the era of national self-protection, or what Hobsbawm calls the age of extremes, from Fascism to Stalinism, from Social Democracy to the New Deal. During this period sociology is either destroyed or it becomes focused on policy questions of the emergent welfare state. This was a period of social rights that protected labor from the market: social security, unemployment compensation, pensions, labor legislation and minimum wages. Sociology deals with such familiar issues as inequality, educational opportunity, poverty, political stability, industrial organization, and the family, all with a view, implicitly if not explicitly, to developing state policies that regulate the destructive consequences of the market. Such a policy sociology calls for a unified discipline with a singular science—just like the Strong Program in Professional Sociology.

Polanyi thought that second-wave marketization spelled the end of market fundamentalism since it had led to such disastrous political forms as Fascism and Stalinism. At his most optimistic he anticipated a socialist future in which markets and states would be subordinated to a self-regulating society. Polanyi's warnings notwithstanding, today third-wave marketization is sweeping the earth, with the state no longer a bulwark to market expansion but its agent and partner. The state, either directly or indirectly through the market, takes the offensive against labor and social rights won in previous periods, establishing a very different terrain for sociology that can no longer collaborate with the state for a policy sociology. Instead sociology must directly defend civil society, against the twin forces of state and market. In other words, third-wave marketization makes public sociologies necessary.

When second-wave marketization swept the world in the early part of the twentieth century, it led first to the retrenchment of labor rights but then to a deeper reaction from the state (in the United States the New Deal) that brought social rights into existence, social rights that included rights of labor organization and regulation of working conditions and wages, but also a range of welfare rights—from

unemployment benefits to pensions, from health insurance to minimum wages. Now third-wave marketization has turned against both labor and social rights, and the question is whether the reaction can subsume both under an even broader rubric. The obvious candidate for such a rubric is human rights, the rights of human beings to survive in community with one another, wherever they are, under whatever conditions. The progression from labor rights to social rights, and then to human rights corresponds to the succession of fictitious commodities: labor, money and the environment. Polanyi had little to say about the environment but the commodification of nature has reached new proportions threatening the survival of all, endangering the human species. There is, therefore, an elective affinity between the defense of human rights and environmental degradation.

Human rights can be a treacherous terrain, exploited by powerful nations, the United States in particular, to justify all manner of atrocities at home and particularly abroad. If human rights are defined in the narrow terms of political liberalism, it is well suited to the expansion rather than containment of the market. To ensure the protection of fundamental labor and social rights and to extend them to rights of universal survival, we must enter into a struggle over the very definition of human rights.

In this era of third-wave marketization, sociology turns toward civil society, above and below the nation state. Below the nation state sociologists forge a public sociology with local communities and even a policy sociology tied to local governments that now have to bear the brunt of the provision of social support—responsibility which the federal state has abdicated. Above the state, public sociology develops in close connection to transnational associations, organizations and movements. Third-wave marketization calls for a public sociology that knits together local publics into a global formation. The impetus of a global public sociology is transmitted back into professional sociology not only in the form of multiple research programs, attentive to the needs and interests of different publics, but also in an overarching sociology of publics.

These three periods of sociology should not be seen as separate and disconnected. Shaped in response to marketization, they also develop dialectically. If professional-policy sociology repudiates utopian sociology, public sociology combines the value stance so central to the latter with the disciplined engagement of the former. Third-wave sociology replaces the quest for a singular object of knowledge with the embrace of multiple such objects organized around the concerns of multiple publics. The corresponding plurality of research programs combines the value commitments of early sociology with the knowledge-base of the empirical research of second-wave sociology. The Strong Program of Professional Sociology can only present itself at the forefront of sociology by collapsing public sociology back into first-wave utopian sociology, thereby missing public sociology's transcendence of first and second waves and its elective affinity to the challenges of the contemporary era.

If third-wave marketization calls for reactions on the level of a global civil society, how well are our sociological organizations doing? Do the structure and interests of professional sociology reflect the diversity of the publics we might reach? Looking at the American Sociological Association we see that it is indeed a plural organization—according to the defenders of SPPS disastrously fragmented—divided into 43 sections that in large part reflect the overlapping publics that are our potential audience, partners in dialogue. To be sure there are sections that speak

Table1

Three Waves of Marketization and Sociology

	First Wave of Marketization (1850-1920)	**Second Wave of Marketization (1920-1970)**	**Third Wave of Marketization (1970 onwards)**
Rights against the Market	Labor Rights	Social Rights	Human Rights
Social Defense against Market	Local Community	State Regulation	Global Civil Society
Contribution to Society	Utopian Sociology	Policy Sociology	Public Sociology
Unifying Principle	Vision	Object of Knowledge	Standpoint
Science	Speculative Science	Pure Science	Value Science

mainly to sociologists—theory or mathematical sociology—but so many speak to actual or potential publics such as Medical Sociology, Mental Health, Children and Youth, Latino/a Sociology, Labor and Labor Movements, Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Religion, etc. Conceived of in this way professional sociology consists of multiple intersecting research programs, some more developed than others, each with its own theoretical frameworks rooted in value assumptions, and expanding through the engagement of empirical anomalies and internal contradictions.

The American Sociological Association is less effective when it comes to developing global perspectives, reaching out to transnational publics. Institutionally, American sociology is the most powerful in the world, yet it remains strangely parochial. It possesses far more resources than the International Sociological Association, which, it is also worth noting, is also divided into 53 Research Committees, reflecting a potential array of public sociologies on a global scale. We should not romanticize the ISA, however, since, as in so many transnational organizations, the presence of Europe and United States is hegemonic.

To summarize the argument so far. Disciplinary unity is no longer based on the quest for a singular paradigm but on the interconnections of multiple research programs. If the unity of *pure science* requires an authoritarian organization of sociology, what Durkheim might call a mechanical solidarity with a strong collective consciousness, the unity of *value science* is based on an organic solidarity, involving the interdependence and complementarity of multiple research agendas. But even the latter requires a type of shared collective consciousness, namely the standpoint from within civil society that opposes the tyranny of markets that threaten human survival. When values are the self-conscious foundation of sociological research, critical sociology has a particularly important role, engaging with and making manifest those value presuppositions, linking them to one another. I will return to this aspect of critical sociology in the last section. First, I will consider the diversity of public sociologies exemplified by the other papers in this volume and the synergy between public and professional sociology that they embody.

IV. Varieties of Public Sociology and Their Synergy with Professional Sociology

We can see now why the accusation that public sociology is a thinly disguised Marxism is baseless. The disciples of the Strong Program in Professional Sociology

can only imagine a monolithic science, echoing the old aspiration of second wave sociology. They, thus, reduce my defense of pluralism to a political ruse for a Marxist takeover of sociology. This accusation is a projection of their own imperial ambition for a sociology with a singular, unified, homogeneous frame. To be sure I have never made a secret of my Marxist commitments and, undoubtedly, if I had a public sociology it would have a Marxist coloring. But I don't represent a distinctive public sociology. Instead I advocate a broad range of public sociologies, which I have never tried to reduce to Marxism. My sociological Marxism, with its emphasis on the restoration of the social, calls for a pluralistic professional sociology with multiple research programs, corresponding to multiple public sociologies. The history of twentieth century Marxism has tragically shown that when Marxism rules it petrifies. To sustain itself as science and critique Marxism has to occupy a minority position. The demonization of Marxism as dogmatic and supremacist is a relic of the cold war when sociology as pure science was an ideological front in the siege against Communism. That period is now over.

Any doubts about the plurality of public sociologies should be dispelled quickly by the essays in this volume, which range from an exploration of Sorokin's integralism and its connection to religious values, to the new science of social gerontology, to the study of labor movements, to transnationalism at the World Social Forum. There is as little doubt about the breadth of publics being engaged as there is about the diversity of their value orientations. These essays also demonstrate, contra SPPS, the possible synergies among three and sometimes all four types of sociological knowledge: professional, policy, public, and critical.

One common criticism of public sociology focuses on its failure to capture the imagination of publics with mentalities, different from that of the sociologist. Vincent Jeffries's counters this criticism with his rendition of Sorokin's "integralism." He shows how Sorokin's life can be seen as a complex movement among the four types of sociological knowledge. Deeply involved in social issues of the time, Sorokin began systematizing sociology in Russia, immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, and before the advent of professional sociology. In the United States his early work on social mobility was one of the first attempts at systematic analysis of social stratification. When he went to Harvard in 1931 to head the newly created department of sociology his projects became ever more ambitious, developing grand theories of history while attacking professional sociology's penchant for trivial empiricism. He tied the crises of the age to the rise of sensate culture, represented within sociology as the devotion to pure science. Sorokin's critical sociology was aimed precisely at the SPPS, with its absence of moral foundations. He resolutely opposed any policy sociology in the service of a client. His own "integralism" combined empirical, rational and intuitive knowledge as the basis of a public sociology for a new moral order. You might say he was one of the prophets of public sociology.

Jeffries especially admires Sorokin's later faith-based sociology, his theories of human goodness and the creative power of altruistic love. Social life, writes Sorokin, will be more effectively ameliorated through personal transformation than through "political campaigns, legislation, wars and revolutions, lockouts and strikes, and pressure reforms." Sorokin becomes ever more the public and critical sociologist than a professional sociologist, gathering behind him a band of devoted followers. It remains an open question as to how successful they will be in turning Sorokin's

sociological legacy toward an organic public sociology engaged with communities of faith or toward a broader traditional public sociology in the lineage of Robert Bellah, Andrew Greeley, Christian Smith, Rodney Stark, or Robert Wuthnow.

If Sorokin's public sociology grew out of a dissatisfaction with professional sociology, then the field of social gerontology took the opposite trajectory. It grew up as a response to a particular public—the elderly—that becomes ever more important with the aging of the demographic structure of societies. The public impetus inspired theoretical developments that grew back into professional sociology. Norella M. Putney, Dawn E. Alley, and Vern L. Bengtson illustrate the complex synergy among all four types of sociological knowledge. For them the organic division of sociological labor is no utopia but the reality of a youthful disciplinary subfield whose latecomer status gives it access to a wide range of preexisting sociological theory. It has yet to develop an elaborate division of labor in which the core professional knowledge develops autonomously from policy, critical, and public knowledges. Social gerontologists might have difficulty grasping what all the fuss is about, why SPPS finds reflexive knowledge to be such a threat, when it appears to be the driving energy behind this subfield, as well as connecting it to other disciplines.

Our third case offers another example of the synergy of professional and public sociology. Edna Bonacich has a long history of working with the labor movement, starting with her own union on campus, AFT (American Federation of Teachers), then AFSCME (American Federation of State, Country, and Municipal Employees), garment workers when they were still organized by the ILGWU (International Ladies Garment Workers Union), truck drivers and most recently the WGA (Workers Guild of America). Her close engagement, a case of organic public sociology, reverberated into a policy sociology concerned with organizing strategies, such as the campaign against Guess, but also into professional sociology, concerned with the place of labor in the global economy.

Bonacich's autobiographical narrative emphasizes the precarious character of the dialogue between sociologist and public. She recounts her efforts to combine independence and trust, to deflect pressure to become a paid consultant for policy research, to avoid the appearance of omniscience while still offering unionists important insights. How to sustain such a delicate balance is an important issue and Bonacich has much to teach us, but here I want to attend to what she sidelines, namely how her public sociology has contributed to the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Bonacich made a big splash in the professional world in the 1970s with her theory of the split labor market, which, simply put, argued that racial orders spring from a class compromise between capital and high-priced white labor at the expense of lower-priced black labor. She applied this idea with appropriate specifications to the history of race and class in United States and South Africa.

Her public sociology, which came decades later, eventuated in a book written with Richard Applebaum, *Behind the Label*, that analyzed the plight of garment workers in Los Angeles. *Behind the Label* shows how the split labor market was transformed as capital went on the offensive against high-priced industrial labor while low-priced immigrant labor began to flex its organizational muscle. In a development unanticipated by her earlier research, global capitalism undercuts high-priced industrial labor, redirecting union campaigns to the more vulnerable sectors of the labor force, be they made up of women or immigrants, and often in the

service sector—groups the labor movement once deemed unorganizable. The split labor market theory reflected the protectionist era of second wave marketization. Since then third-wave marketization has recalibrated the dynamics of the labor market, redistributing power within the working class. The public engagement of the new labor scholars, among whom Bonacich is a leader, has produced a new research program and a thriving new section of the American Sociological Association, Labor and Labor Movements. This is just one example of third-wave marketization generating a new public sociology in tandem with major advances in professional sociology.

Our fourth case is less developed than the others but no less important. In search of a public sociology on a global scale, Chris Chase-Dunn calls attention to waves of globalization and anti-globalization, and directs us to the literature on transnational social movements. He announces his yet-to-be-analyzed interviews with activists at the World Social Forum (many of whom, it turns out, have some social science background). In taking the World Social Forum as his research site, however, he risks romanticizing global civil society and missing the way it is decisively shaped by states and supra-state multi-lateral agencies. As other commentators have shown the ever-growing ranks of transnational organizations compete for limited resources from the same nation-states and foundations. This competition all too often forces them into a more conservative mode, as they tailor their projects to the preferences of these powerful actors. The thickening of global civil society, then, is as likely to bolster as to oppose the hegemony of states and the tyranny of markets.

To capture how third wave marketization absorbs or destroys opposition, it might be more pertinent to study the clash between insurgent elements of transnational civil society and the World Trade Organization. This body with its 149 member states governs through consensus so that the presence of protestors outside can often give confidence to dissident voices on the inside, thereby subverting the will of the dominant powers, as happened in Seattle (1999), Cancun (2003), and Hong Kong (2005). The WTO's mission (if not necessarily its effect) is to foster international trade, so that the Global South has found this to be a convenient place to protest, for example, the enormous subsidies the United States and the European Union give to their domestic agriculture. These subsidies sponsor the export of cheap food that has displaced farmers in the Global South, ruined local agriculture, and made basic human survival dependent on the North. If in this case the Global South is fighting for the expansion of markets, more usually it is defending itself against the invasion of markets. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), for example, WTO's new program to give multi-national capital access to public utilities, health services, higher education, etc. is a direct threat to the welfare of the Global South. Public sociology can join with professional sociology, as it does in South Africa, to study the effects of privatizing water, electricity, and health, and on that basis enter into a dialogue with elements of global civil society, arming them with the knowledge to challenge the capitalist giants now striding the earth. Herein lies an emerging research program for economic sociology, a shift from the static analysis of the embeddedness of markets (that is, the exploration of the conditions of existence of markets) to the more dynamic understanding of markets—in this case by investigating the causes and consequences of privatization and the deepening commodification of all facets of human existence.

In the age of third-wave sociology, second-wave sociology becomes a tool of critical analysis. Brint's warning against romanticizing civil society can be extended to global civil society as I noted above. No less important is Turner's stress on subjecting the claims of public sociology to empirical examination and his warning against the dangers of populism and vanguardism. More interesting and original, however, are the criticisms of Boyns and Fletcher. Especially important is their distinction between a *sociology for publics*, which is public sociology, and a *sociology of publics*, which would be an integral part of professional sociology.

If public sociology requires a sociology of publics, where might we begin? We have some possible building blocks for such a sociology—from Lippmann to Dewey, from Park to Arendt, from Habermas to Fraser, from Sennett to Warner, from Blumer to Eliasoph, from Du Bois to Collins—but we don't have a coherent sociology of publics. We need to ask such basic questions as: What is a public? What are the dimensions of variation of publics: thin versus thick, passive versus active, local versus global, hegemonic versus counter? How have publics varied historically and geographically? To study public sociology comparatively, as McLaughlin, Kowalchuk, and Turcotte propose, we need to map national terrains of publics and their arrangement into public spheres. What would that entail? How have publics interacted with and shaped one another? As Brint asks, what is the relation between civil society and publics? How are publics distorted by mass media? What does it mean to engage with different publics and are some disciplines better equipped to do so than others? These are questions for a research program in a sociology of publics, a program driven by the development of public sociology, a program that should be at the core of tomorrow's professional sociology.

V. The Critical Foundations of Public Sociology

We have attended to the policy, public and professional dimensions of third-wave sociology but what about the critical dimension? Critical sociology generates the four-sociology scheme, which does not arise *ex nihilo* but from two sets of questions, both well entrenched in critical thinking: Knowledge for whom? Knowledge for what? If the first question generates the distinction between academic and extra-academic audiences, the second (analytically) separates knowledge for efficient means from knowledge for ultimate ends. This latter distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge recognizes intellectuals, sociologists among them, as inherently part of the world they study.

Reflexivity, reflecting on who we are and what we do, becomes imperative as third wave marketization's offensive against society, even denying its very existence, has placed sociology in a weakened, defensive position. At the same time, this inescapable reflexivity comes not at the cost of instrumental knowledge but is its necessary accompaniment. Third-wave sociology counterpoises reflexive to instrumental knowledge, but never to the exclusion of either. It refuses the post-structuralist reduction of all knowledge to reflexive knowledge no less than pure science's reduction of all knowledge to instrumental knowledge. Sociology is neither a branch of literature nor a branch of physics.

While not joining the backlash against public sociology, Neil McLaughlin, Lisa Kowalchuk, and Kerry Turcotte nonetheless want to dispense with the instrumental—reflexive axis. To do so, however, is to cut out the core of third-wave sociol-

ogy. Their strategy of excision is to turn the empirical world against the ideal type. But being normative as well as descriptive, ideal types are not so easily refuted. Let us take a look at their argument. McLaughlin, Kowalchuk, and Turcotte correctly point out that there is much public sociology that is not itself reflexive. Their examples are such well-known writers of public sociology as William Julius Wilson, C. Wright Mills, and David Riesman. To be sure they may not always be engaged in dialogue but they certainly stimulated dialogue. Still an argument could be made, as Boyns and Fletcher do, that these classics are better understood as the public face of professional sociology rather than as core works of public sociology. The distinction is an important one, based on whether the work in question was designed and produced in conjunction with and accountable to some real or virtual public or whether it became "public" as a by-product of professional research. Public sociology proper is not the popularization of professional sociology but the product of a distinctive dialogical practice of sociology.

McLaughlin, Kowalchuk, and Turcotte go still further, however, and argue that not only traditional but also organic public sociology is non-dialogic. Here they provide precious little evidence. Would they deny the dialogic moment to the two examples of organic public sociology in this volume—the new labor studies, exemplified by Edna Bonacich and the research program in social gerontology? To be sure, there is no perfect dialogue even here, but that doesn't deny the importance of the aspiration to reciprocal interchange. In fact the failure to achieve this goal only underlines its importance as a regulatory principle. Thus, to argue that organic public sociology fails to realize its own ideal is not to disqualify the ideal but to compel us to think more deeply about its conditions of possibility. As Bonacich herself is at pains to point out, reciprocity between sociologist and public is hard to achieve and always precarious but this does not put the objective in question. Falling short of an ideal is not a warrant for dismissing it but for redoubling our efforts to reach it.

Ideal types are important as enduring standards of evaluation and aspiration but they are also internally complex. Each type of sociological knowledge has its own internal divisions: professional sociology has its critical and public dimensions, just as critical sociology has its professional side, a careerist moment necessary to simply survive in the academy. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer, titans of critical theory, had to search for sponsors of their research, but that reality does not invalidate their critical theory. To the contrary it underlines the truth of their critical theory—even the most committed reflexivity cannot escape instrumental action. That is to say, instrumentalism pervades intellectual life, invades the academy—which is precisely why it is so important to sustain the distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge.

The key point can be summarized as follows: instrumental knowledge is concerned with orienting means to given ends, while taking the larger world as given and unproblematic. In the academic context we generally accept existing frameworks of sociology and spend most of our time working within them rather than inventing new research programs, while in the extra-academic context instrumentalism means serving clients who define the problems and issues of research. Reflexive knowledge, on the other hand, problematizes the foundations, and especially the value foundations, of our discipline, or reveals the assumptions behind policy research sponsored by the rich and powerful. The Frankfurt School was

bound up with a critique of second wave marketization, whether it was totalitarian reactions of the state (Fascism and Stalinism), the commodification of mass culture or the administration of needs by the welfare state. Its reflexivity sought to rescue human values in a sea of instrumentality, or, in Habermas's framework, to save the life world from colonization by the system world.

Third-wave marketization poses these questions even more starkly as the state loses its autonomy *vis-à-vis* the market. Nothing seems to be protected from the twin forces of marketization: commodification and privatization. The production of knowledge itself—not just in the media but also in our universities—is increasingly subject to market forces. Increasingly, the rich and prestigious universities organize corporate campaigns for buildings and research, advertising campaigns for admissions, recruitment campaigns for prestigious faculty, and so forth, while the rest of higher education is denuded of funds, subjects staff and faculty to speed up and cut-backs, while hiking fees for students. Public entities everywhere are under assault, from state services that are privatized and outsourced, or simply disappear, to the public spheres of political debate, increasingly subjugated to the dictates of the corporate media. The degradation of everything public and the valorization of almost everything private put public sociology on the back foot, battling against the grain.

To eliminate the distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge—between the logic of means and the logic of ends, between the logic of efficiency and the logic of reason—just because there is a real tendency toward the stifling of reflexive knowledge, whether critical or public, is to surrender to third-wave marketization. It implicates one in the destruction of all things public—public life, public spaces, public services, and public education. In retreating from values, pure science has no basis for contesting the destruction of the conditions of its own existence. What we share as sociologists—pure scientists as well as public sociologists—is the defense of our profession, that is, the maintenance of an arena of autonomy against the corrosive powers of privatization and commodification. In this we have much in common with other publics beyond the university. Public sociology is the recognition of such a common interest in human freedom, and thus a commitment to human rights that reach beyond the university, human rights that are embedded in the standpoint of civil society. It is part of the art of public sociology to build bridges and transcend differences between otherwise disconnected worlds.

Note

1. Thanks to Erik Wright for his comments and suggestions.