Public Sociology and Democratic Theory

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Abstract

Sociology, as conceived by Comte, was to put an end to the anarchy of opinions characteristic of liberal democracy by replacing opinion with the truths of sociology imposed through indoctrination. Later sociologists backed away from this, making sociology acceptable to liberal democracy by being politically neutral. The critics of this solution asked ‘whose side are we on?’ Burawoy provides a novel justification for advocacy scholarship in sociology. Public sociology is intended to have political effects, but also to be funded by the politically neutral state. He argues that public sociology is institutionally neutral, but that committing to an organic relation with a social movement is legitimate as a matter of the sociologist’s personal value choice. Although this produces side-taking sociology, by improving the case for particular standpoints it serves to improve democratic discussion generally, which is an appropriately neutral public aim.

Keywords

Burawoy / Comte / democratic theory / foundations / liberal democracy / political neutrality / public sociology / standpoint theory / value-neutrality

On the eve of the Second World War, the Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf wrote a study in the history of sociology, which he published under the title ‘Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism’ (1939). It is a stark reminder that sociology has always been in conflict or potential conflict with liberal democracy. August Comte earned a privileged place in Ranulf’s text for his attacks on the idea of freedom of conscience and the ‘anarchy of opinions’ of his time. These make for shocking reading even today. Comte denounced the very idea of a liberal public making decisions based on discussion, ridiculed citizens for forming their own opinions, and called for state control over the dispersion of ideas.
There is no liberty of conscience in astronomy, in physics, or even in physiology, that is to say, everybody would find it absurd not to have confidence in the principles established by men who are competent in these sciences. If it is not so in politics, this is due only to the fact that, since the older principles have yet to be abandoned, and no new ones have as yet been devised to replace them, there are really no fixed principles at all in the meantime. (Comte, 1864[1830–42] IV: 44n)

The argument is compelling, as even John Stuart Mill, who broke with Comte over it, conceded (1865: 302). Comte also argued that the lessons of sociology should be imposed on the population through a regime of indoctrination (1864[1830–42] IV: 22, 480; V: 231). If sociology was taken to be, as Comte took it to be, a science which had, for the practical purpose of ordering political life, reached the positive stage, it ought to be taught as scientific truth, not as a matter of opinion. To object to teaching it in this way would be similar to objecting to teaching evolution as fact: a kind of willful obscurantism.

Why did Ranulf regard this reasoning as fascistic? Writing near the Nazis, he was sensitive to one highly overt kind of intervention by the state: indoctrination. The idea that the state should be in the business of indoctrinating students, as Ranulf saw, was continuous with totalitarianism. Indeed, the following might be a good definition of totalitarianism: for the totalitarian regime all significant matters that were formerly thought to be matters of opinion are placed in the category of truths about which there can be no legitimate dispute, and which are thus appropriately the subject of indoctrination. Ranulf of course disagreed with Comte’s assessment of the state of sociology, and specifically with the idea that it had attained such a level of development that it could be regarded, in practice, as truth rather than opinion.

But the issue cannot be regarded as having died with Comte, or even as being closed. Instead it points to a pervasive issue within democratic theory. What does it mean for liberal democracy if a significant part of public discourse is false or erroneous? Democratic theory assumes that this discourse is self-regulating, and that error will be corrected by discourse itself. But what if there is genuine expert knowledge about the kinds of things that public discourse takes as its object, but public discourse does not acknowledge it? What if the errors cannot be readily corrected within public discourse itself, precisely because understanding them requires expertise beyond that of the ordinary citizen? What if the terms of public discussion, or the conditions of its conduct, are such that the truth on certain issues cannot come to the fore?

Nor is this a purely hypothetical possibility. Elements of the public routinely dispute or reject academic claims, including those of natural science. Does this discredit the basic ideas of democratic theory? Comte’s answer would of course have been ‘yes’. His answer to the question of what to do about the ignorance and incompetence of the public is a draconian one: abolish public discussion in favor of expert rule and indoctrination. And there is a sense in which this was tried by Communism (Turner, 2006). But what is the proper democratic response?
The Problem of Public Opinion

Liberal democratic theory is absolutist about the political neutrality of the state. ‘The conception that government should be guided by majority opinion makes sense’, as Hayek puts it:

only if that opinion is independent of government. The ideal of democracy rests on the belief that the view which will direct government emerges from an independent and spontaneous process. It requires, therefore, the existence of a large sphere independent of majority control in which the opinions of the individuals are formed. (1960: 109)

For the state to intervene and shape opinion, for example by indoctrination, makes the ‘democratic’ subordination of the state to public opinion into a sham by making the public process of discussion into a sham. This basic idea can also be understood as involving fundamental rights. Jefferson put it thus: ‘To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical’ (1779, Papers 2: 545). The background to Jefferson’s claim is the issue of state-sponsored religion or ‘establishment’. But the form of the claim is to affirm a right against a certain kind of state coercion, coercion to support the propagation of opinions one rejects.

These basic liberal premises present a dilemma. If sociology is opinion, that is to say if we put it into the same category as religious dogma, citizens ought not to be forced to subsidize it or have it directed at them. It is no more than state-sponsored propaganda. Alternatively, if sociology is a science, a science of facts, we may grant it the kind of exemption from this restriction that natural science receives. Sociology can be part of the educational process, and promoted by the state, if it is itself neutral, as facts are. If it is a science that can have its full effect only by being accepted as true, the inculcation that offended Ranulf would be as appropriate as a public health campaign. Sociologists who failed to act on their knowledge by giving it to the public would be morally culpable. And states which failed to make use of it would have failed to act on behalf of their citizens.

Yet drawing the line between between fact and opinion leads to endless muddles. Paul Feyerabend argued, in Science in a Free Society, that science itself was one opinion among many and thus should not be imposed by the state as dogma, as it is through educational institutions (1978: 91–2, 106–7). But radically expanding the notion of opinion leads to absurdities, or, more importantly, what appear in given political traditions to be absurdities. Should the state not teach science at all? If it attempts to be non-dogmatic in the teaching of science, does that mean that such things as creation science need to be taught? Grounding the distinction in the philosophy of science has not proved satisfactory: there are too many different accounts of the boundaries of science to think that any of them can be treated as fact. The very existence of diversity of opinion here poses a problem: unless we think that philosophies of science can be taken to be fact rather than opinion (something assumed, rather
strangely, by US Court decisions in cases involving ‘Creation Science’). Choosing one over another to draw the line is a matter of choosing one opinion over another, and is thus a violation of neutrality. It also raises a political question: who decides? In an important sense, Carl Schmitt’s dictum, that what is ‘unpolitical’ is a political decision (1985[1922]: 2), is true, even for, and perhaps especially for, liberal democracies.

The notion of indoctrination raises questions of its own. What is the line between the propagation of opinions or the intervention in democratic discussion – discursive will-formation, to use the Habermasian term – and something that is not proscribed, such as education? Romanticist critics of the Enlightenment denied that there was such a distinction, and today it is an anti-liberal commonplace to regard schoolbooks and the schooling experience as sources of sexism, racism, and the reproduction of class distinction (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu et al., 1994).

The distinction between fact and opinion that is central to the liberal principle is controversial even within liberalism. Many liberal thinkers agree, tacitly or explicitly, that it is a mistake to draw the line between science and other forms of opinion in an absolute way, and argue for a different way of understanding the relation of science and politics (cf. Polanyi, 1964[1946]: 67, 69, 72–3; Turner, 2005).

There is another critical line-drawing problem that has been alluded to here. Indoctrination is an extreme and overt form of state action. But there are many other ways in which the state intervenes in public discussion. Hayek used the phrase ‘independent and spontaneous’ to describe the process of democratic discussion. But what does this mean? A traditional view holds that it is sufficient for the state to be politically neutral. But what if, as Habermas argued (1989[1962]), the social structure that underlies ‘public’ discussion is itself biased toward certain systematic errors and illusions? What if the process is distorted by non-governmental factors, or by indirect consequences of state actions? For example, if there are multiple sides to a controversy, what if some sides have access to resources that allow their views to be made persuasive beyond what is rationally justified? Does the state have an obligation to support corrections to this process, such as attempts to balance the discussion? Or to intervene with research to improve its quality?

Thinkers like Hayek tend to regard the issue narrowly; for them, the public discussion we have is good enough. The primary risk is in the intrusion of the state. But they also take the category of state intervention broadly. For thinkers on the ‘democratic Left’, the promise of liberalism is chronically unfulfilled for reasons that arise from society rather than the state. Without the intrusion of the state in society, genuine discussion, discussion in which the argument with the greatest rational force wins, will remain out of reach. So for them, state intervention and regulation is not only justified but necessitated by what we might think of as the market failures of the marketplace of ideas (Dahl, 2006; Pettit, 1997: 194).
The Practice of Political Neutrality

Liberal democracies have steered a complex middle course in the face of these issues, by encouraging, subsidizing, and granting partial autonomy, a separation from direct political involvement and control, to special institutional structures that support expertise by education and research. Foundations, for example, operate under a ‘contract’ which allows them to avoid taxes as long as they spend money for charitable purposes: politics in the explicit sense of partisan electoral politics are excluded. But policy studies, advocacy of various kinds, as long as it is not direct advocacy of pending legislation, and so forth, are allowed, along with traditional charitable activities. What is the rationale for this arrangement? The basic idea is this: it is better for the rich to give money to charity than to spend it on luxuries or on their heirs, so the state permits the creation of foundations with the incentive of no taxation. In return, the foundations are to comply with the law, with the chance of having their tax-free status revoked.

The political logic behind these relationships is rarely discussed. There is a large literature on science and its political meaning. Michael Polanyi, for example, who argued, like Feyerabend, that science was a form of opinion, also argued that it deserved its exemption from the restrictions of liberalism because science was an autonomous, self-governed community with its own core commitments and purposes that shared features of liberalism, served society at least indirectly, and needed to be treated like an established church or the legal profession (1964[1946]: 67). A similar argument was made about science by Don Price (1965) in the USA, likening science to an ‘estate’. Sociologists are most familiar with what was, at the time it was published, a minor contribution to this discussion: Merton’s paper, ‘A Note on Science and Democracy’ (1942), better known by one of its later titles, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’ in The Sociology of Science (1973).

The contract with science was this: fund science and leave it alone to determine its research priorities, and in return science would yield results of significant practical value for social needs. This was an instrumental contract. Neutrality was dealt with implicitly by virtue of the fact that science, meaning natural science, had its own strong tradition and a sense of its boundaries. Merton called this an ethos, and described it in terms of communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. The autonomy of science, he argued, was justified by the fact that scientists policed themselves in accordance with this ethos.

One of Merton’s concerns in this paper was with the autonomy of sociology, which he recognized was threatened by the fact that sociological claims often conflicted with popular beliefs. The concern proved to be well founded. A significant group of scientists opposed the inclusion of the social sciences into the National Science Foundation, in part on the grounds that the social sciences were political or ideological rather than genuine sciences. They succeeded in excluding the social sciences from the original legislation. When the foundation
eventually relented, it did so with the understanding, enforced by the choice of
program officers and by their decisions, that the sociology supported by the
foundation would be quantitative and apolitical.

But sociology had its own version of the contract, and its history is essen-
tial to understanding the case for ‘public sociology’. The implicit deal that has
been the basis of sociology’s claim on society has been that supporting sociol-
ogy as a research and academic discipline will produce results that have a pos-
itive effect on societal problems through authoritative expertise.

At many points in the past this deal has been articulated explicitly. The vast
investment of Rockefeller funds in social science in the 1920s was understood
as a means of improving the quality and capacity for research, which in a few
years was expected to be applied to and to have an impact on social problems.
When this did not occur, funding was cut (Turner and Turner, 1990: 41–5).

As an academic subject, sociology operates under the autonomy granted to
the university, and to such bodies as foundations. In the university, fields that
conflict with public opinion can survive, even flourish, by attracting students
who are skeptical of public orthodoxies. And at various times sociology has
flourished, precisely in its role as an alternative to public opinion.

As with foundations, the autonomy of universities is granted under certain
conditions, one of which is that they remain outside of politics. In the course of
establishing itself as an academic subject, sociology had to draw its own lines
in a way that was sufficiently convincing that other scholarly fields accepted it
as a legitimate discipline. And the admission of sociology into the university
provided a kind of resolution to the problem of neutrality. Within these insti-
tutions, the issue is transformed, but does not vanish. It is often transferred to
the specific details of the institutional arrangements themselves. But the logic of
political neutrality does not become irrelevant. There are still boundaries, such
as the limits of the tradition of academic freedom, and issues like ‘is it educa-
tion or indoctrination’ still arise.

Sociology has, throughout its history, flirted with the boundaries set by
these relationships, and has a long internal history of discussing them. A signif-
ificant part of the background to the current discussion of ‘public’ sociology is the
fact that a discussion has opened up in the United States of America over the
politicization of the universities (Horowitz, 2006). It is routinely alleged that
academics have stepped over the line by producing biased scholarship and teach-
ing and by punishing students who present views in class that are acceptable,
even conventional, in the larger body of public discussion, but are treated as false
and even excoriated as racist, sexist, and so forth by classroom teachers.

This new discussion of professorial political bias is particularly relevant to
Berkeley sociology and its form of ‘public sociology’; especially as articulated in
the much debated American Sociological Association address by Michael
Burawoy (2005). The major critic of politically motivated abuses of the aca-
demic status, David Horowitz, was an associate of some of the present Berkeley
faculty in the 1960s, when they were all involved in radical politics. Horowitz
became an apostate (1998) and critic of politicization; Burawoy, a defender of public sociology.

**Burawoy’s New Model**

The implications of the discussion so far are straightforward enough. There is a conflict in the abstract, and recognized explicitly in Comte and others, between liberal democracy and a ‘social science’ that makes ‘political’ pronouncements, whether it does so by asserting intellectual authority over topics that public discussion takes as its domain or by participating as a state-sponsored source of opinion within public discussion. This conflict takes other forms as well, such as the issue of classroom indoctrination. How does the literature on public sociology handle this conflict? And how does liberal democracy handle sociology?

As we have seen, sociology occupies an uncomfortable and anomalous position. Sociology purports to have expert knowledge about matters that are in the domain of public discussion in liberal democracy. Its value lies in the ability of sociology to do something that public discourse ordinarily cannot or does not. The claim that sociology makes for public support and recognition depends on this purported ability. But once recognized and supported, what status do sociological claims have? Are these claims merely another contribution to the debates that make up ‘public reason’? Or are they properly understood as claims that serve to take issues out of the realm of public discussion and into the category of fact or expertise proper? How one answers this question has implications for the question of funding. Ordinarily the state in liberal democracies does not fund political viewpoints. If sociological claims are part of public reason, they would run afoul of this practice. But if sociology were a more limited activity, it would undercut the raison d’être for sociology, for it would limit its contribution to public discussion. The issue can be put differently. Is sociology, as a publicly funded activity, an anomaly for liberal democracy, fundamentally in conflict with it because it is an attempt to usurp the functions of public discussion by expertizing it? Or is it a means by which liberal democracy is supported and improved, and a legitimate object of state support?

It is in his approach to this question that Burawoy comes to a genuinely novel and radical conclusion. But the argument is not made directly. The literature on public sociology begins with a few core ideas: that sociology has gone Left while the world has gone Right, as Burawoy puts it (2005: 261); that sociology has a direct contribution to make to democratic discussion that is frustrated by various factors; that engaging the public, especially by critiques of conventional and especially right-wing views, is a moral obligation of sociologists; that sociologists are disadvantaged in the realm of public debate by the reductive and simplistic character of public discussion (cf. Stacey, 2004) and the lack of respect for sociology; and that other fields have greatly outpaced sociology in the ‘public intellectual’ market, to the detriment of the field.
Burawoy’s explicit contribution to this literature is that he has outlined a model of public sociology and sketched out the relations between various forms of present sociology, particularly the relation between activist public sociology and what he calls professional sociology. His innovative concept in the presidential address is the idea of an organic relation between sociology and its various publics (2005: 263–6). The examples he has in mind include sociologists’ participation in NGOs and social movements, a relation that he suggests is dialogical rather than expert. This is, superficially, a ‘liberal’ idea; Comte, as we have seen, would have nothing of dialogue.

Burawoy adds to this a novel approach to the problem of neutrality. In addressing this problem, Burawoy is implicitly acknowledging that sociology as an ideological activity – as a discipline with its own value scheme – would be a serious problem for liberal democracy. If ‘public sociology’ was, to put it bluntly, an ideology or set of ideologies with some supporting factual content, subsidizing it would violate the political neutrality of the state, represent an intervention in public discourse on a particular side, and oppress by virtue of coercing citizens to pay for themselves to be subjected to propaganda. This is a trap that arguments for a politicized sociology of the ‘Whose side are we on?’ form routinely fall into.

Burawoy, however, is more subtle than this. Rather than rejecting the idea of neutrality outright, he appeals to the idea of neutrality. In a crucial passage, he claims that there is ‘no intrinsic normative valence’ to the idea of public sociology (2005: 266). He nevertheless provides a model of the relation of values to public sociology: the character of particular expressions of public sociology – books, relations of support and cooperation with NGOs, and the like – reflect the individual values of sociologists. But these are taken to be private matters, rather than, as with Comte, matters which sociology itself can decide. When sociologists ally themselves to a social movement in an organic manner they do so out of individual choice. They would still be in the bounds of public sociology even if the movement in question were fundamentalist Christianity. This means that the idea of a public sociology is not intrinsically Leftist, despite the fact that most sociologists are on the Left. Moreover, it means that sociology as a discipline is not responsible for the ‘public sociology’ commitments and alliances that individual sociologists undertake in the name of sociology and in accordance with their own conscience. We can, in short, recognize a work as a piece of good public sociology while rejecting the values on which it is based.

The legitimacy of sociology, for Burawoy, depends in part on the successes of professional sociology in providing rigorous social research. But it also depends on the dialogic success of public sociologists’ organic relations to social movements and to the audiences, especially student audiences, which sociology cultivates a relation to. These relations also provide an important kind of constraint on sociologists: they are compelled to express themselves in ways that fit with and articulate the experiences and convictions of these movements. Thus the sociologist in an organic relationship is engaged in the task of providing the self-understanding of society, in the phrase of Edward Shils, but no longer for society as a whole, but for a society made up of different standpoints.
The Meaning of the Argument

If we read Burawoy as not so much advocating but rather ratifying the new relation of sociology to the political, the significance of the argument becomes clearer. American sociology, of which Berkeley sociology is an extreme case, is now primarily sustained by relationships of the sort he describes. The model is women’s studies, which purports to represent the standpoint of women, and stands in a special relationship of mutuality, organic and dialogic, with the feminist movement. Like women’s studies, the appeal of sociology to students is bound up with a kind of self-understanding that involves identities, especially those of race and gender. The actual scholarship of sociologists is primarily motivated by public issues raised by such movements.

Burawoy’s achievement is to provide an articulation of the normative content of the social relationships that sustain this kind of sociology – its contract with society. In this respect it represents a significantly novel approach to the problem outlined above: finding a modus vivendi with liberal democracy. As such, it belongs alongside such works as Weber’s *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (1946[1917]) and his essay on Value-neutrality (1949[1917]), with which it sharply contrasts. And its implications, many of which are not stated by Burawoy, are very far reaching.

The central political implication involves the place of sociology in relation to liberal democracy. The kind of sociological scholarship Burawoy is legitimating under the heading of organic public sociology is advocacy scholarship: it consciously attempts to understand and articulate the standpoint of some group in society in a way that is intelligible and instructive to the members of the group, as well as to support this standpoint through social research. The term ‘dialogical’, whose ordinary contrastive is ‘analytic’, implies in this context that the concerns and viewpoints of the partners are not merely topics for research but enter into the definition of the problem. It may be noted that this use of dialogue is not liberal: the partner in the dialogue is not the public as a whole, but the movement allies.

Under previous models of sociology and its role in liberal democracy, this kind of scholarship would be a problem both for sociology and for the state: for the state, because it represents a form of taking sides; it would be a problem for sociology, understood as a science, because it lacked what Merton called distinterestedness. Burawoy’s model, if we understand it in the larger context of democratic theory, allows sociology to transcend both problems. Many liberal democracies subsidize viewpoints, under some form of the neutrality assumption. Burawoy supplies a parallel neutrality assumption: group advocacy scholarship, or what he characterizes as audience specific organic public sociology, is acceptable in principle as public sociology regardless of the group. This kind of scholarship is not impermissible state subsidization of viewpoints, but rather a means of improving the quality of public discussion through the subsidization of opinion diversity. This transcends the problem of political neutrality because the state does not chose, and the state-subsidized
discipline of sociology itself is neutral between the kinds of commitments that individual sociologists choose to make.

Sociology is understood to be one of many participants in the larger public debates in which a flourishing liberal democracy engages. It is understood as well that there are viewpoints of other, contrary kinds, which are also subsidized and also contribute to competition in the forum of liberal democratic public discussion.

The problem of intellectual neutrality or disinterestedness is solved in a different way, and it is crucial to see what the full implications of this solution are. Burawoy appeals to the standpoint epistemology of Patricia Hill Collins (2000[1990]) and Dorothy Smith (1987), which is rooted in a larger feminist epistemological literature. Weber had argued that values entered into the description of social phenomenon, but not into the casual analysis done using these valuative descriptive categories. Myrdal put this same point differently in the methodological appendix to An American Dilemma: sociology can say something scientifically about the correctness of people’s beliefs, but nothing about the correctness of their valuations (1962[1944]: 1027–34; cf. Eliaeson, 2006). Standpoint theory draws the line differently: beliefs and values are determined by one’s standpoint, and evidence enters into a standpoint – facts become facts – according to standards specific to that standpoint. One variant of standpoint theory holds that certain standpoints, those of the oppressed, are epistemically privileged, because privilege blinds its possessors to truths about privilege. Another variant holds that standpoints are irreducibly plural and in conflict. Disinterestedness, in either case, is not possible.

Yet public sociology in the organic mode, despite its engaged or standpoint character, may be said to be legitimately part of academic scholarship, and appropriately supported by the state, if it serves the purpose of improving democratic discussion. The advocacy studies that are done by sociologists organically related to social movements are valuable only if they are persuasive, and to be persuasive they need to be up to professional standards. But adhering to these standards is merely a means of gaining public credibility – legitimacy, as Burawoy puts it (2005: 267). They do not establish the objective truth of the conclusions in any sense similar to that of ‘positivist’ science. The conclusions are, rather, accredited by professional consensus as claims to be taken seriously in public discussion. This is the end point and aim of this kind of sociology. The political meaning of sociology is thus to contribute to the diversity of political discussion by helping to give voice and support to particular movements and groups.

**Epilog**

I began this article with the Comtean idea of the intellectual authority of scientific sociology supplanting the anarchy of opinions of liberal democratic discussion. The discussion of Burawoy closes with the idea of organic public sociology as a handmaiden to partisan participants in liberal democratic
discussion. The transformation is profound. Comte, and after him (and for much of the next century) the Left and reformers (such as Karl Pearson and the Webbs) looked to sociology to solve the problem of the anarchy of opinions. Where Comte believed politics resolved nothing, Burawoy believes that science resolves nothing – that standpoints are irreducible. Past sociologists, such as Merton, defended sociology in its conflicts with public opinion by stressing its self-imposed restrictions, such as universalism and disinterestedness; Burawoy seeks to justify sociology for its contribution to, and intimacy with, particular social movements and causes in their political efforts.

The former goal of sociology was to get a seat at the table of the sciences; the goal of public sociology is to kibitz at the table of political discussion. Although Burawoy does not formally abandon the scientistic aspirations of sociology, he pointedly reminds us that the reign of scientism was brief, partial, and unsuccessful (2005: 278–9), and that sociology as a discipline recovered its lost student audience at the same time that the scientistic dream of a coherent, cumulative science evaporated. This is a conception of sociology that thus has the virtue of realism about the actual prospects of sociology as a viable discipline, which the scientizers never did, as well as solving a problem that the advocates of politically committed sociology, such as Robert Lynd (1939), failed to solve: the problem justifying its subsidization by a neutral state.

Notes

1 This problem was the focus of Merton’s ‘Norms’ essay (1942, 1968 [1957, 1949]; Turner, 2007a), but formulated as a problem in political theory by Michael Polanyi (cf. Polanyi 1939, 1941–43, 1943–45, 1964[1946], 1980[1951]).

2 The terms of this ‘contract’, however, go beyond the law, which can be revoked or changed at any time. It is revealed in the various public investigations into foundations that have occurred when politicians believed the foundations had strayed into politics. From the point of view of liberal democratic theory, these investigations, and the ensuing threats to change the law if the foundations didn’t stay out of politics, served to mark the boundaries of acceptable behavior (Nilsen, 1972: 53–4).

3 The history of the complex issue of the place of science in relation to liberal discussion is discussed at length elsewhere (Turner, 2007b).

4 The term derives from Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual (1971).

5 Ironically, the value theory which underlies this way of making the distinction is Weberian.

References


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