The Field of Sociology
Its Power and Its Promise

Sociology in the United States has spanned three waves over the past 150 years. It was born as a utopian project during the nineteenth century; it was disciplined into a science during the course of the twentieth century; and now, in its third wave, it harnesses that science to its earlier moral concerns in order to give vitality to public sociology. This is the thesis of my rejoinder, which situates my critics in the field of sociology, navigating its successive waves.

The three waves of sociology reflect and refract broad societal responses to three waves of market expansion. The first wave of marketization led to a spontaneous reaction from an emergent civil society that not only softened the blow of labor commodification but also sought to transcend capitalism with socialist, communitarian, and cooperative experiments. In sociology's first wave, which in the United States stretched from the Civil War to World War I, the field was closely associated with this burgeoning civil society. It was married to moral reform and, therefore, in its origins possessed a strong public character.

The second wave of marketization took off after World War I with renewed global intensity, leading to equally profound reactions, but this time from nation-states—such varied forms as fascism, communism, and social democracy. In the United States the state-regulated capitalism of the New Deal found its reflection in a professional sociology, concerned with social control, social order, and social problems. A latecomer to the social sciences, this second-wave sociology began to shed its association
with moral reform, aiming to establish a codified body of knowledge that could be deployed in the policy world. Although there were powerful strands of public sociology throughout this period—from Edward Ross to David Riesman, from W. E. B. Du Bois to Erving Goffman—the hallmark of the second wave was the rise of a professional sociology whose outward orientation, to the extent it had one, focused on power and money. At its apex professional sociology built relations with major foundations, with market research, and with federal agencies.

Professional sociology not only supplied technical tools for policy sociology but also supplied its own rationale—the theory of mass society that gained currency in the United States after World War II. It was a theory that denied the very existence of articulate publics and thereby justified either ignoring them or speaking for them. Ties to states and corporations led professional sociology to emphasize its expert rather than its public role. However, this did not last for long. Under attack from critical sociology—inigrated by the civil rights, antiwar, Third World, and feminist movements of the 1960s and early 1970s—professional sociology underwent a veritable revolution. A new generation of sociologists, with ties (real and imaginary) to effervescent publics, now rewrote the sociology of politics, of culture, of work, of development, of the economy, of the family, of urbanization, of race and ethnicity, of gender and sexuality, and, more generally, of inequality. Casting aside models of irrational mass behavior, social movement theory epitomized the transformation of sociology, successively incorporating the centrality of social conflict, resource mobilization, political process, and framing. From the perspective of sociology, “publics” had now thrust themselves onto the political stage as rational and articulate actors. The theoretical conditions for the renaissance of public sociology were born as sociologists rediscovered civil society and its public sphere.

The political impetus for the renaissance of public sociology emerged later, in the 1980s, with the resurrection of market fundamentalism. This third wave of marketization was actively promoted by the U.S. state—a state that had reversed itself and begun to deny the very existence of society. Policy makers by now had less use for sociology, and sociology had less leverage with state and business. Deregulating the economy, cutting welfare, starving education, and privatizing public services (not to mention imperial adventures abroad) recreated the specter of the nineteenth century, when sociology had first sprung up to aid “the self-defense of society.” With third-wave marketization, or neoliberalism as it is more popularly known, public sociology was reborn.

Today, in its third wave, sociology's external focus turns from the policy world to the world of publics. But second-wave professional-policy sociology has not simply disappeared. Indeed, it is mounting a struggle against resurgent critical-public sociology, claiming that the latter threatens the unity of our discipline, endangering its legitimacy, devaluing its professional credentials, and contaminating its scientific neutrality. Nonetheless, second-wave sociology, with its decaying linkages to the state, is giving way to third-wave sociology that shifts the balance away from policy to public sociology, reshaping professional and critical sociology along the way. As the state forsakes its progressive face, losing any semblance of universality, it compels sociology to seek allies in the realm of publics. Third-wave sociology joins first-wave moral reform to second-wave professional science to produce a renewal of public sociology, recasting our discipline.

STRUCTURING THE FIELD, MAKING SENSE OF THE CHAOS

Successive waves of sociology cannot be reduced to a succession of different types of knowledge, for example, from public to professional to policy to critical and back to public sociology. Rather, successive waves reconfigure the content of and the relations among all four knowledges. The coexistence of professional, policy, public, and critical sociologies, albeit in continually changing constellations, has been an ever-present and necessary feature of our discipline. That these four knowledges crystallize into a dynamic division of labor that defines our field is not an accident of history but springs from their origins in two fundamental questions: “Knowledge for whom?” and “Knowledge for what?” In other words, are we addressing fellow sociologists (or other academics), or audiences beyond the academy? Are we interested in matters that take for granted a specific set of values and societal goals, or are we interested in the interrogation of those values and goals? These are not arbitrary questions—they have a genealogy that stretches back to ancient philosophy and forward to the most contemporary of theorists.

Here I am less concerned with ancient lineage and more with how these two questions—knowledge for whom and knowledge for what—define the components of our disciplinary field. Instrumental knowledge answers the question “Knowledge for what?” by focusing on means rather than ends. It divides into professional sociology, aimed at puzzles (external anomalies and internal contradictions) defined by our research programs, and policy sociology, aimed at solving problems defined by
clients. Reflexive knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned with ends rather than means. It divides into critical sociology, which interrogates the normative assumptions and constructs the value foundations of professional sociology, and public sociology, which engages in public dialogues about major issues that affect public life. Here, then, is the fourfold division of sociological labor—each type of knowledge interdependent on but also at odds with the others.

The fourteen commentaries in this volume, which seem to be a bewildering cascade of claims and counterclaims, make sense when located within the division of sociological labor. Each protagonist adopts a perspective tied to his or her place in the (division of sociology and defends that position-taking through antagonism and alliance with other position-takings. Even those—indeed, especially those—who make no mention of the division of labor or who seek to abolish it nevertheless reproduce its elements. Thus, Immanuel Wallerstein's triumvirate of functions—analytical, moral, and political—broadly corresponds to professional, critical, and a conflation of policy and public sociology. Leaving aside this conflation, to which I will return later, Wallerstein would have us carry out all three functions simultaneously, repudiating any notion of specialization. His own Olympian trajectory notwithstanding, such a vision of the Renaissance man is not an option for the vast majority of academics today.

Rather, we have here not four dimensions of a single sociology but four distinct knowledges—cultures with their own repertoires and practices—that form a dynamic set of oppositions and interdependences. In place of Wallerstein's ahistorical, decontextualized fusion of functions, I propose a historically emergent and geographically variable division of labor that portrays our discipline (and other disciplines) as a field of power. The four knowledges are knitted together in a configuration of domination that varies over space and time. The domination of professional sociology in the United States, for example, emerged through its successive dialogues with public, policy, and critical sociologies. If professional sociology still dominates U.S. sociology today (even as it makes a greater space for public sociology), public sociology is relatively stronger in South Africa and Brazil, and policy sociology is prominent in Scandinavian societies, just as a subterranean critical sociology has often been strong in authoritarian societies. In considering the global division of sociological labor, we need to recognize not only how certain knowledge configurations concentrate in certain nations and regions but also how these in turn interconnect with and dominate each other.

We can think of sociology as a field of power because the field leads sociologists to place themselves within and among the four quadrants that define the division of labor. Riveted to our engagement with one another, denigrating the positioning of others in order to normalize and elevate our own, we miss the structure of the field as a whole that sets limits on our maneuvering. This is the first face of the power of the field—what one can call disciplinary power or disciplinarity—that creates the playing field, made up of the four interconnected positions and corresponding practices, acknowledged if not legitimated by all. In what follows I shall try to show that beneath the chaos of our discipline, represented in the preceding essays, there is indeed a patterning that reflects the power of the disciplinary field over its participants. Each displays an intuitive sense of the possible positions in the field and of the actual or putative positions held by others. Each defends his or her own position by reference to other positions, often by stereotyping and pathologizing them. Thus, professional sociologists often disparage public sociology as "pop" sociology, servile to its audiences, while casting themselves as paragons of disinterestedness. Public sociologists, on the other hand, may respond by appropriating disinterestedness for themselves while viewing professional sociology as trivial and irrelevant, as servile to academic careerism. Such oppositions are produced by the field's division of labor and its disciplinarity.

Such antagonisms are complicated by the second face of the power of the field—its power over other fields. Disciplinary power is directed outward as well as inward. Commentaries on public sociology, here and elsewhere, develop position-taking within the field in order to be effective (or not) outside the field, that is, to be effective on other disciplines but also on other spheres of life. Beyond the academy, there are parallel fields—policy fields and public fields, themselves structured into dominant and subordinate positions—that are more or less accessible, depending on one's location within the division of sociological labor. Moreover, building connections to other fields can be part of a strategy to protect or accumulate internal power within sociology. Yet external alliances can also lead to the erosion of fortress mentalities within the discipline, taking us beyond sectional oppositions to embrace the underlying interdependencies that give integrity to our field and contribute to its effectivity beyond.

Disciplinary fields are not static. The division of sociological labor changes over time, and indeed also over space, as do its effects on other fields. This reconfiguration is shaped by broad changes in state,
Recognizing that we do have different values, Smith-Lovin argues that institutionalizing them as public sociologies would endanger the consensus necessary for advancing cumulative knowledge. It would, she claims, divide our community where we need unity. We should, therefore, keep our values to ourselves and try, as best we can, to pursue a value-free science. But, if values are so central to our sociological being, to hide them under the pretense of value neutrality will all too easily result in the tyranny of the majority, making minority claims illegitimate. For example, by giving legitimacy to the values behind gay studies, one allows the development of novel theoretical perspectives and corresponding innovative methods that spill over into and invigorate other areas. This is, indeed, Abbott's position: a humanist sociology that insists on the inseparability of science and values, of instrumental and reflexive knowledge. For him there's no question of hiding values, but neither is there a question of politicization from without. Values yes, politics no. He is as opposed to specialists of reflexive knowledge—which critical or public sociology—as he is to specialists of instrumental knowledge.

This is more easily said than done. Our field is not simply a field of force, akin to a magnetic field, but it is also a playing field in which the practice of professional sociology has a gamelike character. In order to advance our research programs, we have to suspend doubt in the values and rules that uphold them and concentrate on doing science. We can't simultaneously play the game and question its foundations. I agree with Abbott that values are central to our practice as sociologists, but in order to interrogate those values we have to step outside science and devote ourselves to a different knowledge-practice, what Max Weber called value discussion. Critical sociology can perform its critical function only if it can maintain some distance from the science it problematizes. Specializing in critique is sufficiently disruptive but, because of its separation, not too disruptive. It allows progressive research programs to advance and helps degenerate programs wither away. That, for example, was the function of critical theory with respect to structural functionalism.

If Smith-Lovin and Abbott see professional sociology as threatened from without, whether from public sociology's values or its politics, Arthur Stinchcombe sees professional sociology as limited from within. Ours is an immature science, he says, with underdeveloped research programs. We don't have enough truth (nor the capacity to transmit what truths we do have), so we need to spend more time locked up in the ivory tower accumulating more truth. When we are ready we can venture forth to sell our wares. It's a particular truth Stinchcombe is
after—reliable prediction. But that’s just the sort of truth that cannot be conjured up within the academy but calls for an intense engagement with the world beyond. Thus, one of Stinchcombe’s favorites—Leon Trotsky—turned out to be so prophetic in his analyses of the fate of the Soviet Union precisely because of his deep involvement in its molecular movements. Even economists, practitioners of the paradigmatic social science, are notoriously bad predictors of macrophenomena. There are, of course, notable exceptions, such as John Maynard Keynes, but he is the exception that proves the rule. He too was deeply engaged with the society around him, giving him the broader vision to diagnose the dilemmas of capitalism. In short, to have a chance in the business of prediction, one must venture beyond the academy.

Stinchcombe, an exemplar of the very best of second-wave sociology, is interested not in talking to publics but rather in developing a predictive science for policy makers. Douglas Massey, too, is interested in an instrumental knowledge for policy makers, but unlike Stinchcombe, he is extremely confident, almost euphoric, about sociology’s potential contribution. He cites his own contribution to the congressional bill to end housing segregation and his attempt to influence immigration legislation. He expresses no doubts about sociology’s technical capacity. For him, our effectiveness in the policy world depends on sociology’s persuasive power, its scientific authority, and here he believes the politicization of our discipline is only a liability. The American Sociological Association should not be discrediting sociology’s standing by passing ineffectual resolutions. Instead we should be promoting serious research, cultivating a reputation for impartiality and objectivity, building professional respect and scientific prestige. His model of nonpartisanship is the Population Association of America. His criterion of success is “clout in Washington.” In effect, Massey would like to see our profession as a disciplined political organization for influencing the state. Impartiality and objectivity, thereby, become a tool and a weapon—a tool for disciplining sociologists and a weapon for persuading others. He is trying to redeem second-wave sociology in a period of its decline.2

Massey’s “weak politics” ultimately aspires to a “strong politics” of disciplinary control that we can find, for example, in the field of economics. Unlike economics, however, we don’t have the sine qua non of centralism—a singular doctrine to go along with our scientific methods, putting us at a disadvantage when dealing with political entities that demand coherent policy recommendations. What marks our profession is its multiplicity of research programs, mutually enriching each other, destined to speak to a plurality of publics rather than agencies of the state. Moreover, we live in an age of market idolatry and possessive individualism, when higher circles have diminishing tolerance for notions of social justice, social welfare, and social equality—when the very notion of the social is held in disrepute. Perhaps government and legislative agencies at the regional or local level are more receptive to sociology, if only because they have to bear the costs of federal laissez-faire, but sociology’s comparative advantage today still lies in cultivating relations to publics.

**CHALLENGING THE SECOND WAVE: THE CRITICAL–PUBLIC NEXUS**

Like professional and policy sociologies, critical and public sociologies are natural allies. If public sociology involves dialogue between sociologists and publics, critical sociology creates the space and the foundations for such a dialogue, by challenging the professional-policy alliance of second-wave sociology. This was the thrust of critical sociology from Robert Lynd to Pitirim Sorokin, C. Wright Mills, and Alvin Gouldner. Critical sociology is our field’s internal engine for public sociology.

Among our commentators, we can distinguish the critique of the content of sociology from the critique of its institutional form. Orlando Patterson points to professional sociology as inimical to the development of a public sociology, especially since its scientization in the 1950s with its supposed bias toward structuralism and abstraction. Perhaps he is talking about Harvard sociology, because if the intellectual center of gravity of sociology has moved in any direction over the last forty years, it is toward social process, historical change, and collective action. Indeed, it is this transformation of professional sociology that created the foundation of sociology’s third wave.

Alain Touraine, speaking from a pinnacle of French sociology, has been the strongest and most original proponent of the still-incomplete revolution toward a sociology of the actor. Classical sociology, with its laws of societal development and its systems analysis, is no longer relevant in an era of neoliberal capitalism that has destroyed society and replaced it with disparate processes of domination—institutionalization and desocialization on the one side and the ascent of groups defined by their culture (not their function) on the other. In this new world, public sociology takes the helm in recovering the subject through the defense of human rights and the search for actors. If before the initiative came from professional sociology, now public sociology in alliance with social...
actors, so he claims, is driving critical, policy, and professional sociology. Touraine is the prophet of third-wave sociology.

From within the United States, sociology looks less rosy, especially from its more critical margins. Although a lifelong practitioner of public sociology, Patricia Hill Collins is far more skeptical than Touraine about its possibilities and promise. The reed of public sociology is a thin one indeed, so much so that she fears that it might wilt in the heat of naming. Labeling public sociology makes it an easier target for those dominant professional forces hostile to its expression, leading to ghettoization, marginalization, and stigmatization. Alternatively, and just as problematic, institutionalizing it—if that were ever possible—could routiniz it, sapping it of its imagination and critical powers. Finally, at a time when the very idea of “public” is denigrated, it is asking for trouble to call something public sociology! Perhaps. But I think this is where we make a stand. Now is precisely the time to defend the idea of public before it disappears, injecting it with new meaning and vitality. Without a public, real and virtual, practical and discursive, sociology may as well be dead.

To be sure, Collins is right to be wary of naming. The issue, however, is less the fact than the act of naming—who does the naming, who controls the naming and determines its meaning. There are two types of naming: “labeling,” which dominant groups foist on subordinate groups, and “consciousness raising,” through which subordinate groups develop insights into and contest their subordination. The first challenge to domination, as feminists long ago made clear, is the capacity to recognize and name it. Indeed, Collins herself concludes that “the name is less important than to know she is not alone,” but the name is what allows her to find common cause with others and thus to carve out a place for public sociology within our discipline.

If the first step is naming, that is, reclassifying the categories we use to perceive and judge the world, the second step is to seek institutional change that will create more freedom for the subjugated. Judy Stacey offers seemingly modest proposals to lessen the domination of instrumental over reflexive knowledge and thereby promote public sociology. She would have a moratorium on publishing one year in three to free up time for public sociology, introduce guidelines for promoting faculty on the basis of public sociology, make sociological writing more accessible to wider audiences, have public intellectuals regularly visit departments, and promote interdisciplinary exchange to erode disciplinary boundaries and intercontinental exchange to make U.S. sociology more cosmopolitan. Sociology should take the lead in transforming academic culture. The danger, of course, is piecemeal reform that it could intensify subordination. But reform is not the heart of the matter. In putting forward these proposals Stacey is effectively underlining just how deeply entrenched are the hierarchies within our field and how difficult they would be to dislodge. But imagining possibilities is the first step to realizing them!

Institutional reform may be off the map for now, but there is nonetheless plenty of space for public sociology within the interstices of professionalism. To be sure, the official rewards are few and far between—although they are becoming more numerous as the idea gains currency—but we don’t practice public sociology for professional recognition. Just as a sense of vocation commits us to teaching, whether or not it is formally rewarded, the same is true of public sociology. Doing public sociology is its own reward. It is why so many of us became sociologists. How often do I hear senior sociologists—William Julius Wilson in his response is a case in point—advise graduate students and junior faculty to postpone their public sociology until they have tenure? From my observations, many graduate students would never survive the ordeals of graduate school were it not for their ventures into public sociology—sometimes open, sometimes secretive. That is what gives their commitment to professional sociology its meaning. If graduate students were to defer public sociology until they were mature and secure, our profession would be not only more boring but depleted of some of its best talent.

In the United States, for the foreseeable future, professional sociology will dominate the discipline, but there is an ongoing battle for its soul—a battle that has ramifications beyond the United States. Here critical sociology plays a pivotal role, directed against professional sociology’s faltering alliance with policy makers and propelling it into a new alliance with public sociology.

RIDING THE THIRD WAVE: SUBJUGATING POLICY TO PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY

The rise of third-wave sociology is marked by sociology shifting its outward orientation from policy to public sociology. Here our leading spokesperson is Frances Fox Piven, architect and veteran of the welfare rights movement of the 1970s. Taking a position diametrically opposed to Massey’s messianic defense of second-wave sociology, Piven calls for a dissident public sociology accountable to popular classes rather than elites, using participatory techniques of research. The state is so tainted—its
democracy corroded, its legitimacy lost—that it cannot be the audience for our research endeavors. As the political climate moves ever rightward, so we in the university have a special responsibility, she argues, to defend the interest of the poor and downtrodden. We must propagate our critical values quite openly, conduct the best research in their name, and not be concerned about our prestige and standing among power elites whose interests too easily distort our endeavors. Our impact on policy must be indirect through the organization of publics.

Sharon Hays extends Piven’s outspoken critique of policy sociology to professional sociology. Far from being divisive—and here she takes a position directly opposed to that of Smith-Lovin—public sociology should become the unifying foundation of our discipline. For Hays the division of sociological labor is, thus, the enemy of public sociology, not because it fragments our discipline but because it reproduces the very hierarchy that thwarts public sociology. Like Abbott and Smith-Lovin, firmly placed within the division of labor, nonetheless Hays too wants to get rid of it.

Undoubtedly subjugation to professional sociology can be seen as an impediment to public sociology, but scientific knowledge is different from—even at odds with—public knowledge. Scientific knowledge is accountable to peers rather than publics, its truth lies in correspondence with the world rather than in consensus, and its legitimacy lies in building research programs rather than being immediately relevant to the issues of the day. To be sure, professional sociology suffers from pathologies of self-referentiality and irrelevance, often driven by a narrow careerism, but public sociology has its own dangers of distortion, vanguardism, and pandering. These are two different knowledges, requiring different conditions of production, each necessary for the flourishing of the other. Professional sociology cannot be simply harnessed for public projects; it has a logic and autonomy of its own, just as public sociology has to be given space to develop its communicative action.3

If William Julius Wilson, public sociologist par excellence, sees this intimate connection between professional sociology and public sociology, he misses what Hays sees all too clearly, the hegemony of professional sociology. From his vantage point, professional, public, policy, and critical knowledges form a single seamless whole. Wilson cannot comprehend what all the fuss is about—why all the opposition to public sociology, and why sociologists don’t make greater efforts to get their ideas out. Sociology will survive only if it has a public profile. There’s no danger that public sociology will discredit the profession, because good

public sociology is and has to be good professional sociology. This view reflects Wilson’s own path into public sociology. The Declining Significance of Race (1978), intended for his professional peers, caught fire in the public sphere. It was a case of spontaneous combustion. The book began as the public face of professional sociology; it was only when Wilson had to defend it on radio and television, in the press, and in a host of public forums that he truly entered the world of public sociology. After that he never looked back—the public, the professional, the critical, and the policy appeared to melt into one.

Of all the figures in this symposium, Orlando Patterson is the most enigmatic. Surfing between second and third waves, he dissolves the distinction between public and policy sociology. For him it’s all a matter of maintaining independence—whether he is writing an op-ed for the New York Times, discussing dependency with the prime minister of Jamaica, advising the president of the United States on matters of ethnicity, addressing personnel executives from the top five hundred corporations, or helping pharmaceutical companies deploy the concept of freedom to make more money. We are living in a capitalist society, he says, so we should serve it to the best of our ability. The brunt of his attack is aimed not at the world beyond but at the world within our discipline. Thus, paradoxically, with one hand he seeks to rehabilitate the lost science of market research, while with the other he condemns the narrowness of professional sociology upon which it is based. Fortunately, history has moved on. Professional sociology has directed its methodological advances onto the big issues of the day, and now the values that inform its research are increasingly at odds with those propagated by power elites, so that few sociologists are willing and even fewer are able to become consultants of the capitalist class.

But Patterson and I agree completely on one point: the public face of professional sociology must be distinguished from traditional and organic public sociologies. I have already referred to the first, so let me elaborate on the second and third. Traditional public sociology is addressed to publics that are broad and national, that are largely anonymous and passive, that are relatively thin inasmuch as they involve limited internal interaction, and that are often mainstream in their orientation. Traditional public sociology, whether it be one of Patterson’s or Wilson’s op-eds in the New York Times or a best-selling book, emanates from the protected sphere of the university and engages publics at a distance. In this context the media are indeed mediators, becoming a public unto themselves, whose structure we need to understand if we are to get
through to the lay publics beyond. After all, engaging with the media is quite different from our customary academic communication with our peers. Sociologists have not been laggards here, with such notable scholars as Herb Gans, Todd Gitlin, Bill Gamson, or Bob McChesney showing just why our access to the media is limited and how we may expand it. Perhaps, as Barbara Ehrenreich suggests, part of the problem is that we simply don’t try hard enough or don’t try at all. Still, we need to understand this enterprise and the conditions of its possibility.

The second type of public sociology—organic public sociology—is much less visible but no less important. It circumvents the media in favor of a direct unmediated relation to publics, which might include neighborhood associations, communities of faith, labor movements, environmental groups, in other words, publics that are local, thick (with intensive interaction among their members), active, and often counterpublics that make demands on municipalities or state governments. As nation-states become ever more attuned to the demands of markets in a global context, so local states and local communities have to bear the human costs and are thus more attuned to the perspective of sociology. Here organic public sociologies can flourish, but not without dilemmas, since the publics themselves can become more demanding, calling on sociologists to service their immediate needs, subverting their autonomy, and pushing them in a policy direction.

Third-wave sociology will also valorize teaching as a form of organic public sociology in which there is a mutual adjustment between the vision of the sociologist and the lived experience of the student. Through this lens teaching becomes a triply dialogic: first, between student and teacher, in which each learns from the other; second, among the students themselves as they learn to discuss their lived experience with one another; and third, between students and various publics with whom they interact. There are models of teaching, including service learning, that quite deliberately invoke these forms of dialogue as principles of pedagogy—models quite different from those associated with professional and policy sociologies.

Indeed, the classroom can be seen as a laboratory for public sociology, a source of techniques of dialogue that can be transported beyond the academy in the manner that Paulo Freire celebrated in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970). To be sure, the conditions in the classroom are quite unique in that students are a captive audience, thereby potentially distorting dialogue. By contrast, to engage publics beyond the academy, the sociologist has to compete with many other messages from more powerful sources. Nonetheless we should think about and experiment with various strategies in the more protected environment of the university. Students should be seen not as a drag on our professional careers but as our first public—first in the sense that we meet them early on in our careers, first in the sense of their being inescapable, first in the sense that they are our most immediate public, first in the sense that they are our largest public (roughly a million students take introductory sociology every year), and first in the sense that we do have a chance of persuading them!

THIRD-WAVE SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

So far I have examined sociology from the inside out, highlighting the ways in which each commentator takes as reference point opposing positions within a field of power and the implication this has for the way each seizes the external power of the field. How does sociology look from the outside looking in? Writing as a consumer of sociology, Barbara Ehrenreich complains that we simply don’t do enough to meet the demands of journalists. Either we don’t address public issues or we don’t make the effort to publicize our work. There is a sense of frustration and incomprehension with the gap between sociology’s public potential and our professional parochialism. In particular, she has limited tolerance for disciplinary boundaries that might impede our coming to terms with public issues.

Ehrenreich is correct. Public sociology calls for multidisciplinary collaboration. Whether organ trafficking or labor organization, incarceration in prisons or tracking in schools, the degradation of the environment or community medicine, these questions are, indeed, ones in which disciplines can pool their knowledge, their expertise. Of course, professional sociology also borrows ideas from neighboring disciplines. But such interdisciplinary borrowings are absorbed into and governed by the logic of our own research programs, with little concern for their integrity in their originating discipline. Just as we are aghast at the way economists appropriate sociology, so they in turn are no less aghast, if they notice at all, at the way we appropriate economics. This distinction between multidisciplinary collaboration in the realm of public sociology and interdisciplinary borrowing in the realm of professional sociology only serves to underline once again the separation—but also the interdependence—of these two knowledge.

If Ehrenreich complains about the limited influence of our field, Evelyn Nakano Glenn complains about the opposite. Speaking from a place
in an interdisciplinary program, she resents our overbearing presence. The public sociology I propose is an outpost of professional sociology, designed to keep the discipline alive, not one that organically connects to subaltern publics—the specialty of subaltern disciplines. Glenn asserts that I too easily endorse disciplinary hierarchies and boundaries which subjugate interdisciplinary departments and programs—ethnic studies, African American studies, women’s studies, and others—which in their origin and nature were constituted to speak to and on behalf of specific publics. Indeed, their ideas have affected sociological knowledge through their infusion into critical sociology. Their always precarious place in the hierarchized world of the academy mirrors the subjugation of their publics in the broader political and economic fields. A dissident public sociology needs to collaborate with them in earnest— they continue to be a source and inspiration for third-wave sociology.

Glenn complains that I take as my point of reference the stronger disciplines of economics and political science and overlook the subaltern disciplines. True, but this is not because I have some fondness for these disciplines, but because they represent sociology’s other, particularly in times when state and economy collude in the cooperation, regulation, surveillance, and repression of society. Economics is at the vanguard, closely followed by political science, in constituting the foundations of neoliberal thought, which is bent on the destruction of everything to do with the idea of “public.” They are producing ideologies that are threatening all arenas of autonomous politics, not least the university in which they thrive—the university that every day becomes more like a private corporation than a responsive community of scholars and students. To be sure, both political science and economics are fields of power, possessing subaltern tendencies with which we can forge alliances, while the prevailing forces generate ideologies that justify a world ever more productive of and callous toward the weak and the poor. In the endeavor to fight off the tyranny of markets (propagated as freedom) and despotism of states (camouflaged as democracy), public sociology finds its allies in anthropology, in human geography, and in the hybrid disciplines created to defend subaltern publics.

I repeat this point because it is so fashionable to talk of the anachronism of the disciplines—whose pertinence is confined to their genesis in the nineteenth century—and of the need to compound the social sciences into a single discipline. To do so would be to invite the rule of the most powerful discipline, namely, economics, which has already made major inroads into political science. Even sociology, with its long and deep traditions of antiutilitarianism, is not impervious to economism. Propagators of rational actor theory, methodological individualism, often in the guise of social capital theory, have attempted, albeit so far unsuccessfully, to capture sociology.

Yes, the disciplines emerged in the nineteenth century with the rise of global capitalism, but we should not forget that U.S. sociology was born out of a conflict with economics as the latter took its neoclassical turn. It became an independent discipline (formally in 1905 with the creation of the American Sociological Society), splitting from economics because, for the most part, it saw capitalism through a more critical lens. Today third-wave marketization is returning us to the nineteenth century with a vengeance. Sociology is destined to play the same public role it played then, along with other disciplines (and fractions thereof), fighting to protect civil society and its endangered publics. But now the battlefield has expanded beyond the local and the national to a global terrain, where third-wave sociology not only defends labor rights and social rights but incorporates both under the greater universalism of human rights.

With over a century of professional knowledge behind us, and in alliance with other national sociologies, far more experienced and sophisticated in the practice of public sociology, today we are better equipped to thwart market fundamentalism. At the same time, the assault on human life and dignity is more ubiquitous and thus more insidious—because taken for granted—than previous waves of marketization, demanding a concerted response from within the trenches of civil society, a battle conducted on local, national, and global terrains. This, then, is the promise and the challenge of public sociology.

NOTES

Note: Thanks to Dan Clawson, Robert Zussman, and Erik Wright for their comments.

1. We can also create a parallel (homologous) matrix out of two types of academic capital—professional standing (publications, their number and their influence) and prestige of institution (reputational rankings). An individual’s position in this matrix combined with career trajectory would go a long way to explain the position he or she occupies in the division of sociological labor. In other words, position in the division of sociological labor determines the exercise of power but also selects the likely characteristics (types of capital) necessary to occupy that position. It would not be difficult to interpret the position-takings of the fourteen commentators in terms of their academic capital and career trajectories, but here I am more concerned with the position-takings themselves and how their interrelations and combinations shape the field of sociology.
2. Massey himself has provided eloquent testimony to the demise of second-wave sociology in a recent account of how his own scholarly work on immigration, far from influencing legislation, was peremptorily "blackballed"—no reasons given—by the Bush administration. See Massey 2006.

3. This is not to say that public sociology should not be held to the highest scientific standards, formally guaranteed by the professional moment within the public sociology quadrant. A case in point is Dalton Conley’s op-ed in the New York Times (December 1, 2003), proposing that men should have the right to compel women to continue their pregnancy so long as men legally commit themselves to being prepared to raise the child themselves. In her open letter to Conley, Carol Joffe draws on existing bodies of research, with which Conley seemed unfamiliar, to show that his proposal would further subjugate young and poor women in particular, even to the point of endangering their lives. Conley’s intervention was a “private sociology,” deriving from speculative knowledge and personal experience, Joffe claims, the very antithesis of public sociology.

REFERENCES

Editors and Contributors

Editors
DOUGLAS L. ANDERSON, DAN CLAWSON, NAOMI GERSTEI, JOYA MISRA, RAVI BALL SOKES, AND ROBERT ZUSSMAN are in the sociology department of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. From 2000 to 2005 they were editors of the American Sociological Association’s Rose Series in Sociology. Michael Burawoy approached them about editing a book on public sociology and worked with them to make that happen.

Contributors
ANDREW ABBOTT: Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor in the Department of Sociology and the College at the University of Chicago. Author of The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (American Sociological Association Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award) and Time Matters: On Theory and Method.