ENGAGED, PRACTICAL INTELLECTUALISM:
JOHN PORTER AND “NEW LIBERAL” PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY

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Abstract: Michael Burawoy’s plea for a “legitimate” public sociology that would help to realize a progressive, social democratic political project, in particular by contributing to the spread of human rights, has rekindled a very old, heated, and divisive debate over the nature and purpose of the discipline. My paper focuses on the contribution to this debate made by John Porter (1921–1979), probably Canada’s most famous and influential English-language sociologist to date. Following in a tradition of “New Liberal” scholarship developed in England near the end of the 19th century by Leonard Hobhouse and others, and introduced into Canadian academia and public service in the early decades of the 20th century, Porter developed and practised a type of methodologically sophisticated, “scientific” sociology that rejected the doctrine of value neutrality and advocated a form of “engaged practical intellectualism” intended to create a more thorough-going democracy in Canada. His approach is significant not only because it is an important and undocumented development in Canadian intellectual history, but because it has current relevance. My comparison of Porter’s notion of New Liberal sociology and Burawoy’s public sociology reveals many parallels between the two and demonstrates that a rereading of Porter’s work would add to the current debate on what a “legitimate public sociology” might look like.

Key Words: John Porter, New Liberalism, Michael Burawoy, public sociology, history of Canadian sociology

Résumé. L’appel de Michael Burawoy à une sociologie publique « légitime » qui viserait un projet de démocratie politique progressiste et sociale, contribuant tout particulièrement à la propagation des droits de la personne, ranima un très vieux débat passionné qui divisa l’opinion sur la nature et le but de cette discipline. Mon article porte sur la contribution de John Porter (1921–1979) à ce débat; Porter est sans doute le sociologue de langue anglaise et le plus célèbre et le plus influent au Canada à ce jour. Fidèle à la tradition du savoir de libéralisme de type nouveau développé en Angleterre à la fin du XIXe siècle par Leonard Hobhouse et autres et introduit au monde universitaire canadien au cours des dernières décennies du XXe siècle, Porter développa et pratiqua
un type de sociologie « scientifique » méthodologiquement élaborée qui rejetait la doctrine de la neutralité de la valeur et préconisait une forme « d’intellectualisme engagé pratique » dans le but de créer une démocratie plus complète au Canada. Sa démarche est intéressante non seulement parce qu’elle constitue un développement important non documenté de l’histoire intellectuelle canadienne, mais aussi parce qu’elle est pertinente aujourd’hui. Ma comparaison entre la notion de sociologie du libéralisme nouveau de Porter et de sociologie publique de Burawoy révèle de nombreux parallèles entre les deux et prouve qu’une relecture de l’œuvre de Porter ajouterait au début actuel, à savoir à quoi ressemblerait une « sociologie publique légitime ».

Mots clés : John Porter, libéralisme de type nouveau, Michael Burawoy, sociologie publique, histoire de la sociologie canadienne

INTRODUCTION

The debate initiated by Michael Burawoy’s 2004 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, “For Public Sociology,” has been a “public good” (2005a; see also 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e; 2005f; 2005g; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). Burawoy provoked sociologists around the world into revisiting the fundamental question “What is the nature and purpose of the discipline?” and the variety of responses they have crafted is remarkable. For me, one thing stands out when you consider them together: whatever the views individual scholars might hold, the discipline as a whole is deeply, inherently, and unavoidably political. Certainly Burawoy’s vision of a “legitimate” public sociology is animated by a politicized critical sociology. Given this situation, many of his critics have commented on the fact that it incongruous for him to call for a rejuvenated, highly politicized public sociology and simultaneously claim that such an entity could realistically involve relationships of “synergy,” “reciprocal interdependence,” and “organic solidarity” with the other three types (or “faces”) of sociology, including professional sociology (2005a:15, 18; see also Burawoy 2008a:437, 443). They have regarded it as incongruous because it is axiomatic — part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline — that professional sociologists cannot accept the politicization of the research process. Were they to allow values to intrude into the research process, they would be unable to legitimately don the coveted mantle of science. Put differently: in order to remain scientific, professional sociology must stand in an unalterably adversarial relationship with the value-laden radical/critical sociology that constitutes the basis for Burawoy’s vision of a properly constituted public sociology. And the
negative, sometimes vitriolic, response from professional sociologists makes this clear (Deflem 2004; 2007; Tittle 2004; Boyns and Fletcher 2005; Brint 2005; Turner 2005; Smith-Lovin 2007; Stinchcombe 2007; Massey 2007; see also Burawoy 2007a:244–6).

In response to this backlash, Burawoy has tried to convince professional, mainstream sociologists that the doctrine of “sociology as a science” is outmoded, reflecting an historically specific set of material/intellectual conditions that no longer exists, and rendering scientific sociology inappropriate and unviable as a model/\textit{modus operandi} in the 21st century. His critics remain undeterred. They reiterate their basic claim — any professional sociologist who violates the principle of value neutrality, who engages in the kind of “value science” that Burawoy called for, would be a scientist no more — and argue that more and better science, not less, is the way to go. The discipline, it seems, remains locked in a standoff — resolutely political, irremediably divided.

It might be more fruitful for those who share Burawoy’s political-scholarly views to spend less time trying to convert their opponents and more time thinking about what kind of public sociology they should be doing; that is, they should try to answer the following inextricably interrelated questions: What would a practically feasible, morally defensible social democratic society look like? What would a properly constituted social democratic public sociology look like (methodology, value orientation, vision of “practical utopia,” etc.)? Or, taken together, and phrased differently: What kind of public sociology would best serve what Burawoy refers to as humanity’s “universal interest” (2005b:319)? Were they to do so, and by their intellectual and practical activities succeed in helping to create some pockets of humanity and democracy, then (as Marx suggested in the second and eighth “Theses on Feuerbach” [1978]) the question would answer itself in practice rather than via scholastic speculation. That said, a degree of speculation, much careful reasoning, and extensive debate are essential to the public sociology project. In a changing world, the issues involved must be continually revisited. In a spirit of renewing the discipline, and humanizing the world, Burawoy has posed them yet again. Indeed, he has gone a good way toward providing us with his own answers. It is with these questions and his thoughtful, partial, and tentative answers in mind that I introduce the purpose of my paper.
PURPOSE

For some years, I have been writing an intellectual biography of the late John Porter (1921–1979), English Canada’s greatest sociologist (see Helmes-Hayes and Curtis 1998; Helmes-Hayes 2002). Just as I completed the Porter volume,¹ the furore over Burawoy’s presidential address broke out. Intrigued, I read the debate. As I did so, it struck me that, especially in the last few years of his life, Porter, in an effort to develop a politically progressive, methodologically sophisticated form of comparative macrosociology, had framed a highly professional and “scientific,” but morally committed social democratic sociological perspective: a public sociology. It also occurred to me that Burawoy and others might find his ideas useful as they thought about what public sociology, properly conceived and practised, might look like. Many aspects of Porter’s sociology anticipate Burawoy’s conception of public sociology, despite the fact he framed it over three decades ago. In fact, I would argue that, in Burawoy’s terms, Porter was in many respects a “third-wave” sociologist who became prominent and influential during the era of “second-wave sociology” in Canada. This was possible only because of political, economic, and intellectual developments particular to Canada in the 1950s and 1960s.² These circumstances created an environment highly receptive to left-liberal and social democratic ideology and scholarship while simultaneously allowing the establishment of a much more powerful, interventionist welfare state than that which developed during the same period in the US. In this unusual and historically transient environment, Porter achieved great scholarly success in the mainstream North American sociological community despite combining science and political advocacy in a way that professional sociologists would now find inappropriate and unacceptable.

In the remainder of the paper I outline the elements of John Porter’s version of New Liberal sociology³ and compare his model of “engaged practical intellectualism”⁴ to Burawoy’s public sociology. While part of

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¹. The Porter biography, Measuring the Mosaic, to be published by the University of Toronto Press, is scheduled for release in the autumn of 2009.

². One might make a similar point about British sociology in the period 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. A.H. Halsey (1987) has written about his cohort of sociologists from the LSE (trained at exactly the same time as Porter) who established modern sociology as a discipline in Great Britain.

³. The first set of New Liberals appeared in Canada at Queen’s University (Ferguson 1993) and the University of Toronto (see McKillop 1994). The New Liberalism became especially influential in Canadian politics after World War II (see Granatstein 1982; Owram 1996).

⁴. Porter never referred to himself as a “New Liberal” and the New Liberals never used the term “engaged practical intellectual.” The label is mine.
my justification is historical — I want to highlight Porter’s contribution as a public intellectual/ sociologist in the 1960s and 1970s — I want also to demonstrate that his contribution is apposite to the current debate, despite the fact he framed it more than thirty years ago. Indeed, his version of New Liberal sociology anticipates a good deal of Burawoy’s argument, combines the four “faces” of sociology, and offers a number of concrete theoretical, methodological, and political recommendations about how we might go about doing public sociology.5

SOCIOLGY, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, AND PROGRESS: BURAWOY ON “LEGITIMATE” PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY

In his presidential address, Burawoy claimed that “public sociology” had “no intrinsic normative valence” and could as easily support “Christian Fundamentalism as … Liberation Sociology” (2005a:8–9; emphasis added; see also 2004c:1608). However, later in that essay and subsequent writings, he made it clear that a properly constituted public sociology has to be “critically disposed,” that is, it has to be committed to the task of cleaning up the mess that “neoliberal” economic and social policies, which he called “third-wave marketization,” had created around the world (2005a:7). His own preference, expressed in “Third-wave sociology and the end of pure science,” and “The critical turn to public sociology,” was for public sociology to have a “Marxist coloring” (2005f:160). Whatever coloring it might have, though, at a bare minimum it had to be a “value science” (2005f:158–9) operating from a set of “progressive,” “social democratic” principles (2005c). These principles, he said, would undergird sociology’s three-fold mission:

1. to “search for potential and actual counter-hegemonic publics” and “social movements” devoted to the fight against neoliberalism (2005c:389–90);
2. to develop “normative and institutional criteria for progressive intervention” (2005b:324) that would constitute objective criteria — a vision of a real and practical “utopia” (2005b:325) — against which progress could be measured; and
3. to work with publics to turn these principles into institutional practices — culturally appropriate instances of “participatory democracy” (2005b:325; 2006).

5. There are similarities between my purpose in this paper and Vincent Jeffries’ discussion of the relevance of Pitirim Sorokin to the debate on public sociology (2007). Like Sorokin, Porter might be seen as a “prophet” of public sociology (Burawoy 2005f:160).
He framed this three-fold mission explicitly in terms of the creation of a viable social democracy:

[C]ritical engagement with real utopias is today an integral part of the project of sociological socialism. It is a vision of socialism that places human society, or social humanity at its organizing center, a vision that was central to Marx…. If public sociology is to have a progressive impact it will have to hold itself continuously accountable to some such vision of democratic socialism. (2005b:325; emphasis added)

This statement drew much criticism. Commentators argued that Burawoy’s Marxist — or, at least, left-wing, social democratic — conception of sociology was ideologically narrow and would likely stifle the kind of open debate about the future that public sociology was supposed to generate. As well, it would engender a negative public reaction, especially among the powerful, and do great damage to the internal unity, reputation, strength, and viability of the discipline (Nielsen 2004; Boyns and Fletcher 2005; Brint 2005).

Burawoy responded that while his personal preference was for a socialist sociology, public sociology did not have to be Marxist. Marxism, he wrote, is not the “true face” of public sociology (2005f:152) and any such characterization of it was “baseless.” Rather, he said, public sociology could and should be “pluralistic” (2005f:159; see also 2004b:127). By this he did not mean that “anything goes.” Pluralism had its limits. There was such a thing as “legitimate public sociology” (2004b:126; emphasis added). Sounding much like Emile Durkheim (1938:47–75), Burawoy argued that the “[e]mpirical examination of actual public sociologies would distinguish the normal from the pathological” (2005f:153), that is, differentiate legitimate from (presumably) illegitimate public sociology. At a bare minimum, a legitimate public sociology had to be opposed to neoliberalism — the “rapacious capitalism that destroys everything in its path” (2006:2; see also 2005g:522) — and favourably disposed to the creation of culturally appropriate, egalitarian, participatory social democracies.

In none of his early essays did Burawoy describe either the methodological form a liberatory sociology might take (see, e.g., Boyns and Fletcher 2005; Brady 2004:1632, 1635) or the political/institutional form a participatory democracy might assume. He has since addressed these issues. On the first question, he is and always has been methodologically ecumenical. In his view, sociologists can and should draw on multiple, diverse, sophisticated “research programs” (2004b:125; 2005f:160) which might employ surveys, participant observation, historical re-
search, and so forth (2004b:125). All can contribute to the “scientific” core of professional sociology. His views on the political/institutional form it should take have come increasingly to favour an organic style of engaged, practical, public intellectualism. Narrowly conceived, elitist sociology (professional, policy, critical) geared to elite audiences of various types are inappropriate and unacceptable. Sociologists must be “accountable” in two senses (2005e:79). They must “back-translate” the results of their investigations to the publics they study (2005e:77); that is, they must validate the knowledge they have gathered/constructed via their engagement with publics with those publics themselves. This kind of validation has the additional benefit of encouraging publics to develop “a more reflective engagement with the world” (2005e:78). Second, sociologists have to be accountable to society as a whole. They cannot remain value neutral. They must contribute to the process of defining and building utopia. This cannot be accomplished by engaging in purely detached, value-free professional activities. There are two reasons for this. Most obviously, they are responsible for contributing to the social good. In his words, sociologists must engage in activities that “coincide with humanity’s interest” by opposing the erosion of civil liberties, the violation of human rights, the degradation of the environment, the impoverishment of the working classes, the spread of disease, the exclusion of ever greater numbers from the means of their existence, and deepening inequalities.

Throughout the debate he has maintained that these consequences of neoliberalism or third-wave marketization “threaten the viability and resilience of civil society at home and abroad” and must be confronted by a vigorous public sociology (2004b:125; see also 2005g:521–4; 2008a; 2008b). There is a second, more “local” reason why they must take up this struggle. As third-wave marketization “invades” the university itself, the ivory tower crumbles.

The ivory tower — academic freedom and university autonomy — … are falling to corporatization, privatization and profit considerations…. We can no longer build a moat around the university, but instead we must venture out … and join forces with other publics that face the tsunami. (2008a:359)

This brings us to the second question: what form should society take? Here, again, Burawoy did not say much in his early essays, with the exception of brief references to the success of feminist sociology as a form of public sociology (2005b:313) and to the promise of the model of “em-
powered participatory governance” developed by Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003; cited Burawoy 2005b:325). However, beginning with “Third wave sociology and the end of pure science” (2005f), Burawoy increasingly places *universal human rights* at the core of his view of utopia.

*[A]t the heart of sociology must lie a concern for society as such, the protection of those social relations through which we recognize each other as humans … fundamental human rights that uphold human community … against the colonizing projects of states and markets. (2006:1; see also 2005f:157–8).*

But he made it clear that the rights of the neoliberal market (narrowly conceived property rights) and the rights of the neoliberal state (narrowly conceived political rights) were not enough as currently constituted. In fact, he claimed that in their extant form they had merely “commodif[ied] … everyday life and … privatiz[ed] all things public” (2005f:155). They had actually created and exacerbated rather than solved problems related to human emancipation (2006:4–6). “If human rights are defined in the narrow terms of political liberalism,” Burawoy noted in 2005, this will allow “the expansion rather than the containment of the market.” “To ensure the protection of fundamental labor and social rights and to extend them to rights of universal survival,” he continued, “we must enter into a struggle over the very definition of human rights” (2005f:158). Three years later, he had not changed his position.

I am struck by the way that hopes for a better world have been dashed by market fundamentalism. Rather than greater freedom and equality, decolonization, deindustrialization and destabilization have led to social disintegration, marked by inequality and oppression. (2008a:437)

Since the problems created by third-wave marketization are global or “universal” in scope, Burawoy writes, they can be addressed only by working to guarantee *civil rights* that are equally universal in scope. “The universality of rights,” he wrote in 2006, “is the reaction or counter-movement to the universality of markets” (2006:9). In 2008, he reiterated the point:

The defence of society against third-wave marketization will have to be scaled up to the global level, but it must also universalize its reactive discourse: it will have to embrace a discourse of human rights…. Human rights demand that humans treat each other as ends rather than means, that they potentially form a community of self-realization through symmetrical reciprocity and mutual recognition. It entails rights to dignified labour and … material comfort. (2008b:358; see also 2006:9).
In sum, legitimate public sociology has a role in fostering human rights by cultivating and aiding civil society (2005f:156).

**Porter’s New Liberalism**

John Porter’s New Liberal sociology combines the professional, policy, critical, and public faces of sociology in a fruitful way that bears striking similarities to Burawoy’s conception of a properly constituted public sociology. Both perspectives are built on the proposition that sociology has both the potential and the responsibility to help establish a more humane, maximally inclusive, and democratic society by extending human rights. I outline Porter’s perspective below. First, however, a few words about Porter.

Born in 1921 in Vancouver to Welsh immigrant parents, John Porter moved to England during the Depression. Two years later, World War II broke out and he enlisted in the Canadian Army. After serving in the Intelligence Section for six years, he attended the LSE on veterans’ benefits, graduating with a degree in economics and sociology in 1949. While at the LSE, he studied with some of the most accomplished social scientists of the time: Harold Laski, Karl Popper, T.H. Marshall, and Morris Ginsberg. The one who had the greatest influence was Ginsberg, who was Hobhouse’s intellectual disciple (Helmes-Hayes 1990). Ginsberg was a leading New Liberal of the period (McKillop 1994:672, n. 61) and he introduced Porter to Hobhouse’s New Liberal conception of sociology.

British New Liberal sociology is intimately related to (but not strictly part of) the well-known New Liberal political economy developed in the last years of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th by political philosophers and political economists such as John Stuart Mill, T.H. Green, Graham Wallas, Leonard Hobhouse, and John Hobson (Allett 1981; Clarke 1978; Collini 1979; Freeden 1978). New Liberal sociology was developed in its fullest form by Hobhouse, who taught at the LSE from 1907–1927. According to Hobhouse, sociology had two inextricably intertwined aspects — one political, the other scholarly. In political terms, Hobhouse argued that England had become a highly unequal, unjust, and irrational society because the British government had adopted the philosophy and practices of classical, free-market liberalism. In his view, the doctrine of laissez-faire had to be jettisoned and a powerful interventionist welfare state put into place. Only by such

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7. Some New Liberals regarded political economy as the master discipline, subsuming sociology and other disciplines (see Ferguson 1993). Hobhouse and Wallas argued the opposite (see below).
means would the lives of the majority of Britons be improved and the march of progress stimulated once again. The scholarly complement to this faith in the “positive state” was the view that politics and scholarship constituted a unified enterprise. In order to create an efficient, just, and rational society, the state needed guidance from a wide-ranging, synthetic, empirical form of applied social science guided by left liberal/social democratic moral and political principles. To this applied social science, the New Liberals gave the name sociology. Porter internalized the core principles of this approach while at the LSE and then drew on and developed them over the rest of his life, but most specifically in a series of philosophical/methodological essays he wrote near the end of his career, discussed below.

After graduating, Porter returned to Canada for a visit. He had no intention of staying, but a chance occurrence led to a job lecturing at Carleton University (then College) and he never left. Indeed, from that fortuitous beginning, he built a remarkable career, highlighted in 1965 by the publication of his masterwork, *The Vertical Mosaic* (1965). A classic piece of what Burawoy would call traditional public sociology, *The Vertical Mosaic* documented in detail the existence of huge class disparities in wealth, income, and economic opportunity among Canadians. At the same time, he provided compelling evidence that the key institutional subsystems of Canadian society — economic, political, bureaucratic, ideological8 — were run by and in the interests of a set of mutually accommodating elites dominated by Anglo-Canadians drawn largely from the upper reaches of the class structure. Canada, Porter charged, was firmly stratified along class and ethnic lines. It was not the classless democracy and land of equal opportunity that the dominant meritocratic liberal ideology made it out to be.

It is important to note, given our focus here on public sociology, that Porter wrote *The Vertical Mosaic* with political motives in mind. Reared in a working-class family, scathed by the Depression and the war, schooled in the radical environment of sociology at the LSE, and inspired by the widespread reconstructionist sensibilities of the postwar period, he was openly critical of the inequalities of class and power his research had unearthed. This willingness to take a political stand made his book unusual in Canadian academic circles at the time for, in the Canadian humanities and social science community of the period, “a sense of commitment, of engagement, [was regarded as] … a sign of scholarly impurity” (Meisel 1965:x; emphasis added). Porter was unfazed by this

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8. Porter actually described five elites and five subsystems, but two of the elites, the economic elite (the most powerful) and the labour elite (the least powerful) operated within the economic subsystem.
general attitude. He devoted a substantial section of *The Vertical Mosaic* to a critique of his social sciences and humanities colleagues who, in his view, had failed to act as “social critics.” Rather than instigating and maintaining a lively partisan debate on social issues, they had served as a system-stabilizing intellectual “clerisy” (1965:494).

These iconoclastic claims had their intended effect. Porter’s charge that Canada was a deeply flawed democracy received immediate, widespread notice in the media and stimulated much public debate. In fact, *The Vertical Mosaic* not only garnered rave reviews from scholars in Canada, Britain, and the US, but also made the bestseller’s list, an unheard of accomplishment for an academic book. It even won the 1966 MacIver Award of the ASA. Its impact on Canadian sociology was transformative and long-lasting; it set much of the agenda of English-language sociology for the next decade and became the most influential, most frequently cited, and best-selling book in the history of Canadian sociology (Brym with Fox 1989:92; Helmes-Hayes and Curtis 1998:7–9). Subsequently, Porter went on to co-author a series of three additional, equally high-profile, benchmark studies designed to document, expose, and critique the impact of class inequality on educational opportunity and social mobility. In his view, it was only by such means that political pressure could be brought to bear and informed social policy framed.

To appreciate the connections between Porter’s work and the ideas of Britain’s New Liberals of a century ago, and from Porter’s ideas to Burawoy’s, we must examine at least briefly some elements of the New Liberal perspective.

**BRITISH NEW LIBERALISM, 1880–1930**

The New Liberalism was intended as both a challenge to and an improvement on classical liberalism (Allett 1981; Clarke 1978; Collini 1979; Freedon 1978). As the 19th century drew to a close, British capitalism was beset by serious problems: oligopoly, imbalances between capital and labour, huge disparities in wealth. Progressive intellectuals and social reformers argued that equal *legal* rights and the so-called “free market” would never create a free, just, and rational society. Among these critics were the New Liberals, including Graham Wallas, John Hobson, and Leonard Hobhouse. Following John Stuart Mill, the New Liberals had no thought of doing away with the market, private property and so forth — these they regarded as “progressive elements of the ‘individ-

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9. *The Vertical Mosaic* remained in print for four decades and sold over 110,000 copies (Virgil Duff, University of Toronto Press, to the author, 13 May 1997; 18 February 2004).
ualistic’ society” (Allett 1981:21) — but they did argue that principles such as equality, freedom, rights, and universality had to be reconceptualized so that liberal society could be made more inclusive, rational, and egalitarian. In particular, the rights of private property would have to be restructured and a more powerful interventionist state put into place. The “New Liberals” often described their perspective using the language of socialism. Hobhouse, for example, referred to his perspective as “Liberal Socialism” (Hobhouse 1964:87, 88–127 passim; see also Grimes 1964:6; Allett 1981:258) and with his colleagues argued that the mixing of liberalism and socialism — individual rights and the market combined with increased state intervention and collectivism — was a natural, practical, and necessary development that “completed” rather than “destroyed” classical liberal ideas (Hobhouse 1972:229, see also 225, 237; cited Clarke 1978:72). “The ideas of Socialism, when translated into practical terms, coincide with ideas to which Liberals are led when they seek to apply their principles of Liberty, Equality and the Common Good to the industrial life of our time” (Hobhouse cited Dennis and Halsey 1988:75).

One part of their argument centred on rights. The so-called “negative” rights and freedoms granted to citizens by classical liberal theory were in their view a necessary but insufficient condition for the realization of the Good Society (Allett 1981:179). People needed a set of “positive” citizenship rights (the right to work, etc.). A second argument focussed on the market and the notion of opportunity. The market inevitably created so much material inequality (via unequal rewards) that there existed only formal (or legal) rather than real equality of opportunity. This negated a fundamental principle of liberalism. In their view, liberty could no longer mean “the absence of restraint”; it had to mean “the presence of opportunity” (W. Clarke; cited P. Clarke 1978:58). The crucial means to this end — and one of John Porter’s interests throughout his career — was publicly funded education (Wallas 1948; cited P. Clarke 1978:136). A third major criticism focussed on the intertwined classical arguments that society was nothing more than an agglomeration of individuals (atomism) and that the collective interest was nothing more than the sum of the respective interests of the individual members of society (utilitarianism or the “greatest happiness principle”). For the New Liberals, society was an emergent “organic” entity, a social whole greater than the sum of its parts. Invoking the notion of the “common good” (Hobhouse 1898:2–5 passim; see also Collini 1979:67–8, 129), they argued that the “greatest happiness” was both different from and greater than the sum of the separate and several happinesses of the individual members of society (Allett 1981:54). They acknowledged that
the concept of the common good placed limitations on individual rights, but were content with the prospect, arguing that this would contribute to the common good. In particular, the rights of private property had to be rethought. They agreed that “private property [was] essential to the individual” and had to be protected, but they developed the complementary notion of societal property rights and argued that the latter were likewise essential, absolutely necessary for “the expression and development of social life” (Hobhouse 1913:98–106 passim; cited Collini 1979:143). This was related in turn to a fourth aspect of New Liberal thinking. Classical liberals claimed that all individuals had the same legal rights in the marketplace and could, thus, be held accountable for their life situations, however dismal. Poverty, for example, was a personal problem. By contrast, the New Liberals regarded poverty as societally created (Hobson 1891:227) and argued that the positive state had the right and duty to “directly promote the social interest” by redistributing wealth to eradicate poverty (Allett 1981:17; emphasis added). Following up on this principle, and anticipating John Maynard Keynes (1973), Hobson in particular argued that the state could and should manage the economy by using collective societal resources to help solve structural and cyclical problems that plagued capitalist economies (e.g., Hobson 1969:284–311, 1992; see also P. Clarke 1978:226–34).

Two additional principles completed the roster of New Liberal ideas: their view of progress and its relationship to sociology. For the New Liberals, the whole purpose of establishing the positive state was to facilitate societal progress which, by their reckoning, had ground to a halt. Hobhouse’s term for societal change in the direction of social improvement (or “progress”) was “orthogenic evolution,” which would occur, he thought, via “the gradual replacement of instinct by reason” (Hobhouse 1915a:5, 9). In his view, humans possessed the capacity to apply individual and collective reason to develop an increased societal self-consciousness or intelligence which they could then use to “suppress … the struggle for existence” and put “social cooperation” in its place (Hobhouse 1927:xv–xvi).

The source of the societal “intelligence” or collective self-understanding that would help to inform/create social progress was a historically specific New Liberal conception of the “science” of sociology, developed in greatest detail by Hobhouse. In his view, sociology could and should facilitate the best possible “scientific adjustment of man to man” while also helping to develop a set of rational ethics identifying objective moral principles which would, in turn, provide a “guarantee of right conduct” in a properly constituted society (Hobhouse 1915b:280–1).
From our current standpoint, this conception of scientific sociology is deeply flawed in three ways. First, the New Liberals adopted the concept of “rational empiricism.” According to this view, one can combine the insights of the rationalist philosopher — who would use a broadly conceived reason, rather than just science — with those of the empiricist — who would look to the facts of “experience,” again defined more broadly than science would allow — to produce empirical data and theoretical knowledge (Owen 1950: esp. 261–2 and 262 n. 10). Present-day sociologists would regard much of this endeavour as nothing more than philosophical speculation.

Second, the New Liberals included under the rubric of science what John Owen has referred to as “rational humanitarianism.” Those who adopted this perspective believed it possible to submit “the enduring problems of human values … [and] justice” to careful logical and empirical scrutiny (Owen 1953:29) and from this analysis to identify a set of objectively good moral principles and societal best practices. In fact, Hobhouse and his colleagues believed they had discovered just such a set of objectively good moral criteria — a “rational ethics” (Hobhouse 1924:88) — and argued that sociology should help to realize them. Specifically: they claimed that the rational application of the principles of freedom, tempered with altruism and universal humanitarianism, would lead to cooperation, community, and social harmony.

For his part, Hobhouse, the New Liberal who influenced Porter most, talked about four objective moral criteria of progress: scale, efficiency, freedom, and mutuality. By “scale,” he meant the size and extent of the community; the larger the unit covered by the principles of rational ethics, the better. By “efficiency,” he meant the degree to which the community met its common goals, however defined (Collini 1979:233–234), bearing in mind there existed an objectively real “common good” at the heart of which lay “freedom” and “mutuality.” By “freedom,” he meant “scope for thought, character and initiative on the part of members of the community” and by “mutuality” he meant “service of an end in which each who serves participates” (Hobhouse 1924:78). Thus, the Social Good balanced freedom with restraint and individual rights with community rights. In Hobhouse’s view, however, these limitations on individual rights were perfectly proper, as long as “the restraints involved [were] voluntarily accepted and self-imposed” (Collini 1979:234; see also Hobhouse 1920:50–55). Again, however, from our current perspective, no matter how noble a scientist might judge such objectives to be, no matter how much he or she might agree with them, they are the product not of science but moral speculation.
There was a third problem. The New Liberals rejected value neutrality. Though they referred to sociology as a science, they regarded sociology as intrinsically and unavoidably moral. Indeed, they regarded it as a “vocation” (see Collini, 1979:209–34), a life’s orientation that was really a “duty” and “mission” (see Ferguson, 1993:41–2). For them, sociology was not a positivist social science, not just an academic discipline, not a profession. Rather, it was a form of rational, empirical understanding combined with a specific kind of social “service,” a moral commitment to transformative practice. It could identify and should work toward collective rationality and a sense of societal mutuality under the guidance of principles of universal humanitarianism and social justice.10

**John Porter as a New Liberal**11

That Porter was deeply influenced by these New Liberal ideas while at the LSE is well-known because he has drawn the connection directly. “[A]s a consequence of studying sociology at the London School of Economics … where importance was attached by Ginsberg and others to the work of L.T. Hobhouse,” he said, he became much impressed with the essentials of Hobhouse’s sociology. He noted that he was

attracted to Hobhouse’s principle of social development, that a community develops as it grows in scale, efficiency, freedom, and mutuality: efficiency toward an end, freedom and scope for thought, mutuality in a service toward an end in which each participates.

He then quoted Hobhouse — “Social development corresponds in its concrete entirety to the requirements of rational ethics ... Good is the principle of organic harmony in things” — and summarized Hobhouse’s general argument.

Hobhouse … saw emerging in the process [of social development] the principle of reason and progress. To him, the relationship between social values and social science was close. He was firmly convinced of the need for an empirical social science and believed one could be developed which was closely linked to ethical principles. (1970:151–2).


11. I have examined some of the links between Porter and the New Liberalism in detail elsewhere (Helmes-Hayes 1990).
Despite this proclamation, an examination of Porter’s professions of political faith over his career indicates that he vacillated between classical, meritocratic liberalism and social democracy. While at the LSE, he rejected Marxism, became a strong Labour supporter, and developed an affinity for the principles of Hobhousian liberalism. However, after emigrating to Canada and early proclaiming his faith in social democracy — he referred to his essay “Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy” (1961a) as a “[contribution] to social democratic theory” (Porter 1979c:208; emphasis added) — he came increasingly to identify with American society and mainstream American sociology and its more classical liberal political underpinnings (see Hofley 1981:596–9). In fact, during the 1960s and early 1970s, he took an optimistic view about the possibilities of the then-expansionist Canadian economy and bought into modernization theory, the “end of ideology” thesis, the theory of postindustrial society, etc., all of which were fundamentally uncritical of American capitalism and its particular version of liberal democracy. Not until the early-middle 1970s did he once again overtly embrace social democratic values (Porter 1974; 1975a; 1975b, discussed below and Clement 1980:99, 111–2).

These vacillations in his political allegiance demonstrate why Porter has reasonably been claimed as a travelling companion by both liberals and social democrats. My own view is that in the end and overall he remained a devotee of the New Liberalism which, as I noted above, combines the two perspectives. Given the historical circumstances in which he found himself, he emphasized one or the other aspect of it. Further evidence for this interpretation of his intellectual loyalties may be found in other features of his work.

Like his New Liberal mentors, Porter was interested in philosophical issues, including the philosophy of science and knowledge, especially as these related to questions of methodology and the purpose and morality of social research — one of Burawoy’s chief concerns and a major point of contention in the debate on public sociology. For Hobhouse and Ginsberg, philosophy and sociology were inseparable (see e.g. Hobhouse 1919; Hobson and Ginsberg 1931; Ginsberg 1947; Owen 1974). Though Porter was much less interested in abstract philosophical argumentation than either of them, he developed reasoned and thoughtful positions on such issues. More importantly for our purposes here, when, near the end of his career he revisited philosophical issues in depth, he drew explicitly on New Liberal sources. Three things spurred his renewed interest in philosophical questions in the mid-1970s: the rise to prominence of Marxism and radical political economy, the persistence of class inequality in Canada despite the growth of the welfare state, and a massive in-
jection of funds into the educational system (see Porter 1979d; 1979g), and his desire to develop a methodology that would allow him better to study nation states in a comparative, historical, empirical, macrosociological way (see Porter 1974, 1975a).12

In addressing these and other philosophical questions, Porter re-emphasized his ongoing faith in and fundamental connection to New Liberal ideas that had been somewhat submerged during his “American” period. Like Ginsberg and Hobhouse, he had never given up on his efforts to understand the interplay in human society of rationality and irrationality. At the turn of the century, Hobhouse formulated his conception of the nature and purpose of sociology, based on a philosophy — at once scientific, moral, and political — designed to “demonstrate the meaning of history, ... unravel the structure of present social problems, and ... specify strategies of amelioration” (Abrams 1968:87). Ginsberg’s moralistic sociology can be seen in the same light; it was an effort to struggle against the “flight from reason” (the Depression, World Wars I and II) that characterized Western society during much of his adult life. Porter, too, struggled to understand the nature and role of reason. His problem and circumstances were different, however, because he worked as a scholar in the reconstructionist period after World War II. Like other intellectuals of the period, he took it as a personal and scholarly responsibility (a kind of civic “duty”) to help realize reason’s emancipatory potential during an era when liberal rationality and optimism held sway. In the words of his friend and colleague, Frank Vallee, Porter believed that reason, informed by social scientific evidence, could and would have a liberatory effect.

[As time passed,] all liberal-minded people would see the truth…. [S]ocial science was always discovering something new…. [and] eventually … all right-minded persons would see that the proper way to go was this way rather than that way. (Vallee interview, 11 August 1986; emphasis added)

It is here, where the issues of “right-mindedness,” social science, and the possibility of progress come together, that Porter again shows his New Liberal colours. Hobhouse once defined sociologists as “all [those] who treat problems of social life in the scientific spirit” (Hobhouse 1908:3–4) and throughout his career worked as an engaged and practical sociologist/reformer intent on contributing to what he saw as the ultimate goal: “the unity of mankind.” Porter, too, felt sociology should be practical. It should be relevant for the public discussion of social issues, the formulation and implementation of humane public policy, and (more

12. I discuss this methodology in detail below.
on this below) the measurement of societal progress. For much of his career, he worked on research projects designed to provide policy-relevant information to educational and governmental decision-makers. But he did so without becoming a narrow policy analyst or liberal technician/“tinkerer.” In order for the kind of progress, social harmony, and societal rationality he had in mind to be realized, capitalism and liberal democracy would have to be substantially restructured in line with New Liberal social democratic economic and political principles. Here is where his choice of research topics is important.

I noted above that during the long postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s, he thought capitalism would continue to provide abundant opportunities for economic growth and social development. However, essential to the realization of this conception of meritocratic, liberal, individualistic, social justice was equality of opportunity, especially educational opportunity. So he studied it in detail. After completing The Vertical Mosaic, which itself focussed a good deal on education, he undertook a series of policy-relevant research projects examining the class/opportunity/mobility nexus. The three most important of these studies were Does Money Matter? (1973) which examined educational opportunity at the secondary and postsecondary levels of education in Ontario, Towards 2000 (Porter et al. 1971), a policy document/position paper which advocated for progressive reform of postsecondary education, especially around questions of access, and Ascription and Achievement, a policy-relevant analysis of the relationship between educational attainment and social mobility/status attainment (Boyd et al. 1985). Finally, in his last few years, he wrote a series of important essays on social justice, inequality, methodology, and the like that dealt with these issues of values, methodology, social justice, and so on in a formal way (see sections immediately below).

Porter’s choice of the class-education-mobility nexus as a topic for investigation and activism is an obvious link to the New Liberalism. It was also a choice of topics entirely typical of “second-wave sociology” which, as Burawoy notes, focussed on “policy questions of the emergent welfare state,” attempted to entrench “social rights that protected labor from the market,” and examined issues such as “inequality, educational opportunity and poverty” in order to mitigate the “destructive consequences of the market” (2005f:157).

14. In a related field of endeavour, he tried to apply his philosophy of education and his research-based knowledge of the dynamics of the university system to his day-to-day activities as Vice-President (Academic) at Carleton (1977–78).
Just as important as the empirical focus of his work were two major aspects of the style of research/activism he adopted. Throughout his career, the means he chose were typically academic; he published policy-relevant research and took part in relevant advisory and policy-oriented bodies. As well, however, though not a “limelight” intellectual, he dabbled as a traditional public sociologist, presenting the results of his research in public media forums (radio, television, newspapers, popular journals, and books) and at gatherings of relevant professionals — social workers, teachers, advisors, and school guidance counsellors.15 Like all traditional public sociologists, then, he tried to stimulate and contribute to the informed debate of crucial social, economic, and political issues.

There is a more unusual and especially telling way in which Porter’s research agenda and style place him in the New Liberal camp and make his work relevant as a point of comparison for Burawoy’s conception of public sociology: Porter’s attempt to use sociology to conceptualize, measure, and pursue progress. It is this task he undertook in a concerted way in the set of late-career essays to which I referred immediately above. He intended these essays — some theoretical/philosophical, some methodological, some published, some not (1974; 1975a; 1975b; 1977; 1978; 1979b; 1979d; 1979e; 1979g) — to be part of a macrosociological magnum opus he was writing as a sequel to The Vertical Mosaic. Sadly, his premature death prevented him from completing the project. The philosophical touchpoints on which he relied most heavily in these essays were Leonard Hobhouse, T.H. Marshall, C.B. Macpherson (himself a New Liberal), and the American philosopher, John Rawls.16 He had three goals: to develop an objective conception of the Good Society, to describe sociology’s contribution to realizing that goal, and to develop a method that would allow us to measure societal progress along the way.

In 1977, Porter composed a brief essay which outlined his choice of values for the Good Society. He began with a critique of the classical liberal conception of human nature: naked self-interest. If pursuing one’s own self-interest was all there was to it, he wrote, “then there would be no moral problems other than acting naturally.” However, humans had often acted badly in pursuit of their personal interests. So people had to develop a set of institutions that would allow them to “cooper-

15. Porter appeared on television and radio more than a dozen times over his career and wrote a handful of articles for popular public affairs journals. As well, he made at least a dozen presentations to various professional groups.

16. Two general remarks about the “style” of these essays: 1. Porter does not always provide explicit references to these thinkers each time he uses their ideas in these essays. 2. There are many overlapping, indeed more or less repeated, passages in this set of essays, especially in Porter (1978; 1979b; 1979d; 1979e; 1979g).
ate for their mutual advantage” and foster “a morally supportable social order.” Like Hobhouse, Porter regarded human nature as flexible and argued that progress had occurred only because over time people had framed “morally approved institutional structures” that “progressive[ly] suspend[ded] inherited dispositions” such as self interest (Porter 1977:1; emphasis added).

If not self-interest, then what value(s) would serve as an acceptable basis for the good society? In his view, the values that undergirded traditional societies were useless, for they had helped create and legitimate the inequality, privilege, and power that modern societies were trying to overcome. Religion was likewise useless because Western societies had become predominantly secular (1977:2). One had to look to secular, intrinsically liberal social values — liberty, justice, and equality — for a conception of the good. The thinkers whose ideas he liked best on this score were John Rawls (liberty and related principles of distributive justice), C.B. Macpherson (human nature) and T.H. Marshall (citizenship rights).

Rawls’ conception of liberty, outlined in A Theory of Justice (1971), was highly influential in the mid-1970s when Porter was writing about these issues. For Rawls, the social good was just as important as individual freedom and happiness. According to Porter, the principles of liberty and justice developed by Rawls meant that any unavoidable inequalities, including inequality of opportunity (Porter 1977:5, 11), had to be “so arranged [as] to be [of] the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.” Porter used this Rawlsian argument to make one of his favourite points about educational opportunity.

[I]ndividual talents should be considered as social resources to be developed for the benefit of all, particularly the least favoured. In the past we have too readily accepted the view that the accidents of genetic endowment and the effects … of social investment in education … should become personal capital for unlimited acquisition. Such a view scarcely has a place within a framework of social justice. (1979d:278; emphasis added)

In fact, in Porter’s view, social justice could arise only in a system based on universal, individual rights. Collective ethnic rights, for example, constituted a step backward, toward atavism. His view on this issue was not popular in Canada at the time, for multiculturalism was an official policy, and collective rights were regarded as a way to protect

17. He took as prototypical for purposes of his analysis the “modern industrial society” which was in the process of becoming a “post-industrial society” (Porter 1975a). The modern industrial society had a mixed capitalist economy with a solid industrial base, a large service sector, and a liberal democratic form of government.
French-language culture. But he stood firm. In his view, the terms “ethnicty” and “culture” as they were being used at the time came dangerously close to the terms “racism” and “nationalism” that had been part of the ideological justification for World War II (1978:passim, 1979a:132). Moreover, he said, giving collective rights to ethnic and other collectivities would be counterproductive. It would, he argued, invoking Morris Ginsberg, “run counter to any emerging concept of the unity of mankind within a conceivable rational order and directed towards a common good” (1979a:104; emphasis added; see also 1979e:passim, 1979f:142, 160, 1978:6–7 and passim).\(^\text{18}\)

He fleshed out his Rawlsian conception of social justice and its relation to rights by drawing on the ideas of two other prominent scholars of the time, C.B. Macpherson (1965, 1973) and T.H. Marshall (1950). According to Macpherson’s New Liberal conception of human nature, people possessed creative capacities which needed self-realization through rational, self-directed productive activity. In Porter’s view, this conception of human nature constituted a better basis upon which to build a just and democratic society than Rawls’ which focused too narrowly on the distribution of utilities. The redistribution of utilities was a necessary but insufficient part of the solution to the problem of social justice because humans had a “dual nature” — they needed to “maximize” their respective “human attributes or capacities” as well. Porter captured this idea by quoting Macpherson: “[W]e must increasingly think of the good society in terms of the ‘egalitarian maximization of powers’” (1979d:273–4).

Expanding the “powers” of individuals to increase the social good meant expanding the liberal conception of rights. Porter pursued this issue by drawing on T.H. Marshall’s work on citizenship rights (1950). These he regarded as not only the basis for a more just society but also as “the guiding judgemental principle” for the kind of “evaluative sociology” he wanted to develop (1979b:3, emphasis added; see also 1978:8; 1979a:128). Porter’s stress here on the idea that sociology should be judgemental and evaluative, ceaselessly pushing for a wider distribution of societally responsible individual rights, not only demonstrates his long-term allegiance to the New Liberal view that sociology should not be value-free but also places him on exactly the same page as Burawoy.

The argument that values have no place in social scientific inquiry is in my view incorrect for the central question of that inquiry relates to the conditions and capacities that a society needs to move itself in the direction of the social good. (Porter 1975b:2; emphasis added)

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\(^{18}\) The “unity of mankind” is Hobhouse’s precise phrase.
The social scientist’s freedom to pursue research — a societally granted privilege — carried with it the responsibility to use that freedom in the service of society. Sociologists were duty-bound to assess and criticize any social order that served particular rather than general interests. In the last five years of his life, Porter wrote three essays in which he made this point crystal clear. Perhaps a 1975 address is the best example. There he stated bluntly that scholars had to choose sides in moral and political skirmishes.

To me, the major task of social science is to abstract from the confused flow of events perspectives which clarify and which permit some judgment about society in the light of moral principles. (1975b:2; see also 1973:467; 1979b:2)

PORTER’S “VALUE SCIENCE”?: CONCEPTUALIZING, MEASURING, AND WORKING TOWARD PROGRESS

By what methodological/normative means was one to judge? What constituted the Social Good toward which sociology should work? What style of sociology would offer most help in this project? He answered these questions — echoing Hobhouse and anticipating Burawoy — a number of times during his career, but especially in these end-of-career essays (1961a; 1974; 1975a; 1975b; 1979b). I review them below as a prelude to a detailed discussion of the parallels between Porter’s approach and Burawoy’s.

The most obvious place Porter echoed Hobhouse is the cover page of “Macrosociology: Some Problems with the Nation State as the Unit of Analysis,” written in 1974. The cover page of that paper bears in full the Hobhouse quotation — “Social development corresponds in its concrete entirety to the requirements of rational ethics.... Good is the principle of organic harmony in things” — cited above (1974). Obviously, this conception of the good society constituted a career-long source of inspiration about the moral purpose of sociology. But it was integral to his thinking about the methodology of sociology as well.

In fact, Porter’s late-career methodology essays are highly relevant to the current debate on public sociology. They not only manifest Burawoy’s idea that it is necessary to develop “normative institutional criteria for progressive intervention” — that is, a vision of a “practical utopia” toward which public sociology should work — but also they outline the parameters of a social democratic sociology and — in a bold gesture —

19. “Value science” is Burawoy’s term, not Porter’s.
attempt to operationalize progress. I begin by describing the bare bones of his conception of a social democratic sociology.

In the “ Macrosociology” essay Porter begins by stating that sociology should be grand in scale and synthetic; i.e. methodologically wholist. Here Porter has in mind the omnium gatherum political economy and moral philosophy of the 19th century. He did not want sociology to be reduced to the status of a “fringe” or “residual discipline” which would: 1. deal only with “problems left aside by the other social sciences,” 2. “apply a set of quantitative skills for market researchers,” or 3. “provide historians with some broader perspective to the major political and social dramas of history.” In this regard, he differs somewhat from Burawoy, whose conception of sociology does not include either political science or economics to the same degree Porter’s does. In fact, Burawoy sees sociology as protecting the interests of civil society against intrusions from states (political science) and markets (economics) (see e.g. 2005a, 2007c).

Following up on the notion of “grandness of scale,” Porter argues that properly practiced sociology should be comparative in orientation and international in scope. While his basic unit of analysis would be the nation state, and while it would take into account unique features of the development of individual nations, he argued that particular nation-states should be studied as instances or examples of a wider type of society developing along a common type or path of development.

What [might we] expect from a macrosociology?… [I]t should be a general model and not one specifically created for a particular society. By general, I do not mean of universal applicability to all groups at all places…. Rather, there are a number of societies at different stages of social evolution which have a similarity of structure such that they may be viewed as a type or a species. (1975b:1)

Nor could an individual nation state be understood in isolation. In keeping with the internationalist flavour of Hobhouse’s original New Liberal thinking, Porter argued that it was necessary to remove exploitation from the web of relations between ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ nations (1975b:4).

[A]ny studies undertaken with the goal of … measuring the progress of modern nations which ignore the interconnectedness between nations [are] bound to fall short of adequacy. Nations no less than men are not islands unto themselves, and it is the very relations which they enter into in the trans-national context that become constitutive of their national characteristics and dynamics. (1974:15)
While Porter’s perspective is not as sophisticated as current treatments of global economic relations, including Burawoy’s, he saw the need to address such issues. Then as now, the problems created by international capitalist markets and colonizing liberal states, dressed up in the guise of “democracy,” are global in scope.

Another feature of Porter’s macrosociology, again anticipating Burawoy, was that it should be as quantitatively sophisticated as possible and “applied” in the sense it was oriented to the solution of practical problems. According to Porter, sociologists needed to develop empirical indicators of “social development” equivalent to those employed by economists to describe economic development. Porter had a degree in economics and understood full well that economics had its flaws. Nonetheless, he thought its structural-level focus and scientific approach to the gathering and analysis of quantitative data were worthy of emulation (1974:7).

Sociologists have not measured the nation’s growth or performance in any respect…. [U]nlike economics, there is not for sociology a bundle of concepts and measures about which there is substantial agreement. (1974:8)

And make no mistake; by “sociological development,” Porter meant “progress” or “social development” in the New Liberal sense of the term. He recognized that it would be difficult to measure progress in a meaningful, sophisticated, mathematical way, but nonetheless regarded it as possible and necessary to do so. Note the following, written in 1970, over twenty years after he left the LSE:

[T]he present resurgence of interest in [macrosociology] may reflect a new concern of sociologists for the quality of social life and in the conditions of progress…. [T]he major problems of contemporary societies … are the problems of achieving “organic harmony” [Note: this is Hobhouse’s precise phrase]…. The macrosystem can be viewed as one in evolution, and the appropriate macrodata to trace out this evolution are to be found in time-series and ultimately expressed in complex mathematical models. (1970:152–3; see also 1975b:2)

Following Marshall, he regarded citizenship rights as among the best indices for measuring progress.

Citizenship has evolved historically at different times and different rates in western societies with the extension of legal political and social rights. Social indicators can be developed to measure their distribution. (1979b:3)

20. On this question, Dennis Olsen said that Porter saw James Coleman and O.D. Duncan as exemplars (Olsen, unpublished 1971–2).
In the second macrosociology essay, “Towards a Macrosociology: Further Notes,” he offered further details of his value orientation and proposed methodological approach. He began by listing twelve “common elements” of modern industrialized societies which he wanted to operationalize as “variables” and combine into a tentative “model” or “explanation sketch.” Of these, four variables — a just reward system, an open and democratic political process, the widest possible distribution of citizenship rights, and the stewarding of the environment — constituted his preferred outcomes. Together, they were “progress” operationalized. The goal of the model was to see which of the common elements of industrial societies were most important for predicting these desired outcomes. Once these variables were identified, he reasoned, sociologists could provide “societal guidance” with the aim of producing a maximally open and just democratic society:

Each of the components of the social system can be described and quantified. Similarly the development of each component can be described over time since each will have their own histories as in the case of the evolution of rights. In value terms the outcomes can be viewed as goals. The major social divisions … [would] change over time [but] finally the principle of equality [would remove] the social significance of any differentiating criteria that remain such as sex, colour and so on: all would be citizens.

In the best case scenario, he argued, “a common set of categories and measures” could allow for the development of “a comparative macrosociology, a general theory of societal evolution and guidance” much like 19th century political economy: “a search for the conditions which might maximize social welfare.”

This stress on the idea of moral judgment in light of absolute (left liberal/social democratic) standards of social development makes clear an additional feature of Porter’s conception of macrosociology. In the last year of his life he wrote:

I would like … to work toward a macrosociology that is capable of both explanation and evaluation … we should be able on the one hand to understand … how a society in its totality works and how it got to be where it is, and on the other hand we should be able to judge whether or not it is moving in the direction of maximizing human welfare.

And it was not just that it was possible to judge; one had a moral obligation to have an explicit moral position, make clear what that position was, and defend it against other moral positions. As well, it was one’s duty not just to hold values and defend them but also to try to move these
values from the realm of the desirable — “this is what should be” — to the realm of the real.

Like the British New Liberals before him, and Burawoy after, Porter argued that one could and should use carefully gathered empirical data and objective moral standards to subject societies to a thorough moral assessment. Social development and moral progress were two sides of the same coin. Just as societies had developed to greater and lesser degrees in terms of economic growth and other “sociographic” measures, so, too, had they achieved varying levels or degrees of moral progress. “Not all cultures have equal claims on our moral support,” he wrote. “[I]n the course of social evolution some principles of social life have emerged which are more morally supportable than others.” This meant that some cultures — traditional and contemporary — would and should disappear.

Many of the historic cultures are irrelevant to our futures. Opportunity will go to those individuals who are future-oriented in an increasingly universalistic culture. Those oriented to the past are likely to lose out. (1979e:130, 133)

Classical liberal and neoliberal cultures were likewise candidates for the chopping block; only a left liberal/social democratic society based on universal human (social) rights could serve as a potential template for a viable future. On this count, then, Porter and Burawoy share the view that neither classical liberalism nor its modern neoliberal counterpart can be the basis of any positive, humane future for the world’s peoples.

**Comparing Burawoy’s Public Sociology and Porter’s New Liberalism**

As Burawoy describes it, public sociology must be 1. based on solid science, 2. reflexive and morally committed, and 3. “practical” and politically engaged. I deal with each in turn, comparing Burawoy’s views with Porter’s.

**Based on Solid Science**

Burawoy maintains that any valuable public sociology must be based in professional, i.e., scientific, sociology. This implies that it should draw on the most sophisticated quantitative (and qualitative) data. “I believe that an effective public sociology, far from being incompatible with science, depends on the best of science” (2005g:515).
For his part, all of Porter’s work, from his early articles on elites (1955, 1956, 1957, 1958) to *The Vertical Mosaic*, and his later essays and books on occupational prestige, educational opportunity, and social mobility, were based on carefully gathered, systematic, quantitative empirical data, much of it drawn from surveys. Indeed, the three last-mentioned studies were modelled on the most sophisticated quantitative American mainstream sociology of the period.\(^{21}\) They were what Burawoy would call professional/policy sociology. Porter had three goals in mind in prosecuting these studies: to produce badly needed data, to inform/influence policy decisions, and to facilitate the development of a Canadian survey research tradition. The late-career macrosociology essays were more “philosophical” in character but, nonetheless, advocated the use of highly sophisticated techniques of data production and analysis and the development of mathematical theoretical models. He thought it possible to identify objective measures of progress and then operationalize and measure them. Like Burawoy, then, Porter regarded the technical merits of mainstream American sociology as indispensable to the prosecution of high-quality public sociology and modelled his work on it.

Neither of them is a positivist. Burawoy was highly critical of professional sociology for sometimes devolving into a “pathological” enterprise. Drawing on Orlando Patterson (2002) and Peter Berger (2002), he notes that in its efforts to “mimic the natural sciences” it has “fallen victim to methodological fetishism and an obsession with trivial topics” (Burawoy 2005a:15). Porter was equally leery of the pathologies of American professional sociology. “Although I always admired American sociologists for their methodological skills,” he wrote, “I was never particularly attracted to the kinds of problems to which they were bringing their skills” (1979h:8). Far too often, he wrote, they simply engaged in “aimless empiricism” (1979b:3).

For Burawoy there is an even bigger problem. The natural science model is seriously flawed, he says, because it relies exclusively on criteria internal to science for its validity. This was problematic even in the 20th century, but is entirely unsuitable now. This is where the second criterion of a legitimate public sociology comes in.

**Morally Reflexive and Committed**

According to Burawoy, sociology needs to make a reflexive component integral to its nature and practice. “Science has to be postpositivist,” he

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21. The study of occupational prestige was modelled on Hodge et al. (1964). The study of educational aspirations and opportunity was modelled on *inter alia* Coleman et al. (1966) and Sewell (1971). The study of social mobility was modelled on Blau and Duncan (1967).
argues. “[I]t has to recognize its own implication in the world it studies” (2005g:515–6). More specifically, he says, drawing on the moral reflexivity of critical sociology, it must be alive to the moral deficiencies, blindnesses, etc. of professional sociology.

The social sciences are at the intersection of the humanities and the natural sciences because they necessarily partake in both instrumental and reflexive knowledge. Here are research programs that are deeply embedded in value premises that need to be critically fleshed out and become the object of public debate. (2005g:514–5)

Indeed, as I noted in the discussion above of his conception of a legitimate public sociology, Burawoy argues that a legitimate public sociology must reject value freedom and base itself on a set of social democratic values which it holds to be objectively good, i.e., constitute a vision of progress properly conceived. Put in other words, a properly conceived, legitimate public sociology holds to a set of values based in critical and radical sociology which form the basis for a practical “utopia,” a humane, inclusive, egalitarian, participatory democracy, that constitutes the “real world” institutional goal (humanity’s collective social interest) toward which sociologists as a community must work.

The New Liberalism Porter adopted as a perspective was a likewise “radical” interventionist form of liberal/social democratic doctrine which involved the adoption of a value-laden approach to intellectual activity. The social scientist was not to be a technician or morally detached “professional” but an engaged, practical intellectual who should not, indeed could not, be morally neutral.

We conduct research with careful design and controls in order to provide evidence that might enlighten publics and policy makers, spark debate about whether what we find is desirable, satisfactory, or reprehensible in the light of some standards that we have, and, depending on the outcome of that, help to mobilize forces of change…. I think it is possible to combine within the same framework both explanatory and judgmental modes of analysis…. We need to know how the great society in Graham Wallas’ sense can also be the good society. (1979b:3)

All this is to stress, then, that, like Burawoy, Porter rejected the principle of value freedom. He agreed that the objective gathering of data using a scientific approach was a crucial aspect of intellectual practice but argued, drawing specifically from the original British roots of the New Liberalism, that sociology was both science (of a sort) and philosophy, both a means of gathering socially important knowledge and a way of putting it to practical, morally good use. As a part of this commitment,
he rejected value neutrality and claimed that it was possible to use philosophical/sociological reasoning to identify *objective standards of moral worth* that could and should then be scientifically operationalized and used as a standard against which to measure progress.

This brings us to the third characteristic of a legitimate public sociology.

**Practical and Politically Engaged**

According to Burawoy a legitimate public sociology must be engaged in dialogic relations with publics, specifically, counterhegemonic, oppressed publics (local, regional, national, international) with the dual practical/political goals of fighting the forces and effects of third-wave marketization and creating more humane and democratic societies. Organic public sociologists work with publics directly, by understanding their democratic goals and helping to develop and achieve them. Traditional public sociologists are less directly engaged with publics but, by definition, do “applied” work. Public sociologists must be engaged in the nitty-gritty of political practice, working for and/or with publics in a cooperative effort to do battle with neoliberalism, protecting and augmenting universal human rights, thereby “making progress” and contributing to the realization of a practical utopia.

For his part, Porter drew on the New Liberal conception of the practical, engaged intellectual to claim that it was his duty and mission to define the good, pursue truth, work toward progress, and measure success along the way. He engaged in politically motivated and relevant research on issues central to the just and efficient working of liberal society and did so without becoming a liberal technocrat or policy sociologist. Indeed, while he harboured liberal meritocratic sensibilities throughout his career, he retained an abiding belief that classical liberal democracy was deeply flawed. In the late 1970s, he reiterated the point on a number of occasions, noting specifically that “neoconservatism” — what Burawoy would call “neoliberalism” — was the culprit. As well, he specifically noted that neither economic nor political rights narrowly conceived would create the Good and Great Society that he wanted to help build.

During the 1970s, western capitalism had reached a critical point of slow growth giving the state an increasingly ambiguous task of intervention to maintain or re-establish climates favourable for capitalist enterprise. In this context has arisen the new conservatism…. The new conservatism is both economic and political; it warns us of an inescapable trade-off between equality and economic efficiency and equality and political liberty, since the redistributive objectives which equality requires can be reached
only through increased state encroachment and control. (1979b:4).

Like Burawoy, then, Porter was an astute, politically engaged scholar with a detailed knowledge of the weaknesses of capitalism. Like Burawoy, he developed — and was not afraid to expound — a reasoned, principled, philosophical and empirical critique of capitalism, liberal democracy, and liberal ideology. His style of engagement changed from time to time over his career, but he was never either a detached, ivory tower professional sociologist on the one hand or an organic public intellectual on the other. He never became a backroom intellectual for a political party and he stayed in academia rather than leaving for politics or the public service. Indeed, he remained for the most part a traditional public sociologist. At the beginning of his career, he identified a set of social issues that seemed to him to prevent Canada from being a just, humane and rational society — a democracy — and over the balance of his career tried to understand and reduce these problems by doing policy-relevant research and by advocating for progressive change. While he did this for much of his life from within the confines of the university system and related advisory and policy-related bodies, he also wrote articles and books for the educated lay public and presented his research findings on class, education, and the like to gatherings of relevant professionals in order to make them aware of the complexities, difficulties, and opportunities related to the class-education nexus in Canada. Adopting this style of scholarship created some tensions among the various components — what Burawoy would call “faces” — of his work.

WHY DID PORTER ADOPT THIS STYLE OF [PUBLIC] SOCIOLOGY?

The circumstances in which Porter developed his style of New Liberal sociology are very different from the circumstances, described above, in which Burawoy developed his version of public sociology. In 1949, when Porter first came to Canada, he did so in the heyday of postwar reconstructive optimism. Sociology was beginning to grow and assume its modern professional form (Hiller 1982). Interventionist liberalism was becoming hegemonic in Canadian political culture (Ferguson 1993; Owram 1996; Granatstein 1982), indeed, far more hegemonic and influential than in the US. This influenced the style of scholarly/political engagement he chose. Since Canadian academic and political culture was receptive to the engaged, practical New Liberal style of scholarship he practised (Ferguson 1993; Owram 1996; Granatstein 1982), he did not have to become Burawoy’s “organic” public sociologist. Some pieces of his early work (1961a; 1961b), and particularly *The Vertical*
Mosaic, were radical, outspokenly social democratic, and irreverent of Canadian political platitudes. As with much traditional public sociology, these writings were aimed at a wide, literate audience beyond the academy. Though he got into some hot water for taking an obvious moral stance in The Vertical Mosaic and other early essays, the book was so influential and he became such an eminent figure, that his moral stance (indeed, that he had even chosen to take a moral stance) came to be a nonissue. Indeed, despite its radical tone and content, The Vertical Mosaic was sufficiently mainstream, sufficiently liberal, in style and content that neither professional scholars nor politicians and bureaucrats could safely ignore it as fringe scholarship. Moreover, due in part to the ubiquity of New Liberal political and economic beliefs at the time — this was the heyday of the building of Canada’s interventionist welfare state, after all — Porter was able to try to push society in the left liberal/social democratic direction he preferred without having to become a radical “squeaky wheel” or organic public intellectual in Burawoy’s sense of the term. In fact, by this odd conjecture of factors he was able to combine elements of second- and third-wave sociology — professional but social democratic — in a way that was acceptable to mainstream sociologists of the time. For a while it seemed he could make progress toward his social democratic goals from within the system. He became a prominent professional/policy sociologist doing state-funded research on educational opportunity, social mobility, and the like, all the while garnering great respect from senior Ottawa mandarins and mainstream sociologists on both sides of the 49th parallel. Simultaneously, in an unusual development, he temporarily held a central spot in the community of radical (critical) scholars as well. Marxists and new political economists liked his data — his well documented claims about the inequalities of class and power — even if they did not share what they regarded, somewhat inaccurately, as his mainstream liberal political views (Clement 1980; Helmes-Hayes and Curtis 1998). In short, he filled the role of a third-wave sociologist during a period dominated by second-wave sociology in Canada.

There were limits. Despite his considerable academic stature, and despite the relatively progressive atmosphere in the Canadian social science community of the time, he found he had little influence in policy forums. He had “tried serving on [such] committees,” he said, “but they seldom took his advice” (Porter, cited Olsen 1971–2:n.p.) Why? Because then as now they were dominated by conservative, mainstream economists who had more credence with politicians and bureaucrats (see Brooks and Gagnon 1988:83). Moreover, while governments made some policy changes he liked — increasing the accessibility of postsecondary
education, for instance — such changes were partial, slow in coming, and had less effect than he had hoped (see 1979d; 1979g). Particularly when the political climate changed in the early 1970s with the rise of neoconservatism/neoliberalism, he began to play up once again the social democratic side of his New Liberal sensibilities.

A BRIEF CLOSING REMARK: PORTER’S RELEVANCE TO THE PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY DEBATE

The relevance of Porter’s perspective to the current debate on public sociology is obvious. It combines empirical/scientific (read “professional”) and “policy” sociology with critical and public sociology. It offers some very specific and appealing ideas about directions a legitimate public sociology might take. The key for Porter, as for Burawoy, is that the doctrine of value freedom is not an appropriate basis for the discipline. A major difference between him and Burawoy is that during much of the era that Porter practised sociology in Canada, a set of New Liberal political sensibilities, aided and abetted by even more radical arguments offered by Marxists and the New Left, dominated the scholarly/political landscape. This reduced the problem his political engagement created. This is no longer the case, as Burawoy’s experience attests. Porter’s New Liberal views would be more controversial now than they were then, given the greater prominence of professional sociology and the current neoliberal political/economic environment. Nonetheless, his approach does have a number of features that would be judged as merits by sociologists of various types, even now. Critical and radical sociologists would likely find it appealing because it rejects the doctrine of value freedom and has social democratic values at its core. Conversely, professional and policy sociologists would appreciate the fact it is highly empirical, methodologically sophisticated, and applied. They might see it as useful because it is rooted in liberal political philosophy rather than the Marxism and “radical sociology” that Burawoy places at the centre of his emancipatory public sociology. For them what would be especially controversial about Porter’s approach — like Burawoy’s proposed model of public sociology — is that it presumes to identify objective criteria of progress and specify the discipline’s role in furthering and measuring society’s development in that direction. For his part, I suspect that Porter, like Burawoy, would welcome the debate such disputes would generate. Open debate is central to a progressive public sociology.
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