THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION
AND THE PRODUCTION OF
POLITICS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
PIECEWORK MACHINE SHOPS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY*

Michael Burawoy, University of California,
Berkeley

The distinction between politics and production is a legacy that Marxists inherited from Marx. The labor process is looked upon as an economic arena where raw materials are transformed into useful products through the coercive organization of collective labor, while significant political processes occur elsewhere. The separation of politics and production is reflected in the abiding distinctions between base and

*Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 1, pages 261–299
Copyright © 1980 by JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISBN: 0-89232-115-6

261
superstructure, class in itself and class for itself, object and subject, and so on. In terms of this separation twentieth-century Marxism can be divided into two broad traditions. The first focuses on politics at the expense of production, while the second deals with production to the neglect of politics. In this paper I try to link the two divergent paths.

The first tradition finds an early representative in Lenin, who insisted that revolutionary class consciousness must be brought to the proletariat from outside the labor process. He saw the transition to socialism as harnessing a transformed politics—the dictatorship of the proletariat—to the most efficient and advanced organization of capitalist work. Under the assumption that the “objective” conditions for revolution were ripe, Gramsci studied the various levels of the “superstructure” as barriers to the development of revolutionary struggles. Based on the economic analysis of Pollock and others, the Frankfurt School stressed the durability of the advanced capitalist economy and in this way justified an almost exclusive interest in the cultural, philosophical, and psychological realms. Following Lenin—and indeed, Marx’s political works—Poulantzas uses the concept of relative autonomy to justify the study of politics independently of economics. Finally, Habermas’s distinction between labor and interaction epitomizes the imposition of a theoretical rupture between production and politics.

If the first tradition assumes that politics can be understood independently of the labor process, the second assumes that the labor process can be understood outside politics. Accordingly, those who offer more than a cursory view of the labor process emerge with a correspondingly inadequate notion of politics. For example, Lukács’s discussion of the labor process regards it as being subjected to the forces of commodification, fragmentation, and atomization. While this treatment of reification does address the ideological effects of capitalist production, it leaves no opening for the analysis of politics, except in the form of the messianic transformative role of the party. More recently, Harry Braverman (1974) has highlighted the separation of manual and mental labor as the essential form of reification in the capitalist labor process. He further reduces control to reification by insisting that the characteristic manner through which capital exercises control over the labor process is the separation of conception and execution.

In limiting control to a purely objective phenomenon he focuses only on the negative moment, on the restrictions on the transformation of labor power into labor, on what workers can no longer do. He thereby misses the positive moment of control, workers’ adaptation to the labor process and their active cooperation in the production of surplus value.

The transformation of the worker into a mere cog—which capitalism constantly attempts but never succeeds in achieving—comes into direct conflict with the de-
The Politics of Production and the Production of Politics

Development of production. If capitalism ever succeeded in fulfilling this objective, it would mean the immediate breakdown of the productive process itself as the simultaneous attempt on the one hand to reduce work into the mere execution of strictly defined tasks (or rather gestures), on the other hand constantly to appeal to and rely upon the conscious and willing participation of the worker, on his capacity to understand and do much more than he is supposed to (Cardan, 1961:5).

Control cannot be reduced to an objective moment of the labor process, that is to the separation of conception and execution, to commodification, or to bureaucratization. Control also involves the organization of "conscious and willing participation" on the one hand and the containment of resistance on the other. In short an analysis of control over the translation of labor power into labor must include an analysis of ideology and politics. The development of a concept of the politics of production and the analysis of its link to global politics is the task of this paper. But first it is necessary to examine the notion of "forces of production" more carefully.

The last hundred years has driven Marxism beyond Marx. This can be seen most clearly in debates over the place of the forces of production and of politics in the unfolding of history. The evolutionary optimism in Marx's vision of the future was anchored in the expansion of the forces of production. The movement from one mode of production to the next "higher" mode hinges on the development of the productive forces. These in turn are shaped by the relations through which surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers, that is by the relations of production—which, from conditions of the development of the productive forces, become so many fetters. Therefore, if history is to march forward, the relations of production must be "burst asunder." The twentieth century has not only shattered this optimism but has rudely awakened Marxists' awareness of the use to which such "laws" can be put.

There are two assumptions upon which Marx's teleology of history rests. First, the development of the forces of production necessitates the supercession of the relations of production. Second, the development of the forces of production lays the basis for the next mode of production. In connection with the transition to socialism, both assumptions have been vigorously contested. First, productive forces, far from undermining capitalist relations of production, reinforce those relations. The relations of production shape the productive forces in conformity with their own needs. In other words, efficiency, technology, bureaucracy are not "neutral" or independent of capitalist relations of production, but are an expression of those relations. It follows from this that the development of the forces of production under capitalism does not necessarily lay the basis for socialism. To the contrary, as has been plausibly argued by Herbert Marcuse (1964:Chapter 6), for example, the forces of production are irretrievably impregnated with capitalist rationality and are necessar-
ily incompatible with socialism. In losing their neutrality the productive forces no longer provide the thread of continuity and determinacy to the transition from one mode of production to another. Rather, the forces of production, like the relations of production, are looked upon as discontinuous, and only lend indeterminacy in the succession of modes of production. Feudalism is no longer the unique antecedent of capitalism; socialism is no longer the inevitable successor to capitalism. One result of projecting a radical break or of merely introducing a degree of indeterminacy between the dissolution of one mode of production and the genesis of another has been a rising interest in the politics of transitions. Increased interest in global politics, that is politics concerned with the reproduction and transformation of the relations of production, is reflected, for example, in the emergent theories of the state. Moreover, in loosening the grip of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" on the Marxist imagination, new doors have been opened in the discussion of the role of the state in the transition to socialism.

However, my concern here is a narrower one, confined to developing an alternative understanding of the forces of production. In what terms shall we conceive them if we are to stress the radically different forms they assume under different modes of production? With what shall we replace the emphasis on the capacity to transform nature and on how this increases unilinearly through history? Such a "productivist" notion not only offers continuity where discontinuity is sought but suffers from another drawback as well, namely its conception of emancipation. Through the reduction of the amount of necessary labor (that is, the reduction of the length of the working day), the expansion of the forces of production promises to establish a realm of freedom, but only outside the factory. Inside the factory a regime of alienated labor continues to prevail. This, for example, is Lenin's conception of socialism (see Santamaria and Manville, 1976). That the adoption of efficiency as the primary criterion for organizing the labor process might impose constraints on the form of politics is not considered. Nor does the possibility of achieving freedom within the labor process itself enter the discussion.

If the conception of the forces of production as the capacity to transform nature offers continuity rather than discontinuity, determinacy rather than indeterminacy, freedom in leisure rather than freedom in work, we must construct an alternative conceptualization. Recently, Balibar (1970) and Hindess and Hirst (1975) have insisted on viewing the forces of production as a set of relations, rather than a collection of things. These are the relations into which men and women enter as they transform raw materials into useful goods; the relations into which they enter as they transform their capacity to labor, their labor power, into actual labor; the relations which define the labor process; what Marx sometimes
refers to as the immediate production relations and what others call the
technical division of labor. In order to emphasize the relational feature I
will here adopt the concept of "relations in production" as a replacement
for forces of production and will speak of raw materials and instruments
of production separately.

We can see immediately that this has the desired theoretical effects.
First, when conceived of as a set of social relations the forces of produc-
tion become discontinuous and qualitatively different under different
modes of production. Second, such qualitative differences allow us to
conceptualize work and work relations under socialism as the relations
among "freely associated producers," and therefore as fundamentally
different from those under capitalism. The notion of relations in
production pushes forward an additional problem, namely their reproduc-
tion. Moreover, this is the problem that defines the politics of produc-
tion.

In order to focus directly on the forms of politics of production, on the
organization of struggles over relations in production, I will draw on a
variety of empirical studies of a single labor process. By restricting the
discussion to piecework machine shops, the political and ideological
effects of the labor process itself are held relatively constant, while the
independent contributions of different political structures to the shaping
of struggles are thrown into relief. Miklos Haraszti (1977) describes life in
a Hungarian machine shop. I will use his study to illustrate one type of
politics of production—the politics of bureaucratic despotism. I will con-
trast Haraszti's study with one made by Donald Roy in 1945 in a machine
shop in South Chicago and then proceed to examine changes that I
observed thirty years later. What emerges here is a hegemonic form of
politics. But first I will begin with Marx's own description of a piece rate
system, and suggest the basis of the despotic form of politics associated
with early capitalism.

I. KARL MARX AND THE ORGANIZATION OF
DESPOTISM

In arguing that the production of commodities is simultaneously the
reproduction of relations of production, Marx took for granted the repro-
duction of relations in production:

The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total connected process,
i.e., a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus
value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital relation itself, on the one hand
the capitalist, and the other the wage-labourer. (Marx, 1976:724)

The reproduction of relations among workers and between workers and
managers, supervisors, etc., are not problematic or even worthy of con-
In the factory code, the capitalist formulates his autocratic power over his workers like a private legislator, purely as an emanation of his own will, unaccompanied by either that division of responsibility otherwise so much approved of by the bourgeoisie, or the still more approved representative system. This code is merely the capitalist caricature of the social regulation of the labour process which becomes necessary in co-operation on a large scale and in the employment in common of instruments of labour, and especially of machinery. The overseer’s book of penalties replaces the slave-driver’s lash. All punishments naturally resolve themselves into fines and deductions from wages, and the law-giving talent of the factory Lycurgus so arranges matters that a violation of his laws is, if possible, more profitable to him than the keeping of them. (Marx, 1976:549–60)

In short, the wage and therefore the reproduction of labor power depended directly and immediately on the translation of that labor power into labor.

This intimate bond linking individual survival to individual productive activity reaches its apotheosis in the system of piece wages, which Marx describes as “the form of wage most appropriate to the capitalist mode of production” (1976:698). Following the enforcement of factory acts, surplus value could no longer be increased through the extension of the working day, but instead had to be augmented through the intensification of labor. At this time “piece wage becomes the general rule because where capital can increase the yield of the working day only by intensifying labour” (Marx, 1976:699). Under a system of piece wages, “... it is naturally in the personal interest of the worker that he should strain his labour power as intensely as possible” (Marx, 1976:695). Capitalists can therefore, increase the intensity of labor without elaborate superintendence: the piece rate becomes the master. But the increased wages that accompany the extra expenditure of effort delivers the worker into the hands of the capitalist, who now increases the rate of surplus value through cutting piecework prices:

The raising of the overall wage (the weekly wage, for example) frequently occurs in branches of industry where piece work has been freshly introduced. But as soon as it has reached a certain rate, the rise which has been brought about by the increased intensity of labour becomes itself a reason for the masters to reduce wages, since they regard them as higher than is good for the worker. (Marx, 1976:1072)

This is the piecework trap. In order to earn a subsistence wage workers must strain their labor power, which then provides the capitalist with a
justification for cutting prices. Surviving today means working harder tomorrow for the same wage. To escape the trap workers must collude, but that presupposes some form of collective organization which the system of piece work systematically undermines through its ideological effects.

But the wider scope that piece-wages give to individuality tends to develop both that individuality, and with it the worker's sense of liberty, independence, and self-control, and also the competition of workers with each other. The piece wage therefore has a tendency while raising the wages of individuals above the average, to lower this average itself. (Marx, 1976:697)

The production of commodities is not only the production of social relations but also the production of an experience of those relations, the basis of an ideology. Thus, in addition to promoting the sense of "liberty, independence and self-control," a piece wage system masks its true nature as a converted form of time wages in which workers receive compensation for only a portion of their labor. Payment by the piece is experienced as payment for labor expended, not as the costs of the reproduction of labor power. Moreover, this ideology of individualism and reward for effort provides the terrain for struggles between labor and capital:

This change in the piece-wage, so far purely nominal, leads to constant struggles between the capitalist and the worker, either because the capitalist uses it as a pretext for actually lowering the price of labour, or because an increase in productivity of labour is accomplished by an increase in its intensity, or because the worker takes the outward appearance of piece wages seriously, i.e., he thinks his product is being paid for and not his labour power, and he therefore resists any reduction of wages which is not accompanied by a reduction in the selling price of the commodity. (Marx, 1976:699-700)

Thus, the very appropriateness of the piece wage for the capitalist mode of production is also the source of intensification of struggles between capital and labor. The contradictory consequences of piecework express the contradictions of capitalism—contradictions which for Marx could only be resolved by overthrowing capitalism.

History, however, suggests that class struggles of this kind, rather than being the grave digger of capitalism, were its saviour, instigating the transition from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism. For our purposes, the essential change in this transition is the severance of the individual bond between the reproduction of labor power and the expenditure of labor, and the reconstitution of this bond at the collective level. Future wages depend on the prosperity of the firm, that is on the labor of the collective worker. When workers are delivered from the arbitrary
despotism of the employer and from the drive for economic survival, through minimum wage guarantees and trade union organization, then the effectiveness of individual piece wages is undermined. New mechanisms must be sought to secure the transformation of raw materials and the production of surplus value."

One possibility is to incorporate coercion into the means of labor, the technology. From being bound hand and foot to the piece rate, the worker is transformed into an appendage of a machine.

The worker's activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the opposite. The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself. . . . The worker appears as superfluous to the extent that his action is not determined by [capital's] requirements. (Marx, 1973:693-695)

Unfortunately for capital, workers effectively resist the reduction to "abstract activity." Thus a new form of politics emerges which tries to organize and contain the "superfluous" activities, the struggles over relations in production.

In part three of this paper I will outline the form assumed by politics in a piecework machine shop in the United States. But first, in part two, I turn to a situation in which economic survival is still hinged to individual production levels, but where struggles have been systematically suppressed through the politics of bureaucratic despotism.

II. THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC DESPOTISM

Between 1971 and 1972, Miklos Haraszti, a Hungarian poet and sociologist, worked in Red Star Tractor Factory. He describes his experiences there in Piece Rates, which appears in English as A Worker in a Worker's State. He was brought to trial by the Hungarian government, accused of writing a book likely to stimulate hatred of the state, falsifying the facts, and generalizing on the basis of this false picture. There are indications that Red Star Tractor Factory might have been somewhat exceptional. During the fifties it had benefited from subsidies, which it attracted due to the mechanization of agriculture. In the sixties, however, it had lost those subsidies, and in 1971 was struggling for survival. "The gravity of the situation required severe measures" (1977:134). Indeed, to anyone familiar with machine shops in the United States and Britain, the remedies were unthinkable. Because I am not in a position to assess the representativeness of Haraszti's compelling description, in what follows I
am merely using his book to illustrate a particular type of politics of production.\textsuperscript{10}

The Dictatorship of the Norm

At Red Star Tractor Factory the piece rate system operated much as described by Marx. There was a basic wage, but it did not constitute a guaranteed minimum. However, this hourly wage was important in other ways. First, it determined the wage a worker would receive were he or she to move to another firm. In keeping the hourly wage as low as possible, the foreman was not so much saving the factory money but, more significantly, deterring workers from quitting (1977:25). Second, the hourly wage determined the midmonth advance workers received, as well as holiday and sick leave pay—"not that you can afford to be ill with an hourly wage that low" (1977:27). Third, the hourly wage was used by the foreman in distributing work to machine operators. Jobs with the easier piece rates generally went to workers in higher job categories, that is on higher hourly wage rates (1977:90). Fourth, for the first three months foremen were entitled to guarantee workers' hourly wage even if their output did not achieve it. Thereafter operators were on their own. When piece rates were impossible, there was nothing workers could do to bring their earnings up to the hourly wage. The only recourse was first fury, then frenzy.

Earnings were directly proportional to the number of pieces produced. Each piece had a price, supposedly fixed at such a rate as to allow operators to make their hourly wage, that is, an output of 100 percent. By following the directions of the blueprint, the stipulated speed, feed, and cutting depth, Haraszti found that it was impossible to produce the pieces at a rate which would earn him his hourly wage. Moreover, the piece rate system did not allow him any time for setting up, getting pieces checked, and other contingencies (1977:36–37). To make the hourly wage, let alone a living wage, operators had to break the rules and safety regulations by increasing speeds and feeds, and taking dangerous shortcuts (1977:40). Only in this way could an operator produce over 100 percent. This cheating of the norm, known as looting, dominated the entire shop-floor experience of the operator. It consumed his concentration and, when successful, offered some sense of accomplishment.\textsuperscript{11} The unity of conception and execution was thus partially restored, but in the interests of the bosses.

"Nerves" brought about by the necessity of looting cannot be calmed by anything except loot itself. We have to stake all our inventiveness, knowledge, imagination, initiative and courage on getting it. And when this comes off, it brings a certain feeling
of triumph. This is why workers on piece rates often feel they have beaten the system, as if they'd got the better of someone. (1977:51)

Although foremen, inspectors, and rate fixers were "there to see that the rules are observed, they turn a blind eye... so long as you do not force your looting to their attention" (1977:49). Indeed, the foreman’s bonuses and prestige rested on operators risking life and limb in the pursuit of loot.

But in going beyond the norm to make a living wage, operators provided the rate fixer with the ammunition for speed-ups. The pursuit of maximum economic gain forced down the price per piece.

To make our living we are forced to provide the rate fixers with irrefutable arguments for the revision of norms, and so for the reduction to an ever more unreal level of the time per piece and consequently the pay per piece. This incites us to speed up the rate still more to try and reach a greater level of production. Therefore, we prepare the ground, slowly but surely, for another increase of the norms. (1977:63)

Revisions of the norm were not only made on a job-by-job basis but, more significantly, on a collective basis. Workers were exhorted to increase their output in the common interest and were "rewarded" with a general "readjustment" of the norms, which hit everyone (1977:63, 134). "The real meaning of piece rates lies in the incessant increase in production" (1977:59).

In terms of sheer effort the norms described by Haraszti seem unbelievable. After his period of probation he was introduced to the "two machine" system. The rate fixers had decided that operators should run two machines simultaneously whenever this was at all possible. Haraszti initially considered this a means to earn more money, until he discovered that for such jobs (in the case of milling this was most jobs), the piece time had been cut in two, with the possibility of earning an additional fifth as compensation.12

Working on two machines at once is very difficult: it is dangerous and exhausting, you have to use all the brains you’ve got. When I work on one machine, it is boring and tiring, certainly, but the moments during which it functions automatically do lead to some satisfaction. It seems that I dominate the machine: I have fed it, my hands rest upon its casting, and now it works. It’s true that I only feel these almost tender sentiments when I switch from two machines to one; even then, they vanish after a little while. But when I'm working on two machines, such feelings are utterly impossible. You can’t dominate two machines: they dominate you... I change into a senseless, mindless machine. (1977:111)

The dictatorship of the norm is supplemented by the tyranny of the machine, and the real subsumption of the laborer is complete.
Ideological Effects of the Labor Process

How was it that workers cooperated in their own barbaric subordination? The need to survive and the power this gave to management were obviously critical. Yet there was something about the labor process itself that generated a certain complicity of the workers in their own subordination. The mechanism through which workers were drawn into their own destruction was the uncertainty of outcomes and the possibility of controlling those outcomes. "Insecurity is the main driving force in all payment by results. . . . The manifest coercion and dependence which characterize payment by the hour change into a semblance of independence with piece-rates. . . . Uncertainty is the great magician of piece-work" (1977:56, 57). At the same time too much uncertainty would put outcomes beyond the operators' control, while too little uncertainty would make workers indifferent to the outcomes. If rate-fixers pushed their luck too far, or if a general revision of norms was too drastic, then operators would leave (1977:134, 136–137).

Once workers thought it was possible to survive under a piece rate system, they took up the challenge to their ingenuity, will, and endurance and blamed themselves for failure (1977:39). In this way they were sucked into participating in their own brutalization.

Of course, [the worker] knows perfectly well that he is being cheated. But his active participation in this trick against himself makes it impossible for him to see the deception: or to identify it with his conditions of life, as can the worker on hourly wages. Instead he has a sharp eye for petty discrimination, injustice or manipulation, and fights against such things in the belief that such victories can be set against the defeats. He leads to judge everything in terms of pay, and when he has a good month, he believes, from the bottom of his heart, that he is not the dupe but the victor. (1977:58)

Once compelled to engage in this preoccupation for looting, the conditions which made it necessary receded into the background as unalterable givens: "... not only the two-machine system, but also the nature of the work itself seemed unchangeable" (1977:119).

The system of norms is far more effective at shackling the imagination than at stimulating production: the most daring dream of piece-rate workers is to achieve a fair and sufficient hourly wage; in other words to be delivered from the norm. If a utopia of productive relations where they could determine their goals together threatens to break to the surface, they immediately force it back. (1977:132)

Rather than conceiving of alternative ways of organizing production, workers were absorbed by variations which they faced on a day-to-day basis: good jobs rather than bad jobs, one machine instead of two, the
possibility of supplementary wages, bonuses, and so forth. Such apparently insignificant differences came to overwhelm all other experiences on the shop floor.

We are like natives who, in the early days of colonialism handed over everything, their treasures, their land, and themselves, for worthless trinkets and who become aware that they had been robbed only when they failed to get the usual jink in return. (1977:114)

And the very relativity of gains had the effect of only further mystifying the basis of wage labor.

One might think that the two-machine system itself is so outrageous that it would shatter the illusion that we are really being paid, and with it the illusion of paid work in general. But the truth is that it enhances the power of the illusion. When it emerges that the two-machine system does not improve our pay in comparison with the old system, or with the hourly wages, this does not appear to us as a brutal manifestation of the famous relations of production, we feel fooled: well and truly fooled. (1977:115)

No matter how much knowledge one brought to the shop floor, no matter how many times one had read Capital, the experience was the same. A monomania set in which concentrated all energies and ingenuity on factors that shaped marginal variations, rather than on factors that determined the limits of those variations. If looting sprang from the need to survive, once set in motion its ideological effect was to conceal its origin and autonomously generate the ideological conditions of its own reproduction.

_The Political Effects of the Labor Process_

The production of objects is simultaneously the production of relations—relations of competition and interdependence. Under a system of piece rates, competition revolves around the distribution of good and bad jobs (1977:53, 66), the transfer and promotion of people into new positions, and the distribution of supplementary wages, which supposedly compensate operators for contingencies not allowed for in the calculation of piece rates. While such competition is to be found in all piecework machine shops, its particular mode of resolution shapes the form of subordination. In some shops, competition is resolved through the application of rules, in others through interminable negotiation, while at Red Star Tractor Factory it was through the arbitrary will of the foreman.

So everyone is dependent personally on the head foreman who fixes the level of his pay; this is a paradox of piece-rates. The only concern one worker has for the others is jealous suspicion. Are the others a few fêtes [unit of currency] ahead? Is their
hourly rate going up more quickly? Are they getting more of the best 'good' jobs that are going? Such rivalry is equally fierce over matters in which the local foreman's decision is final: holidays, overtime, bonuses, awards. (1977:90)

There were other sources of competition. Where looting is the secret of survival and its possibility is limited, operators jealously guard their accumulated experience. New operators faced this when they arrived on the shop floor to be broken in by a senior operator who ran a similar machine. If the novice was prepared to play along with the instructor by turning out lots of pieces to advance the latter's earnings, then he might have learned something. But it wouldn't have been the angles which make looting possible, or the homemade fixtures which turned a bad job into a good job. This the new operator had to find out for himself, discover from watching others closely, or elicit through an exchange of favors.

He [the instructor] doesn't let me work on both machines at once, although I'm going to have to do this eventually. He sets up one machine so quickly that I can hardly see how he goes about it, and then he leaves me to put a run through. Meanwhile he's milling on the other machine himself, and he doesn't utter a single word until I've finished. There's a hint of blackmail in his way of going about things: if I agree to play along, perhaps he'll agree to explain the odd thing to me. Now and then, from time to time, he knocks off early and asks me to punch his card for him. In exchange, he's quite prepared to spend half an hour telling me how things work. (1977:28)

An operator really only began to learn the art of looting after his period of training was over and he was plunged into battle. He was left to his own devices not only in operating and setting up his machine, and in competing with other operators seeking the same scarce resources as he was, but in fighting for the cooperation of auxiliary workers as well. He was dependent upon these workers while at the same time he was placed in an antagonistic relationship to them. For operators paid by the piece, time lost was money lost; for auxiliary workers paid by the hour, time lost was effort saved. Haraszti soon discovered the meaning of this in his confrontations with the setter (set-up man), who had every reason to lord it over the operator if possible, sending him scurrying hither and yon on futile and unnecessary errands. "But what is a straight loss for me is a gain for the setter: he's paid by the hour. I began to hate him." (1977:31). As a neighbor explained, "Look, they're just not here to make life easier for you. . . . And why should they be more helpful? If you want to carry on with this, then it's much better to learn how to get by on your own. You've got to if you want to make any bread." (1977:32).

The story was similar with the inspector, but with a difference: you couldn't do without the inspector. It was his stamp of approval that decided whether you could go ahead and try to make some money.
Inspectors were so obviously superfluous, so clearly an expression of the system of wage labor that they had to build an image of themselves as "men of quality." In this role they directly confronted the operator—a man of quantity—as an antagonist.

The petty officials on the shop floor—neither workers nor bosses—appeared as agents of the company, executors and enforcers of the rules, keepers of the records, and communicators between bosses and workers. Although without power of their own, they were still in a position to humiliate workers on the shop floor:

None of this leads to any feeling of solidarity: the piece-rate worker cannot pass insults on to anyone else, and suffers enormously when he is kicked around by those who are not, in principle at any rate, his superiors. Besides, any hope of solidarity is excluded by the simple daily experience that white-collar workers do lighter work and accomplish less. Their work is easier and less intense, they don't clock in at the crack of dawn, they don't eat during working hours, and the coffee machines that simmer in their offices symbolize their stake in power, limited though it is. (1973:76)

Objective differences separated machine operators from the petty officials. Although they didn't earn more than a good piecework wage, auxiliary workers were clearly of a higher status than the piece rate workers, symbolized by the time they spent brewing coffee, gossiping, and joking with one another. What was the basis of their elevated status? How were these divisions created and reproduced? Why were inspectors, setters, and clerical workers more closely allied to the bosses than to the workers on the shop floor?

The Political Organization of Hierarchy

As agents of managerial control, auxiliary workers were in a position to frustrate operators. At the same time they were also wage laborers who earned little (if anything) more than operators and who had to deal with operators on a day-to-day basis. Yet they had no doubt that their interests lay with the bosses. The role of the Party was critical in ensuring their allegiance to management. Promotion to auxiliary work was a necessary if not sufficient step for those seeking a career. But such an advance out of the ranks of the operators was made possible through Party membership and Party activities:

They're all friends of the bosses; that's why they're setters. They are on the way up. . . . He [the older setter] was chairman of the local magistrate's court. On full
pay plus all the usual extras, of course. It's the same with the others. The younger one, who only became a setter last year, will be made a trade-union representative or Party secretary by next year, you'll see. The works manager was also a setter in his time. (1977:225)

Inspectors, like setters and foremen, were in a privileged position and obtained their jobs by the grace of the Party.

But even if the menis [inspectors] were falling over themselves to help us, the bosses would stop them. They are very jealous of their inspectors' reputations and they think that their jobs should be enviable and respected. It's no contradiction that these independent members of the "jury" have posts on their side, in the union or the Party. Promotion to menis should be counted as one of those privileges which can be bestowed on a worker, just as footballers and other sportsmen are often raised up to the level of "men of quality." (1977:84)

The Party was harnessed to the interest of management by creating a status hierarchy in production. The allegiance of managerial agents of control was guaranteed, not by material benefits, but by creating privileged positions, access to which was based on political criteria. Raised above the lowest ranks and on the way to making a career, auxiliary workers had their eyes on those pulling them up, rather than on trying to appease the frustration of those from whom they had come.

The Internal State—The Dictatorship of the Foreman

I have already described how relations in production are reproduced directly through the labor process itself and the system of piece rates. What happens when the labor process does not uniquely determine relations and activities? Potentially, this could provide an arena of struggle in which workers might manage to recover some of their power. In practice, however, such uncertainty was turned into an arena of absolute power for the foreman. "They are emperors here. They hold us all in their hands. They dole out favours as they feel like it." (1977:86). Thus, the fact that there were jobs with good rates and jobs with bad rates—an inevitable concomitant of any piecework system, no matter how "scientific"—was turned into a power resource for the foreman who distributed the work. The same was true of supplementary payments. Since piece rates could not incorporate the very real contingencies of production—the worn-out drill, the tough material, the warped stock, and so on—foremen were entitled to dispense supplementary wages as a recompense for lost time. In practice, operators were reimbursed for only a fraction of the time lost: "... my supplementary wages don't supplement my wages one little bit. Rather, they are a part of my pay on which they try to economize!" (1977:101). The crumbs owed to the operator by "right" were turned into a favor which had to be bargained for, enhancing the power of the foreman and wasting the time of the operator. "All the foremen... do
everything to make us feel that supplementary wages are special presents which they hand out to us, for which we give nothing in return” (1977:101). In behaving as though supplementary wages were a scarce resource, the foremen promoted jealous suspicion and guarded secrecy among the operators, thus weakening the workers’ solidarity even further.

Not content with exploiting uncertainties endemic to the labor process of a piecework machine shop, foremen managed to expand their arena of discretion to include matters which could have been very easily fixed beyond their control.

The foreman doesn’t just organize our work; first and foremost he organizes us. The foremen fix our pay, our jobs, our overtime, our bonuses, and the deductions for excessive rejections. They decide when we go on holiday; write character reports on us for any of the state which requires them; pass on assessments of those who apply for further training or request a passport; they supervise trade union activities in the section; they hire, fire, arrange transfers, grant leave, impose fines, give bonuses. Their signatures are essential to authorize any kind of departure from routine. Only information coming from them can be taken as official. They alone have the right to call a meeting. (1977:86–87)

To be sure, not all workers were equally powerless. Those who managed to make themselves irreplaceable and indispensible through the monopoly of some skill, knowledge, or experience were in a much stronger position to wheedle concessions out of the foreman than those who had nothing special to offer, novices such as Haraszti (1977:118). These variations were marginal and at the same time compounded divisions among the operators.

More generally, the dictatorshp of the foreman fostered an intense rivalry among workers for the crumbs which he chose to dispense. Competition was more formally introduced through the organization of workers into brigades. Twice a year the foreman told each brigade about their production record and whether they had won some bonus or honorific title, such as “Socialist Brigade” (1977:67). Except for “the good boys who want a political future and are laying the basis of a career” (1977:69), such “clowning” failed to summon the interests of workers. They were already so divided—first by the labor process and piece rate system, and second by the personal rule of the foreman—that the organization of brigades had little impact. Finally, workers were further divided by restrictions on their movements around the factory. They obtained no sense of the totality of the production process. Yet, at the same time that these various forms of competition and antagonism split the workers, they also promoted a bitter class hostility towards the bosses and their various agents.
In dealing with "contingencies" the foreman did not appear to be constrained by any regulations or countervailing bodies. To the contrary, all other bases of affiliation existed to enhance rather than to diminish his power. Thus, the trade union became an arm of the dictatorship of the foreman. "The union is our paid enemy...we look upon him [the union official] much more as a straw man, or a string puppet. If he was a careerist, we would certainly class him as one of them (1977:93-94).

The [the trade union secretary] is nominated for the job by the head foreman. To put up or vote for another candidate would be a direct provocation of the head foreman. Anyway, what could possibly come of it? After the election, the head foreman lives the pay of the secretary, who, in any case, has a second master as well: his superior in the union hierarchy, who works from a desk in the factory office building (1977:92).

And so the union official strolled about the workshop, promising to put grievances before the head foreman and thereby acting as an effective block to their being dealt with. He turned up at all the meetings, but his presence was a formality and he was reduced to the status of a spectator. "There is a collective agreement; almost everyone knows that, but nobody knows what is in it" (1977:95). After remonstrating with the foreman, Harasztő managed to secure permission to look at a copy of the "collective," but only under the surveillance of a secretary. It was written in such a way as to confuse, hedging its stipulations with qualifications, and placing the ultimate decision-making power in the hands of the foreman. A fellow worker put it like this: "It states everything we have to put up with, except for what it doesn't state" (1977:95). The collective is merely one more instrument through which the foreman wields and justifies his unrestrained power. "The 'collective' is for them, and not for you" (1977:97). The dictatorship of the foreman was carried out in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, in the interests of all. The collective sacrifices, the general revisions of the norms and so on, sprung upon the workers, were stamped with the approval of their representatives—the Party and the trade union—and ratified by workers themselves, after the event, in orchestrated meetings. This is the meaning of bureaucratic despotism.

From Despotism to Bureaucratic Despotism

Both Marx's argument that the piece wage is the most appropriate form of wage for capitalism and the claim of Hungarian management experts that the piece wage is the ideal form of socialist wage are based on erroneous (but different) assumptions concerning the survival and destruction of capitalism. Yet both errors reflect an underlying reality which is apparent in the striking similarity between the descriptions of Harasztő and Marx, that is between the labor process under competitive capitalism
and under what Rudolf Bahro (1977) refers to as “actually existing socialism.”

Although Marx does not discuss the independent and interactive effects of any specific labor process combined with piece rates, one can infer the following similarities between the two forms of politics of production. In both cases economic survival depends directly on the expenditure of labor. As a result, the labor process combines with the system of piece wages to autonomously generate, to a large extent, the reproduction of the relations in production. When relations in production are not automatically reproduced, uncertainties in the labor process are resolved to the advantage of management and provide the basis for the dictatorship of the foreman. Finally, the effect of piece rates is to stimulate competition, individualism, and the redistribution of hierarchical domination into lateral conflict.

At the same time, fundamental differences separate the despotism of competitive capitalism from the despotism of “actually existing socialism,” revolving around the use of “extra-economic” forces in the reproduction of relations in and of production. Distinctive to the politics of bureaucratic despotism is a harnessing of party and trade union structures to the managerial function. While the organization of the labor process binds the reproduction of labor power to the expenditure of labor at the individual level, the organization of politics through the trade union and Party binds the reproduction of labor power and the expenditure of labor at the collective level. It is in “the interests of everyone” (the survival of the factory) that there be a general revision of the norms (speed-up). The organs of global politics enter directly into the reproduction of relations in production as instruments for the repression of struggles, in shaping everyday relations on the shop floor, and in distributing labor power, both within the factory and among different factories.

With competitive capitalism, despotism on the shop floor is unrestrained and unassisted. Global politics does not enter directly into the reproduction of relations in production, rather it exists to “support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists” (Engels, 1972:633). The distribution of labor power among capitalists is organized through a labor market. Except under crisis situations, factory politics (“economic struggles”) and global politics (“political struggles”) are separated. Under bureaucratic despotism, where the two forms of politics are continuous and interpenetrate, struggles which begin in one arena easily spill over into other arenas. They therefore have to be repressed rather than organized.

Differences between the two forms of factory politics revolve around links between politics of production and global politics. Similarities rest
on the bond between an individual’s material survival and his or her expenditure of labor on the shop floor. What happens to the nature of factory politics when this bond is cut? “What would spur us on constantly to increase output if one hundred percent performance was really feasible and its corresponding pay satisfactory?” (1977:45). This was the piece workers’ dream (1977:132). How does it turn out in reality?

III. THE EMERGENCE OF A HEGEMONIC FORM OF POLITICS

Between October 1944 and August 1945 Donald Roy worked as a radial drill operator for a company that he called Geer. Workers in this factory had been organized by the United Steelworkers as early as 1936. In 1945, Geer employed around 4,000 workers and manufactured a variety of engines, lift trucks, industrial drills, and railway maintenance supplies. It had expanded considerably in response to wartime government contracts. Roy worked in the Jack Shop, which became the subject of a long and detailed doctoral dissertation as well as a series of seminal articles. In 1953 Geer was taken over by a multinational corporation specializing in agricultural, construction, and electrical equipment. Before World War II, Fortune Magazine had referred to this corporation (which I shall call Allied) as America’s Krupp. It is an old company, renowned for its conservative managerial policies, and one of the last of the large corporations to decentralize its organization into a system of multifunctional divisions (Chandler, 1962). As part of this reorganization, Allied bought out Geer and turned it into its engine division. In 1961, the engine division moved from its old premises in the building described by Roy to a new site about a mile away. It was here that I worked as a miscellaneous machine operator between July 1974 and May 1975, along with about a thousand other employees. The contrast with Red Star Tractor Factory will guide my discussion of the changes that took place on the shop floor between 1945 and 1975.

Changes in the Labor Process and Wage Form

All the labor processes—at Red Star, Geer, and Allied—bear a striking resemblance to one another. The machines—mills, drills, lathes, and so forth—and the system of auxiliary functions—inspection, setting up, distribution of tools, fixtures, blueprints, and stock—were all organized similarly. In some departments, Allied had brought in more automated equipment, including numerically controlled machines, but in the small parts department where I worked the machines were generally more recent models of what Donald Roy had used in 1945 and what Miklos
Harasztì used in Hungary. In short, differences in technology could have had but a marginal effect on differences in the politics of production.

The same cannot be said of the system of piece rates. The fundamental difference between the Hungarian and American plants lay in the absence of a guaranteed minimum wage in the former and its existence in the latter. Although operators were paid by the piece and auxiliary workers by the hour in all three factories, at Allied and Geer they were assured of a basic day rate, irrespective of how many pieces they produced. As we shall see, this led to very different forms of worker behavior and, above all, to the severance of the bond between expenditure of effort and economic survival.

But there were also differences between Geer and Allied in the way the piece rate systems worked. In Roy’s time each “operation” had a price, and earnings were calculated on the number of pieces produced so long as this came to more than the day rate, which varied with machines and operators. In 1975 an operator’s day rate was made up from a basic wage plus an override (plus shift differential and cost of living increase). Incentive earnings were calculated on the basis of the number of pieces produced per hour as a percentage of an official piece rate. According to the contract, “a normal experienced operator working at incentive gain” should produce at the rate of “125 percent,” which gave incentive earnings of 25 percent of basic wage, or about 15 percent of the day rate. Thus, between 1945 and 1975 there had been a shift from piece work based on prices to one based on rates. The change appeared in the early fifties with the rationalization of collective bargaining, when day rates became the basis for negotiation. With the increasing size of the override, the size of the guaranteed minimum wage increased relative to incentive earnings. As a result, monetary reward became less important to the expenditure of effort on the shop floor.

To understand this change, and in particular why workers continued to respond to the piecework incentive, we must first understand the options open to the machine operators. In its essentials, Roy’s discussion of restriction of output and “making out” was as true of 1975 as of 1945. Operators adapt to work by playing a game in which the goal is to make a certain quota, that is, achieve a certain percentage output. The specific target varies with the worker, the machine, and the operation, but it is always greater than the anticipated rate of 125 percent and usually less than 140 percent. Making out refers to achieving the targeted quota, and is just another name for looting. But the choice of words is significant. Whereas “looting” conveys a sense of illegitimacy and justifies a revision of the norm, “making out” is openly encouraged by shop management and, as long as it does not exceed certain well-defined bounds, it does not, in general, lead to rate increases. In other words, while looting is both
necessary for economic survival and leads to the intensification of labor, making out is economically less important and does not usually lead to the intensification of labor.\(^\text{17}\)

Although rate fixing is supposed to be scientific, everyone knows it is not, and never can be. That would be a denial of human ingenuity—of the workers' ability to fool the rate-fixers on the one hand and to learn new and quicker ways of running jobs on the other. At Red Star, operators had few options in adapting to the existence of 'good' and 'bad' jobs. By contrast, at Geer and even more at Allied, the existence of a minimum wage encouraged workers to engage in various forms of restriction of output. When the rates were impossible, operators wouldn't even bother to try and make out. They goldbricked. When the rate was easy (''gravy'') they made sure they never turned in more than 140 percent. Turning in less than 140 percent when more is easily within reach is referred to as quota restriction. Those who turned in more than 140 percent—rate busters—were subject to severe social sanctions from fellow workers and even shop management. Indeed, foremen frequently returned cards to those who turned in more, and suggested to the operator that he or she alter the entries. If workers insisted on systematically turning in more than 140 percent, and occasionally this did happen, sooner or later the rate was increased.

In 1975 operators could produce more than 140 percent without actually turning in the excess, banking the difference to cover operations with lousy rates. "Building a kitty" was officially frowned upon, but shop management turned a blind eye and some foremen openly encouraged it. In Roy's time building a kitty was hedged with restrictions. It was only possible so long as the operator was running the same job, which was usually no more than two shifts. In 1975 operators could turn in work they had completed weeks before.

What about the rates themselves, and the infamous time and study men? In Roy's day they would stalk the aisles, clocking jobs when operators had their backs turned. In 1975 it was difficult to so much as get a job timed or retimed. The time and study men—stop watch in hand—had largely disappeared, replaced by the industrial engineer seated in some remote office. Only rarely did they descend onto the shop floor. Whereas at Red Star they made themselves scarce because revisions of the norm did not need the justification of the stop watch, at Allied this was because of the declining importance of incentive earnings in the workers' wage packets. There was less to be gained from increasing rates on individual jobs than from the reorganization of the labor process, introduction of new machines, and so forth. As a consequence, piece rates tended to be looser in 1975 than in 1945.

There are a number of other reasons for the withdrawal of time and
study men from the shop floor, some having nothing to do with changes at Geer and Allied. Here, however, I wish to stress two factors linked to changes in the process of production. First, the reduction and standardization of the products manufactured led to a corresponding reduction and standardization of jobs to be performed on the shop floor, and thus fewer operations for the time and study men to clock. There was not the creation of new jobs requiring new rates in 1975 that there was in 1945. Second, improvements in machines and fixtures allowed easier prediction and calculation of piece rates.

The introduction of more reliable machinery had other effects, which reduced conflict between workers and agents of managerial control. The improved machines gave operators greater control over production and, as a result, over making out. This decreased the importance and power of the foremen. The newer machines also held the required tolerances better, and so the quality of the pieces produced improved. As a result, inspectors became less oppressive in their insistence on quality. Indeed, the responsibility for quality control shifted away from the inspector, on the one side towards the operators who were supposed to make frequent checks themselves, and on the other side towards the engineers who designed the products in the first place.¹⁵

While some functions of managerial control have withdrawn from the shop floor, those that remain are mainly concerned with coordination, with the facilitation of making out. Shop management actively promotes a factory culture that evaluates workers in terms of their ability to make out. At the same time they combine with workers to oppose interventions from middle management that might interfere with the game of making out. In summary, over the thirty years we observe the following changes: easier rates, increased opportunities for output restriction and kitty building, the departure of some forms of managerial control and the relaxation of others. At the same time, relatively lower incentive earnings lessen the economic rewards for increasing production. So to return to our original question, why do workers continue to engage in making out?

The Production of Consent

The reproduction of relations in production and the expenditure of effort rest on a combination of force and consent. Consent, as used here, is not a subjective state of mind, but rather is expressed through choosing among alternative activities. The range of choices which define an arena of “freedom” is limited and when these limits are struck force intervenes. Consent always presupposes the existence of force, however remote or hidden.

At Red Star Tractor Factory, survival depended on looting and this laid the basis for coercion embodied in the labor process, the system of piece
work, and the dictatorship of the foreman. Alternative strategies at work were severely restricted. Haraszti's work rhythm, dictated to him by his two machines and the norms, left little room for maneuver. Although coercion prevailed, there did exist an arena of consent where uncertainty and the chance to loot involved the exercise of ingenuity. But even this was continually undermined by the arbitrary interventions of the foreman. As I shall now demonstrate, at Geer and even more at Allied the relationship between force and consent is reversed with consent prevailing over force, but never, of course, to the exclusion of force. That is, the politics of production becomes the terrain for the "normal" exercise of hegemony.19

If looting stems from economic coercion, making out stems from the inescapable subordination to capitalist work. Although couched in the idiom of dollars and cents, both Roy and myself came to the conclusion that the psychological, physiological, and social rewards of making out were more important than the monetary gain. Constituting work as a game is a common form of endowing activities on the shop floor with meaning. Sometimes with the cooperation of management and sometimes in opposition to it, workers constitute an arena of consent in which they choose among a variety of strategies to achieve certain production targets. There are always definite limits on this arena, the broadest being the accomplishment of a minimal amount of work and the necessity of coming to work each day. When these limits are transgressed, force is applied.

Before a game can absorb the attention of its players, a number of conditions have to be satisfied. The first concerns the relationship between strategies and outcomes. If outcomes are largely independent of strategies, and workers have little control over their environment, the game loses its appeal. For example, when machines are unreliable, when workers are continually being frustrated by arbitrary management interventions, and so on, the achievement of targets becomes more a matter of accident than of ingenuity. Also, if the range of outcomes is too small workers will not be interested in gaining control over them. But what is a significant variation of outcomes? This is defined by the game. Thus, the seduction of making out rests on the likelihood of not achieving one's quota as well as achieving it. What may appear as trivial differences to the outsider loom high in the worker's consciousness, shaping their moods on the shop floor and their dreams and nightmares at home. When we first entered our machine shops, both Roy and myself looked upon making out with a certain contempt, as a ridiculous enterprise through which management secured the cooperation of operators, but it was not long before we too were "busting our asses" to make the quotas. One set of conditions for the reproduction of games, therefore, is that outcomes be neither too uncertain nor too confined.
A second set is that the arena of choice or consent be free from domination. That is, within the limits of rules that define the game, there must be a genuine choice of strategies, and management must refrain from dictating options to the workers. Domination and application of force must be confined to the breach of limits and must not enter onto the terrain of consent.

In light of these conditions, what can we say about changes in the organization of consent between 1945 and 1975? Whereas the significance of discrepant outcomes may have declined, if only due to the decline in their monetary value, the link between outcomes and strategies was stronger. The withdrawal of time and study men, the possibility of building kitties, and the improvement in machinery offered greater opportunities for making out. The withdrawal or relaxation of managerial control offered more autonomy to workers. This is not to say that conflict between operators and auxiliary workers no longer existed, but that conflicts were not completely beyond the operators’ control. Operators could bargain with inspectors, crib attendants, scheduling men, and foremen and were not subjected to the unilateral and often arbitrary decisions described by Haraszti. Thus, in eliciting “supplementary wages,” or their equivalent at Allied—“double red cards”—the operators had resources, such as the threat of restriction of output, not available to workers at Red Star. Similarly, competition among operators, both at Allied and at Geer, was not resolved in ways completely beyond their control and anticipation, as it was at Red Star, but through bargaining on the shop floor or the application of rules. In short, as force receded so consent expanded.

The “rationality” of making out, which suffuses every interaction on the shop floor and stimulates conversations at breaks and in the washroom after shift, also defines the terrain of struggles. Thus, individual struggles between workers and management revolve around cheap drills that burn out quickly, the disappearance of fixtures, the rates on jobs, and so on. That is, they are struggles over things or relations that frustrate the operators in their attempts to make out. They serve to reinforce the norms of making out and its centrality to the work experience. Collective struggles between workers and management erupt when middle management attempts to intervene in the labor process by changing the rules of the game. Both Roy and I experienced the promulgation of “new” rules from on high that restricted the strategies open to operators, in preventing the building of kitties, in the imposition of more stringent quality control, and so on. Shop management attempted to minimize the impact of these rules by turning a blind eye to violations. It was usually only a matter of a few weeks before the old rules were restored, informally if not officially.

The cyclical nature of change at Allied and Geer—the imposition and relaxation of new rules—gave way to unidirectional change at Red Star.
At Allied and Geer, the creation of a common interest between workers and shop management around making out developed a breach in the management hierarchy, whereas at Red Star, where the loyalties of white-collar workers lay with their bosses, the management hierarchy was more continuous. There workers were powerless to resist through collective struggle. Resistance was not shaped by looting, but against looting. In moments grabbed between jobs, workers would turn to the production of "homers"—useless but imaginatively conceived objects, shaped (very often with the assistance of others) out of scraps of metal. Homers expressed an antithesis (and antipathy) to the detail labor of individualized commodity production. Bureaucratic despotism produces its opposite in the form of a utopian escape, while a hegemonic politics organizes struggles which reproduce the conditions of hegemony. Yet these latter struggles on the shop floor, in order to be effective, do assume a minimal amount of worker power and also certain constraints on managerial discretion. The basis for this lies in the guaranteed wage, but it is also founded in two institutions connected to the labor process—the internal labor market and the internal state.

The Internal Labor Market

The differences between a society such as Hungary and one such as the United States can be grasped by examining the relationship between the political and the economic. The degree of their interpenetration is the subject of much debate, but it is clear that in the case of Hungary global politics is involved in the distribution of labor power, both between and within enterprises. As we have seen, within the enterprise mobility is orchestrated by the Party and a hierarchy is created on the basis of Party activities. Through the Party, management extends and protects the power of the foreman as well as that of the auxiliary workers. Under competitive capitalism labor power is distributed among enterprises through a market or markets while within the enterprise mobility is governed by the arbitrary rule of management. As capitalism moves into its monopoly phase, enterprises establish their own "internal" labor markets, which distribute people into different jobs within the enterprise through the organization of competition.

At Geer, mobility between jobs did not arouse much interest among the workers. It was as likely to be used as a punitive measure by the foreman as to spring from the request of a worker. The authority and responsibility for internal mobility rested with Geer management. By 1975 an internal labor market had developed, through which workers voluntarily competed for job vacancies within the engine division. Vacancies that opened up were posted on department bulletin boards and workers would hand in "bids" to their foremen, who then chose the new incumbent on the basis
of seniority and ability. Bidding was first confined to the department in which the vacancy appeared. If it was not filled, it was then posted on a plantwide basis, and only if it was still open would management recruit someone from outside, from the external labor market. Thus, new employees usually joined the company at the lowest level, in jobs that no one else wanted. The market operated in reverse when there were lay-offs, and an elaborate system of bumping took place in which some workers could displace others with less seniority provided they could claim expertise in the particular job. A single lay-off or job opening produced a long vacancy chain, which could be very disruptive for management. But what were the political and ideological effects of the internal labor market?

First, employees had the opportunity and therefore the threat of transferring to another job if they objected to the rates, the foreman, the machine, the shift, or anything else about their particular job. The power of workers was therefore enhanced in proportion to the amount of training their jobs required. Not surprisingly, those jobs requiring the greatest "skill" also had the lowest rates, and the operators were treated with corresponding caution by management. In the small parts department where I worked, the pinnacle of the hierarchy was occupied by the lathe operators, and at the bottom were the speed drill operators. The lathes offered gravy jobs to those who had acquired the necessary expertise, while operators on the speed drills only rarely made 125 percent. But there were exceptions to the rule. My own job was inhuman and dirty with a low labor grade and lousy rates, but because it involved operating more than ten different machines which no one else on second shift knew, I found myself in a strong bargaining position with my foreman.

Attempts by the methods department to increase rates, particularly the looser ones on the more sophisticated machines, were actively resisted by shop management, which feared disruption of production when disgruntled operators transferred to new jobs.21 In summary, the possibility of transfers reduced the level of managerial domination and fostered a common interest in making out. That is, by further restricting the intervention of coercion and extending the range of strategies, the arena of consent was also expanded.

With sufficient seniority or experience any worker could become an auxiliary worker—truck driver, inspector, crib attendant, or set-up man. There was nothing about auxiliary workers themselves which gave them power over the operators. Any such power they might have was due to their positions in the labor process, rather than to some managerially sponsored privilege. Thus, it was a constant complaint of the quality control manager at Allied that, as a result of their union membership, the inspectors' loyalty veered too much in the direction of the operators. Even after their promotion, foremen retained their seniority in the union
should they decide to return to their machines. This reduced their dependence on and therefore also their loyalty to management. In general, auxiliary jobs were looked upon with favor only by those who preferred the conflicting demands of management and operators to the pressures of making out. Placed at the center of hierarchical conflicts, auxiliary workers were frequently the most militant.

To conclude: The effect of the internal labor market was to take a major source of discretion and power—the control over the distribution of labor power—out of the hands of the foremen. Instead of binding workers to their bosses through the exercise of dictatorial power, the internal labor market promoted a common interest between shop management and workers in making out, and between the company and workers on the basis of seniority, at the same time that it fostered individualism and conflict among workers themselves. All these changes reinforced and dovetailed with those which took place in the labor process and the system of piece rates.

The Relatively Autonomous Internal State

Just as the global state organizes, represses, and transforms struggles over the relations of production, so does the internal state organize, repress, or transform struggles over relations in production. At Red Star the internal state interpenetrated the labor process. Uncertainty in the labor process did not become an object of struggle but was directly translated into the dictatorship of the foreman. The trade union and Party became arms of managerial rule. All forms of struggle were repressed in the exercise of bureaucratic despotism in which the internal state became the instrument of unfettered managerial domination.

At Geer and even more at Allied, the internal state had emerged out of entanglement in the labor process and had developed an autonomy of its own, to some extent independent of management and a restraint on management’s discretion. But as I propose below, this relative autonomy of the internal state is necessary if it is to have the capacity to reproduce the relations in production under conditions of the separation of the reproduction of labor power from the expenditure of labor.

We have already seen how, at both Geer and Allied, the reproduction of relations in production is not secured through coercion alone but rests on the organization of consent on the shop floor. Struggles assume the form of competition, conflict, and bargaining among individuals as shaped by making out. The individual worker can avoid unresolved struggles by transferring to another job, thus diffusing conflict. When struggles intensify instead of being settled in this way, the mechanisms of the internal state can be activated. Given the nature of the labor process at Geer and Allied, these interventions of the internal state cannot represent the
unmediated and arbitrary will of management. Indeed, the internal state must protect management from its inclination toward such despotic rule, since that would directly undermine the consent necessary for the translation of labor power into labor. In other words, to guarantee the reproduction of the relations in production, the internal state must be independent of management and at the same time must contain, transform, and organize workers' struggles which threaten those relations. How does it accomplish these tasks?

The internal state is constituted out of two basic institutions—the grievance procedure and collective bargaining. Roy offers little information on either of these, but from odd comments I get the impression that the present system was in the process of being elaborated at that time. Rather than attempting to reconstruct the form of the internal state at Geer in 1945, I will confine my comments to Allied in 1975.

The grievance procedure defines workers as industrial citizens, endowed with rights and obligations. Management's violation of these rights, or a worker's failure to carry out his or her obligations, becomes the basis of a grievance arbitrated by management and union officials. A system of industrial law emerges with a coherence of its own, that is, a set of rules which cannot be arbitrarily altered by any class or individual. Thus, the relative autonomy of the internal state is in part embodied in the legal structure of the grievance machinery. Right and wrong are defined by the legal principles enshrined in the contract, which the union defends at least as ardently as management does. At monthly meetings of the local, the president refuses to recognize collective struggles, but instead forces these into the shape of individual grievances based on the sacrosanct contract. In adhering to the contract and grievance machinery the union contains and individualizes struggles and, insofar as it is successful, generates consent to these constraints.

While some collective struggles are transformed into grievances, others become issues for collective bargaining. But once the contract has been renegotiated, union officials collaborate with management in the protection of the contract which they've signed. Collective bargaining combines with the grievance machinery to circumscribe the form of struggle in which unions can officially become involved.

While the form of collective bargaining generates a common interest between union and management, it is the content of the contract which provides the basis of a common interest between rank and file and management. The contract binds workers both individually and collectively to the company. Workers are bound individually to Allied through the dispensation of compensations on the basis of seniority. The length of vacations, the size of supplementary unemployment benefits and pensions, and the possibility of transferring to new jobs are all determined by
length of employment. Thus, the longer one works for Allied the more one stands to lose by moving to another company, and hence the greater the commitment to Allied. As members of a collectivity, workers are bound to the company through dispensation of concessions on the basis of the company's growth. Wage increases and extension of benefits depend on the bargaining strength of the union, but also on the financial strength of the company. In this way, the link between wage and expenditure of effort, severed at the individual level, is reconstituted at the collective level. This is the basis of the productivity deal. Or, as the president of the local told us, absenteeism is just as much our problem as it is management's.

While the internal state regulates the reproduction of relations in production, it does not directly control either the expenditure of effort or changes in the labor process. Struggles over these issues can only be handled in a displaced form by the grievance machinery or collective bargaining. Direction of the labor process is the prerogative of management, and the internal state exists to protect that prerogative:

The management of the Company and the direction of the working forces, including the right to plan, direct and control plant operations, hire, suspend, or discharge for proper causes, to assign work to employees, to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, and right to improve new or improved production methods or facilities or to discontinue or alter facilities, is vested exclusively in the Company, provided that this will not be used for the purposes of discrimination against employees because of membership or activities on behalf of the Union and provided also that the specific provisions of the contract shall govern. (Article II, Section 1, Allied Contract 1974-1977)

The effect of the internal state, then, is to confine the power of the union in such a way as to protect the fundamental interests of management. At the same time, changes in the internal state have an indirect effect on the organization of work. Thus, the extension of bidding and bumping rights, the falling significance of incentive pay as a percentage of total income, and so on, all affect the expenditure of effort as well as the balance of forces in the struggles over changes in the labor process.

From Bureaucratic Despotism to the Organization of Hegemony

At first sight the situations at Red Star and Allied appear similar. In both, the union collaborates with management in the regulation and containment of struggles. Even the attitudes of rank and file towards the union are similar. The critical difference lies in the subordination of both union and management at Allied to a set of rules which prevent the arbitrary domination associated with both forms of despotic politics. The rank and file at Allied express this difference in their ambivalence toward
the union. On the one hand they bitterly dismiss union officials as "company stooges" and condemn both the overt and underhand collaboration between union and management. They show little interest in union affairs except just before the signing of a new contract. However, whenever they are faced with an arbitrary intervention by management, they call in the union without hesitation. Their ambivalence reflects the invisibility of the little power that the union can wield. No matter how uninterested the shop steward may be, no matter how corrupt the president, the very existence of the union poses a constraint on managerial intervention. This, of course, does not preclude the existence of the occasional vigilant shop steward who knows the contract and the law and fights for the workers' rights on their terms.

In contrast to the two forms of despotism, the organization of hegemonic politics rests on the creation of an arena of consent, guarded at its limits by coercion. But even the application of coercion becomes the object of consent. Gramsci's comments on the role of the state in the organization of hegemony apply also to the internal state.

It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter's maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the "national" energies. In other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e., stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest. (Gramsci, 1971:182)

To translate into our own framework: the movement from one contract to the next is a shift from one unstable equilibrium to another. It is unstable because it represents a balance of class forces which, although natural and eternal in appearance, can change rapidly. It is an equilibrium because the class forces are momentarily held in balance through their inscription in a legal system. The superseding of equilibria takes place through struggle organized by the internal state, that is on the juridical plane. These equilibria constitute the interests of the company as the present and future interests of all by extending to wage laborers material concessions and minimal rights which do not threaten the interests of the "dominant group"—the profit of the company and management's right to transform the labor process.

Thus far we have argued that both the internal state and internal labor market should be seen as integral parts of the organization of consent on the shop floor, and that this is made necessary by the diminished role of
economic survival in the shaping of productive activities. But the separation of the reproduction of labor power from the expenditure of labor is an expression of a much broader movement in the relation of the corporation to its environment. The transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism reflects a shift in the enterprise's relationship to its market—from subordination to the market to subordination of the market. However, once supply and product markets are partially controlled through vertical and horizontal integration, uncertainties which stem from the labor market and from struggles have to be equally contained. It is precisely here that the internal labor market and internal state perform essential functions. Just as the internal labor market internalizes the vagaries of the external labor market, so the internal state confines to the enterprise struggles which might otherwise gather momentum outside the enterprise and pose a broader threat to the capitalist system as well as to the individual capitalist.22

Conclusion

The shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism pushes Marxism beyond Marx. In regarding the reproduction of relations in production as automatic, Marx reflected the conditions of the period of competitive capitalism when economic survival rested on the expenditure of certain levels of labor. The piece rate system epitomized the coercive character of the labor process. Monopoly capitalism, however, forces us to consider spontaneous cooperation and consent as necessary for the survival of capitalism. Indeed Cardan regards this to be the basic contradiction of capitalism:

[Capitalism] is obliged to try and achieve the simultaneous exclusion and participation of people in relation to their activities, in the fact that people are forced to ensure the functioning of the system half of the time against the system's own rules and therefore in struggle against it. This fundamental contradiction appears constantly wherever the process of management meets the process of execution, which is precisely (and per excellence) the social moment of production. (Cardan, n.d.:11)

In other words monopoly capitalism leads us to render problematic what Marx took for granted: to examine the conditions for the reproduction of relations in production, that is to examine the politics of production. As a corollary it also compels us to consider the relationship between the politics of production and global politics.

In this paper I have outlined three different forms of politics of production—the despotic, the bureaucratic despotic, and the hegemonic. Although the despotic form or something approaching it can still be found in the nonunionized competitive sector, the hegemonic form is becoming increasingly typical of monopoly capitalism.23 Whereas in the despotic
form coercion prevails over consent, in the hegemonic form consent plays a more important role. The necessary self-organization of workers increases under monopoly capitalism and constitutes an arena of consent protected by the armor of coercion.

For Gramsci it was this arena of consent, this organization of hegemony—"the system of fortresses and earthworks"—which makes modern democracies impervious to frontal assault and more resilient than Russia, where "the State was everything, civil society was primordial and transparent." (Gramsci, 1971:238, 243). Following Gramsci we can conclude that the despotic organization of production is more vulnerable to frontal assault than the hegemonic form. But, at the same time, there is a decisive difference between the hegemonic organization of politics at the global level and at the level of production, which makes the latter at least potentially more vulnerable than the former. The capitalist state in its advanced form does not recognize agents of production as such. The various ideological and repressive apparatuses generally constitute people as individual citizens with equal rights before the law, the electoral system, and so forth. Class is absent from the structures of the global state.

By contrast the relatively autonomous internal state, inasmuch as it concretely coordinates the interests of management and workers through collective bargaining explicitly recognizes classes in its very structure. Therefore, there is nothing inherent in the nature of such an internal state to prevent the union encroaching upon managerial prerogatives and fighting for increased control over the labor process. Once the hegemonic form of politics replaces the despotic form, once "citizenship" replaces direct subordination to the unrestrained domination of the overseer, then a whole range of issues from supervision, safety, and pace control to investment decisions become potentially negotiable in collective bargaining. In other words the struggles organized by the internal state can have as their immediate object relations in production whereas struggles organized by the global state cannot have relations of production as their immediate object.

Although very different in their responses to struggles, the hegemonic and despotic forms of politics do have one thing in common, namely they tend to disperse struggles by localizing them within the enterprise. Under a system of bureaucratic despotism, on the other hand, production politics and global politics are so interconnected that struggles emerging within the enterprise can easily spread beyond the enterprise to challenge the global state. This occurred in the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Moreover, in such times of crisis the dominant "ideology" of Marxism can become a material force which shapes the development of struggles, such as in the emergence of workers' councils during October 1956. In normal times the dissemination of Marxism has probably relatively little
impact on the day-to-day life on the shop floor. It does not even provide an ideological terrain for struggle since under bureaucratic despotism all organized struggle is repressed and resistance normally assumes individualistic forms such as the creation of homens. But once resistance has burst out of its individualistic shell it can detonate an incipient class consciousness against the party state. 21

Our three types of politics, therefore, offer somewhat different possibilities for the emergence of revolutionary struggles on the shop floor. But this should not blind us to the fact that, despite their differences, in practice, they all reproduce the same relations in production. Moreover, they all accomplish this through the internal state which concentrates and protects the control over the form of the labor process in the hands of management. Only under a fourth type of politics—collective self-management—in which workers direct and plan the labor process themselves would it be possible to transform the relations in production themselves. However, the conquest of the internal state is only a necessary condition for this to happen. It is not a sufficient condition for the transformation of the labor process. There can be no workers’ self-management so long as the global state continues to reproduce relations of production which, by setting limits on when, how, and what is produced in the factory on the basis of profit, inhibits changes in the labor process. The effective transformation of politics of production rests on the transformation of global politics. 22

The four types of production politics are critically shaped by the form of global politics. We can see this by examining two aspects of the relationship between production and global politics. First, there is the form of intervention of global politics into production politics. On the one hand the global state guarantees certain external conditions of production: under simple despotism the protection of private property, the application of organized force in times of crisis, and so forth; under collective self-management the role of global politics is to define some constraints or parameters, possibly formulated in some sort of plan. On the other hand the state can intervene more directly in the stipulation of both the form and content of the internal state: under the hegemonic system the stipulation of compulsory bargaining, minimum wage legislation, affirmative action, safety regulations, and so on serve to protect certain minimal worker rights whereas under bureaucratic despotism the Party as an instrument of state power becomes an agent of managerial domination. The second dimension of the relationship of production and global politics is their institutional separation. Under both the despotic and hegemonic systems the internal and global states are more or less distinct institutions with a coherence and autonomy of their own. Under a system of bureaucratic despotism the internal state is subsumed within and subordinated to
the global state whereas under collective self-management, although there is continuity between production and global politics the former is shaped by the direct producers themselves as they respond to guidelines from above. Moreover, under collective self-management there are mechanisms through which the factory producers can participate in global decisions.26

It is being suggested, therefore, that with the transformation of global politics and the transition to socialism there is no disappearance of politics. There is no automatic resolution of conflicting needs between, for example, producers and consumers. (See Korsch, 1975.) Political decisions have still to be made. Indeed, to claim the end of politics or the withering away of politics is to open the door to another form of despotism—the politics of no politics. In the postrevolutionary period no less than in the prerevolutionary period, the articulation of global and production politics remains a central concern. Again the Hungarian revolution of 1956 provides a striking example of the formation of a network of workers’ councils and revolutionary committees which began to develop new ways of articulating global and production politics (Castoriadis, 1976; Lefort, 1976).

FOOTNOTES

1. I am indebted to Gretchen Franklin, Erik Wright, and Maurice Zeitlin for comments, suggestions, and criticism. Part III of this paper draws on some of the data and theoretical explorations in a forthcoming book, *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism*.

2. I am here referring to Poulantzas (1973). In a later work he recognizes the political dimension of the labor process: “The work of management and supervision, under capitalism, is the direct reproduction, within the process of production itself, of the political relations between the capitalist class and the working class” (Poulantzas, 1975:227–228). However, he does not grasp the specificity of the politics of production as concerned with the reproduction of relations in production rather than relations of production. See below.

3. This is true of his major contributions (Habermas, 1970:Chapter 6; 1971:Chapter 3). However, in other places he writes of the repoliticization of the relations of production when political class compromises, rather than the market, shape the level of the wage and when the relations among capitalists come to be increasingly regulated by the state (Habermas, 1975:Part II). O’Connor (1973) provides a more fully elaborated framework for understanding the intervention of the state into the economic arena particularly in the organization of relations among capitalists, the provision of infrastructure, and the extension of certain minimal concessions to particular sectors of the working class. Such interpretations of the interpenetration of political and economic arenas, while clearly an advance on earlier treatments of the political economy of advanced capitalism, do not address the issue of the politics of the labor process.

4. Apart from Braverman (1974) there are a number of other discussions which emphasize the importance of negative control established through hierarchies, the fragmentation of work, the separation of mental and manual labor, etc. See, for example, Marglin (1974):
4. Marx and Engels express this idea in a number of places. For example:

Since steam, machinery, and the making of machines by machinery transformed the older manufacture into modern industry, the productive forces evolved under the guidance of the bourgeoisie developed with a rapidity and in a degree unheard of before. But just as the older manufacture, in its time, and handicraft, becoming more developed under its influence, had come into collision with the feudal trammeis of the guilds, so now modern industry, in its more complete development, comes into collision with the bounds within which the capitalist mode of production holds it confined. The new productive forces have already outgrown the capitalist mode of using them. And this conflict between productive forces and modes of production is not a conflict engendered in the mind of man. (Engels, 1972:623)

5. For example, Marx heralded the potential of large-scale industry to engender "the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn" (Marx, 1976:618).

6. In one way or another almost the entire corpus of twentieth-century Marxism can be viewed as addressing and modifying these assumptions. For an extreme position, see the magnificent polemic of Cornelius Castoriadis alias Paul Cardani (1977).

7. In this paper I have taken for granted the essential form of the capitalist labor process and have focused on the mechanisms of its reproduction. Elsewhere, I have tried to develop a concept of the capitalist labor process and the meaning of the capitalist control. See Burawoy (1978).

8. Marx himself did not think that new mechanisms were necessary once capitalism had established itself. "Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the natural laws of production, i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them. It is otherwise during the historical genesis of capitalist production" (Marx, 1976:899).

9. Such new forms of factory politics have been described by Huw Beynon (1973) and Theo Nicol's and Huw Beynon (1977), with respect to British automobile and chemical industries.

10. Although I do not attempt a critique of Haraszti's book, a few cautionary points are in order. First, much of his argument rests on the need to produce a sufficient number of pieces in order to maintain a living wage, yet he gives us little sense of the purchasing power of his earnings. Second, he does not provide many detailed accounts of the manipulations workers develop in order to cope with their condition. For example, we are led to believe that it is impossible for workers to restrict output in any way, yet prices are continually being revised downwards and output seems to be maintained at the same level. Third, the book is written entirely from the perspective of the machine operator, and therefore reflects the fragmented experience of the operator—each chapter is another fragment. Like Haraszti, the reader is never allowed an insight into the totality of the production process, or the pressures on auxiliary workers and various levels of management.

11. Haraszti only writes about male operators although at one point he says that women were employed in another department on semiautomatic machines. "Their wages are so low that no man would take the job" (1977:153).

12. At Allied I often ran two machines, one of which was an automatic saw that did not need
continuous attention. Not only did this mean that I was always building up a stock of pieces from another job which I could turn in at any time, but I could also refuse to run two machines unless I was guaranteed an acceptable output on the two. In other words, running two jobs at once was all gravy, just as Harasztzi originally thought it would be.

13. According to Hillel Ticktin (1976: 31-32, 38), auxiliary workers are also more independent than production workers in the Soviet Union. There they constitute the most unmechanized sector of the labor force, and their numbers are a reflection of the inefficiency of the Soviet economy. Although it is by no means clear, I do get the sense that there might be proportionally more auxiliary workers at Red Star than at Allied.


15. For an attempt at an explanation of the changes that took place during the thirty-year period in terms of forces outside the shop floor see Burawoy (1979: Part V). Here I just describe some of the relevant changes.

16. At Red Star there was no time officially allocated to setting the machine up for a given job, whereas at Allied and Geer each job had a specific set-up time. This meant that one could make incentive earnings on set-up as well as on production.

17. At Geer, time and study men would haunt the aisles, and some of the rate changes could be quite arbitrary. Rate increases at Allied were rare, and when they did occur they were usually the result of an operator continually handing in over 140 percent. In any event such increases had to be preceded by some technical change in the running of the job which while easy to arrange nevertheless made the task of the industrial engineer a little more unpleasant.

18. This movement of control in two directions suggests that as conception is concentrated in the heads of management so it is equally possible for conception to be restored to the worker on the shop floor. More generally, the tendency towards the exercise of managerial control in the form of the separation of conception and execution elicits worker resistance in the form of the reunification of conception and execution. This is the meaning of adaptation to work which takes on such elaborate forms as making out and looting.

19. This is drawn from Gramsci's view of capitalist democracy: "The normal exercise of hegemony on the new classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt will always be made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion—newspapers and associations—which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied." (Gramsci, 1971: 80).

20. The humor is in fact a prototypical example of what Marcuse would call "play": "The ideas of play and display now reveal their full distance from the values of productiveness and performance: play is unproductive and useless precisely because it cancels the repressive and exploitative traits of labor and leisure; it just 'plays' with the reality" (1955: 178). At Allied workers sometimes engaged in making new tools or surreptitiously reading a newspaper, as well as making out.

21. This antagonism between shop management and rate-fixers appears to be a universal phenomenon. See, Harasztzi (1977: 127); Dore (1973: 182-183); Lupton (1963: 151).

22. William Serrin describes how General Motors responded to the bitter strike of 1945-1946 by proposing to introduce cost of living allowances and other new features into the contract in order to stabilize industrial relations and preempt future struggles (1974: 170). Initially the union was ambivalent about accepting the cost of living allowance. But later after it had been withdrawn from the contract they fought for its restoration.

23. Here I am referring to the United States. If we were to look at other countries, variants of the hegemonic form of production politics would present themselves. Thus in Britain the legacy of a strong union movement prior to the advent of mechanization has led to
more confrontational type of shop floor politics in which the internal labor market and
internal state are subject to much greater union control than in the United States. See,
for example, Lupton (1963) for a case study of a British piecework shop similar to
Allied. Ronald Dore (1973) brings out the major differences in systems of industrial
relations between Britain and Japan based on a comparison of two monopoly-sector
firms—English Electric and Hitachi. The hegemonic pattern described here lies some-
where in between the confrontation type in Britain and the "corporatist" type of Japan.
Interestingly, Nichols and Beynon (1973) describe an attempt by one British chemical
industry to circumvent the confrontation type of politics and establish a system similar
to the hegemonic form outlined in this paper. The reasons behind the emergence of
different forms of production politics would be an important area of study. Possibly,
they can be seen as being shaped by the form of the global state as well as by the relative
timing of unionization and mechanization.

24. Istvan Meszaros has recently pointed to the brittleness of what he calls post-revo-

cutionary societies faced with political resistance:

... the post-revolutionary state combines as a matter of necessity, the function of
overall political control with that of securing and regulating the extraction of
surplus-labor as the new mode of carrying on the material life-processes of society.
It is the close integration of the two which produces apparently unsurmountable
difficulties for dissent and opposition. (1978:17–18)

Frank Parkin argues that under a command system (bureaucratic despotism), domina-
tion is more transparent than under a market system (hegemonic and despotic forms
of politics), and that consequently, "the conditions making for class consciousness are
perhaps more favourable in present day European socialist states than they are in
capitalist states" (1971:163).

25. The significance of changes in global politics for production politics is illustrated by the
effects of the capturing of political independence in the Third World. For example in the
case of Northern Rhodesia, the colonial state had a certain relative autonomy from the
mining corporations and the internal state was wedded as an instrument of despotic
racial domination over African labor. When Northern Rhodesia became Zambia the
post-colonial state lost its independence of the mining companies while the internal state
assumed a new relative autonomy from other fractions of management, allowing work-
ers greater control over the labor process. (See Burawoy, 1978b)

26. The four types of relations between production and global politics can be represented as
follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Intervention of Global Politics</th>
<th>Degree of Institutional Separation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT (INTERNAL)</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIRECT (EXTERNAL)</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Despotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCES**

Bahro, Rudolf
Barinb, Etienne  

Beurov, Harry  

Braverman, Harry  

Burawoy, Michael  

Cardan Paul  

Cardin, Paul  
1961 Redefining Revolution, Solidarity Pamphlet 44.

Castoriadis, Cornelius  

Chandler, Alfred  

Dore, Ronald  

Edwards, Richard  

Engels, Frederick  

Goffe, Andre (ed.)  

Gouldner, Alvin  

Gramsci, Antonio  

Habermas, Jurgen  
1971 Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston: Beacon Press.
1975 Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.

Haraszti, Miklos  

Hindess, Barry and Hirst, Paul  

Korsch, Karl  
1975 "What is socialization?" New German Critique 6:60-81.

LeFort, Claude  
Lupton, Tom

Marcuse, Herbert

Marin, Stephen

Marx, Karl

Meszaros, Istvan

Nichols, Theo and Huw Beynon

O’Connor, James

Parkin, Frank
1971 Class, Inequality, and Political Order. New York: Praeger.

Poulantzas, Nicos

Ray, Donald

Santamaria, Ulysses and Alan Manville

Senn, William

Stone, Katherine

Ticktin, Hillel