A New Sociology for Social Justice

Movements

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Max Weber was clear that the rise of formal rationality, whether in the form of bureaucracy, law, or mass democracy, does not compensate subject populations for their economic and social oppression. Rather, formal rationality that extends equal rights to all perpetuates the injustices they experience. Weber argued that the only way this might be challenged was through informal means, what he sometimes called ‘Kadi-justice’ (Weber, 1946, p. 221). These informal means, however, whether they are public opinion or communal action, are often manipulated and staged from above. Weber was very suspicious of what today we call social movements, which he saw as arising from an ‘incoherent mass’ driven by ‘irrational sentiments’ (Weber, 1946, p. 221). His theory of collective action belongs to the first wave of social movement theory that stretches from Durkheim and Weber, to Smelser and Parsons for whom collective action was an irrational response to social change.

The second wave of social movement theory, drawing on Marxism, viewed social movements as rational in their pursuit of interests outside parliamentary politics, and they were successful insofar as they managed to develop resources, including an appropriate strategic framing, to achieve their goals. Here sociologists were in pursuit of a general theory of collective action – a theory true across time and space – that took the social, political, and economic context as a background variable. It was only ‘new social movement’ theory, associated with such writers as Alain Touraine, that considered the context – in his case postindustrial society or the programmed society – as defining the form of collective action.

Today, we need to move toward a third wave of social movement theory that centers on a new context, namely ‘neoliberalism’ – a nebulous concept that expresses the invasion of markets into all arenas of social and political life. In order to understand contemporary movements for social and economic justice it is necessary, therefore, to define ‘neoliberalism’. Here I will take Karl Polanyi’s (2001) The Great Transformation as my point of departure. But first let me explore the way marketization propels movements for social justice.

From Marketization to New Social Movements

Social justice and democratization are especially pertinent themes in Latin America, which for many years was ruled by military dictatorships. The transition to democracy, fought for bravely by so many, has been a major and indisputable advance. Democracy has not, however, fulfilled all its promises. Primarily, this is because the fall of political dictatorship has been followed by yet another dictatorship – the dictatorship of the market through structural adjustment. In its wake came wave upon wave of injustice and inequality that have inspired Latin Americans, sociologists among them, to battle for a deeper democracy. We see this, for example, in the schemes of participatory budgeting in Brazil, in the Piquetero Movement and factory occupations in Argentina, in the ethnic democracy of Bolivia, and in the student movement of Chile. There has been a relentless struggle to counter market fundamentalism with new forms of participatory democracy.

This Latin American history of the last 30 years is now being replayed across the world. Responding to the silent encroachment of markets, not least in the Arab world, where the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on 17 December 2010, sparked uprisings across the region in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. Calling for ‘bread, freedom and social justice’ these uprisings may have been revolutionary in their demands but they have not delivered the outcomes they sought. All eyes were fixed on Egypt, where national rebellion gave rise to a frail democracy that was then hijacked by the military. Difficult though it has been to overthrow dictatorships, the real problems only begin after their overthrow, problems that Latin America has been wrestling with for more than three decades.

Partially inspired by these movements, the Indignados of Southern Europe have stood up to the regimes of austerity, imposed by ruling parties aided and abetted by regional and international financial agencies. In 2011 and 2012 we witnessed a wave of remarkable protests that might be
Common Political Repertoires

These new social movements of the 21st century are responses to various social injustices, stemming from the different forms and dimensions of marketization, but they gain expression and consciousness, not in the economic but in the political arena. The pursuit of political goals, however, is driven by economic deprivation and dispossession. Let us consider some of the features they share.

First, they have in common what differentiates them. They all have a national specificity, whether it be a struggle against dictatorship, against austerity or against the privatization of education. They are framed by their national, political terrains, which exhibit regional patterns – Southern Europe, Middle East, Latin America, South-East Asia, etc. Yet, at the same time, these movements are also globally connected through social media and even traveling ambassadors. Movements have become an inspiration to each other even if their frame of reference is usually national.

Second, they derive from a common inspiration, the idea that electoral democracy has been hijacked by capitalism, and more specifically by finance capital. Governments are beholden to finance capital, which effectively paralyzes electoral democracy – capitalist in content and democratic in form. In Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) terms, there is a separation of power and politics, so that power is concentrated in the hands of the capital-state nexus, while electoral politics is reduced to an ineffectual ritual.

Third, the movements reject formal democracy to adopt direct democracy, sometimes called pre-figurative politics that involve horizontal connections as much as vertical struggles. The General Assemblies of participatory democracy have been the cellular foundation of many of these movements. The challenge, then, is to bring unity and a broader vision to these autonomous, and often separatist struggles. They have had varying success in connecting themselves to wider publics and even when they do accomplish this it is only for short periods.

Fourth, while much has been made of virtual connections, these make concrete real space more rather than less necessary. To be effective, virtual communications requires its complement – the assembly points of public space, Zuccotti Park in New York, Catalunya Square in Barcelona, Tahrir Square in Cairo, Taksim Square in Ankara, and others. These assembly points were crucial to establish dense and creative communities, and the planning of new and novel actions. Social media becomes an auxiliary if essential tool of communication.
Fifth and finally, the occupation of public space has made these social movements vulnerable to a severe and repressive backlash from police, often backed by the military. This repression is consistent with the more general destruction of the public and valorization of the private, but it has prompted a continuing cat and mouse game between movements and police. These movements, however, will not go away. They are a form of 'liquid protest' that disappears only to reappear elsewhere. We have to look at them as part of a connected global movement, connected by social media that provide the vehicle for continual reorganization and flexibility. The fear of coercion has been replaced by despair and anger.

The conjecture of this chapter is that these social movements can, and indeed must, be understood in terms of their differentiated responses to the marketization that has become a defining feature of our era. This requires a new sociology of movements that attends not only to the political repertoires they deploy but also to the pressures of marketization to which they are a response. Such a sociology should advance a unifying vision for these movements, a vision they so badly need, and one that knits them together in a common project — a new sociology for social movements. Moreover, the very context and practice of sociology now finds itself subject to pressures of commodification. Sociologists can no longer pretend that we are objective observers, outside society. We are part of the world we study and, therefore, we cannot avoid becoming an interested party, taking sides in social conflict even as we study it. If not, sociology will become irrelevant and disappear. Marketization is undermining the conditions of our own existence just as it is destroying society, and we need to connect the two before it is too late — sociology itself becomes a social movement. We take up each of these challenges in turn.

A New Sociology of Social Movements

To better understand this connection between today's social movements and unregulated marketization, I turn to Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*. Written in 1944, explaining the continued existence of capitalism but without denying its problematic character, *The Great Transformation* can be considered a revision of Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, written a century earlier. Polanyi argues that the experience of commodification is more profound and immediate than the experience of exploitation, which, as Marx himself argued, was hidden from those who were supposed to rebel against it. In effect Polanyi takes Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, namely that market exchange obscures its ties to production, more seriously than Marx who thought such illusions would eventually dissolve in the class struggle. For Polanyi, the source of destruction lies with the market rather than with production. The expansion of the unregulated market threatens to destroy society, which then reacts in self-defense. This is what Polanyi (2001, Chapter 12) calls the 'double-movement', and what I will refer to simply as the 'counter-movement' against the market.

One of the virtues of Polanyi's theory, like Marx's, is that it ties the micro-experience of people to world systemic movements of capitalism. The lynchpin of the connection lies in the idea of the fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 2001, Chapter 6) — a factor of production, which when subject to unregulated exchange loses its use value. For Polanyi labor is but one such fictitious commodity; the others are land and money. Today these factors of production are subject to an unprecedented commodification that even Polanyi could not anticipate.

When labor is subject to unregulated exchange, i.e. when it is commodified, when it is hired and fired at will with no protection, when the wage falls below the cost of the reproduction of labor power and when the laborer cannot develop the tacit skills necessary for any production, so the use value of labor also falls. Polanyi writes:

For the alleged commodity 'labor power' cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man's labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity 'man' attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. (2001, p. 76)

The issue, therefore, is not exploitation but commodification. Indeed, as Guy Standing (2011) has eloquently demonstrated, the problem today is the disappearance of guaranteed exploitation, and in its place the rise of precarity, not just within the proletariat but climbing up the skill hierarchy. Precarity is part of the lived experience behind all contemporary movements — from the Arab Uprisings to the Indignados, from the Occupy Movement to student movements.

One of the conditions for the commodification of labor power is dispossession from access to alternative means of subsistence, that is to the
elimination of all social supports—including minimum wage legislation, unemployment compensation, and pensions but also access to land. The separation of labor from land provides for the commodification of both labor and land, which according to Polanyi threatens the viability of the human species. ‘Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed’ (Polanyi, 2001, p. 76). But, actually, Polanyi is also sensitive to problems resulting from the absence of markets.

The economic argument could be easily expanded so as to include the conditions of safety and security attached to the integrity of the soil and its resources—such as the vigor and stamina of the population, the abundance of food supplies, the amount and character of defence materials, even the climate of the country which might suffer from the denudation of forests, from erosion and dust bowls, all of which, ultimately, depend upon the factor land, yet none of which respond to the supply-and-demand mechanism of the market. (Polanyi, 2001, p. 193)

These prescient comments point to the inability of markets to defend the integrity of nature, which accords well with recent arguments that climate change represents one of the biggest market failures of our time.

When it comes to the plunder of nature, the destructiveness of markets has led to a host of struggles, especially in the Global South, from landless movements in Latin America to popular insurgency against Special Economic Zones in India, and protests against land speculation and expropriation in China. Throughout the world the mining of natural resources has generated militant opposition from communities whose lives and livelihoods are being threatened. It takes place within cities, too, against such processes as gentrification and the attempt to build global cities, both of which involve the expulsion of the marginal from their homes. We have to extend the commodification of land to the commodification of nature more broadly, including the commodification of water that generated water wars in countries as far apart as South Africa and Bolivia, protest against market solutions to climate change, so-called carbon trading, and most recently against fossil fuel extraction through fracking.

Polanyi regarded money as a third fictitious commodity. For Polanyi money is what makes market exchange possible, but when it itself becomes the object of exchange, when the attempt is to make money from money then its use value as a medium of exchange is undermined. He writes.

‘Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society’ (Polanyi, 2001, p. 76). Polanyi was especially concerned that fixed exchange rates between currencies organized through the gold standard would create economic rigidities within national economies while going off the gold standard would create chaos and radical uncertainty. Today, we see how finance capital again becomes a prominent source of profit, making money from money, whether it be through micro-finance, loans to nation states, student loans and mortgages, or credit cards. The extraordinary expansion of debt eventually and inevitably brings about bubbles, which just as inevitably pop. The creation of debt only further intensifies insecurity and immiseration, feeding the protest of the Occupy Movement across the globe.

There is a fourth fictitious commodity—knowledge—that Polanyi did not consider. The theorists of postindustrial society, pre-eminently Daniel Bell (1976), recognized knowledge as an ever-more-important factor of production giving pride and place to the university as its center of production. Bell did not, however, anticipate the way that the production and dissemination of knowledge would be commodified, leading the university to sell its knowledge to the highest bidders, biasing research toward private rather than public interests. Knowledge has become a commodity, and universities now cultivate students as customers who pay ever-increasing fees for instrumental forms of knowledge. The university reorganizes itself as a corporation, which maximizes profit not only through increasing revenues, but through the cheapening and degrading of its manpower, reducing tenured faculty, and increasing the employment of low-paid adjunct faculty (which the university itself produces). Universities also have begun outsourcing services, all the while expanding its managerial and administrative ranks. The protests emanating from the university, from Chile to Quebec—be they from students or faculty—center on its privatization and the distortion of the production and dissemination brought on by commodification.

Contemporary social movements, therefore, can be understood through the lens of these four fictitious commodities, through the creation of the fictitious commodity through different forms of dispossession, through the reduction of the fictitious commodity to an object of exchange that annihilates its commonly understood purpose, and through the new forms of inequality commodification produces. Any given movement may organize
Polanyi couldn't imagine humanity would dare to risk another round of market fundamentalism. Yet, that is just what has happened, starting in the middle 1970s, and developing on a global scale, leaving few spaces of the planet unaffected. The rising concern with globalization expresses the global reach of markets.

It is important, however, to understand that this is not the first wave of marketization. Indeed, examining Polanyi's own history suggests it is not even the second, but rather the third wave. Where Polanyi saw a singular wave spreading over a century and a half, we can now discern two distinct waves. One advances through the first half of the 19th century and was turned back by the labor movement in the second half of that same century, and a second wave that advanced after World War I and was reversed by state regulation in the 1930s extending into the 1970s, which in turn inaugurated a third wave of marketization that has yet to be contained. These waves of marketization become deeper over time as their scale increases, but they also involve different combinations of the fictitious commodities. The counter-movement to first-wave marketization in the 19th century was dominated by the struggle to decommodify labor. In England this assumed the form of the factory movements, cooperatives, Owenism, trade-union formation, and the Labour Party (Polanyi, 2001, Chapter 14). These local struggles spread, melded together, and compelled changes in state policy.

Three Waves of Marketization and their Counter-movements

The success of labor led to a crisis of capitalism, resolved through imperialist strategies and World War I, which was followed by a renewed offensive of capital against labor, leading to the recommodification of labor. The assault of the market spread to the loosening of constraints on international trade through currencies pegged to the gold standard that, in turn, led to uncontrollable inflation and the renewal of class struggles. The upshot was a variety of regimes that sought to regulate markets through the extension of social rights, as well as labor rights.

These regimes, whether social democratic, fascist, or Soviet lasted until the middle 1970s at which time they faced a renewed and mounting assault from capital not only against the protections labor had won for itself but also against state regulation of finance, marked by the end of Bretton Woods. Indeed, we can see how the offensive against labor across the planet, but especially in the North, led to a crisis of
overproduction that did not lead to renewed Keynesian politics but to the financialization of the economy via the creation of new monies that could be extended to individuals in the form of credit (credit cards, student loans, and above all subprime mortgages). This also led to enterprises and countries generating unprecedented levels of debt. The bubble burst when the debtors – whether individuals, enterprises, or countries – could no longer deliver on their interest payments. There were few limits to what finance capital could commodify – from minerals to water, from land to air – creating the environmental catastrophe that the planet now faces. The solution to create new markets in the rights to pollute and destroy the atmosphere – the so-called carbon markets – has not proven to be a solution but a way of making money from the deepening ecological crisis.

Third-wave marketization has gone far deeper than second-wave marketization in the commodification of labor, nature, and money. Moreover, to turn something into a commodity requires first that it be dispossessed from its social and political moorings. Labor had to be dispossessed from its supports in the state, peasants had to be dispossessed from access to their land, people had to be dispossessed of access to their own body (so that their organs can be sold). This dispossession requires, in short, the escalation of violence perpetrated by states on behalf of capital, and direct deployment of violence by capital. Violence is at the heart of third-wave marketization in a way that Polanyi never anticipated.

The question now is whether the expansion of the market will generate its own counter-movement. It certainly generates multiple reactive movements, but when and how they will add up to a counter-movement is an entirely different matter. For that we need to develop a sociology that establishes their interconnection – a sociology built on the relation between capitalist accumulation and market expansion. What I have offered here are the building blocks of such a theory – the specificity of third-wave marketization as the underlying cause of social movements, and third-wave marketization understood as the articulation of four fictitious commodities – labor, nature, finance, and knowledge.

**Sociology as Social Movement**

In underlining the fourth fictitious commodity – knowledge – I am pointing to the transformation of the conditions of knowledge production. What relative autonomy the university possesses is rapidly evaporating in the face of its commercialization. We in the academy can no longer pretend to stand outside society, making it an external object of examination. Academics are irrevocably inside society and we, therefore, have to decide on whose side we are. Those disciplines that are best able to exploit market opportunities are the ones to benefit – the bio-medical sciences, engineering, law, and business schools – and they become the more powerful influences within the university at the potential cost of the social sciences and humanities.

The social sciences, however, do not form a homogeneous block. Ironically, economics has created the ideological justification of market fundamentalism – the very force that is destroying the university as an arena for the independent pursuit of knowledge. Political science, concerned with political order, now aspires to be an extension of economics, reflecting the increasingly collusive relation between markets (and especially finance capital) and nation states. Of course, there are dissidents within both fields, and they play an important role, but the dominant tendency is the endorsement of market fundamentalism through the embrace of utilitarianism. Sociology, too, has not escaped efforts to turn it into a branch of economics, but the anti-utilitarian tradition within sociology from Marx, Weber, and Durkheim all the way to Parsons, Bourdieu,
feminism, and postcolonial theory are so well entrenched that economic models have made few inroads.

Sociology was born together with civil society, in an arena of institutions, organizations, and movements, which are neither part of the state nor of the economy. But we should be careful not to romanticize civil society as being some coherent, solidary whole as though it were free of exclusions, dominations, and fragmentations. It is Janus-faced, and can aid in the expansion of the market and state, just as it can also obstruct and even contain that same expansion. This is where sociology is situated – its distinctive standpoint is civil society – examining the economy and state from the perspective of their consequences for civil society, as well as the ways in which civil society supports the economy and the state. Like civil society, sociology looks two ways. On the one side it examines the social conditions of the existence of markets and states. On the other side, along with such neighboring disciplines as anthropology and geography, it can also take a critical stand against the unregulated expansion of the state–market nexus.

In the context of the rationalization and commercialization of the university, sociology is the one discipline whose standpoint viz. civil society behaves it to cultivate a community of critical discourse about the very nature of the modern university, but also conduct a conversation with publics beyond the university, making it accountable to those publics without losing its commitment to its scientific research programs. As the membrane separating the university from society becomes ever thinner, failure to counter-balance the commercialization of the university will end with the destruction of the university as we know it. It is in this sense that we must think of sociology as a social movement as well as scientific discipline, calling for a critical engagement with the world around. To sustain this dual and contradictory role the discipline must develop its own mechanisms for internal dialogue, mechanisms that appear at the local level within the university, at a national level, and most importantly at a global level. Building such a global sociology requires the development of a global infrastructure that fosters dialogue and outreach. In this way we can produce a third-wave sociology to meet the theoretical and practical challenges of third-wave marketization, and to halt the Third World War that is being waged on communities across the planet.

Note

This chapter is derived from a talk given at the 2nd Forum for the International Sociological Association in Buenos Aires, 1 August 2012. Many of the ideas in this chapter were developed in dialogue with graduate students in the sociology department at Berkeley – Marcel Paret, Adam Reich, Mike Levien, Julia Chuang, Herbert Docena, Andrew Jaeger, Zach Levenson, Gabe Hetland, and Alex Barnard. They also originate in an imaginary conversation between Gramsci and Polanyi that has stretched over the last decade, conducted most recently with my friends and colleagues in South Africa – especially Jackie Cock, Eddie Webster, and Karl von Holdt.

References