Forging Global Sociology from Below

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Clarity of analysis is often blurred by the chaotic realities and their immediate emotional tugs. But if the intellectuals don't hold the flag of analysis high, it is not likely that others will. And if analytical understanding of the real historical choices is not at the forefront of our reasoning, our moral choices will be defective, and above all our political strength will be undermined.

Immanuel Wallerstein, 2005

Immanuel Wallerstein's words are lofty and inspiring, but his message is also urgent. Since 1968, he maintains, the world system has been in a period of sustained economic crisis. We are now living in a period of global transition that calls on intellectuals to map alternative paths - paths that will inform our moral visions and their political realization. Failure to tackle this visionary work will lead the world system into an abyss of its own making. Economic crisis, he continues, not only poses multiple challenges for social science but also creates new opportunities. By disrupting global knowledge systems, the crisis dissolves the antiquated division between the humanities and the sciences, does away with the artificial separation of economics, politics, sociology and anthropology, and thereby creates the conditions not just for the reunification of the social sciences but for the 'social scientization' of all knowledge. The nineteenth-century Positivist dream of universal knowledge that will rescue humanity is now, for the first time, on the horizon.

Wallerstein et al.'s noble vision was first broadly disseminated in the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission (1996), Open the Social Sciences. Wallerstein chaired the commission, which assembled ten distinguished scientists and humanists to plan the unification of knowledge. In the more recent article from which the above epigraph is taken, Wallerstein (2005) calls on intellectuals, armed with their unified knowledge, to diagnose historical alternatives, inform our moral choices and advocate political projects. In this process, Wallerstein warns that intellectuals will not be popular with 'those in power', with 'those in opposition' or even with 'the vast numbers of working strata', but they must endure their isolation, and simultaneously pursue all three goals - analytical, moral and political - that define their vocation.

In decrieing narrow disciplinary specialization, Wallerstein effectively embraces Sartre's ideal of the 'total intellectual', or what Foucault dismissively called the 'universal intellectual'. Wallerstein's is, indeed, a heavenly ideal and that is its problem, its abstract character. We learn so little about the possibilities and obstacles to its realization in the here and now; the dilemmas of being simultaneously analytical, moral and political. He does not broach the interests that lie behind disciplinary knowledge - interests that do not just evaporate because to some they appear arbitrary. In Wallerstein's imagination the unification of the disciplines would be wondrously progressive, but in practice it would be a unity of the powerful. It would mean the reduction of social science to economics - a reduction that has already made great incroads into political science and is knocking at the door of sociology.

Wallerstein also omits - strangely, for the leading world system analyst and, moreover, one who did so much to promote regional sociologies - any consideration of the context within which different intellectuals operate in different parts of the world, in different historical periods. Here too, the unification of the social sciences, let alone of all knowledge, would be a unity of the powerful - a unity springing from the West, and inevitably advancing the interests of a new imperialism. Again, we already have an inkling of what such unity might portend, as national systems of knowledge production become more dependent on the well-resourced global North, and benchmarked to so-called 'international standards'. Absent from Wallerstein's analysis are the implications for knowledge production of the broader political terrain of this 'age of transition'. We are missing precisely the sociological analysis necessary for the political realization of moral vision - the analytical moment that Wallerstein argues is so central and so important. We need to bring Wallerstein down from heaven to earth.

Leaving aside such questions as to whether there is a world system obeying laws of its own, whether it has been in prolonged economic crisis for forty years due to rising costs of accumulation, whether economic crises give rise to transitions or are the vehicles through which capitalism restructures itself, and whether economic crises automatically generate political openings or the political has an autonomy of its own - putting aside such important questions I want instead to dwell on the micro-politics of knowledge production and dissemination. I shall focus, therefore, on the sociologist, not as a Wallersteinian 'total' or 'universal' intellectual but as a humble specialist intellectual, who simply cannot pursue the analytical, the moral and the political all at once.

My approach advances from below in four steps: (1) locating sociologists in the concrete context of their practice, paying attention to the actual division of sociological labor; (2) recognizing how national historical contexts have shaped the particular form of the division of labor; (3) grouping historical contexts into configurations of transition shared by different nations (post-industrial, post-socialist, post-colonial, post-authoritarian), broadly regional in character; (4) delineating the emergent global division of sociological labor that mirrors world regional and economic power. In this ethnographic excavation, sociologists do not orbit in some empty space beyond the economy, but carry out their missions on ideological and political terrains - terrains that are local and national before they are global. Reconceiving these terrains is the first task of any critical engagement or political project, and any collective recomposition of international sociology.

The Disciplinary Division of Labor

By couching his 'universal' knowledge in abstract terms, Wallerstein obliterates the genuine and fundamental differences in intellectual approach borne of vastly discrepant positions from which sociologists (and intellectuals more generally) undertake their work in different sociopolitical spaces around the globe. We need a conceptual apparatus
that will bring the existence and vitality of these divergent practices into relief. I propose to do so by asking two critical questions Wallerstein systematically obfuscates: Knowledge for whom? Knowledge for what? These are questions of universal validity that have historically, geographically as well as biographically specific answers. These questions compel sociology to confront the logic and context of its practice.

First, sociology for whom? For the purposes of this essay I distinguish between two broad audiences: on the one side we are producing knowledge for one another, a community of scholars, of scientists seeking to better comprehend the world, to develop our research programs, while on the other side we are producing knowledge for others beyond the academy so that they can be more effective in the world. Sociological knowledge helps others understand their place in the world as well as strategies for what they can and should do about it. This division between academic audiences and extra-academic audiences implies that sociology cannot be reduced to its activist or pragmatic moment, but has an indispensable scholarly moment, requiring its own relative autonomy. Equally, the necessity for such an autonomy does not gainsay our responsibility for taking our research, or the implications of our research, to constituencies beyond the academy, constituencies that would benefit from sociological knowledge. Their responses in turn become a living laboratory for our research programs.

This leads to the second question of how different constituencies might benefit from sociology: Knowledge for what? Here I distinguish between an instrumental knowledge in which ends are taken as given and where the purpose is to decipher means that will best realize those ends, and reflexive knowledge that concerns precisely an open discussion, an open collective examination of those ends or values. Max Weber called this 'value discussion', Jurgen Habermas called it 'communicative action'. This distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge is an old one with a venerable tradition in sociology, most clearly formulated by Weber, whose conceptualization of social action distinguished between technical and value rationality. It was developed by the Frankfurt School in a more critical vein - that contemporary capitalist society, driven by markets and profits, is riveted to questions of efficiency and thus of means, thereby losing sight of ultimate goals, what they referred to as 'reason'. Whether there has been such an eclipse of reason or not, it is important for sociology to place at the forefront of its analysis not only instrumental knowledge of means but also reflexive knowledge about ends.

This distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge applies to the academic community as well as to interventions beyond the academy. Thus, we distinguish between the puzzle solving - addressing anomalies and contradictions of our research programs - in which we take for granted all sorts of assumptions of an ontological kind (such as the nature and potential of human beings), an epistemological kind (the ways we may apprehend the world, methodologies), but particularly the normative assumptions that necessarily underlie our research programs. Serious research within a paradigm, what I call professional sociology, pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge, cannot at the same time question the foundations upon which it rests. Puzzle solving is a game (in the serious sense of Bourdieu) in which focused playing presumes agreement on the rules and the suppression of critique. 'Critique', therefore, requires a special knowledge of its own kind, what I call critical sociology, that interrogates the foundations of our research programs. In the first instance it is separate from the development of research programs. Celebrated exponents of critical sociology in the United States have included Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner and, more recently, Patricia Hill Collins and Dorothy Smith. Each country has its own tradition of critical sociology, counterequilibrium professional sociology.

We can apply the same distinction to our extra-academic constituencies. On the one hand we have policy sociology that seeks to provide solutions to problems defined by a client or a patron. The sociologist may be an expert who sells his or her specialized knowledge to a client for a specific task, e.g. to discover how popular is a politician, how to sell soap powder more effectively, to develop strategies of union organizing or to be an expert witness in a legal case. Alternatively, public sociologists may serve a patron, such as a foundation, which gives money for research in a particular area of concern, whether it be HIV AIDS or criminal justice, anti-terrorism or human rights. On the other hand, the reflexive form of extra-academic knowledge is public sociology which distinguishes itself from policy sociology by the dialogic relation of the sociologist with specific publics. The function of the public sociologist is to problematize the goals taken for granted by policy science, and to do so by heightening the self-consciousness of publics through broad conversations about values.

Here we can distinguish between traditional public sociology in which the sociologist, as a writer, say, of a widely read book, is a catalyst for public discussion and organic public sociology in which the sociologist has a direct relation with a public, such as a social movement or a local organization.

The traditional public sociologist speaks from a pedestal and has a relation to publics mediated by print, television or virtual communication - and with all the distortions they entail - whereas the organic public sociologist works directly, often face-to-face, with publics in the trenches of civil society.

We may distinguish, therefore, among different public sociologies by the nature of the publics they engage. Considered as discursive communities with shared commitments, publics vary by the density of their internal interaction (thin versus thick), by their level of mobilization (active versus passive), by their geographical extension (local, regional, national or global), by their politics (hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic). Traditional public sociology addresses thin, passive, national and hegemonic publics, whereas organic public sociology focuses on thick, active, local and counter-publics. In our ideal typical formulation, however, what is important is that public sociology generates a public dialogue on the values and goals as well as their possible realization. Table 4.1 cross-classifies knowledge-for-whom and knowledge-for-what in order to generate four disparate sociologies that diverge in their production, in their criterion of truth, in their mode of legitimation, in their accountability, in their politics and in their pathologies. The table summarizes the

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differences which define the four subcultures of our discipline—subcultures expressed in different values, modes of evaluation, forms of communication and so on.

These are not simply four disconnected types of knowledge, but are dependent upon one another even as they are in contradiction. Thus, for example, professional knowledge involves the interchange of theory and empirical data, its criterion of truth is correspondence to reality, its legitimacy is based on scientific norms, its accountability is to peers and its politics is professional self-interest. Its pathology is self-referentiality. Public sociology, on the other hand, is developed through communication of sociologists (carrying analytical sociological knowledge) with publics (carrying folk or commonsense knowledge). Here truth is measured by the consensus that emerges through symmetrical communication. Its legitimacy is based on relevance to publics which is easily at odds with professional knowledge that is often incomprehensible to publics. Public sociology is accountable to designated publics, which puts it in tension with professional knowledge accountable to peers. Its politics involves public dialogue which can indeed be threatening to professional self-defense. Here the pathology is not self-referentiality but pandering to publics, faddishness. At the same time that they are antagonistic, the two knowledges are also interdependent: professional knowledge is inspired by impulses from public sociology just as public sociology could not exist without the input of professional sociology. I could develop parallel arguments about the antagonistic interdependences between any other two types of sociological knowledge. My underlying thesis is Durkheimian: while the division of labor undoubtedly involves relations of domination among these four knowledges, a thriving discipline depends upon their organic interdependence. You might say that the flourishing of each type of knowledge depends on the flourishing of all.

Therefore, these four knowledges form distinct subcultures, connected to one another through a division of sociological labor.

When these subcultures lose their vigorous interchange with one another, whether because they are drawn inwards or outwards, they assume pathological forms that endanger the discipline as a whole. Wallerstein is right to emphasize the functions of analysis (professional sociology), moral vision (critical sociology) and politics (policy and public sociology), but he does not analyze how their distinct projects are bound together in antagonistic interdependence, how they each call for their own specialization and relative autonomy—a relative autonomy that does not preclude but mediates external influences. Nor does Wallerstein recognize the traps and dangers intrinsic to each of the knowledge types as they pursue their distinctive practices.

Of course, it’s more complicated than I have so far enunciated. Each specialized knowledge is itself internally divided along the same dimensions—knowledge-for-whom and knowledge-for-what. There is, for example, a policy, public and critical moment of professional sociology. In addition to this internal complexity of each quadrant of knowledge, we also have to recognize a distinction between the type of knowledge and the people who produce that knowledge. Specialization might be necessary but it does not mean that any given sociologist has his or her foot in only one type. Far from it! Many sociologists straddle different types of knowledge and, moreover, their careers follow different routes through the four quadrants. In this (di)vision of labor, interdependence does not mean one has to be a public sociologist, for example, to contribute to public sociology; one can do so indirectly through one’s professional, policy or critical sociology. There is no space to develop these aspects of the division of sociological labor here since I am concerned with national and historical variations in the division of sociological labor.

NATIONAL REGIMES OF SOCIOLOGY

Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) signal contribution to the theory of economic development lies in showing how the world economic order of the sixteenth century, when capitalism began in Western Europe, is profoundly different from the world system of today, where those who develop later are subordinated to an already advanced capitalism. In his writings on the social sciences, Wallerstein turns his sociology of development into an account of the development of sociology. The nineteenth-century imperial order created three sets of untenable distinctions: between state, civil society and market that separated the social sciences into political science, sociology and economics; between past and present that separated history from the social sciences; between civilized Europeans and uncivilized others that separated all the previous disciplines from anthropology and Oriental studies.

According to Wallerstein, these distinctions represent a mythical past and are no longer valid. To render his claim plausible, he reduces the history of the social sciences to three periods: a period of conflict between 1750 and 1850, the consolidation of boundaries between 1850 and 1945, and a return of increasing overlap and confusion after 1945. Out of this confusion emerges a universal knowledge built around a unified social science. What this Olympian scheme misses, among other things, is the obduracy of the major historical and geographical variations in the social sciences, rooted in divergent material, political and cultural conditions of production. Just as the past was not, so equally the future of social science cannot be imposed from above; it has to be built up from below. This applies to sociology no less than the social sciences as a whole.

We need to move back to the local production of knowledge and its division of labor to understand the historical and geographical transformation of our discipline. Let us look first to the United States, the heartland of disciplinary divisions that have spread the world over. If we reconstruct the history of its sociology, we discover its origins in a public sociology emerging from reform and religious associations both before and after the civil war. Interestingly, the first sociology in the United States was a Southern appropriation of Comte’s ideas of “order and progress” to justify slavery, an ideology that played up the social degeneration of the industrial North. Sociology’s entry into the university in the post-bellum period, especially in the Gilded Age, was colored by reform and social gospel, inspired by utopian ideas and led to struggles over the limits of academic freedom. Once joined together in a single social science, during the mounting class struggles of the 1880s the economists professionalized, leaving the sociologists to pursue their more radical visions. By the turn of the century, however, and through the Progressive Era, private sponsors of universities and their administrators successfully sought to contain sociology’s public commitments. So sociology followed economics into the world of professionalization with its academic journals, textbooks, PhD programs, organized careers, esoteric language, and hierarchies.

If the first period was marked by a dialogue between professional and public sociology, the second period, which begins with the formation of the American Sociological Society in 1905 and stretches through two World Wars and into the 1960s, involves a dialogue between the professional and policy sociology. Under the surveillance of captains of industry and their foundations, sociology framed its research in terms of social control—the dominant theme after World War I at the then emerging hegemon in the field, the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, but also in the other leading departments, Columbia University. Sociology would develop and deploy its science in pursuit of the regulation of subordinate populations, whether immigrant populations from Europe or Blacks migrating from the South to the northern cities, or the militant working classes of the 1930s. If initially foundations were the main sponsors of sociological research, over this period the federal state also became more deeply involved, especially during World War II after which federal funding grew by leaps and bounds.
The messianic celebration of the United States and the intensified application of sociology to policy issues finally led to a backlash in the 1960s, responding to the social movements of the streets - civil rights, antiwar, feminist and so forth. In this third period there developed a sociology critical of professional sociology as well as its entrenchment in the policy world. Both grand theory, which provided the scientific foundation of value consensus, and abstract empiricism, which was tied to market research, came under assault. Such notable figures as C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner captured the growing sentiments among a new generation, that sociology had sold its soul to the establishment. During the 1970s sociology responded to multiple challenges from Marxism, feminism and critical race theory, by absorbing critique and indeed moving the whole discipline leftward. But as the political climate moved rightwards, in the era of Reagan and then Bush, so sociology came to shed its radical wings, although it still remained far to the left of the American public. The question now is whether US sociology is ready to launch into a fourth period of renewed dialogue between professional and public sociology, and what role it will play in the international arena.

The history of US sociology that I have just sketched is marked by the broad ascendancy of a powerful professional sociology, that, in alliance with policy sociology, dominates and at times suppresses critical and public sociology. In other words, it is a history of the contested and always incomplete ascendancy of instrumental knowledge. Similarly, the history of other national sociologies can be understood in terms of the changing division of sociological labor. If in the United States professional sociology has been ascendant, in France or Brazil public sociology is more prominent, under Scandinavian welfare states policy sociology might assume greater importance, while critical sociology may have been strong in the dissent movement against the Soviet order. In considering the peculiarities of sociology in different countries, one should not focus just on the prevalent type of knowledge but on the changing configuration of all four types of sociology, what I have called a disciplinary regime. Moreover, configurations may actually vary within a country from institution to institution, from locality to locality. Finally, national sociologies may diverge in their absolute strength (measured by the number of degrees, publications, teaching in high school, etc.) and in their relative strength (relative to other disciplinary knowledge) or their density (e.g. sociologists per capita). Indeed, many poor countries do not have the (mis)fortune of an institutionalized sociology.

One can trace the history of national sociologies in terms of the recomposition of national divisions of labor, in terms of their overall strength and resources, or any other way, but they do not develop in isolation. Today we are only too aware of the hegemony of US sociology, but it has not always been a one-way street. US sociology has borrowed ideas from Europe as well as from its imagination of the countries it dominated. Repressing the past and externalizing the present gives the impression that newly emergent sociologies have to imitate the United States as we know it today, as though its sociology arose spontaneously and fully formed. Interrogation of its history reveals different paths of development, that in successive periods public sociology, policy sociology and critical sociology were the driving force behind the discipline as a whole. It is important, therefore, to counter the notion of US sociology as a static, invariant, homogeneous model to be emulated (or dismissed) by other sociologies, a norm against which they are assessed, or assessed themselves, as more or less deviant. Thus, Wallerstein's teleology toward the unification of knowledge with its inevitable concomitant, the hegemony of the center, is neither desirable nor feasible. There have to be and there are many roads forward.

### Regional Constellations of Sociology

If we are looking at sociology from the ground up, is there any way to group national sociologies by the context of their development? One obvious way would be to follow Raewyn Connell (2007) and distinguish between northern and southern sociology. While this is an important distinction, speaking to domination within a global division of sociological labor, these categories are far too blunt, heterogeneous and indeed ambiguous to capture the different national regimes of sociology. Alternatively, we could classify regimes by their political context - democratic, patrimonial, authoritarian, etc. - and while this may be an important factor it is probably too fluid to explain much variance in the development of sociology. Since the character of sociology is especially sensitive to social change, I propose to divide the world into broad regions that have experienced similar types of transition in the past forty years - transitions from colonialism, authoritarianism, military dictatorship, socialism and industrialism. These regional transitions have had different outcomes - post-colonial, post-authoritarian and post-socialist - with divergent (re)configurations of the division of sociological labor. The prefix 'post' marks a transition from a particular type of society but with unclear destiny. That is to say outcomes vary not only between regions but also within regions. Still, the focus on transition, even if it does not give us fixed outcomes, does shed much light on the changing and unchanging aspects of sociology. Let us begin with post-colonial regimes grappling with the legacies of colonialism.

The colonial past is strongly present in India, for example, where sociology has been inextricably bound up with anthropology, and especially British social anthropology, notwithstanding the importation of American sociology of development. Reacting against its colonial legacies, Indian sociology also exhibits an ambivalent relation to western social science. India, after all, has not only been the home of social anthropology but also of subaltern studies that wrestled with the deep influence of western doctrines of modernity by seeking out alternative visions harbored by lower classes. With its vast network of universities and colleges and some prominent institutes of social research, Indian sociology is strongly rooted in the academy and yet it also has a strong public arm, built on intimate connections to a variety of social movements - feminist, environmental, Dalit and farmer's movements - and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

There are parallels here with South Africa - the vibrancy of a public sociology. But the struggles against apartheid were both more recent and of a different character than the ones that made up the Indian independence movement. In South Africa the industrial working class, formed by over a century of economic development, was the dynamite that brought down apartheid, creating a powerful industrial and social movement sociology. As compared to Indian sociology, Marxism is more deeply imbricated in its basic ideas and concepts, although there has always been an Africanist element rejecting Marxism as a western contamination. So today, South African sociology is caught between a strong orientation to the West and a weaker orientation to Africa. Its antisapartheid public sociology is in retreat as sociologists have lost collaborators in civil society to the state and corporations, as sociologists face increasing professional demands, and as they are forced into selling their expertise as policy sociologists. Of course, much of the rest of Africa, Nigeria being an obvious exception, has barely the resources to maintain an independent sociology.

Very different is the legacy of socialism. The Soviet state, for example, alternately banished and resurrected sociology as an ideological tool. It is not surprising, then,
that post-Soviet sociology has been hostile to Marxism, combined sometimes with an uncritical embrace of western, particularly American sociology, and other times with a more ideational outlook toward anything western. While a public sociology briefly flourished in the Soviet Union under perestroika in the twilight of communism, without a history of professional autonomy post-communist sociology has quickly fallen prey to policy research—opinion polling for politicians and market research for corporations. Attempts to counter these policy trends are fragmentary: a line of fault divides nationalists, who are developing a public sociology hostile to anything western, from liberal cosmopolitans fighting for an autonomous professional sociology free of government and market influences.

Although there is a central tendency toward crude policy science, there are also divergences among post-communist regimes that reflect sociology’s variable status under communism. Thus, sociology was freer to develop in Poland and Hungary, suppressed in Romania and Czechoslovakia, while in Bulgaria it developed expansively under the careful tutelage of the state. Reflecting variations in the degree of political freedom allowed under post-socialism, these divergences have since given rise to somewhat different emphases around the centrality of policy sociology. As regards a true critical sociology—reflective and normative—it is as weak as professional sociology, waiting for a new generation of sociologically inclined intellectuals who will follow in the footsteps of a Havel in Czechoslovakia, a Kolakowski in Poland or Conrad and Szelenyi in Hungary.

In the realm of post-socialism, China is a case unto itself. Sociology was only restored as a legitimate science in 1991. Since then, while retaining the pretense of Marxist orthodoxy, the Chinese state has invested heavily in sociology, encouraging students to get US PhDs and to return as university faculty. While China is home to both critical and public sociologies, the center of gravity is heavily centered on professional and policy sociology. It is an expansive, energized sociology, so very different from the depressingly fragmented found in Russia. Vietnam is perhaps the most fascinating case of all, with the superimposition of Soviet legacies upon French legacies, manifested in tensions between generations and divergences between North and South. Fragmentation, division and limited resources make Vietnamese sociology a precarious discipline, dependent on policy research for state, NGOs and multinational organizations.

Post-authoritarian regimes present a different configuration. In many countries of Latin America, the lifting of military rule led to an effervescent anti-authoritarian, public sociology that had earlier been nurtured in pockets of freedom, often sustained through continental networks of support. Authoritarian regimes controlled sociology to different degrees, from banning it in Chile to giving it space in Brazil. But sociology was not used as a lever of party dictatorship as it was in Soviet societies, or as a lever of colonial rule as it was in much of Africa and Asia. During the era of dictatorships, Latin American sociologists were able to build alliances and draw on critical thinking in Europe, especially France, in order to develop an engaged sociology that flourished with transitions to democracy. Spreading into civil society, it became a prototype of public sociology. Similar patterns can be discerned in the two countries of Southern Europe that lived under authoritarian regimes for such a long time—Spain and Portugal. Portuguese sociologists, in particular, drawing on both US and French traditions (assimilated in exile), have developed a powerful synergy of all four types of sociology.

For want of a better term, I call the fourth complex of disciplinary configurations, post-industrial regimes of Western and Northern Europe. The economies of these countries have increasingly abandoned heavy industry and turned toward the service sector—a shift that is reflected in both the structure of the sociological discipline and its substantive concerns. There is a turn away from such traditional subjects as industrial sociology and labor movements toward new social movements, gender, leisure, mass communications, information society and so forth. Sociology is neither so developed professionally nor so delineated from other disciplines as it is in the United States, and accordingly policy and public dimensions are, therefore, relatively well developed. We might divide the region into two sub-regions—Northern Europe with its more developed welfare states has stronger policy sociology while Southern Europe with its more vibrant politics and civil society has stronger public sociology. In both regions, however, public and policy sociologies tend to be mutually reinforcing.

Britain is an interesting case, straddling the two regions. With a long tradition of social administration closely connected first to Fabian evolutionary socialism and then to the birth of the welfare state, sociology proper was a late development in the 1960s, coming as it did with the expansion of the university system. As a late developer its boundaries were porous, drawing sustenance from the neighboring disciplines of economics, anthropology, geography and history as well as from European social theory. It was much more insidious if not downright hostile to American sociology. Being taught in high schools, sociology put down deep roots, which Thatcher’s antiscience policies could not destroy. Today, sociology exists as a force in public debate but also in expanding consultancies with state agencies, especially in the area of policy evaluation.

The prefix ‘post’ signals legacies that constrain but do not determine national trajectories. ‘Post’ allows us to identify national sociologies that share a common history—the basis for regional dialogues about differences as well as commonalities, but also a locus for developing a sense of national specificities. Regional associations and networks can build connections that are especially important for sociologists with weak institutions. It can strengthen the critical and public backbone of national sociologies, especially where they are under statist pressure to instrumentally orient themselves. Finally, such associations can stiffen contestation over global hegemonies, thereby contributing to an emergent international sociology.

THE SKewed TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

National divisions of sociological labor are not autonomous; they are constituted by and constitute a broader global division of sociological labor—an emergent global configuration of professional, policy, critical and public sociologies. Thus, it is not surprising that global professional sociology is dominated by the United States that stands like a Leviathan, with its concentration of resources per two hundred journals, some fourteen thousand members of the American Sociological Association, more than twice that number of active PhDs, and lavish funding for research from private and public sources (at least compared to any other country if not to other disciplines). Every year universities pump out over six hundred doctoral degrees and twenty-five thousand undergraduate degrees in sociology. The US educational system has its own internal hierarchy, of course, with a carefully calibrated prestige system, so that the division of sociological labor looks very different at a state college as compared to a private research university. Still, the stamp of a US PhD, from wherever it comes, has high status in most parts of the world, whether in universities or government agencies. Whatever the hostility to the United States, few turn down the opportunity of graduate or postgraduate education or a research fellowship in the country. Time spent in the United States usually pays off in careers back home. In this way US professional sociology leaves its mark on national professional sociologies as a hegemonic point of reference.

This influence is especially marked in client states such as Israel and Taiwan, where
the majority of the leading sociologists are trained in the United States and where a publication in a leading American journal commands a place at the top of the prestige hierarchy. But even here the situation is not as simple as it appears. In Taiwan, there is a selective appropriation of American sociology, manifested in a clash of generations, with a more reflexive sociology pursued by those influenced by the student movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s, opposing the instrumental sociology of the establishment. In Israel, while the leading universities are indeed oriented to the United States, sociologists in the lower status and recently created college system are oriented to the issues of local communities, exponents of a critical and public sociology. Palestinian sociology, beleaguered by occupation, struggling for survival, is almost unavoidably critical and public. Countertendencies notwithstanding, benchmarking scientific research, including sociology, to publications in “international” journals is becoming increasingly common across the globe, and not just among those tied to the United States for geopolitical reasons. The National Research Foundation of South Africa, for example, grades individuals on their international profile, thereby drawing the best researchers away from national and local issues to ones that concern the gatekeepers of American journals. Even in such a wealthy country as Norway, the trend is in the same direction, drawing science into international competitive networks. These alien influences are generally not the result of a US imperial conspiracy to control national sociologies but more often propelled by the interests within nation-states and their elite academies. The surfacing of sociology in China—an intriguing and complex case of late development—has also frequently drawn on the more conservative strands of US sociology, with a limited but not absent space for critical and public sociologies.

Such models of international referencing might work for the natural sciences, but can be a disaster in the social sciences, whose flourishing depends on connection to local issues. Brazil provides an interesting counterexample to the general trend with an elaborate internally driven system of ranking individual scientists and their multiple journals. The professional association elects its own reviewers and deploys a rating scheme that does not privilege “international” journals. The national focus combines with Brazil’s size, its relatively lavish funding of the social sciences, and its vibrant civil society to foster public sociology alongside professional sociology. Moreover, it has done so without sacrificing international contact and networks, especially with Latin America and Europe. Thus, the hegemony of US professional sociology does not go unchallenged. From Europe, especially France but also Germany, traditional heartlands of sociology, have come powerful critical sociologies. Alain Touraine and, much more directly, Pierre Bourdieu, have assaulted American professional sociology for its claimed universalism, its obfuscation of class, its lack of historical depth, and most generally its lack of reflexivity. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas, continuing the tradition of the Frankfurt School, has challenged the limitations of Positivism, or more generally what I have called instrumental knowledge, from the standpoint of critical theory and communicative action, what I have called reflexive knowledge. From the standpoint of the global South, however, European sociology might represent the symbolic capital that buttresses—all the more insidiously because of its claimed critique—the more silent domination of US academic and institutional capital. After all, there has been an active exchange between these two poles of domination, with the flow of research methodologies in one direction and social theory in the other. Another layer of critical theory, often under rubrics of post-colonial studies and born in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has taken a hostile stand toward all “Western” social science. But even here Western academies have often absorbed such critique, lauding their critics with medals and even celebrity status, and in the process the critical moment is blunted.

This pattern of global domination is reproduced within the major world organization of professional sociologists—the International Sociological Association (ISA). The leadership of ISA is overwhelmingly dominated by (A) countries: as of 2006, the president and 5 vice-presidents are all from the richest (A) countries, while of the 16 person executive committee 9 (56%) are from (A) countries, 4 (25%) from (B) countries, and 3 (19%) from (C) countries. Table 4.2 shows presidents of the 53 research committees to be overwhelmingly (92.4%) from the richest countries. Even individual members are heavily weighted toward the well-endowed, although representation of countries (collective membership) is, not surprisingly, less skewed. Looking at representation by regions of the world, Table 4.3 shows that the European Union accounts for half the presidents of the research committee and North America a third, while they account for 35.3% and 22.9% respectively of individual members—still more than half of the total number. Yet, of course, the European Union and North America provide less than half (41.8%) of the countries represented. Still, it would take a fundamental realignment within the ISA to counter the material and symbolic domination of the global North.

If North America and Western Europe dominate international professional sociology, What of policy sociology at the global level? Here we might think of sociology’s place in various multilateral agencies—United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB),
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a wide range of transnational NGOs – that hire social scientists to address their specific policy agendas. It turns out, of course, that sociologists are rarely found in such corridors of power, although feminists have made inroads in the UN and in NGOs. Generally, this is the terrain of the economists, accountants and lawyers, whose knowledge systems are better attuned to the politics of world organizations. More likely we will find sociologists among those who criticize the operation of these multilateral agencies, questioning the IMF’s one model fits all, or attacking the World Bank, whether in its old swashbuckling destruction of the environment or, as Michael Goldman (2005) has shown, in its dissemination of new and more subtle disciplinary knowledges and technologies of power.

Such critiques of world-straddling organizations emerge from and in turn feed transnational civil society – the soil of public sociologies on a global scale. The crucible of such public sociologies can be found in the World Social Forum and the regional forums it has spawned, living off networks that join all manner of reformist, anarchist and radical antiglobalization struggles. Here we can find novel labor movements that stretch across national boundaries, environmental movements, human rights organizations, antipower protest and feminist networks all of which breed public sociology’s engagement within an emergent global public sphere. Inspired by critical sociologies, often born on national terrains, opposed to global structures of power, and aiming at conscientizing and provincializing professional sociologies, especially US professional sociology, global public sociologies seek to realize values that have impelled sociology from its outset.

Finally, then, to return to Wallerstein, global public sociologies are the antithesis of his project to unify the social sciences. Any unity of the social sciences would be a unity of the already powerful: in disciplinarity terms it would be a unity around economics and its neoliberal project, and in geopolitical terms it would be a unity around the interests of well-resourced western social sciences. I have, therefore, sketched an alternative project whose energy comes from below, that seeks to protect the integrity of national divisions of sociological labor through the binding of public, critical, professional and policy sociologies. It involves stitching together national sociologies into regional associations, challenging the hegemonies of US and European sociologies, while all along retaining connection to civil society – national and transnational. Such a project would not bypass US and European academic sociologies, but force the latter into a consciousness of their own power, compelling their adjustment to the needs of revelations from and dialogue with the powerful public sociologies, emanating from but not confined to the global South.

In direct contrast to the world systems theory, which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from an imaginary unity of knowledge, or from an abstract economic system with natural laws, in order to arrive at society in the flesh. Rather, we set out from real existing sociologies, struggling to survive in hostile milieus, and, on the basis of their divisions of labor and their living connections to civil society, we weave the tapestry of international sociology.

3. My data are limited, and so the mapping that follows is but an initial sketch. I have had to rely on visits to many countries over the last three years, on my research experiences in the former Soviet Union and Central Europe, my long-lasting attachment to Southern Africa, an ongoing familiarity with Western Europe, living in the United States, and a romance with Latin American sociology, as well as many years working with graduate students studying different regions of the world.

REFERENCES


NOTES

1. This paper was originally an address to the Conference of the Council of National Associations of the International Sociological Association held in Miami, 9–10 August 2005. It has since been revised on the basis of the papers presented there and discussions in different continents. I’d like to thank Sujata Patel for many conversations on the nature and possibilities of world sociology, and Robert Van Krieken and Isabella Barbńska for help in gathering the data for Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Finally, back in Berkeley, I’ve relied on the perspicacity of Peter Evans.

2. Wallerstein has enunciated similar proposals in many places, but see in particular his essays in Wallerstein (1999) and in an earlier collection (Wallerstein, 1991).