VI: INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR PUBLICS: BOURDIEU INHERITS MILLS

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So far these lectures have dwelt on putative conversations between Bourdieu and Marxism, how Bourdieu appropriated so much of Marx but took it in a direction unimagined by Marx, namely the political economy of symbolic goods, how in many ways Gramsci and Bourdieu are at loggerheads over the sources of the durability and depth of domination, how my own work also suggests submission may be more structural and situational than Bourdieu implied with his notion of habitus, how despite common views of colonialism Bourdieu and Fanon clash over the means of its transcendence (and here, ironically, it would seem that colonial domination is deeper for Fanon than it was for Bourdieu), and finally we saw the remarkable convergences between Beauvoir’s feminism and Bourdieu’s symbolic domination. We end with another convergence, this time between Bourdieu and Mills. They share sociological and political projects, despite living a half a century apart and on different continents. Indeed, I shall claim that Mills is the American Bourdieu.

**Striking Convergences**

Bourdieu’s attack on US sociology for its professionalism, its formalism, its empiricism, and its provincialism to be found in *The Craft of Sociology*, as well as in other places, echoes those of C Wright Mills’s *The Sociological Imagination*. Indeed,
Mills was almost unique among the American sociological pantheon to receive Bourdieu’s seal of approval. Since their outlooks were so similar the comparison of the two underlines the enormous scope of Bourdieu’s scholarship, but it will point to how the world has changed since the 1950s (but also, in some ways, reverted back to that era) as well as how different are the United States and France. The immediate years after WWII continued the radicalism that began in the 1930s, but it wasn’t long before reaction asserted itself in the form of McCarthyite witch hunts, anti-communism, American triumphalism, and the “end of ideology.” Just as Mills confronted the swing away from the political configuration of the New Deal, much of Bourdieu’s writings can be seen as coming to terms with the denouement of the 1960s and the rightward turn in the 1980s and 1990s.

Biographically, they came from very different backgrounds – the one grew up the son of a postman in a village in the French Pyrenees, the other from middle class stock in Texas. More interesting they both began as philosophy students and turned from abstract formalism to a more direct engagement with the world. For Mills his interest in pragmatism gave him a particular stance on sociology, opposed to structural functionalism and survey research, just as Bourdieu reacted against the pretensions of Sartre and his circle as well as against social reform sociology. Mills came to Marxism late but like Bourdieu, while he borrowed many ideas, he never identified with its political project, except perhaps at the very end of his life, and he had abiding problems with its theoretical framework. Both were hostile to the Communist Party, and were never members, although both exhibited sometimes overt sometimes covert sympathies
for democratic variants of socialism. Both were more influenced by Weber with whom they shared a preeminent concern with domination, its reproduction and its repercussions. Like Weber they did not imagine any future utopias, and both had only a weakly developed theory of history. Mills’s history focused on the shift from a 19th century aristocratic order (alongside putative democratic publics) to the new regime of power elite and mass society. Bourdieu was even less self-conscious in developing a theory of social change, but broadly speaking he subscribed to a theory of differentiation, characterized by the development of relatively autonomous fields, analogous to what Weber called value spheres.

They were reflexive sociologists, writing about the academic and political fields in which they operated. Both, therefore, were invested in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of sociology, and the sociology of the academy. Mills’s dissertation was a study of the history of pragmatism -- the secularization and professionalization of philosophy. Following in the footsteps of Veblen, Mills was always critical of the American system of higher education, but, again like Bourdieu, had a fondness for its elitist aspects. Still, both felt themselves to be outsiders in the academy and from this vantage point wrote their savage criticisms, lambasting the establishment, generating the hostility of their colleagues and the adoration of new generations of sociologists.

Both were public sociologists but also major public intellectuals, and not just in their own countries but across the world. Both served their scholarly apprenticeships as professionals but soon sought out wider audiences. Neither hesitated to enter the political
arena as intellectuals and their careers displayed a steady movement from the academy into the public sphere. Mills was writing in an era of passivity and his writing on mass society reflected this. Like Beauvoir he inspired a movement he never anticipated – the New Left of the 1960s. It remains to be seen whether Bourdieu will inspire such a movement -- certainly his political writings and addresses played an important role in public debate in France.

**Classes and Domination**

At the same time Bourdieu developed a theoretical framework – centering on fields, habitus and capital and above all symbolic violence – that transcended his own empirical projects, a theoretical framework that has been taken up by others. Mills’s only venture into broader theoretical issues, *Character and Social Structure* written with Hans Gerth, was never taken up by sociologists. Mills’s critical evocation of the social structures of his time and his invitation to the sociological imagination have inspired successive generations of students. There are definite parallels in Bourdieu’s corpus since he rarely made sorties into pure theory, even though his empirical research was always more theoretically self-conscious. Its impact transcends sociology not just in reaching the public realm but it has also spread into many disciplines, beyond sociology and beyond the social sciences into the humanities.

The three major works of Mills to address American society in the 1950s dealt sequentially with labor and its leaders (*New Men of Power*, 1948), the new middle classes (*White Collar*, 1956) and the dominant class (*The Power Elite*, 1956). Mills’s framework
for studying US society does develop over the decade of his writing, but there is also a clear continuity in his approach to US society: ever greater concentration of power in a cohesive economic-political-military elite; a passive but burgeoning new middle class of professionals, managers, sales workers, and bureaucrats; and finally a working class about which in the final analysis he has little to say. These are also the three classes treated in Bourdieu’s monumental, *Distinction*. Whereas Mills works his way up the social hierarchy Bourdieu works his way down, from the dominant classes to the petty bourgeoisie and finally to the working class. Both study the way the dominant classes imposes its will on society, but where Mills focuses on the concentration of resources and decision making in the power-elite, Bourdieu takes this concentration of power and wealth for granted. Instead Bourdieu focuses on how domination is hidden or legitimated, by the categories of dominant classes to which the dominated are subject.

Bourdieu’s focus, therefore, is on symbolic domination, the exercise of domination through its mystification. Simply put the dominant class distinguishes itself by its cultural taste. Whether this be in art, architecture, music, literature, etc. the dominant class presents itself as more refined, more at ease with its cultural consumption than the petty bourgeoisie whose taste is driven by emulation and than the working class whose taste is driven by economic necessity. The distinction of the dominant class actually derives from its access to wealth and education, but it appears to be innate, thereby justifying its domination of all spheres of life. The popular aesthetic of the working class, its concern with function rather than form, with the represented rather than the representation is a dominated aesthetic, bereft of genuine critical impulse. Bourdieu’s
innovation, therefore, turns on viewing class not just as an economic-political-social formation but also as a cultural formation. Class members possess not just economic capital but what he calls cultural capital so that a class structure is a two dimensional space defined hierarchically by the total volume of capital but also horizontally (within class) by the composition of capital (the specific combination of economic and cultural capital). He shows how this class structure is mirrored in the distribution of cultural practices and patterns of consumption.

It is interesting to compare this vision of class structure with Mills’s *Power Elite* where he describes the dominant class as three interlocking sets of institutions – economic, political, and military. He calls them “domains,” but he might as well have called them fields. He also writes about their distinction and their ruling class habitus, inherited through families and acquired in elite schools and colleges, and developed through networks of self-assurance. Mills even devotes a chapter to “celebrities” who distract attention from the concentration of power. Symbols of prestige hide the power elite from public view. This is all quite parallel to Bourdieu. But ultimately the emphasis is very different. Mills is not interested in the relation and struggles between cultural and economic-political elites – between the dominant and dominated fractions of the dominant class as Bourdieu puts it, but in the changing relations among the three pillars of the power elite, and in particular the ascendancy of the military (the warlords). Would it be facile to suggest that this different emphasis reflects the very different place of the United States and France within the world order – the one a military power, the other a cultural nobility.
If there is divergence in the conceptualization of the dominant class, there is more convergence in their respective discussions of the middle classes. A theme that threads through both discussions is the insecurity of the middle class, trying to maintain its position within the stratification system. As the gap between the middle classes -- especially the old middle classes subject to deskilling, but also the new middle classes subject to bureaucratization -- and the working class closes so the status panic of the former intensifies. As a form of capital, education becomes more important than property in asserting middle class distinction. *White Collar* makes much of the rising importance of education but also the role of the mass media and the illusory world it creates. Mills devotes considerable space to the fate of the intellectuals, their loss of independence through bureaucratization, becoming a technocracy serving power, unresponsive to publics. Mills describes, in terms directly analogous to those of Bourdieu, how the academic field is looking more and more like an economic market, invaded by the logic of corporate capital.

On the subject of the working class, both Bourdieu and Mills have much less to say. Bourdieu’s *Weight of the World* has a much richer, if untheorized, exploration of working class life than *Distinction* which is more reliant on survey research. The culture of the working class is a dominated culture, responsive to the pressing needs of economic necessity and the prestige of the dominant culture. Mills’s analysis of the working class is thinner since the focus of *New Men of Power* is on labor leaders and not on the led. The argument is very similar to the one Bourdieu makes in *Language and Symbolic Power* –
the representatives of subordinate classes enter the field of power where they engage in a competitive game among themselves – the logic of the field of power trumps their accountability to the dominated. Mills describes how labor leaders, through their negotiations, are co-opted on to the terrain of the business class. They seek to attach themselves at the lower levels of the power elite. Both Mills and Bourdieu, therefore, see leaders manipulating the led, the notion of representation is rhetoric used as a resource to simultaneously pursue and hide games within the higher reaches of society. Bourdieus’s essays on “Public Opinion Does not Exist” and “The Use of the People” follow Mills’s early cynicism about mass society.

Yet alongside Mills’s cynicism is always an alternative political vision, albeit a political vision that becomes more utopian over time. New Men of Power describes the absorption of labor leaders into the power elite, accomplices of the “main drift,” but it also maps out the political field of the immediate postwar period as an array of publics that includes the Far Left (Leninist Left), the Independent Left (more critical than interventionist), Liberal Center (which might include support for trade unions), the Communists (which he sees as anti-democratic fifth columnists), the Practical Right (which supports class war against unions and leftists), and Sophisticated Conservatives (corporate liberals tied to the military-industrial complex who see unions as a stabilizing force, managing discontent). Like so many commentators of his time, Mills expected capitalism to generate another “slump” which would force the hand of the Sophisticated Conservatives, but also attract popular support to a true Labor Party (Mills supported Norman Thomas’s 1948 Presidential bid as candidate of the Socialist Party) that would
organize worker control and democratic planning. Socialism, he asserted, had been
derailed by social democracy, petty trade unionism and communism. Inevitably, Mills
hoped for a new type of intellectual, a “labor intellectual,” independent of but also
committed to the working class, capable of forging a new vision and a new collective
will.

Mills’s optimism did not last long. Reaction swept across the country so that
when he turned to White Collar he came up with a much bleaker scenario. There he refers
to the middle classes as a rearguard, without a will of their own, siding with the
prevailing forces in society, and, pending a slump, the prevailing forces lay with the
power elite. When it comes to The Power Elite Mills is consumed by despair.
Denouncing the “higher immorality” and “organized irresponsibility” of the dominant
classes, his political imagination turns from the bleak future to the radiant past. He
contrasts the mass society he sees around him with a democracy of publics, the founding
dream and early practice of American society. Mills never abandons himself to the
present, never withdraws from the intellectual battle for another world. Like Bourdieu
current events and life trajectory more and more carried him into the public arena.

The Sociological Imagination

But not before a farewell to sociology! The Sociological Imagination was Mills’s
parting gift to sociology, one of the most widely read and inspiring introductions to
sociology. The Sociological Imagination, published in 1959 just three years before he
died, looks two ways – back to sociology and forward to politics. Back to sociology it is
a devastating and memorable indictment of professional sociology for the sins of
abstracted empiricism and grand theorizing. Abstracted empiricism refers to survey
research divorced from any historical or theoretical context, typified in Mills’s mind by
the work of his titular boss, Paul Lazarsfeld, with whom he had a most rocky relation.
Abstracted empiricism approximates market research and exemplifies the
bureaucratization of sociology, and more generally how intellectuals were increasingly
serving the corporate world as consultants and experts and as orchestrators of public
opinion. Grand theory, on the other hand, refers to the hegemony of structural
functionalism within the world of theory, formal theory, arcane and inaccessible except to
the initiated elite around Talcott Parsons. Grand theory builds an elaborate but empty
architecture of the most mundane yet unsubstantiated claims. Against abstracted
empiricism and grand theory Mills celebrated the sociologist as craft worker, uniting in
the one person the development of sociological theory through engagement with
empirical data. He paints a romantic image of the lone sociologist uncorrupted by the
academic environment – a portrait of his own isolation in and alienation from the
academic world. This image is an absurdly unsociological vision of professional
sociology – a Manichean struggle between the god and the devil – but one that justified
his own abandonment of that world.

If the first character in *The Sociological Imagination* is the sociologist as craft
worker, the second character is the sociologist as “independent intellectual,” looking
outwards rather than inwards. Here too there are two sins to avoid, namely the sociologist
as advisor to the prince, the technician, the consultant on the one hand, and the
philosopher king who aspires to rule the world on the other. The advisor to the prince and
the philosopher king are the counterparts in the political realm to the abstracted empiricist
and the grand theorist in the academic realm, while the independent intellectual is the
counterpart of the craft worker. The independent intellectual speaks to publics and at
rulers, maintaining a distance from both. Here indeed is Mills’s notion of public
sociologist – a concept he describes but does not name – for him a traditional rather than
an organic intellectual.

The connection between the craft worker and the independent intellectual is made
through the idea of the sociological imagination that famously turns private problems into
public issues. But here there is slippage between, on the one side, the sociological
imagination, namely the connection between milieu and social structure, micro and
macro, and, on the other side, the never specified political imagination that connects
private troubles to public issues. It is one thing to demonstrate that unemployment is not a
problem of individual indolence but a problem of the capitalist economy, it is another
matter to turn that understanding into a public demand or a social movement.

Appreciating the broad structural determinants of one’s personal troubles is as likely to
lead to apathy and withdrawal as to engagement. New Men of Power, White Collar and
The Power Elite each attempt in their own way to bridge the divide between sociology
and politics, and in so doing demonstrate how difficult it is to cross that bridge.

But is there a public for Mills’s public sociologist to address? His books all point
to the disappearance of publics and the rise of mass society, so with whom then will the
public sociologist converse? Although no one book captures them, the same dilemmas run through the writings of Bourdieu, albeit with their own specificity. As the name implies *The Craft of Sociology*, written in 1968 with Chamboredon and Passeron, speaks directly to Mills’s sociologist as craft worker. It criticizes both existentialism (the counterpart to Parsons’s structural functionalism) as well as the reaction to it in the form of imported American empiricism. Like Mills, Bourdieu’s work is a continual dialogue of theory and empirical research, the one cannot exist without the other. Bourdieu very rarely indulges in flights of theoretical fancy, his theoretical claims are always empirically grounded. On the other hand, he closely follows French philosopher of science, Bachelard, by insisting on the break between common sense, what Bourdieu calls spontaneous sociology, and science. For sociology such break with common sense is especially important because its subject matter are familiar problems about which everyone has an opinion. Throughout his academic life Bourdieu will be fighting with amateurish commentators, in Bourdieu’s language “doxosophers,” who claim to know better than sociologists.

Although the home of sociology, France has always had difficulty developing an autonomous professional sociology, separating itself from social reform and public discourse. In this sense the academic context of Bourdieu is very different from that of Mills, the one faces the struggle to create a science against common sense while the other is suffocated by professionalism, and struggles to reconnect to common sense. This accounts, at least in part, for their opposed genres of writing, the one always simple and accessible, the other dominated by complex linguistic constructions and the coining of
esoteric concepts. For a “new” science to be accepted into the French academic pantheon, it was necessary to adopt the style of writing of the academic field with the highest distinction, namely philosophy. While denouncing the detachment of philosophy from everyday reality, Bourdieu nevertheless replicates philosophical rhetoric style to establish sociology’s distinction, and thus cuts himself off from the wider publics he seeks to reach. Mills suffers from the opposite problem – in making his books accessible to publics and resisting the idiom of science and high theory he loses credibility within the world of sociology. Reacting to opposite challenges -- Bourdieu embracing science against common sense, Mills embracing common sense against hyper-science -- they converge on a common understanding of methodology, represented in the idea of craftwork as the interactive unity of theory and research.

Likewise Bourdieu, no less than Mills, is committed to the idea of the independent intellectual. Moreover, his targets are the same as Mills. On the one side he denounces the philosopher king, or what he calls the “total intellectual” epitomized by Jean Paul Sartre, but also Beauvoir or Foucault and, on the other side, he denounces the advisor to the king, the technocrats, the experts, the consultants to the state, servants of power. The philosophy king – the public intellectual as total intellectual -- has a certain reality in the France that it does not have in the US. Notwithstanding the higher appreciation of the intellectual in France, Bourdieu nonetheless faces the same dilemma as Mills. Neither see a public out there that they can address. Mills talks of a mass society, atomized, withdrawn, and alienated from politics and public discussion, whereas

\[1\] Obviously, Mills and Bourdieu are affected by the styles of thinking and writing that prevail in their own national intellectual fields.
for Bourdieu the problem is, if anything, even more serious. The habitus is so deeply inculcated that the dominated are unreceptive to criticism of domination. Furthermore the independent intellectual, in both their conceptions, faces the power of the media and its own mediators. Both Mills and Bourdieu lost no opportunity to attack the media’s power to determine the message, to even shape the research that becomes the message. Mills did not write a book like Bourdieu’s *Television* but he might well have done.

Whether they sought it or not both -- but Bourdieu more than Mills – became celebrities in their own time for their angry oppositional politics. They became media events in their own right, and the more they railed against the media the more celebrated they became! Yet both were opposed to the idea of the organic intellectual who would circumvent the media and engage directly with publics. In theory both opposed the organic intellectual on the grounds that it compromised their independence, yet their actual practices were quite different. C Wright Mills never participated in any collective demonstration, protest, never signed petitions, and never spent time with the people he contemptuously dismissed as the masses. He was a pure intellectual, speaking down to the people from his pulpit. Bourdieu, however, was very different. He was always ready to initiate or sign a petition, he was ready to talk to all sorts of publics and he could be found addressing workers on picket lines. He had no allergy to the people in whose name he spoke. Quite the contrary he had enormous sympathy for those at the bottom of social hierarchies, that found its most vivid expression in *The Weight of the World*, that describes in rich detail the plight of lower classes and immigrants under modern capitalism. Here lies the paradox -- according to his theory such unmediated engagement
is not only a futile but a dangerous activity. Mills was always truer to the idea of the traditional intellectual, but even he, in the last three years of his life, compromised his independence in a desperate political partisanship.

**From Sociology to Politics**

_The Sociological Imagination_, Mills’s best known book that has withstood the test of time, was indeed his farewell to sociology. In the remaining three years of his life Mills became a public intellectual, writing two pamphlets, short polemical books, intended to capture the public imagination. The first was _The Causes of World War Three_, a continuation of the arguments of _The Power Elite_ condemning “crackpot realism,” and “organized irresponsibility” not just in the United States but in the Soviet Union too. Together these power elites were ushering in World War Three. He ends the book with an appeal to intellectuals to fight against the insanity of “rationality without reason.”

The second book was of a very different character. If _The Causes of World War Three_ diagnosed the way the power elites of the two superpowers were heading toward the annihilation of the human race, _Listen, Yankee_, written in 1960, pointed to an alternative scenario – a socialism that was neither capitalist nor communist. The Cuban Revolution served to make the alternative real. _Listen, Yankee_ is based on a short but intense visit to Cuba in 1960. He spent three-and-a-half long days with Fidel Castro and nearly a week with the head of the Institute for Agrarian Reform. In his account of the Cuban Revolution through the eyes of its leaders, Mills points to the already on-going
and remarkable experiments in economic planning, education expansion, welfare provision and land reforms – experiments that would be institutionalized as the mark Cuban socialism. He undertakes a class analysis of the social forces that are driving the social transformations and the counter-revolutionary forces opposing it, not least the support being given to the counter-revolution by the United States. He describes the challenges Cuba faced both domestically and internationally. The open hostility of the US, Mills says, was driving Cuba into the hands of the Soviet Union, which thereby intensified US military threats. *Listen, Yankee* addresses the US public, befuddled by the jingoist media, on the destructive path of US imperialism throughout Latin America, but particularly in Cuba, and justified under the Monroe Doctrine. The Cuban Revolution should be seen, he argued, as a reaction to Yankee imperialism, an experiment in true democracy, an experiment that all people of conscience can learn from, an experiment they must defend.

It was only two years before the end of his 46 year life that Mills discovered the potential of Third World Revolution. He was ahead of his time. In its class analysis, in its understanding of colonialism and imperialism, in its vision of socialism *Listen, Yankee* is a precursor to *The Wretched of the Earth* that appeared in the following year -- the same year that its author, Frantz Fanon, died at 35. These two lives ended within three months of each other, inspiring in their different ways, social movements across the world. Both saw the key role of intellectuals in forging revolution, but Mills came to this idea very late in life, only when he began traveling abroad, especially to Latin America, where he
discovered first hand the significance of revolutionary theory, that he had previously dismissed as a Marxist ruse.

Just as Mills became ever more outspoken and radical during the last three years of his life, so in the last decade of his life Bourdieu also became more angry, more public, more accusatory. He had always seen sociology, or at least his sociology, as latently political in the sense that it revealed the hidden bases of domination, nonetheless he became more ever more angry about the conservative turn of politics in France and elsewhere. His book on *Television* and then the two short collections of essays *Acts of Resistance* (1998) and *Firing Back* (2001) spoke out against neoliberalism and the tyranny of the market. He established his own press *Liber-Raison D’Agir* to publish such politically motivated and publicly accessible books. His magazine *Actes de la Recherche de Science Sociales* had always had a broad intellectual audience. He became the intellectual spokesmen of a broad left front in France, but also worked to develop what he called an “international of intellectuals.” He could be found on picket lines with workers as well as writing open letters to prominent leaders, protesting violations of human rights. He was committed to intellectuals as an independent collective force, an “organic intellectual of humanity” as he once called it. C Wright Mills had a similar vision of intellectuals as a Third Force, an idea he had formulated as early as the second world war when he taught at the University of Maryland, a view that stuck with him until his dieing days.
Yet here is the paradox, Bourdieu recognizes that the role of ideas can have only limited effect on social change. The dominated, who have an interest in a critical sociology, cannot grasp its meaning, because their submissive habitus is so deeply inscribed, whereas those who can grasp its meaning have no interest in the message. So what is he doing when he addresses workers, writes his polemical pieces, talks on television? In a preface to *Acts of Resistance*, he writes

> I would not have engaged in public position-taking if I had not, each time, had the – perhaps illusory – sense of being forced into it by a kind of legitimate rage, sometimes close to something like duty… I have always done it in the hope – if not of triggering a mobilization, or even one of those debates without object or subject which arise periodically in the world of the media – at least of breaking the appearance of unanimity which is the greater part of the symbolic force of the dominant discourse. (pp.vii-viii)

There is a mismatch, you might say, between Bourdieu’s logic of theory and his logic of practice. His theory says such interventions are futile, yet he can only practice such interventions on the assumption that they might dislodge public discourse, symbolic violence. In the final analysis, he belies his own attacks on ideology and consciousness as too thin to grasp the depth of domination. In the end, despite his theory, Bourdieu cannot but subscribe to the idea of the organic intellectual, engaged directly with publics as well as the traditional intellectual speaking from the tribune, addressing humanity.

**Beyond Mills and Bourdieu**

Throughout his works Bourdieu defends the academy as a unique place to secure truth, but he also warns of the risks of certain “scholastic fallacies” that fail to recognize
how privileged that place is. That is, there is the danger that intellectuals do not
understand the position from which they write and speak, and so falsely universalize the
knowledge they produce. They falsely reduce the logic of things to things of logic. They
fall into the intellectualist trap that everyone thinks like them, sees the world through
their eyes, according to their models. In principle, the sociologist guards against such
fallacies. By their engagement with the world (even at a distance), sociologists are in the
best position to correct such illusions and to recognize the difference between the logic of
theory and the logic of practice.

Yet, one might argue, Bourdieu suffers from the obverse scholastic fallacy, the
presumption that the academy is the only place for producing genuine truth and that lay
knowledge is necessarily misguided. Lay knowledge is but the raw material out of
which scientific knowledge is produced. Bourdieu presumes, therefore, that the academic
scholar has a monopoly on truth, which is why he so vigorously defends the academy
against political and economic forces that threaten its autonomy. C Wright Mills
commits the same scholastic fallacy, claiming that intellectuals, as long as they don’t
succumb to certain pathologies, such as abstracted empiricism and grand theorizing,
monopolize truth. Like Bourdieu Mills pronounces on the world with supreme confidence
in the correctness of his position, disregarding or dismissing other views.

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2 Even The Weight of the World, his most detailed compilation of life among the dominated, is an empiricist account whose purpose is to reveal the perspectives of immigrants and poor people, but not to enter into a dialogue with them. Interviewers must be careful to help elucidate folk understanding in order to execute, most effectively, that rupture with common sense.
Contemporary visions of science, however, think of the production of knowledge as a joint activity, a collaboration of scientist and lay person. As I noted at the end of the second lecture on Gramsci, there is a place for both traditional and organic intellectuals, those who insists on their separation from the world and those who are deeply engaged with the world. Rather than being mutually exclusive, the two types of intellectuals are mutually interdependent, which brings me to the second scholastic fallacy of Bourdieu and Mills. If the first fallacy is an elitist conception of knowledge only produced by the intellectual ensconced in his academic citadel, the second fallacy is to reduce the sociologist to the craft worker, the singular individual as source of knowledge, the renaissance intellectual who is simultaneously critic, scientist, expert and public commentator. To be sure there are such individuals, like Bourdieu and Mills, but most of us have a more humble place, specializing in different knowledges – the professional, the policy, the public and the critical.

The collective intellectual that Mills and Bourdieu envision, when they talk of a third force or an international of intellectuals, is bound by a mechanical solidarity. It is an elite of like-minded and distinguished intellectuals, floating above society. They are cosmopolitans who represent the interests of humanity through their science, much as Comte imagined them. There is, however, an alternative vision of the collective intellectual, more likely to be based in an organic solidarity, specializing in different but interdependent knowledges that make up the division of disciplinary labor. Underlying this organic solidarity and justifying specialization are visions of freedom, reason and equality that we all share. This collective sociologist, bound by organic solidarity, looks
two ways: inwardly to the development of professional knowledge and its critique and outwardly turning those proverbial private troubles into public issues. For the collective sociologist of today, facing the corporatization of the university and the commodification of knowledge, it is not enough to expand the sociological imagination, hoping this will magically imprint itself on the world beyond, but it requires also a political imagination that brings those ideas into dialogue with diverse publics. We have to think not just of the production of social science but also of its distribution and consumption. In the final analysis the reflexive beam that was turned on Marx, accusing him of being unable to understand the effects of his own theory, can be also turned back on Mills and Bourdieu, for failing to theorize their own contributions to public discourse.

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