

Notes

1. An ethnographic account, 'Piece Rates, Hungarian Style', written as a counterpoint to Haraszti's study, will appear in *Socialist Review* (January, 1985).

Introduction: Bringing Workers Back In

This is an unfashionable book. It defends an unfashionable thesis about an unfashionable class formed in an unfashionable place. The class is the industrial proletariat.¹ The place is the point of production. And the thesis has two parts. First, I argue that the industrial working class has made significant and self-conscious interventions in history. Second, I argue that these interventions were and continue to be shaped by the process of production. This thesis is in contention with contemporary trends, both within and beyond Marxism, which either abandon the working class for new social movements or consider it to be just one of a number of collective actors formed in the public sphere. Found on both sides of the Atlantic, the "newer left", as it has been called, challenges two central Marxist propositions: the privileged status of the working class, and the primacy of production. Can one recognize what underlies these critiques and still be a Marxist? My answer is yes.

Within these emerging political and intellectual currents, the postulate of the revolutionary working class is held to be theoretically and philosophically overburdened.² From the beginning the working class could only give lie to the mission, assigned by Marxists, of emancipating itself and therewith the whole of humanity. 'Marxism has been the greatest fantasy of our century.'³ We must cry farewell to the working class, embracing the new social movements which spring from civil society, understood as the forgotten space between state and economy.⁴ From here community struggles, the feminist movement, the ecology movement, the civil rights movement and the peace movement burgeon forth as the progressive movements of the 1980s.⁵ If they have a limited vision this is all to the good, since transcendental tasks, such as the one that Marxists assigned to the working class, are the back door or even the front door to totalitarianism.

If messianic radicalism is now philosophically, theoretically and politically unacceptable, why can we not simply reduce the burden on the working class to one appropriate to its real rather than imagined

interventions in history? The answer, it seems, is that the working class not only has lost its revolutionary temper, if it ever had one, but also is a dying class.⁶ The post-industrial society ushers in 'deindustrialization' and with it a shrinking, weakening industrial working class. In its place new classes, such as intellectuals, emerge as agents for alternative visions of the future.⁷ Another strategy is to reduce socialism to social democracy, and social democracy to a question of numbers. On careful investigation it now turns out that there were never enough proletarians for socialist parties to become effective forces through electoral means.⁸ Coalition politics between the working class and allied classes, and therefore the compromise of socialist goals, were always and inevitably part of capitalist democracy. This provides the basis for a movement to the right in the name of electoral politics.

Contemporary historical studies reproduce this drift. Marxism is fleetingly raised from the floor only to be knocked out of the ring. Marx mistakenly projected the model of a revolutionary bourgeoisie onto the working class, which could never achieve the transformative power of its overlord.⁹ Paradoxically, the peasantry — which Marx, at least in conventional interpretations, condemned to the proverbial sack of potatoes — is resurrected as the last heroic class capable of fuelling revolution.¹⁰ Revolutions become a thing of the past, save perhaps in the beleaguered Third World. Certainly the working class plays no leading role in them.¹¹ Instead the state becomes an actor in its own right with its own interests, something to be not transformed or destroyed but manipulated and bargained with. States are here to stay, so we must learn to live with them.

Equally damning for the postulate of a revolutionary proletariat are the studies of workers in their brief moments of heroism. These studies have unearthed the swan songs of artisans in their battle to defend their skills against the encroachment of capital — a battle they seemed destined to lose, but which momentarily threw up radical visions.¹² We are left rescuing the pristine artisans of the past in those moments of tragedy and ecstasy, as an exhortation to the hollow walls of the present. Now we face an atomized, fragmented, objectified working class.¹³ Labour historian and prophet of work degradation join hands in orchestrating the proletariat's last dance — in a conspiracy upset only by the authors' refusal to be implicated and by their surges of utopianism.

This, then, is the polemical context of this book — the emergence of perspectives that conjure away the working class. A pathos has engulfed Marxist and 'post-Marxist' thought, reconstructing history

in its own image and projecting those reconstructions into the future. It would be foolhardy to place oneself outside the course of history, to swim directly against a tide which is dashing the revolutionary proletariat onto the rocks of history or sweeping it out to sea, never to be seen again. I am not, therefore, going to restore the working class to its messianic role, but nor do I intend to abandon it to the vicissitudes of some putative logic of history. I am not going to replace one metaphysical imputation (the working class as saviour of humanity) with its opposite (the working class as incapable of shaping its own destiny). As we shall see when we undertake sociological analyses in comparative and historical dimensions, the record of the industrial working class is not as insignificant as its detractors would lead us to believe. As to the question of deindustrialization, I do not deny its importance in advanced capitalist countries: it might indeed be happening on a world scale too. Of greater significance, however, is the international *recomposition* of the industrial working class — which entails that the conditions for the renewal of working-class radicalism are to be found in the industrially advancing areas of Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. In other words, the quiescence of industrial workers in some of the most advanced capitalist countries should not be projected into the past and the future or generalized to other countries. Just as revolutionary impulses are not innate characteristics of the working class, so resignation to the status quo is neither natural nor inevitable but is produced by specific conditions.

In the following chapters I argue that the lurches which have plagued the history of Marxism — lurches between a voluntarism in which anything seems possible and a determinism in which nothing seems possible, between a naive workerism and bleak prognostications — can be brought into line with reality if we expand our understanding of production beyond its purely economic moment and explicitly include politics. It is an ironic fact that political economy has conspired in the separation of economics and politics, never attempting to theorize a politics of production. But although I align myself with contemporary critiques of economic determinism, this does not lead me to argue that the working class does or does not become a historical actor outside production. Instead I defend the thesis that the process of production decisively shapes the development of working-class struggles. This thesis can be sustained only if the process of production is seen to have two political moments. First, the organization of work has political and ideological *effects* — that is, as men and women transform raw materials into useful things, they also reproduce particular social relations as well as an experience of

those relations. Second, alongside the organization of work — that is, the *labour process* — there are distinctive political and ideological *apparatuses of production* which regulate production relations. The notion of *production regime* or, more specifically, factory regime embraces both these dimensions of production politics.

Studying the industrial working class may be unfashionable, but it is neither anachronistic nor irrelevant. The framework of production politics leads new interest to the study of an old class, offering an alternative understanding not only of that class but also, by extension, of the new social movements. This should be clear from the rationales for the study of traditional proletarians. First, let me consider the methodological rationale. The thesis of this book requires that real workers be examined in their productive circumstances in periods of turbulence as well as of passivity. It will also be necessary to investigate the various forms of factory regime, and the conditions of their existence and transformation. In order to demonstrate that the factory regime has effects for the mobilization of the working class, independent of the labour process, we shall have to undertake comparisons between countries and over time in which the labour process is more or less the same but the factory regime varies. In order, then, to examine labour processes that are commonly found in different countries in different periods, the essays that follow focus on textile workers, machine operators and miners.

Closely related to this methodological rationale for studying such traditional industrial workers is a theoretical rationale. For the industrial working class is at once the most fundamental and the most suspect link in the Marxian schema. The reconstruction of Marxism must examine how the process of production shapes the industrial working class not only objectively — that is, the type of labour it carries out — but also subjectively — that is, the struggles engendered by a specific experience or interpretation of that labour. Or, in my own terms, it must examine the political and ideological as well as the purely economic moment of production. Moreover, as we shall see, this reconceptualization of production also recasts some of the anomalies and contradictions in theories of underdevelopment, of the state, of state socialism, of the reproduction of labour power and, more generally, of the development of capitalism on a world scale.

The reconceptualization can also illuminate problems in other areas, not least the study of social movements. There are too few theoretically informed attempts to explain why certain groups become movements at certain times while others do not, to understand the effects of apparatuses of domination on struggles. Just as the aban-

donment of the working class proceeds from the fact of rather than the reason for its passivity, so the embrace of social movements often stems from the fact of rather than the reason for their struggles. In this respect, by re-examining the historical interventions and abstentions of the industrial proletariat from the standpoint of production apparatuses, we can learn not only about the working class but also from it. All of which is *not* to say that there is nothing to learn from social movements — quite the contrary. The very concept of production politics owes much to the feminist movement: to its critique of the distinction between public and private, and to its notion of the personal as political. There are, in other words, politics outside the state. Nor do I think these movements are unimportant in their own right. Yet too often that importance is mystified by a certain impatience to discover an actor here and now without examining its basis in micro-apparatuses of domination, the relationship of the latter to state apparatuses, and the barriers that capitalism poses to the transformation of these forms of domination.

In the last instance the reason for studying the industrial working class or any other oppressed group must be political. The industrial working class still represents the most fundamental point of critique, both of advanced capitalism, dominated by private appropriation of the product of direct producers, and of state socialism, dominated by central appropriation of the product of direct producers. The standpoint of the direct producer embodies an alternative to expropriation of one class by another — namely, the principle according to which the producers (considered singularly or collectively) control their product. However, any failure of the working class to realize this principle in no way invalidates its suffering, nor does it free us of the responsibility of examining the forms of its oppression.

I am not denying the existence of other forms of oppression, such as gender or racial oppression. Nor do I believe that any transition from capitalism to socialism would automatically eliminate these. While gender and racial domination may have a greater tenacity than class domination, class is the more basic principle of organization of contemporary societies. This means two things. First, class better explains the development and reproduction of contemporary societies. Second, racial and gender domination are shaped by the class in which they are embedded more than the forms of class domination are shaped by gender and race. Therefore, any attempts to eliminate non-class forms of domination must acknowledge the limits and character of change within capitalism and state socialism, considered as class societies.

At this point, it may assist the reader if I trace the genesis of the concept of production politics. It first emerged while I was machining parts of diesel engines at the South Chicago division of the multinational corporation Allied. During my ten-month stint as a miscellaneous machine operator, from June 1974 to April 1975, Harry Braverman published his path-breaking *Labour and Monopoly Capital*. At the time it failed to speak to my experiences on the shopfloor, to get at what work meant to me and my fellow operators. We were constructing a shopfloor life of our own that took for granted what Braverman bemoaned: the separation of conception and execution. Our jobs may have had little skill in Braverman's sense, but they involved ingenuity enough. They absorbed our attention and sometimes even left us too much autonomy. Uncertainty could be as nerve-wracking as it was seductive. Objectification of work, if that is what we were experiencing, is very much a subjective process — it cannot be reduced to some inexorable laws of capitalism. We participated in and strategized our own subordination. We were active accomplices in our own exploitation. That, and not the destruction of subjectivity, was what was so remarkable.

It was not Braverman who offered insights into my daily life but, curiously, the abstract theories of politics and ideology found in Gramsci, Poulantzas and Althusser — very much in fashion at the time. Their analyses of hegemony — the presentation of the interests of the dominant classes as the interests of all, the constitution of the popular class state, the construction of the power bloc, the disorganization of the subordinate classes, the relative autonomy of the law, and so forth — all appeared as germane to the factory as to the sphere of public power. Thus, collective bargaining concretely coordinated the interests of workers and management, the grievance machinery constituted workers as industrial citizens with rights and obligations, and the internal labour market produced a possessive individualism right there on the shopfloor. These institutions materialized a balance of power, which first and foremost set limits on workers' struggles but also restrained management from its authoritarian impulses. The regulating institutions afforded an arena of self-activity, free from managerial depredations, that gave workers the opportunity to construct effective working relations and drew them into the pursuit of capitalist profit. Cooperation revolved around 'making out', a 'game' in which the goal was to make a certain quota, and whose rules were recognized and defended by workers and management alike. Originally constructed to alleviate boredom and to introduce some meaning into eight hours of drilling, milling or turning, this 'making

out' had the effect of generating consent to its rules and of obscuring the conditions that framed them. Coercion was applied only when the rules were violated, and even then within bounds that were themselves part of a larger game. In short, as we slaved away on our machines trying to make our quotas we manufactured not only parts of diesel engines, not only relations of cooperation and domination, but also consent to those activities and relations.

I christened the regulating institutions that embodied and guaranteed this hegemonic order the 'internal state', underlining the analogies with the 'external state'. However, once the central point had been made that there was a politics outside the state — that is, a production politics as well as a state politics — the concept of 'internal state' was of limited analytical use. It had to go for at least two reasons. First, it blurred the essential association of the state with the monopoly of the means of organized coercion, guaranteed by armed bodies of men and women. The state remains the decisive nucleus of power in capitalist societies in that it guarantees the constellations of power outside the state, in the family, the factory, the community, and so on. In this sense state politics is 'global' politics; it is the politics of politics. The second reason for abandoning the concept of 'internal state' was its unjustified focus on the factory. There was no obvious warrant for referring to factory apparatuses as an 'internal state' while denying such a designation for family apparatuses. I therefore stuck to the idea of politics of production, whose locus and object were not an 'internal state' but simply the political apparatuses of production. The concept of factory regime encompasses these apparatuses and the political effects of the labour process.

The similarities and differences between workplace and state apparatuses led inexorably to the question of their interrelationship. Allied turned out to be the same plant that Donald Roy, a famous industrial sociologist, had studied in meticulous detail while he was a radial drill operator thirty years earlier. I was therefore able to map changes in the factory regime during the post-war period, but I never succeeded in isolating secular changes due to the development of new forms of state regulation of production apparatuses from changes specific to the enterprise, particularly its changing market context. Indeed, I tended to stress the absorption of Roy's Geer Company into the multinational Allied — that is, the firm's passage from the competitive to the corporate sector — as the major explanation for the movement along the axis from despotic to hegemonic regimes.

Undoubtedly the major inspiration for linking production politics

and state politics came from Miklós Haraszti's extraordinary sociography of Red Star Tractor Factory in Budapest, where he worked as a mill operator in 1971. The same stroke of luck that had landed me in Donald Roy's factory also landed me in a machine shop which, in terms of work organization, technology and payment system, bore a remarkable resemblance to the one at Red Star. And yet the production politics could not have been more different. Whereas the hegemonic regime at Allied relied on the relative autonomy of the factory apparatuses, restricting managerial interventions while regulating working-class struggles, the despotic regime at Red Star gave management a coercive instrument of untrammelled domination over the workforce. The importance of the relationship between state and factory was immediately obvious. At Allied, the factory apparatuses and state apparatuses were institutionally separated; at Red Star they were fused. To be sure, the state intervened to shape the form of factory apparatuses at Allied, but it was not physically present at the point of production. At Red Star, management, party and trade union were arms of the state at the point of production.

I called the regime at Red Star despotic because coercion prevailed over consent. I called it bureaucratic despotism because it was constituted by the administrative hierarchy of the state. Market despotism, by contrast, is constituted by the economic whip of the market, and the state regulates only the external conditions of market relations — that is, the state protects market relations and labour mobility among firms. Under market despotism, Marx's prototypical factory regime for modern industry, the state is separated from and does not directly shape the form of the factory regime; whereas, under the hegemonic regime, the state and factory apparatuses are also institutionally separated but the state shapes the factory apparatuses by stipulating, for example, mechanisms for the conduct and resolution of struggle at the point of production. Our three types of regime may be presented in the following table.

		Institutional Relationship between Apparatuses of Factory and of State	
		<i>Separation</i>	<i>Fusion</i>
Intervention of State in Factory Regime	<i>Direct</i>	HEGEMONIC	BUREAUCRATIC DESPOTIC
	<i>Indirect</i>	MARKET DESPOTIC	COLLECTIVE SELF-MANAGEMENT

The fourth cell — collective self-management — combines a different form of state-factory relations, in which factory apparatuses are managed by workers themselves. However, the state, or at least some central administrative organ, stipulates the conditions under which factories become self-regulating — that is, it stipulates what is to be produced with what materials obtained from what source. Moreover, this central planning agency is subject to influence from below through institutionalized mechanisms of participation by factory councils.

The above table provides the point of departure for this book. What significance can we attach to four types of factory regime inferred from a study of just two machine shops?! In particular, is there any relationship between market despotism, hegemonic systems and bureaucratic despotism on one side and early capitalism, advanced capitalism and state socialism on the other? If so, what is it? What other types of factory regime can be found under capitalism and socialism in both core and peripheral countries? What are the conditions of their reproduction and transformation? What are the consequences, in particular for class struggles, of the different regimes? Can we isolate their effects from those of other institutions? And what can we say about the transition from one system of politics (combination/articulation of production politics and state politics) to another? How much is this shaped by tendencies inherent to those systems, and how much by political and economic factors of an international character? We can begin to answer these questions only by situating regimes in their historical contexts of specific economies and states.

Before proceeding to these questions, we must be careful not to detach the political apparatuses of production from their material base — from the labour process. The first part of this study will therefore attempt, through a detailed examination of Braverman's work, to establish the premisses for theorizing the concept of factory regime and production politics. For Braverman, the generic notion of the labour process involves a combination of two sets of activities: mental and manual labour. The hallmark of capitalism is their separation, which appears to the worker as domination. Here we shall pursue a slightly different course, defining the labour process by the social relations into which men and women enter in order to produce useful things. I call these social relations between and among workers and managers *relations in production*. These must be distinguished from the *relations of exploitation* between labour and capital. Whereas the former refer to the organization of tasks, the latter refer to the relations through which surplus is pumped out of the direct producer.

It should be noted that relations of exploitation are part of the *relations of production*, which also include the relations among the units which organize exploitation. Thus, relations of production include both the appropriation and the distribution of surplus. Whereas the relations of production uniquely define a mode of production, the same relations in production — the same labour process — may be found in different modes of production. Hence we refer not to the capitalist labour process but to the labour process in capitalist society.

Once a notion of the labour process as the unity/separation of conception and execution is replaced with a relational notion, the emphasis shifts from a question of *domination* to one of *reproducing* social relations. This is precisely the theoretical inspiration behind the concept of production apparatuses, although there is no one-to-one correspondence between institution and function. Thus, state apparatuses also reproduce relations in production and relations of exploitation, just as production apparatuses can reproduce relations of domination, such as gender and race relations, originating outside production.

Whereas my discussion of Braverman's work stresses the directly political and ideological *effects of the labour process*, the succeeding parts of the book deal with struggles as they are also shaped by different types of *production apparatuses*. I will be at pains to demonstrate that the labour process is only one of a number of factors that condition their form. The other factors emerge through a series of historical case studies. Thus, Chapter Two examines Marx's prototypical factory regime — market despotism. By returning to the site of Marx's analysis, the Lancashire cotton industry, we discover that market despotism, far from being the tendential form of regime, is quite exceptional. During the nineteenth century the Lancashire cotton industry moved from a company state to a patriarchal regime to a paternalistic regime, reflecting changes not only in the labour process but also in the market structure among firms. Moving further afield, to the United States cotton industry, we discover the importance of the mode of reproduction of labour power, or, what amounts to the same thing, the mode of expropriation of the direct producers from the means of subsistence, in the transition from a paternalistic regime to market despotism. Finally, comparisons with Russia suggest the importance of the precise interrelationship between apparatuses of the state and those of the workplace.

In effect, Chapter Two shows how problematic, contingent and indeed rare are the conditions of market despotism, conditions that Marx either took for granted or assumed would emerge with the development of capitalism. Chapter Three continues to elaborate the

actual historical variability, in order to illuminate the development of what I call hegemonic regimes. Here the most crucial factor is the active role of the state in the reproduction of labour power: workers are no longer at the mercy of the overseer's arbitrary rule, and management must strike a new balance between consent and coercion, in which the former rather than the latter prevails. Of course, the extent of state support for the reproduction of labour power varies among countries, being stronger in Sweden and England than in the United States and Japan. Nor should the attempt to develop a scheme of national systems of production and state politics blind one to the considerable variation within countries, occasioned by market factors, the labour process and the differential relations of factories and their employees to the state. Finally, I discuss the emergence of a new despotic production politics in the contemporary period, one that bears the marks of the pre-existing hegemonic regime. This hegemonic despotism is rooted in the accelerated mobility of capital which threatens labour as a collectivity and forces concessions from it in the same way that labour extracted concessions from capital in the previous period.

Studies of the 'capitalist labour process' presume the existence of a distinctive socialist organization of work. But the presumption is rarely put to any serious empirical test. In fact, all the evidence we have from state socialist societies suggests a striking similarity between their labour processes and those in capitalist societies. If there is no obvious 'socialist labour process', I argue in Chapter Four that there is a distinctive state-socialist mode of *regulating* the labour process. The existence of such a distinctive production politics can be explained through a comparison of the political economies of capitalism and state socialism. Instead of the private appropriation and distribution of surplus through a market, the state socialist enterprise faces central appropriation and redistribution. Instead of competition among firms in the pursuit of profit, state socialist firms bargain with central planning agencies. Enterprises have greater or lesser capacity to extend concessions to their employees according to their bargaining power with the centre, linked to their monopoly of the production of key goods. The more centralized the economic system, the more important is the bargaining and the more there develops a dualism of factory regimes: bureaucratic despotism in the weaker sectors producing low-priority goods (for example, consumer durables, clothes, food); and bureaucratic bargaining in the stronger sectors producing high priority goods (for example, fuel, such as coal, steel, machinery).

State socialism also generates a second tendency, toward political

dualism *within* the enterprise. Whereas capitalist firms operate under stringent profit constraints — hard budget constraints — state-socialist enterprises are protected by the state, and operate under soft budget constraints. They continually seek out resources with which to expand or maintain production, if only to enhance their bargaining power with the state. They face shortages, not overproduction, and this leads to searching, queuing and, most important, continual substitution of inputs and outputs. Production is therefore subject to a rhythmical change, requiring constant improvisation. As a result there are pressures toward the bifurcation of the labour force into a core and a periphery. The former, composed of skilled and experienced workers (who are also more likely to be party members or trade union officials), manage the exigencies of continually changing production requirements, while the latter, composed of subordinate groups of unskilled or semi-skilled workers and often peasant workers, perform jobs that are more easily routinized. Management becomes dependent on the core, which is able to extract concessions but only at the expense of the peripheral workers. Bureaucratic bargaining in the core and bureaucratic despotism in the periphery reproduce each other.

Differential bargaining strength of enterprises leads to a dualism between sectors, while indeterminacy of supply relations among firms leads to dualism within enterprises. With a more centralized system of appropriation and redistribution, bargaining with the centre becomes more important and hence the dualism between sectors more pronounced, while management has less autonomy to respond to supply constraints by developing an internal dualism. In Hungary we find dualism more developed within the firm, whereas in Poland it is more developed between firms; as we shall see, this in part explains the different trajectories of class struggles in the two countries.

Just as in capitalism the increasing independence of the reproduction of labour power from the individual firm, guaranteed by the state, leads from despotic to hegemonic regimes, a similar transition can be observed in state socialist societies during the shift from extensive to intensive development. Increasingly workers obtain the conditions for the reproduction of labour power independently of the enterprise, as a result of the distribution of housing and social benefits independent of performance at work but also through the development of the so-called second economy. Whereas under capitalism the state cushions workers against the economic whip of the market, under state socialism the opening up of the market cushions workers against the political whip of the state.

In the study of early capitalism, advanced capitalism and state socialism we discovered a constellation of determinants of factory regime: labour process, enterprise relations to state and market, the mode of reproduction of labour power. This constellation is itself shaped by wider political and economic forces of an international character. This becomes particularly clear in the study of Third World countries. Chapter Five examines how international forces shaped a particular form of primitive accumulation in colonial Zambia. A non-interventionist colonial state generated and reproduced labour supplies, while a company state regulated the miners' work and leisure during their period of employment. I call the regime of regulation in the mines 'colonial despotism', based on the colonial character of the apparatuses of production. There emerged a distinctive labour process which presupposed the existence of colonial despotism. The transformation of state politics in the post-colonial period called forth corresponding changes in production politics, generating tensions for the labour process which for technical reasons could not be altered so easily. In other words, once a certain 'colonial' technology had been adopted, often it could not be changed without overhauling mining techniques and excavation; at the same time, its effectiveness depended on a form of production regime that had been swept away with the colonial state.

Our study of Zambian copper mining, as well as the experience of other peripheral economies, indicates that the relationship between the form of production politics is limited on one side by the labour process and on the other by international political and economic forces. It suggests further that we consider the development of factory regimes in different countries as an interconnected international process, governed by the combined and uneven development of capitalism and indeed of socialism. Bureaucratic despotism at Red Star is as much a product of international economic and political forces as is the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia. Equally, the anarchic character of English production politics is the result not only of the country's history as a pioneer industrial nation, but also of the appropriation of surplus from peripheral and semi-peripheral societies. The exploration of the international determinations of factory regimes is attempted in a preliminary fashion in the conclusion of this book.

Inevitably my critics will wonder how I can draw any conclusions from particular case studies. They will point to the exceptional character, and even bias, of my sample of factories. For biased it certainly is! The cases were chosen not for statistical representativeness but for theoretical relevance. Nineteenth-century cotton spin-

ning, Geer Company, Allied Corporation, Jay's, Red Star and the Zambian mining industry can hardly be regarded as a representative sample. They are not even 'typical' of the societies in which they are embedded. Indeed, the very idea of a typical factory is a sociological fiction. It is the artificial construction of those who see only one mode of generalization — the extrapolation from sample to population. There is, however, a second mode of generalization, which seeks to illuminate the forces at work in society as a totality rather than to reflect simply on the constancy and variation of isolated factory regimes within a society. This second mode, pursued here, is the extension from the micro context to the totality which shapes it. According to this view every particularity contains a generality; each particular factory regime is the product of general forces operating at a societal or global level. It is the purpose of my analysis to expose those forces as they impinge on quite specific and unique factory regimes.

Thus, we discover that the various factory despotisms found in nineteenth-century cotton spinning are a product of the labour process, market forces, patterns of labour force reproduction and state interventions. Just as the more bureaucratic hegemonic regime at Allied is peculiar to the corporate sector of the United States economy, so the more anarchic regime at Jay's is distinctive of a similar sector of the British economy. Haraszti writes his book, *A Worker in a Worker's State*, as though it is a portrait of a typical worker in a typical state-socialist factory. In fact it is the portrait of an intellectual's experiences as a peripheral worker in a Hungarian enterprise suffering from the withdrawal of subsidies at the time of the economic reforms. Thus, Chapter Four deliberately entitled 'Workers in Workers' States', underlines the specificity of Haraszti's experiences and the variety of factory regimes in state-socialist societies. Equally, the despotism of the early Zambian mining regimes was a product of distinctive form of primitive accumulation and state abstentionism — a complex of conditions that we may call colonialism. In each case I seek to extract the general from the particular.

Of course, the facts do not speak for themselves. This process of induction from the concrete situation can be carried through only with the aid of a theoretical framework which already points to critical forces at work. Without the Marxist theory that I critically analyse and elaborate in Chapter One and elsewhere, I could never carry through the connection between the micro and the macro. A theoretical framework also leads us beyond what is, beyond verification, to what could be. We have already observed this in the formulation of a system of politics I have called collective self-management, species of which

have only been realized for fleeting moments under very unusual circumstances. The analysis of realized — past or present — political systems draws out the importance of the labour process, the mode of reproduction of labour power, relations among enterprises, and the relationship of enterprises to the state for the reproduction of production regimes. The salience of these same factors must be brought to bear in the examination of the feasibility and potential instabilities of collective self-management.

For all its dependence on an elaborate theoretical framework, the extended case method roots our analyses in the day-to-day experiences of workers. I have tried throughout to connect the most abstract and most global analyses to what it means to be a worker under early capitalism, advanced capitalism, state socialism or colonialism. Intellectuals who exchange ideas over the heads of those whose interests they claim to defend, without founding their work on the lived experience of those people, run the risk of irrelevance and elitism.

Notes

1. Strictly speaking, the industrial proletariat is a class fraction. Here I take the working class to include all wage earners who do not exercise control over production. I follow Erik Wright's formulations in chapter 2 of *Class, Crisis and the State* (London 1978) as well as his most recent reformulations in *Classes* (London 1985, forthcoming). What distinguishes different fractions of the working class is not the character of the labour process but what I call the political regime of production. Although this book is about the industrial working class, the ideas can be extended to other fractions of the working class, such as state workers, and I do return to this question in the conclusion.

2. The most powerful and cogent critique of Marx along these lines is Jean Cohen's *Class and Civil Society* (Amherst, Massachusetts 1982). I can accept much of her argument but not the conclusion, which jettisons Marxism for a systems analysis of state and civil society abstracted from the economic context. As we shall see, the concept of production politics is an attempt at Marxist reconstruction partly designed to meet Cohen's criticisms.

3. Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, London 1978, vol. 3, p. 523.

4. Again Cohen is very relevant here. A more popular formulation is André Gorz's *Farewell to the Working Class*, London 1982.

5. One of the best examples of this is Manuel Castells's *The City and the Grassroots* (Berkeley 1983). Castells's comparative and historical analysis of urban social movements is a theoretically rooted attempt to move away from the context of production and the working class while retaining some allegiance to a Marxist framework.

6. See, for example, Fred Block, 'The Myth of Reindustrialization', *Socialist Review*, no. 73, January-February 1984, pp. 59-76.

7. There are many theories of the 'new class', but one of the most interesting and novel is still Alvin Gouldner's *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, New York 1979.

8 See Adam Przeworski, 'Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon', *New Left Review*, no. 122, 1980. Przeworski and John Sprague's forthcoming study of European voting patterns during the last century underlines the dilemmas of socialist electoral strategy as shaped by a changing class structure.

9. See, for example, Cornelius Castoriadis, 'On the History of the Workers' Movement', *Telos*, no. 30, Winter 1976-77, pp. 3-42.

10. Teodor Shanin's 'Marx and the Peasant Commune' (*History Workshop*, no. 12, Autumn 1981, pp. 108-28) is a sign of the times. For some time Marxists have been interested in peasant revolts, but only now do we have a serious attempt to construct a Marx who actually anticipated the radical potential of the peasantry. In the 1960s and 1970s debates raged over the existence of an 'epistemological break' between a Hegelian Marx and a scientific Marx. In the 1980s debates have begun to rage over Marx's evaluation and reevaluation of historical change and its agents.

11. Skocpol (*States and Social Revolution*, Cambridge 1979) deliberately excludes the working class from a significant role in the Russian revolution because it was not central to the Chinese and French revolutions. The argument rests on the tenuous assumption that all three revolutions were essentially the same and therefore had to be caused by the same forces.

12. The most celebrated work here is E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth 1968), but there is now a burgeoning literature on craft workers' resistance to the encroachment of capitalism (see Chapter 2 of this book).

13. The best example of this tendency is Harry Braverman's *Labour and Monopoly Capital* (New York 1974). Thus, the contradictory perspectives of the working class as maker of history and victim of history can be cast in evolutionary terms in which early radicalism gives way to later quiescence. Throughout this book, but most explicitly in Chapter Two, I suggest the inadequacy of such a resolution, substituting one that underlines the centrality of factory regime in shaping the interests and capacities of the working class.

The Labour Process in Capitalist Society

It is one of the interesting paradoxes in the history of Marxism that Marx's analysis of the labour process, as formulated in *Capital*, had until recently remained largely unchallenged and undeveloped. Whereas there had been debates over the reproduction schema in Volume 2 of *Capital* and over the falling rate of profit in Volume 3, Marxists had taken Volume 1 for granted. Harry Braverman, whose *Labour and Monopoly Capital* reflected and then instigated a resurgence of interest in Marxist theories of the labour process, wrote:

The extraordinary fact is that Marxists have added little to his body of work in this respect. Neither the changes in productive processes throughout this century of capitalism and monopoly capitalism, nor the changes in the occupational structure of the working population have been subjected to any comprehensive Marxist analysis since Marx's death. . . . The answer probably begins with the extraordinary thoroughness and prescience with which Marx performed his task.¹

Indeed, *Labour and Monopoly Capital* is a monument to the prophetic power of Marx's analysis.

But we should beware of Braverman's humility before Marx. We should not be deceived by his easy flow between the emergent features of monopoly capitalism and the pages of *Capital*. Indeed, Braverman goes beyond Marx in constructing a theory of social structure from the analysis of the capitalist labour process. His argument is elegant, simple, all-embracing, and above all convincing. He begins with the distinctive feature of the capitalist mode of production: that the direct producers sell to the capitalist neither themselves nor labour services but their labour power — their capacity to labour. The definitive problem of the capitalist labour process is therefore the translation of labour power into labour. This is the managerial problem of control that Braverman reduces to the alienation of the labour process from the labourer — that is, to the separation of manual and mental