52. Perrings, pp. 234-5.
53. The information on the strike comes from newspaper accounts and the minutes of the four meetings held between management and the union.
56. Perrings, pp. 113-4.
57. See Parpart, pp. 182-90.
58. Behind the claims that the colonial state is an instrument of international capital lies the assumption that the colonial state is an instrument of the metropolitan state. We have already questioned orthodox Marxism’s first assumption; we are now questioning the second. For an elaboration of this argument, see Emmanuel, ‘White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism’, New Left Review, no. 73, May-June 1972, pp. 35-57.
60. Until 1935 the Northern Rhodesian government’s income from ‘Native Taxes’ was greater than its income from the mines (ibid., p. 230). In 1947 taxes paid by the mining companies made up only 27.7 per cent of total government revenues, but by 1952 this had already risen to 57.5 per cent (Berger, p. 8).
61. Baylies (chapters 7-9) explores in great detail the changing relationship between international, national and state capital.
62. For an account of the relationship between trade-union and nationalist struggles in Northern Rhodesia, see Ian Henderson, ‘Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940’, Journal of Southern African Studies, no. 2, October 1973, pp. 83-97; and Henderson, ‘Wage Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: The Case of the Copperbelt’, African Affairs, no. 72, July 1973, pp. 288-99. The divergence between union and nationalist struggles has been explained in a number of ways. Thus, Epstein refers to the ‘unitary’ structure of the mine compounds and the ‘atomistic’ structure of the locations where the African National Congress was strong (pp. 188-93). But such an argument does not explain the convergence of industrial and political struggles after independence. Parpart argues that the ‘decision to keep the union outside politics emerges as a pragmatic solution in an oppressive colonial context, rather than proof of the absence of political consciousness’ (p. 256). There is little evidence to suggest that the colonial state was any more oppressive than the post-colonial regime. It was more the insulation of the company state from the colonial state than actual colonial oppression that structured the separation of struggles irrespective of political consciousness.

Conclusion:
Toward a Global Perspective

We began with production; we must end with politics. What should we mean by politics? This is itself a political question. Definitions are not innocent.

Throughout this book I have distinguished between the labour process, as the economic moment of production, and the apparatuses of production, as crystallizing the political moment of production. By politics I understand struggles over or within relations of structured domination, struggles that take as their objective the quantitative or qualitative change of those relations. What then is the relationship between politics and apparatuses? Originally I wanted to claim a one-to-one correspondence between apparatuses and politics, such that apparatuses guarantee the production of a distinctive set of relations. In particular, the apparatuses of the state should guarantee the relations of production, while the apparatuses of the workplace should guarantee the relations in production. This, however, is patently not the case, as the apparatuses of the workplace are involved in struggles over wages and benefits — that is, relations of exploitation which are part of the relations of production. A better approximation might be that production apparatuses regulate struggles over the labour process and the valorization process — relations in production and relations of exploitation — while state apparatuses regulate struggles over relations of reproduction. Yet this departs from reality, as the state can be actively involved in the regulation of wages, benefits, working conditions, and even technology, and production apparatuses may regulate struggles designed to transform relations of reproduction, as when wage negotiations are tied to public control of investment.

Considering that there is at best a weak correlation between apparatuses and the relations they regulate — that is, there is not a one-to-one mapping between the two — we must choose between politics defined as struggles regulated by specific apparatuses, politics defined
as struggles over *certain relations*, and the combination of the two. In the first, politics would have no fixed objective, and in the second it would have no fixed institutional locus. I have therefore opted for the more restrictive third definition, according to which politics refers to struggles within a specific arena aimed at specific sets of relations. Thus, family politics are struggles waged within the family over patriarchal relations. Production politics are struggles waged within the arena of production over relations in and of production and regulated by production apparatuses. State politics, on the other hand, are distinctive in that they cannot be characterized by struggles over any particular set of relations. A given set of relations may or may not be the object of struggle within the arena of the state. This varies historically. What is distinctive about the state is its global character, its function as the factor of cohesion for the entire social formation. The state not only guarantees the reproduction of certain relations but, more distinctly, it is the apparatus that guarantees all other apparatuses. State politics include as their core the politics of politics. The characteristic effects of state apparatuses are to protect and shape family apparatuses, production apparatuses, community apparatuses, and so on.

Our alternative understanding of politics critically engages two tenets in the Marxian tradition. First, as we have just seen, it refuses to accept the reduction of politics to state politics and of state politics to the reproduction of class relations. Second, it challenges the reduction of production to economics, so that history can no longer be viewed as unfolding in accordance with a fixed set of economic laws. Economics, politics and ideology are inextricably interwoven within the sphere of production. In this concluding chapter we shall consider how the case studies in this book point to an alternative conception of history — in relation, first, to the development of particular modes of production and, second, to the transition from one mode of production to another. But first we must elaborate the critique of fixed laws of history.

For Marx the hallmark of capitalism, distinguishing it from all pre-capitalist societies, is the separation of state and civil society. Civil society is inhabited by atomized, privatized and above all depoliticized individuals, whereas the state is the locus of political community. In his later writings Marx specifies the separation of state and civil society, so that the former is the arena in which classes become organized into parties, form alliances and struggle, while the latter is the site of laws of development of the capitalist mode of production, the concentration and centralization of capital, and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. These laws operate behind the backs of their agents. In this perspective there is little theoretical room for self-conscious collective action at the level of production. Indeed, Marx could only ‘discover’ these laws of capitalism by suppressing any theorization of the politics of production.

Whatever ambiguities remain in Marx’s writings are brushed aside in the self-confident scientific Marxism of Engels, Kautsky and Luxemburg. Here the economic base is the locus of inexorable laws driving capitalism to its final collapse, while the superstructure is the locus of working-class organization into a party with the aim of ensuring that socialism rather than barbarism arises from capitalism’s ashes. The base is again the realm of laws acting through atomized agents, while the superstructure is the realm of subjectivity, of purposeful collective action. The idea of a politics of production, and of political apparatuses of production, undermines this perspective by insisting that the arena of production contains political and ideological institutions as well as a purely economic organization. Now both ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ are realms simultaneously of subjectivity and objectivity. There are no longer any objective laws of development of the capitalist mode of production: different political apparatuses of production lead to different struggles and thus to diverse patterns of accumulation. Our perspective dovetails well with the game-theoretic approaches where objective limits on subjective choices link micro-indeterminacy to macro-determinacy but without indicating any unique pattern of development.

If the idea of production politics undermines the essential premises of scientific Marxism, it also directly challenges the two classical Marxist responses to that tradition: Leninism and evolutionary socialism. Both restrict politics to state politics, so that different types of politics are defined by their goals rather than their arenas. Theorists of social democracy distinguish, for example, between legal, political and social rights; political, social and economic democracy; and consumption politics, mobility politics and production politics; and in each case politics is restricted to state politics. Furthermore, in repudiating economic laws such theorists follow Bernstein in postulating alternative political laws — the tendency for the expansion of rights, the progressive movement from political to economic democracy, from consumption to production politics. These predictions are at best statistical extrapolations of a putative past into a speculative future. There is no attempt to provide any mechanisms for the unfolding of this progressive movement.

We must think not only of the politics of production but also of the
production of politics. Just as production cannot be reduced to a purely economic component but is a 'base' with its own 'superstructure', so the state cannot be reduced to its political effects. We must go beyond statements about the necessary functions of the state to an account of how those functions are performed. We must now look at the state as an ensemble of apparatuses with their own distinctive 'labour processes', which, rather than producing commodities (although some, such as nationalized industries, do so), produce and reproduce relations (police, law), provide services that socialize the costs of the reproduction of labour power (welfare, education) and of accumulation (postal service), or regulate struggles within the state (representative apparatuses). Thus, state institutions have their own productive component and their own politics of production as well as certain global political effects. Just as the politics of production undermine the possibility of fixed economic laws, so the production of politics by state labour processes is entangled with diverse forms of struggles which preclude any developmental laws of state politics.

The lack of any serious theoretical consideration of production politics is reflected in the practice of social democracy, most notably in the recent socialist governments of Sweden, France, Spain, Chile and Britain. Socialist governments have distinguished themselves by their attempts to contain or even strangle organs of popular control. To be sure, in each case the initial weakness of the working-class base compelled an accommodation to forces hostile to socialism. But it is also clear that without forms of popular control the state is largely ineffectual when faced with the mobility of international capital. By themselves the apparatuses of the state cannot inaugurate socialism in a capitalist work economy.

Leninists, of course, come to the same conclusion but by following a very different argument. For them the root of the problem lies in the character of the state itself. Social-democratic parties become prisoners of the capitalist state — a state that is structured to reproduce capitalism irrespective of the political aims of its personnel. Production politics is a distraction from the real goal of transforming the capitalist state. Thus, the salient distinction is not between production politics and state politics but between reformist and revolutionary (state) politics. The transformation of production apparatuses is condemned as an infantile disorder, so that in the practice of state socialism forms of collective self-management are eliminated in favour of centralized direction. The blindness is compounded in Lenin's own brand of speculative evolutionism, akin to that of Bernstein: the natural movement from the dictatorship of the proletariat to communism through the withering away of the state. Lenin provides no mechanisms that might guarantee such a withering away. Indeed, he eliminates the very organs of popular control that would be essential to such a devolution. Furthermore, because he reduces all politics to state politics Lenin embraces the idea that politics themselves will be abolished. The end of politics — that is, the coincidence of the particular interest and the general interest — not only is a mythical impossibility but also lays the ideological ground for a coercively imposed collective interest. Thus, we see how both social democratic and Leninist traditions, while differing in their conceptions of transitions beyond capitalism, reduce politics to state politics and implicitly or explicitly reject economic laws in favour of political laws. These political trajectories are as erroneous as the economic tendencies they replace.

For all their differences, classical Marxisms, whether scientific, evolutionary or Leninist, subscribed to historical materialism — the Marxian meta-theory of history in which historical progress is assured by the expansion of the forces of production. According to this theoretical framework, any given set of relations of production first accelerates the development of the forces of production and then fetters them so that they can no longer expand, whereupon the old relations of production are overthrown, a new, higher set is installed, and the productive forces are given a renewed impetus. So capitalism follows feudalism and socialism follows capitalism as surely as night follows day. Although this meta-theory has recently been awarded a daring and rigorous defence, it has been the bête noire of Western Marxism, in both its structuralist and its critical theory variants.

In the structuralist account of history, there is a radical discontinuity between modes of production so that the origins of a new mode are separated from the dissolution of the old. Whereas we can theorize about the development of a given mode of production, about its dynamics, we cannot theorize about its genesis. There is nothing necessary about the appearance of a new mode of production; rather, it is the product of conjunctural circumstances. In other words, we cannot theorize a diachronics — a necessary transition from one mode of production to another; only the internal development and decline of a mode of production can be formulated in terms of laws. Just as there is nothing necessary about the rise of capitalism, so there is nothing necessary about the subsequent rise of socialism. In short, the unilinear and deterministic conception of history marked by the expansion of the forces of production is abandoned in favour of an indeterminate perspective on the future, a voluntaristic picture in
which class struggle suddenly enters as the arbiter of history.

We shall return to the question of class struggle. Here I want to underline how the rejection of a telos to history also called forth a reconceptualization of the forces of production. In the structuralist account these are no longer a collection of objects — instruments of production, raw materials and labour power — but a set of relations to nature. A mode of production becomes a double set of relations: appropriation of nature and appropriation from humans. However, to characterize the forces of production in this way raises a question that structuralists repressed: namely, the problem of their reproduction, and thus of a specific politics — the politics of production. Thus, we see how the concept of production politics first emerges from a concept of history that rejects any unilinear succession of modes of production. But, as I suggested above, once one systematically incorporates the idea of production politics, not only are there no clear dichotomies but there are no longer any fixed dynamics either. We have dispensed with all laws.

If structuralism insists on dispensing with the idea that the expansion of the forces of production is the guarantor of progress toward socialism, critical theory has usually taken a much stronger position. It has condemned capitalist forces of production as irrevocably tainted by capitalist relations of production or simply by the domination of nature — so much so that they are inimical to socialism. Capitalist technology and the capitalist labour process, far from posing a challenge to capitalist relations of production, far from being the seed of socialism within the capitalist womb, are effectively shaped by those relations in order to reproduce them. Far from being neutral, the productive forces are a major obstacle to the transition to socialism, both stifling and integrating class struggle within the parameters of capitalism, and impeding the development of collective self-management under socialism. I do not embrace this position here. The distinction between the labour process and the apparatuses of production suggests a distinctive form of socialist production politics that is fused with state politics. But it remains an open question whether a labour process developed under capitalism is or is not compatible with such a system of politics. It is quite possible that certain labour processes are compatible while others are not. The answer will also depend upon the specific form of socialism — that is, the specific form of unity of production politics and state politics — that we are considering.

We have now examined one arm of historical materialism: history as the contention of the forces of production and the relations of production, leading to a particular succession of modes of production. This contention plays itself out in the realm of the 'superstructures', in the form of class struggle. Indeed, the second arm of historical materialism is history as the history of class struggle. But what does this mean? Is it any more than a tautology in which class struggle refers to struggles which affect classes, and that history should be seen as the accumulation of such class effects? Or are Marx and Engels making a stronger claim, that the decisive struggles in history have been between classes? The latter interpretation is the most common and the more easily refuted, since struggles between groups other than classes or struggles within rather than between classes have often been decisive in the transformation of societies. In particular, the transition from capitalism to socialism, it is argued, cannot be reduced to a struggle between capital and labour. To the contrary, the working class can only develop interests in the reproduction of capitalism; it does not develop radical needs that point beyond capitalism. Thus, those originally committed to the working class as the saviour of humanity, the agent of emancipation, now throw up their hands in despair and, feeling let down by the proletariat, abandon it for social movements forged in civil society outside the economy, or embrace avant-garde forms of popular struggle outside, or sometimes even inside, the electoral arena. It turns out that the rejection of one metaphysical imputation evokes its opposite: that the working class never has and never will decisively enter the historical arena. We were, in short, deceived from the beginning.

Here I have adopted a more cautious approach, replacing philosophical speculation with sociological analysis. Rather than abandoning the working class for the peasantry, for a new class of intellectuals or for new social movements, I have sought to examine the conditions under which it has intervened and might continue to intervene in the historical process. Furthermore, I have retained the Marxist orthodoxy that the critical arena shaping the working class is the process of production itself, understood as a political regime. But in reducing the burden forced upon the working class I have left the tracks of history (the contention of the forces of production and the relations of production) in disarray, and the engine of history (class struggle) spluttering. What remains? Here I can only begin a reconstruction based on the case studies contained in this book.

We must return to the question of 'laws' of history and what it may mean to reject their existence. It certainly does not imply that anything is possible. Even in the limited exposition of this book we have seen how the state, the reproduction of labour power, and market
forces all shape the form of production apparatuses, which in turn set limits on the nature of the struggle. Nor does the absence of laws imply that there are no patterns of historical development — such as the transition from despotic to hegemonic to hegemonic-despotic regimes — but only that they are themselves historically contingent. The patterns we discover in history are not immutable, nor are they tendential toward some ultimate ‘true’ pattern; they are continually reconstructed as part of the historical process. History is always coming into existence. To be sure, we build upon earlier reconstructions, we perhaps build a tradition of reconstructions, but they are all relative to the time and place of their theorization, whether or not we acknowledge this. There is no final reconstruction, if only because history does not suddenly cease. That is to say, we do not stand outside history watching it from afar; we are at its centre, continually looking back for pointers to the future. Just as we change with history, so history changes with us and our conception of future horizons expands and contracts.

Laws cannot anticipate what history continually throws up: surprises. They cannot entertain the fundamentally new. Laws can only freeze history into a mould shaped according to the specifications of a particular time and place. They take as given what at the moment of their inception appears unproblematic, what appears eternally fixed and natural, but which subsequently becomes variable and problematic. Thus, Marx did not take the international economic system as problematic, as an object of study in his formulation of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, so that Mandel, responding to the global dimensions of the second slump, reconstructs the history of capitalism as a series of long waves. But Mandel’s reconstruction remains rooted in the orthodoxy which locates laws of development in the base and political struggles in the superstructure. From a different vantage point I have argued that such laws of development can be constructed only by repressing the political component of production, whose variations, I claim, are a necessary part of any explanation of the fate of working-class movements during the last century.

The tradition of reconstructions becomes the reconstruction of a tradition, continually problematizing what was earlier taken for granted. I too must follow this route. In what follows, I reverse the direction of causality predominant in the preceding chapters. There I sought out the conditions of existence of factory regimes and the way those regimes then shaped struggles. Now I want briefly to attend to the more complicated question of the extent to which those struggles in turn shaped different factory regimes. I will problematize the forces that shaped factory regimes by examining how they are determined by struggles. In this way I want to highlight the interdependence of factory regimes, between now and the past, between here and elsewhere, so that changes in particular regimes can be linked to changes in other regimes as a result of the struggles they promote.

We reconstructed the history of capitalism as a sequence of factory regimes: despotic regimes (patriarchal, paternalistic, and market despotism), followed by hegemonic regimes, which in turn are beginning to give rise to hegemonic despotism. The first transition can be understood as the separation of the reproduction of labour power from the process of production. Under despotic regimes survival outside work depended on performance at work. The bond rested on the partial or complete expropriation of labourers from the means of subsistence, and was mediated through the family, the employer, the labour market, or some combination of these. Subsequently, survival outside work came to depend more on the state and less on performance at work, although the latter never lost its predominance over the former, and some fractions of the labour force were better off than others. The rise of the welfare state, however rudimentary, compelled management to rely less on coercive practices and to expand the scope of consent.

How can we explain this transition? Since it has been so widespread in capitalist societies, a general rather than a nationally specific explanation is necessary. I have argued that the pressure came from two directions. First, it came from large-scale capital, seeking the regulation of the labour market through its internalization and of class conflict through its institutionalization — the containment of uncertainty in product and supply markets requiring commensurate regularization in management—worker relations. Moreover, as it faced crises of overproduction stemming from the very success of earlier despotic regimes, collective capital had an interest in reconstituting the norm of working-class consumption and tying it to profitability levels. The second source of pressure, exacerbated by cyclical economic crises, was the drive of labour to establish minimal levels of security in unemployment as well as in employment. It was the convergence of these interests that underlay the consolidation of social insurance and guarantees against arbitrary managerial domination. Different states with different capacities and interests, responding to different constellations of forces, reshaped production apparatuses and reorganized the reproduction of labour power in different ways. But in all advanced capitalist countries minimal levels of security at work and outside work did eventually become the norm, so that
management was forced to temper despotism with various forms of hegemonic regime.

The relaxation of despotism in advanced capitalist countries and the turn to hegemonic regimes did not entail a similar transition in peripheral societies. Indeed, despotistic regimes continued to be implanted there, often under the auspices of colonial rule. As much as they were an extension of the metropolis, colonial economies, such as the one we examined in Zambia, served to supply raw materials for the advanced capitalist economies at the lowest price and with the greatest profit. The colonial state orchestrated the supply of cheap labour, while the company state imposed colonial despotism at the level of production. There was no attempt to boost the purchasing power of colonial working classes to offset tendencies toward overproduction in the metropolis, or to establish demand for the products produced in the colonies themselves. Such colonial economies were indeed 'enclave' economies, extensions of the central economy into a sea of deepening underdevelopment. Or in Amin's words, autocratic development in the centre entailed hegemonic regimes of production, while disarticulated development in the periphery entailed despotic regimes.

Nevertheless, dominant classes in the colony do develop interests independent of, and then opposed to, those of the dominant classes in the metropolis. As we saw in the case of Zambia, a settler population emerged seeking to develop the Zambian economy beyond its enclave, trying to establish a domestic market and threatening the political dominance of the copper mines, so that the colonial state was forced to reorient some of its policies toward the interests of indigenous classes. The embryonic settler regime was soon swamped by the rising African nationalist movement, itself a product of economic development. The new African government only cemented the process of autonomization from the metropolis that had been developing since the beginning of colonial rule. The mining corporations had to dispense with their distinctive apparatuses of production as the settler and post-colonial states proved incapable of providing the conditions of their reproduction. The substitution of bureaucratic rule for colonial despotism, and the corresponding material concessions to the working class, escalated the costs of production of copper — at a time when it was being replaced by other materials in the industrial production of the advanced capitalist countries. The declining importance of their raw materials devastated the post-colonial economies, and the survival of peripheral countries came to depend on the re-imposition of coercive regimes of production to attract new forms of capital from the core countries. But this must also be understood in terms of further changes in the core countries themselves.

The hegemonic regime sowed the seeds of its own destruction. It established constraints on the deployment of capital, whether by tying wages to profits by creating internal labour markets, collective bargaining and grievance machinery which hamstrung management's domination of the workplace. The recomposition of capital was made difficult, and deeper crises threatened to ensue. Yet at the same time, technological developments, particularly in communications, facilitated capital mobility and the segmentation of a single labour process among different countries. A new periphery, epitomized by the export-processing zones, emerged. Thus, while the old extractive industries of the Third World were relaxing their despotic regimes, other countries of the Third World were installing new regimes of despotism. Manufacturing, particularly of consumer goods, from clothes to automobiles, footballs to radios, moved to peripheral countries, seeking not only reservoirs of cheap labour but also political orders which would nurture repressive factory regimes. Most usually the new reservoirs of labour were made up of young, single women, presumed to be supplementary income earners and paid very low wages. High levels of turnover, at least in the beginning, were an effective means of containing any resistance. Peripheral states created a distinctive powerlessness among this new army of workers, so that forms of patriarchal, paternalistic and colonial despotism could be imposed. Just like they did in the past, these regimes generated their own working-class opposition, strongest in the older export-processing zones, such as South Korea, and in the larger 'industrializing' countries of the semi-periphery, such as South Africa and Brazil.

These industrializing countries of the semi-periphery combine elements of the old periphery — the extractive industries such as gold mining in South Africa — with new export-processing zones in textiles or electronics. A third distinctive feature is the creation of consumer goods for domestic consumption — the prototypes being the auto industries of Brazil and South Africa. We can see different production regimes in the different sectors — the continuation of colonial despotism in extractive industries, the patriarchal or, more likely, paternalistic despotism in export substitution, and new forms of despotism in the auto industry, combined with limited trade-union representation. South Africa and Brazil today are the loci of powerful working-class movements centred on such import-substitution industries, and in both countries the state has sought the insulation and regulation of struggle rather than its repression. Given the nature of
their repressive orders, however, it is not clear to what extent such struggle can be confined as it was in the United States, since basic political rights necessary for the defence of working-class organizations, such as trade unions, are still absent. Working-class movements quickly recognize the importance of such rights, so that struggles at the point of production, far from being contained, easily spill over into the wider public arena.

The movement of substantial amounts of manufacturing capital from the core to the periphery, and the transfer of capital within core countries to new industrial areas often reliant on cheap imported labour, effectively undermined the hegemonic regime. Thus, in the remaining manufacturing industry and in allied service industries there emerges what I have called hegemonic despotism. This is a new form of despotism — built on the basis of the erstwhile hegemonic regime — which, rather than creating antagonistic interests (as the early despotic regimes did), begins to construct a coordination of interests around despotic rule. Collective bargaining is now a means of extracting concessions from workers, faced with the threat of plant closures or lay-offs. Fractions of the working class compete with each other to retain capital’s ‘allegiance’. Moreover, the intensification of competition is also made possible on the one hand by the erosion of the popular roots of working-class organization through the previous hegemonic regimes, and on the other by the withdrawal of the state as an arena in which struggles between capital and labour can be fought out. The possibility of constituting a hegemonic despotism becomes a major attraction to capital as it faces widening struggles in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries.

If hegemonic despotism is ascendant in the old core industries with entrenched unions, what is happening in the new industries such as electronics or the so-called service sector? Here too we can detect major changes in the relations of production, making advanced capitalist countries once more attractive centres of investment. The growth of part-time and temporary work, particularly among women, orchestrated by specialized agencies, enhances the separation of relations of production from relations in production, mystifying the former while effectively subordinating workers to the latter. On one side relations of production often revolve around the temporary work agency. The worker relates to her employer as an individual, receiving assignments by telephone and driving them to an automobile. Unions are barred and fellow employees unknown. Moreover, the worker is sucked into this oppressive isolation not only by her material circumstances but also in the name of enhanced autonomy — greater ‘freedom’ to balance domestic work and low-paid wage labour. On the other side, she moves from one set of relations in production to another, unless she should prove herself ‘worthy’ of a permanent job. She has no security of contract, receives no fringe benefits, and cannot bargain over wages. She is at the mercy of her supervisor, who reports back to her employer — the temporary agency. There is no clearly defined job ladder, and the distribution of jobs is clouded in mystery.

Capital’s attraction to temporary or part-time work, as well as to various forms of subcontracting, does not stem merely from the cheapening of labour costs. Through the creation of an atomized and vulnerable labour force, the conditions of an advanced capitalist economy intensify subordination without struggle to the whims of management. For, in export-processing zones of the Third World, workers, usually single women, live together in dormitories or go home together in buses, forge communities of solidarity and present employers with escalating resistance. To maintain a flexible deployment of labour requires brutal coercion at the point of production, whereas the creation of a new hegemonic despotism in core countries effects silent submission. The car and the telephone, artifacts of advancement, potential instruments of collective solidarity, in the hands of capital become the instruments of atomization.

If the private capitalist firm is backing into regimes of hegemonic despotism, how does this relate to changes in state socialism? Although the effects are difficult to isolate, the trajectory of capitalism both stimulated and then reshaped the development of state socialism. Thus, the incapacity of the Czarist state to compete with more advanced capitalist nations in trade and war set the conditions within which the Russian revolution unfolded. Moreover, the backwardness of Russian capitalism instigated various experiments in accelerated industrial development, leading eventually, if not inevitably, to a coercive regime of accumulation framed by five-year plans. Primitive socialist accumulation, like its capitalist counterpart, operated through coercive production regimes based on the unity of the reproduction of labour power and the production process. Survival outside work depended on adequate performance at work, monitored by party, trade union and management. Whereas under capitalism despotism rested on the autonomy of firms linked to one another through a market, under state socialism it operated through the coercive arm of the state at the point of production. Hence, I called it bureaucratic despotism.

Just as the variants of capitalist despotism — market, patriarchal, paternalistic — gave way to hegemonic regimes as the state intervened
partially to separate the reproduction of labour power from the process of production, so corresponding processes can be discerned under state socialism. There the reproduction of labour power became more independent of the enterprise as the state began to withdraw from production, so that housing, employment security and social benefits were increasingly dispensed directly by the state, independently of performance at work. Management, party and trade union became less important in superintending individual workers' lives outside the factory, so that bureaucratic despotism gave way to bureaucratic bargaining. But this has been an uneven transition, varying, as we have seen, both within and between enterprises. Indeed, superimposed on the secular shift have been cyclical changes tied to the expansion and contraction of the second economy and the increase or decrease of enterprise autonomy within the state. The opening of the second economy and the limited expansion of market relations provide alternative sources of income which enhance individual workers' independence from arbitrary control by management. Enterprise autonomy gives management more flexibility in bargaining with different interests within the enterprise. But these moves toward the second economy and enterprise autonomy have generally set in motion political counter-pressures from industries directly dependent on the state and corresponding factions of the party apparatus. Even in Hungary the reforms of 1968 suffered reversals in the mid-seventies.

More generally, the central direction of production through the fusion of production apparatuses and state apparatuses generates pressures for enterprise autonomy. The demand for decentralization may appear as a demand for some form of worker participation in management, as in Yugoslavia and Cuba, or for increased efficiency, as in Hungary. As centralization begets pressures for decentralization, conversely decentralization creates pressures for centralization. These cyclical movements are particularly clear in the case of Yugoslavia, in part because it is less affected by Soviet hegemony. There is, however, a second dynamic of state socialist societies, a product less of the fusion of production and state apparatuses and more of the class character of these societies. The principle of centralized appropriation and redistribution of surplus in the name of a putative and 'scientifically' determined societal interest generates an alternative conception of socialism in which direct producers control the surplus they produce. Inasmuch as central coordination is still necessary, it takes the form of planning from below. Workers' control is not confined to production apparatuses but is institutionalized in the central directing organs of society. This is a system of collective self-management. It began to emerge in embryo in Poland in 1981, when the existing order proved incapable of running the country. It also began to emerge in Hungary in 1956, after the regime collapsed and before the Soviet Union reassessed its control. In both cases, it was global politics that established the limits of national transformations. Indeed, the idea of 'the self-limiting revolution' which informed the practice of Solidarity is an explicit recognition of the decisive character of international political relations.

The experience of state socialism has a definite bearing on advanced capitalist societies. As under state socialism, there is an analogous fusion of production politics and state politics in the public sector of advanced capitalism, although the linkage operates chiefly through management — there is no party or trade union binding workplace regimes to the state. Thus, struggles at the workplace are implicitly and sometimes explicitly struggles against the state. No matter which workers they are — medical or postal workers, police, or workers in nationalized industries — their struggles can assume a political character. Just as there are variations both within and between state socialist societies as to the propensity toward collective struggles, so there are similar variations both within and between the state sectors of advanced capitalist societies. Externally, the various apparatuses of the state are situated in different ways with respect to one another, while internally each develops a different form of production politics.

What is the economic basis of the distinction between public and private sectors? We can say, as a first approximation, that in the private sector exchange value dominates use value. The pursuit of profit in the market establishes the framework within which struggles are carried out. Questions of use value, of supply and demand, are relevant only in relation to the pursuit of present and future profit. In the same way, we can say that in the state sector, on the other hand, use value dominates exchange value — although the extent and character of that domination will vary from apparatus to apparatus, and will itself be subject to struggle. The state's raison d'être is the provision of 'social needs'. Whereas the logic of profitability is defined by competition in the market, the logic of social needs is defined by political negotiations within the state. But through what processes are those social needs to be determined? Citizens can be excluded only if state managers appoint themselves as the arbiters of the collective interest, making such judgements by virtue of their supposedly superior knowledge and expertise, their monopoly of a scientific rationality.

However, this principle has never been supreme, and the definition
of social needs continually bursts into public discourse. The capitalist state deals with this in different ways, shaped partly by the nature of the threat and the character of the apparatus, and partly by the balance of class power both within and outside the state. On the one hand, it can open up struggles by state workers to limited public debate in which questions of social justice define the ideological terrain. The state may seek to defend a particular 'social contract' and isolate a given set of workers as pursuing their narrow self-interests at the expense of others. Workers, for their part, may defend their own position by appealing to public sympathy, seeking alliances with consumers and other fractions of the working class. On the other hand, the state can refuse to enter into any public discussion about 'social justice' and instead try to privatize state apparatuses, applying criteria of efficiency to their operation. But even in the case of nationalized industries, which are easier to put on a commercial footing, the substitution of profitability for the satisfaction of social needs is a contested political process. As in the case of state socialist societies, the profitability of a state enterprise is arrived at through a series of political negotiations over subsidies, taxation, pricing and labour policies. For this political process to be mystified behind market criteria requires effective control over the media. The state must suppress discussion of the social needs implicated in state workers' struggles.

This second strategy of restricting public debate has been pursued by the British and United States governments. However, as the private sector becomes enshrouded in a hegemonic despotism, questions of the provision of social needs, inescapably focused on the state, will continue to bubble forth. The very blockage in the private sector forces questions of socialism into the public sector. This calls for ever more repressive mechanisms from the state to contain those demands, not least the confinement and control of civil society. And this, of course, is precisely why in state socialism civil society has been so restricted. In a society that claims to operate on the principle of the satisfaction of socially defined needs, class divisions can be preserved only by repressing public discourse and movements for the creation of an autonomous civil society — that is, by a 'dictatorship over needs'. Vistas of socialism or barbarism can be attenuated by opening up a private sphere, made up of a second economy, a second culture or, more generally, a second society. But can this privatization of the pursuit of social needs be more than a temporary expedient?

Notes

5. To be sure, structuralists were very concerned with the general problem of the reproduction of social relations, but not with the specific problem of the reproduction of relations in production.
6. Let me clarify the philosophical basis for rejecting fixed laws of development. There are both epistemological and ontological reasons. First, I am quite convinced by the arguments of such philosophers as De Lasa, Queiroz, Lakatos, Heise and Feierabend that theories are underdetermined by data. Although the empirical world may set limits on our theory of history, it does not uniquely determine it. We have to reconstruct history in the light of the standpoint of the present — and even then different paths are open. For example, our reconstruction in terms of politics of production is only one of a number that make sense of the past in a way that also responds to the metaphysical pathos of the present. Second, there are ontological reasons for rejecting fixed laws of history. These should not, however, be construed as a denial of real mechanisms that explain empirical events. At least in this respect I follow such realists as Harré and Bhaskar. But social events are distinctive in that they provoke social responses, struggles, that change those underlying mechanisms. The more that there are limits to the transformation of those mechanisms, at least as long as one remains within one mode of production, does not mean that they do not change. History, then, is the product of changing mechanisms, and we are forced to reconstruct history in the light of the newly emergent mechanisms.
11. See, for example, the study of two branches of the British Post Office by Eric Batstone, Anthony Ferner and Michael Terry, Consent and Efficiency, Oxford 1984.
15. For the concept of second society see Elemér Hankiss, 'AMásodik Társadalom', unpublished manuscript, 1984.