industry is found in Joseph A. Blum, "San Francisco Iron: The Industry and Its Workers—From the Gold Rush to the Turn of the Century."

40. The closing of this plant by United States Steel took place during the same period of massive closings of their steel mills in Pennsylvania and Ohio. In 1982 the corporation invested $6 billion in its purchase of Marathon Oil. For details concerning capital flight, see Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America.*

41. According to James Ruma, a contracts administrator in the office of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, United States Navy, San Francisco Division, repair contracts on United States naval vessels remained at well over $100 million per year and peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s at over $150 million. Today that figure has reached zero (numerous conversations, fall 1996–spring 1997).

42. The emergence of Korea as a shipbuilding power is perhaps the most dramatic. Korea constructed its first shipyard in 1974, delivered its first ship in 1981, and today is the second largest shipbuilding nation in the world. In 1994 Korea delivered 115 vessels totaling 5.17 million gross tons, representing 27.3 percent of the world total. Only Japan, which also had no shipbuilding industry after World War II, had a larger share of the shipbuilding world market. See "The Shipbuilding Industry in Korea" on the World Wide Web at www.iworld.net/Korea/industry/f206.html.

43. Discussions with Boilermakers Business Agents.

44. "Background," from the Center for Advanced Ship Repair and Maintenance, Norfolk, Virginia, on the World Wide Web at www.odu.edu.gnusers/miatc_v/casrm1.htm.

45. David M. Gordon, *Fat and Mean: The Corporate Squeeze of Working Americans and the Myth Of Managerial "Downsizing."*

Global Connections

Introduction to Part Two

The book's first part emphasized global forces—a vision of the global as an overarching structure experienced as an external force by individuals, groups, and localities. However, we see the global as an increasing interconnectedness among diverse places and groups and especially across national boundaries. In the past, the nation state was more likely to be able to "contain" social relations and discourses. Today, new communities are increasingly being formed of people with a foot, either physically or "virtually," in many places around the world. Discourses cross borders with these "travelers" and on electronic pathways. The studies in this part uncover the importance of particular institutions, movements, and organizations as brokers and mediators of this process. While the picture they present is quite different from that presented in the first part, it is a complementary view taken from the perspective of different social actors.

What is the nature of the emerging global connections in which these actors participate? The transnational economic is perhaps the clearest system of global linkages. However, while economic connections play a critical part in our stories, our theoretical focus is the "transnational social"— transnational public spheres that emerge in the spaces between institutionalized power structures.

Nancy Fraser has argued, in relation to the capitalist welfare state, that, as needs spill over from the "private" spheres of the family and the economy, they enter the realm of "the social," where they are politicized and become an object of struggle.[1] The welfare state responds by attempting to enclave these needs into a safe administrative framework where they can be managed, and partially satisfied, without any threat to the existing public and private power structures. Maneuvering in this nebulous arena between the privatization of needs and their public administration, the social is the

arena in which social movements mobilize and genuine communicative action and democratization are possible.

Fraser's concept of the social is similar to the concepts of the public sphere or civil society. However, she sees the social as a much less structured phenomenon than these more institutionalized public spaces. Beyond that, the social is more fragmented and consists of overlapping public spheres with inequalities within and between them, rather than one coherent, structured discursive space. As such, it offers more opportunities for expression by those "subaltern publics" excluded from white, male-dominated civil society.[2]

In our studies, we borrow and extend Fraser's concept of the social by analyzing the way it overflows the borders of the nation state to become the "transnational social." The weakened ability of states to enclave particular expressions of needs facilitates the increasingly transnational nature of the strategies for meeting those needs. This in turn further weakens the ability of the state to contain such needs. While a coherent global civil society clearly does not exist, the concept of the "social" captures the emergent nature of the transnational connections we discuss and the shifting social and discursive relations around them.

We recognize the power of economic forces and connections, but the social relations we study cannot be reduced to the direct effects of such forces. Social links can generate economic activity, but in some cases they will not. Economic ties will produce social relations, but these in turn cannot be totally enclaved and administered within the economic sphere. Neither do any of us see the social as a purely discursive arena. Rather, we analyze the way emerging global connections create new regimes or sets of social relations in which the "material" and "discursive" moments are inextricably linked. In this way, the transnational social occupies a social space that escapes the efforts of the national state to administer social needs and the efforts of transnational economic interests to privatize those needs.

This transnational social is in many ways a precarious place within the world-system, but it is also a place of privilege, albeit limited. During the postwar era, the groups described here were enclaved inside national borders, within a restricted range of relatively rigidly defined identities. But in the contemporary period, crossborder human, economic, technological, and cultural flows have brought together and juxtaposed distinctive material and discursive regimes, destabilizing old identities and offering opportunities to a new, more heterogeneous set of actors for cultural challenges, economic advancement, or social transformation. Whether or not these possibilities are realized, for certain groups in newly industrializing countries and other semiperipheral states the connections forged in contemporary globalization are connections of inclusion into the world-system. This is true even as globalization is experienced as loss and exclusion by many

social groups in core and peripheral countries, including those described in the studies in Part 1 of this book. Indeed, it is the emergence of semiperipheral groups onto the world stage that in many ways defines our view of the contemporary era of globalization.

The studies in this part are from the perspective of those in the middle class from the semiperiphery who have the skills, contacts, and other resources to allow them to incorporate into global economic and discursive flows. Sheba George shows how migration to the United States of Indian nurses has opened up new economic opportunities to these women but has initiated a struggle over the class and gender ideologies of the immigrant community. Seán Ó Riain describes how Irish software developers take advantage of increasing opportunities in an emerging industry and use their social networks and job-hopping strategies to negotiate their place in local and global labor markets. Millie Thayer analyzes how feminist activists in Brazil draw on feminist discourses from the core, translating and adapting them for local realities, as they engage with a constellation of global and local institutions.

Clearly not everyone in Brazil, India, and Ireland has benefited from globalization and many have suffered from its effects. However, the three studies that follow do identify at least potential benefits for Brazilian feminists, Indian nurses, and Irish software developers. These groups are also attached to emerging sectors in the world economy—to nongovernmental organizations and to health and information technology. Indeed, the dominant way in which these semiperipheral groups have advanced themselves has been through attaching themselves to emerging sectors where global power structures have not yet been fully institutionalized.

But the social is not just an area of inclusion. The very fact of incorporation of the new social groups also produces a transformation in social relations as the relations within and among core and semiperipheral countries and social groups are renegotiated. Power differentials persist and are often exacerbated, and the potential of the social for emerging groups depends a great deal on the conditions of their inclusion in the world system.

Racial and ethnic-national hierarchies must be renegotiated as connections are forged between the mainly white core and the mainly nonwhite semi-periphery. In particular, the assumed superiority of core practices is challenged and undermined by the emergence of the new connections to the semiperiphery. Inclusion does not necessarily mean homogenization, as assimilation to the dominant culture is often actively resisted. Brazilian feminists in nongovernmental organizations reject certain imported conceptions of "gender," and reinterpret and incorporate others into their practices in novel ways. At the same time, the efforts at "translation" of these same feminists, considered "white" in their national context, are resisted by black Brazilian women with their own visions of social transformation. Irish

software engineers socialize happily with their United States managers into the small hours of the Dublin night but complain long and hard about them the following Monday. While Indian nurses and their families are marginally incorporated into the United States economy, they maintain their own public spaces in which they struggle over social relations, with India as a main point of reference.

This, then, is the common view of the transnational social that underlies our studies. We each focus on the experience of a group from a semi-peripheral country in negotiating its way between a variety of institutionalized power structures to create new patterns of inclusion and relative privilege. The relation of each to the world system and to the social groups in its own locality or country is transformed by the conditions of its inclusion.

Nonetheless, the transnational social is a heterogeneous space, and internal differences emerge from each study. The source of the global connections, the space available to the social sphere, and the implications of the transnational social for the semiperipheral populations as a whole vary considerably among the three cases. In contrast to Fraser, we do not find that the emergence of the transnational social necessarily leads to the politicization of needs, but rather to a continuum of responses, from suppression and containment, to individual autonomy, to collective critical practice.

In Sheba George's study of Indian nurses in Chicago, a transnational community is formed by the international demand for nurses. The new economic resources available to the nurses and their newly acquired social position threaten community norms around gender and family practices. However, the transnational Indian community "reprivatizes" the nurses' needs quite decisively in its own religious space, and the liberating potential of the transnational social is effectively contained.

The software developers studied by Seán Ó Riain are better able to maintain their autonomy within the transnational social sphere than the Indian nurses. However, this is largely because of their increasing disconnection from the Irish transnational community as a whole. Individual software workers form an uneasy alliance with the transnational corporations that dominate the industry.

The Brazilian feminist social movements that Millie Thayer studies clearly express the greatest opportunity for the ongoing politicization of social needs on a global scale. The transnational social provides crucial material and discursive resources to feminist groups in Brazil. However, their own discursive reach and influence on feminists in the North is limited and their reliance on international funding poses some danger of enclaving their movements' expressed needs within the agenda of the funding agencies. Different conditions are pushing the groups toward a flourishing feminist transnational social, on the one hand, or an incorporation and admin-

istration of womens' needs by the funding institutions and their agencies, on the other.

The studies in this part therefore suggest a variety of ways in which needs can be expressed, mobilized, enclaved, and administered through a vast range of transnational connections. The implications for local and transnational politics, for the ties that bind transnational groups to their "home" locales, and for a democratic form of globalization depend greatly on the circumstances surrounding each different set of global connections—circumstances and connections described in the following studies.

Sheba George, Seán Ó Riain, and Millie Thayer

NOTES

1. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late Capitalist Political Culture," in *Unruly Practices*, pp.161–87.
2. Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere."