

74. See, for example, Paul Willis, *Learning to Labor*; Jay MacLeod, *Ain't No Making It*; and Brian Powers, *Making Marginality*.

75. See, for example, Judith Stacey, *Brave New Families*; Marjorie Devault, *Feeding the Family*; and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, *Gendered Transitions*.

76. Dorothy Smith's "sociology for women" begins by debunking abstract, decontextualized, and universalistic sociology as the ideology of ruling men and turns to the concrete lived experience of women as point of departure. The micro-structures of everyday life, which women direct, become the foundation and invisible premise for macro-structures controlled by men. When one includes the injunction to participatory research, this looks like the extended case method except that it claims to have no theoretical premises. Looking at Smith's empirical studies, on the other hand, I find them saturated with Marxism. See Smith, *The Everyday World as Problematic*.

77. Compare Jaap van Velsen's "The Extended Case Method and Situational Analysis," published in 1967 as one of the most advanced formulations of the Manchester method, with a more recent version, published by his student thirty years later, Burawoy's "The Extended Case Method."

78. Said, *Orientalism*.

79. We follow the lead of Allan Pred and Michael Watts, who study the cultural forms of protest, or what they call "symbolic discontent," that accompany capital accumulation in geographically and historically specific situations—from Islamic millenarianism sparked by Nigeria's integration into a world oil economy, to the renegotiation of gender identities among Gambian peasants instigated by the spread of contract farming, to linguistic resistance of California construction trades, to anti-union strategies of Korean capital. They show how movements are not only generated on the terrain of competing ideologies but such movements in turn often compose further alternative, compelling visions of their own (Pred and Watts, *Reworking Modernity*).

80. I am borrowing Eric Hobsbawm's periodization in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*.

81. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*.

82. Connell, "Why Is Classical Theory Classical?"

83. More sophisticated world systems analysis seeks to understand the way location in the world economy sets limits on the possibilities of national hegemony. For an exemplary study in this genre, see Kathleen Schwartzman's *The Social Origins of Democratic Collapse*.

84. Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," and "When Was the 'Post-Colonial'? Thinking at the Limit."

PART ONE

Global Forces

Introduction to Part One

All three of our projects take globalization as a constellation of forces that impinge upon people's lives. We do not want to argue that globalization is "new" in and of itself. But significant economic, political, and technological changes in the world in the last quarter century have led to a shrinking world, an ever more integrated global economy, and an information and technological upheaval, whose ongoing logic continues to reshape lives and institutions. New forms of globalization are taking shape in the contemporary world—new constellations that both coordinate and disrupt the lives of specific populations in historically unique ways.

A global, completely interdependent world economy has emerged, working as a single unit in real time. All economic processes affect each other, as distant regions of the planet are brought together by flows of labor, capital, information, and commodities. The increasing mobility of capital leads to contradictory effects for domestic labor. Capital flight leaves many previously semisecure workers in the position of having a home and established relations in a community in which they are no longer economically viable and in which occupational opportunities no longer exist for them to maintain their lifestyles. They must either chase capital to new locations and myriad uncertainties, or face certain downward mobility. For others, ranging from some traditional immigrants to the symbolic analysts of the new digital realm, the reconfiguration of capital provides new and sometimes lucrative opportunities.

These shifts in relations between capital and labor have contradictory implications for the nature and workings of contemporary nation states. Governments' ability to control transnational capital has diminished. States and other subdivisions within national entities have become competitors,

attempting to attract, maintain, and retain increasingly global networks of markets, industries, and factories.

The efforts of governments to discipline and restrict both labor and the ordinary citizen, on the other hand, have greatly increased. Across the richer countries, economic transformation has coincided with a shrinking of citizenship rights. The European Community has turned itself into Fortress Europe and the United States denies many social services to immigrants. Along with restrictions on citizenship, states have begun to scale back welfare benefits and social provisions. Once designed to provide social rights and entitlements to recipients, welfare states have become more discretionary, introducing both means-testing and time limitations. In the United States, the so-called Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 abolished AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), the primary safety net for poor families, and affirmative action on behalf of minorities was outlawed in many states. At the same time, the repressive nature of the state has increased, as those discarded by market forces feed a burgeoning prison population.

Our accounts of globalization examine how these forces have reconfigured both sides of the once impenetrable divide between the Soviet and Western spheres of influence. Our essays begin from a period of difference—a historical moment when the industrialized world was split into two opposing “camps” vying for hegemony. On one side of the divide, Joseph Blum shows how the economic and political configurations of the Cold War United States were largely dependent on this global order. Joseph’s subjects are Fordist workers—men whose stable jobs, military positions, and political citizenship were intimately connected to the success of United States hegemony. While they were by no means the architects of this order, their interests were both coordinated and served by it. Lynne Haney examines how the state socialist world of Hungarian full employment and societal welfare was also contingent on this global arrangement. Her subjects were formerly socialist mothers—women positioned as the reproducers of the national labor force and therefore entitled to support from the state.

While our essays begin with the divergent worlds of West and East, they end with a story of convergence. The collapse of the Cold War world system was accompanied by the “end of history,” the triumph of neoliberal economic, political, and societal models. As it traveled, neoliberalism gobbled up all alternatives and assigned all challenges to the historical dustbin. Governments have become more tightly focused on the facilitation of capital accumulation, and are adopting authoritarian methods for dealing with those members of the society unable to prosper within the corporate machine. Structural approaches to the problems of the poor and excluded are discredited as economically infeasible and historically obsolete, just as within the economy alternative modes of industrial work and union orga-

nizing are deemed inefficient and outdated. Thus, our studies reveal the discursive homogenization that has surfaced with the collapse of the Cold War divide.

With this gobbling up of historical alternatives, we also find the subjects of our studies experiencing quite similar forms of domination. The convergences are striking. Once situated in different locations, United States blue collar men and female Hungarian welfare clients confront common processes of marginalization. They all experience economic disenfranchisement, in both real and relative terms. They all face heightened insecurity and instability in their work and everyday lives. And they are all surveyed and stigmatized in new, potentially deeper, ways. In short, they all bear the brunt of forceful global processes of homogenization and domination.

The marginalization and disenfranchisement that our subjects encounter is not simply related to their being from the two key sides of the Cold War order. Not all populations in the United States and Hungary experience this global reshuffling as a time of destruction or loss. Here we must remain attentive to these groups’ subject positions within their particular national contexts. While the groups in our studies were located on the two key ends of the previous global divide, they also were included in the “core” of their respective sides.

In both Hungary and the United States, the Cold War period was also the time when the bulk of the working classes were for the first time integrated into secure, decently paid work, protected by their governments from the fear of poverty through aging, unemployment, or sickness. Following the considerable union successes of the thirties, American workers became constructed into a national workforce, with unions joining large corporations and government to regulate the boom and bust tendencies of competitive capitalism.

Hungarian mothers were similarly central to the socialist model of the Hungarian nation, intrinsically valued and financially rewarded for their labor in reproducing the next generation of Hungarian workers. In theory at least, the government took responsibility for the well-being of mothers in a broadly inclusive framework, including protection from male violence, and help with employment and with housing provision and conditions.

In both Hungary and the United States, therefore, the hegemonic concept of nationhood was intimately tied to the fate of the “ordinary” man and woman. This core citizen was in both cases implicitly white, as opposed to the Romani in Hungary or various peoples of color in the United States. However, even subordinate minorities gained during this period. In the United States, a much-expanded professional military provided employment for millions of poor young men and women, especially African Americans and Latinos, who might otherwise have remained excluded from the corporatist bargain. The victories of the civil rights movement further

broadened the base of working-class integration, as various levels of the government were required by affirmative action to employ large numbers of African Americans. In Hungary, Romani women might be given a lower standard of service by the social welfare offices and caseworkers, yet the rights guaranteed to all mothers within state socialism gave them automatic access to substantial resources.

Lynne Haney describes how the state's broad conception of women's needs under socialism has contracted under neoliberalism into a narrow, stigmatized place, framed in purely economic terms. The increasing stigma, bureaucratic barriers, and means requirements have successfully dissuaded most mothers from demanding help from the state. The remaining claimants are therefore women with no other means of support, largely women from poor and already stigmatized communities.

Like the poverty of American mothers on AFDC, that of Hungarian claimants is increasingly understood by social scientists and social workers as a product of their pathologies. Correspondingly, their meager welfare benefits become loaded with morality tests and exhortations to self-improvement. Detached from their former community with Hungarian mothers as a whole, such women can no longer legitimately claim the role of producers of the national workforce.

The blue-collar men described by Joe Blum and Teresa Gowan are similarly displaced from former positions of integration and security. Joe and his coworkers have gradually lost union power, income security, and respect from management for their skills. Yet, unlike many former industrial workers in the Bay Area, they still have some work. The homeless recyclers studied by Teresa Gowan have been less fortunate. Many who were previously longtime employees of unionized local corporations and the military now struggle for basic subsistence by reclaiming garbage for the international recycling industry. Like the Hungarian welfare mothers, their poverty is taken as a symptom of inner weakness and disease.

What these three chapters have in common, therefore, is their examination of how globalization has destroyed formerly "core" collectives. The more broadly inclusive constructions of working-class employment, entitlement, and citizenship characteristics of the Cold War period have been fragmented in different directions. While some have prospered under the so-called free market, those unable to adapt to the hucksterism of the new order have fallen through the cracks. The recent Asian crisis shows that even the winners in globalized societies are not safe from the fluctuations of the economy without borders.

Without former social entitlements, both the opportunity to better one's position and the possibility of rescue from disaster have been pushed back into the private sphere. As in previous periods of low market regulation, family wealth and cultural capital become a person's primary protection

against the insecurity of the risk society. Those without such resources live in constant danger of social fall, and, once fallen, recovery is unlikely. Degraded, marginalized, and often stigmatized by the broader society, such casualties attempt with difficulty to reclaim the rights and respect they have lost.

Joseph A. Blum, Teresa Gowan, and Lynne Haney