their local contexts, countries, and conditions; and both conferences drew upon discourses of "the global" and constructed visions of global movements. NBCC's report on the Brussels conference indicates, for example, that phrases such as "global standards," "influencing global change," "working together globally," and "the dream that one day we would join hands globally" were sprinkled liberally throughout the first day's plenary sessions.

50. In fact, according to my conversations and correspondence with a participant at the NBCC-sponsored conference in Brussels, those who were interested in networking and organizing around the issues of breast cancer and the environment were forced to meet informally in the hallways because formal meeting space was not made available to them. And obviously, their concerns about the chemical-pharmaceutical were not incorporated into the official conference proceedings.

51. In a plenary presentation entitled "Influencing Industry, Government & Science," Jane Reese-Coulbourne, former Executive Vice President of the NBCC, advised that "some industries want positive press with their customers. Women are their customers and helping NBCC work on eradicating breast cancer is viewed positively. If you are thoughtful and careful, there can be mutually beneficial relationships with industry without giving up your independence" (NBCC, A Report, p. 52). In contrast to this, the Kingston organizers rejected the offer of a major pharmaceutical corporation to sponsor their conference because they viewed the practices of the pharmaceutical-chemical industry as part of the problem and thus believed that allowing this industry to attach its name to the breast cancer movement would create a false impression of the industry's innocence and would be a signal to others that the movement had been co-opted by the pharmaceutical-chemical industry.

52. For example, according to the official conference report, in a plenary speech on cancer causes and cancer prevention delivered by Dr. Susan Love (one of the founding mothers of the NBCC, a breast cancer surgeon, and the author of Dr. Susan Love's Breast Book), pesticides were mentioned briefly and only in passing—as substances that are metabolized as estrogens. But any analysis of the broader implications of this link was quickly abandoned as Love redirected her focus to the individual-agent model of biomedicine. Love's overview of approaches to cancer prevention, for example, focused exclusively on individual and "lifestyle" factors such as exercise, diet, prophylactic surgeries, and pharmaceutical forms of risk reduction—namely, tamoxifen. Here, she simply ignored the efforts of environmental movements to prevent cancer by eliminating and better regulating the production and circulation of endocrine-disrupting chemicals and carcinogens. And, although another speaker offered a brief analysis of the rapidly globalizing pharmaceutical industry, he did not link the pharmaceutical industry to its other arm—chemical and pesticide manufacturers—or to the actual production of cancer.
Grounding Globalization

Michael Burawoy

For his BBC Reith Lectures for 1999, Anthony Giddens, distinguished sociologist and Director of the London School of Economics, chose as his topic "The Runaway World," a discussion of globalization and its effects. To give his five lectures a global feel he broadcast them from London (first and last), Hong Kong, Delhi, and Washington, D.C. They were accessible all over the world on the World Wide Web, where you could watch or listen to the lectures, read interviews with Giddens, and debate with him through electronic mail. Through their transmission he recapitulated the very theme of his lectures. As we listen to him across sound waves, or through cyberspace, or watch him on video, we cannot but wonder how much of globalization talk signifies the privileged lifestyle of high-flying academics. Giddens proclaims, "We are the first generation to live in this [cosmopolitan] society, whose contours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shaking up our existing lives, no matter where we happen to be." But who is the "we" he is referring to? For whom has risk been extended, tradition disinterred, the family made more egalitarian, and democracy become more widespread? To what slice of Hong Kong's, Delhi's, London's, or Washington's population do his sociological observations pertain? Is he talking about everyone or just the new cosmopolitan elite to which he belongs? What does globalization look like from the underside—for example, from Castells's "black holes" of human marginality? This is the question that motivates our conclusion.

Skeptics and Radicals

Giddens himself divides his protagonists into two camps—"skeptics" and "radicals." There are those who believe that all the hype about globalization
is just that, hype. It is ideology rather than reality. The world is not that different today than in earlier periods. On the other side are the radicals, who believe that globalization is not just talk but refers to very real transformations that have had dramatic consequences not only for the world economy but for the basic institutions of society—from sexuality to politics to the environment. By dividing the field in two, Giddens all too easily appropriates the radical label for himself, even though his position is anything but radical, since it takes for granted the totalizing vision of a runaway world. His rhetorical division into skeptics and radicals deftly forecloses other options—the perspectival globalization of anthropologists and our own grounded globalization. His categories are not only not exhaustive but they are also implausible, as I shall now try to show.

Is the novelty of globalization myth or reality? The skeptics say myth. They create a phantom opponent who believes the world economy has perfectly permeable national boundaries and free-flowing capital, resulting in more equal relations among geographical areas. The phantom is subjected to intensive demolition. The argument has three steps. First, when it comes to levels of trade, capital mobility, labor migration, and monetary regulation, the period 1870 to 1914 was as open as any since. Second, while there has been an internationalization of money and of capital markets, significant leaps in foreign direct investment, and increased trade within supranational economic blocs, these do not add up to a new form of globalization. “In the bigger national economies, more than 80 percent of production is for domestic consumption and more than 80 percent of investment by domestic investors. Companies are rooted in national home bases with national regulatory regimes.” The title of openness may be increasing but this by no means implies a global economy in which nation states are powerless to regulate economic activities, in which multinational corporations have been supplanted by transnational corporations, or in which inequalities between First and Third World countries are dissolving. The third move is from the descriptive to the prescriptive. Using Japan and the Asian “Newly Industrializing Countries” (NICs) as their models but also European countries, they argue that the world economy not only makes it possible for states to regulate national economies, but economic success requires such regulation.

If there has been no significant change, one must ask how the skeptics explain the hype around globalization? How can they explain its topicality at the end of the twentieth century—the fact that Giddens has not “been to a single country recently where globalization isn’t being intensively discussed”? Globalization studies are, after all, a growth industry in the humanities and social sciences as well as in the mass media. Is this just an intellectual fad? The skeptics respond that the world has been hijacked by “neoliberal” ideology, spreading its pernicious influence to the furthest corners of the earth, energized by the collapse of communism, aided and abetted by such organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In their very explanations they point to profound changes of a global dimension. They are no longer skeptics. To be a consistent skeptic is to enter a schizophrenic world. It means being a hard materialist when it comes to studying the global economy but metamorphosing into an ethereal idealist when it comes to explaining the ubiquity and power of neoliberalism as something created ex nihilo. Consistent skeptics think that by sheer force of intellectual argument they can dispel the ideological grip of neoliberals. In practice, as our book has shown, their economic indices simply do not capture what is experienced on the ground, the ways globalization attaches itself to everyday life, the way neoliberalism becomes “common sense.”

The radicals are the mirror inversion! For them all the talk of globalization confirms the fact that the world must be undergoing major global transformation. Ideology has to be the expression of underlying reality: “The global spread of the term [globalization] is evidence of the very developments to which it refers.” Here we have a simple reductionism of reality to ideology. Giddens traces the origin, invention and meaning of concepts—risk, family, tradition, democracy—rather than engaging the concrete history of institutions. He does not compile evidence against the skeptics that nothing fundamental has changed. Giddens’s strategy is strangely beside the point. Instead of considering any actual trajectory of change in real space and time, he traces globalization to the origins of modernity in the sixteenth century. Globalization is the culmination of the project of modernity. His history is sweeping and largely irrelevant to the question of what has changed in the last century. But his cavalier approach to history is typical of the radicals. Manuel Castells’s encyclopedic three volumes on the information age is just that—an awe-inspiring analysis of the ways in which information technology is reshaping the contemporary world, but there is no historical depth. It is as if what is “now” is new. Of the radicals, David Harvey gets the nearest to a serious engagement with transformation. But even he, after documenting the postmodern condition, substitutes for history a plausible but nonetheless speculative Marxist periodization of capitalism, based on the successive resolutions of the crises it generates.

Fredric Jameson is the apotheosis of the radicals, bringing together cultural epiphenomenalism and historical unconsciousness. Like Harvey he claims that the cultural is “symptomatic” of and “functional” for “late capitalism,” but his reflections on the economic are so thin as to amount to no more than handwaving. But at least he is consistent, since he argues that the peculiarity of late capitalism lies in the invisibility of its global logic. Taking a leaf out of the philosophical arsenals of Louis Althusser and George
Lukács, he claims that the economic determines its own mystification, bringing in its train cultural reification as loss of history and memory. Since the connection to the economic is so tenuous, his position easily slips into the view that just as the cultural is an epiphenomenon of an invisible economy, so the past is an epiphenomenon of the present. Both history and material reality are lost in an impenetrable cloud of postmodern fragments.

One has to wonder to what extent the radicals are giving expression to their own conditions of existence. Is it an accident that high-flying academics, hotel-circuiting consultants, conference-hopping professionals, and neiscaping virtuosos should develop concepts of the network society, should imagine a manichean world of placeless power and powerless places, should expound on time-space compression or aesthetic cognitive maps? It is perhaps fitting that Giddens should traverse the world from capital to capital as he delivers his Keith lectures, ruminating on risk in Hong Kong, tradition in Delhi, family in Washington, and democracy in London. Their theories of globalization are theories of privileged men, who appear in a privileged airspace above the world they theorize. Their absence from their own accounts aspires to objectivity, but it cannot hide the unspoken, unreflected, stratospheric situatedness of their knowledges. How much of their theorizing is the projection of insulated journeys, unspoken genealogies, self-referential worlds?

This brings me to a third species of globalizer, “perspectivists” who are quite at home with the idea that we create images of globalization in accordance with our own global location. These are what we might call the consistent radicals who accept and sometimes even celebrate the inaccessibility of history. I am referring here, in particular, to anthropologists who hold onto their radicalism by being skeptics at the same time. They are radicals insofar as, having been thrown out of their tents, they have awakened to a world in which outsider and insider, anthropologist and native, colonizer and colonist, center and periphery are no longer neat and water-tight categories. They confront a new world in which the tables are turned: the natives have put up their own tents on the anthropologist’s doorstep. But these anthropologists are also skeptics when they wonder whether the world ever conformed to the presumptions of classical anthropology, whether what is new is the lens through which the world is viewed rather than the world itself. As Clifford and Marcus’s collection on Writing Culture made famous, the isolated village, the symmetrical lineage systems, the peace in the feud were as much constructs of anthropologists and the way they conducted their fieldwork as they were faithful portraits of the world being studied. The differences and separations, the voices and silences, were the products of the anthropologist’s location in imperial or racial orders that were occluded from the classical monograph. From here it is but a short and slippery step to a radical perspectivism in which anthropology turns away from the study of locality to reflections on “epistemological and political issues of location.” The perspectivists among anthropologists become skeptical that ethnography can say anything about the world beyond the ethnographer. Ethnography moves toward comparative literature, an interpretive exercise, a political stance, which justifies the thinnest of accounts, the most fleeting of engagements, and the most unsystematic of observations. To embrace the global they have substituted travel for dwelling, vignettes for theory.

We, however, have not taken this road. We still believe in a realist ethnography that can tell us much about the world inhabited by others. As sociologists, our epistemologies have not been traumatized by upheavals in our working conditions and, so we like to believe, our theories are not without relevance to the world we study. As ethnographers within sociology, we have never been at the center of our discipline, at least since the eclipse of the Chicago School. Rather, we have taken up a critical stance at its margins. In the past ethnographers have tried to drum a little reality into the twin tendencies of grand theory and abstracted empiricism. And in this book we used ethnography to drum some reality into theories of globalization, investigating to what extent globalization is a flight of academic fancy. Thus, in stepping outside our place of worship to plumb the worlds inhabited by other agents and victims of globalization, we hoped to recognize our own positionality. But we also wanted to do more than that, to construct perspectives on globalization from below, what we call grounded globalizations. Thus, we set out from real experiences, spatial and temporal, of welfare clients, homeless recyclers, mobilized feminists, migrant nurses, union organizers, software engineers, poisoned villagers, redundant boilermakers, and breast cancer activists in order to explore their global contexts. The link, however, was not fabricated tabula rasa. It was no immaculate conception but required hard theoretical work. We searched for theories that would help us stretch from local to global. We circled back to where we came from, to our theoretical moorings, only now more conscious of who we were, and what tools we needed to make global sense of our sites. Our grounded globalizations are the antidote to skeptics without context, radicals without history, and perspectivists without theory.

RESTORING IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY

What are the cumulative insights of our grounded globalizations? To what collective vision do they contribute? I approach this question once more through a critique of both the radicals and skeptics and from there tentatively knit together our studies.

Radicals and skeptics suffer from two common defects: a simplistic view of ideology and a thin conception of history. I consider first the relation
between the material and the ideological. The skeptics see neoliberalism, global ideology par excellence, as a mystification of reality; they do not attend to its powerful roots in economic and political life. Our studies, on the other hand, show how ideologies have their power because they are rooted in everyday life, because they speak to lived experiences. Neoliberal discourses of need do not of themselves dismantle socialist welfare but connect to the real interests of specific groups. Postsocialist ruling classes have lost one ideology and need another. Neoliberalism with its focus on the market panacea suits their purposes well, silently reproducing their domination while denying responsibility for economic failures and injustice. For welfare agencies it means more surveillance jobs, for sociologists it means new sources of funding—even if at the bottom of the ladder it receives an angry reception. Ideology does not circulate of its own accord. It is carried hither and yon by interested parties who weld it to economic and political institutions. Brazilian feminists self-consciously import Northern discourses first around the body and then around gender in order to bolster defenses against the authoritarian order or exploit spaces in the democratic aftermath. In the bairros of Recife, foreign discourses are refashioned and mixed in with local discourses of citizenship to create a combustible concoction.

If the skeptics cannot explain the power of ideology, the radicals have the opposite problem. For them ideology is epiphenomenal, trailing one step behind reality. Globalization is reflected in its discourse. Once again our studies show something different. First, ideology may be mobilized to resist globalization. Metropolitan elites may wield neoliberal ideology, turning away from class compromise and public services to demand class concessions and privatization, but they also confront a rising tide of opposition mobilized around local ideologies of justice and care. Second, ideology may offer a psychological defense against the effects of globalization. Thus, homeless recyclers dream of past glories, nostalgia for an era gone by, to bolster their defenses against present degradation. Finally, ideologies are multiple. Globalization is not just a single ideology but a constellation of ideologies that becomes a terrain of struggle. Thus, Hungarian villagers attach themselves alternatively to Green environmentalism or international incineration as they battle with each other for economic advantage.

The very organization of our book into global forces, global connections, and global imaginations presumes that ideology is neither merely mystification nor merely reflection of reality. While global discourses are intricately interwoven with global forces and global connections, they also have an autonomy and coherence of their own, becoming powerful ideological constructions that can arouse collective wills. They have real effects, if not always the ones they announce. In my own research I have wrestled with the paradoxes of Russia's entry into a world economy and politics. As Russia's ruling class appropriated the discourses of liberal democracy and market freedom, it invigorated the old order of cartels, mafias, and apparatchiki, turning them loose in an asset-grabbing war that makes a mockery of the rule of law, democratic accountability, or market efficiency. We have to attend to the manifold and complex ways ideologies are produced, proliferated, transformed, combined, disseminated, appropriated, and mobilized to change the world but also to arrest such change. They are not simply tool kits adopted by different groups, but they become the terrain, the coordinates of struggles. Neither mystification nor reflectionism will do.

If our first criticism of both skeptics and radicals is directed to the place of ideology, our second criticism is directed to their thin conceptions of history. Whereas skeptics argue there is nothing fundamentally new, the radicals find novelty around every corner. Both commit the fallacy of globalism—namely, that one can characterize changes of the whole without examining changes of the parts or, to put the fallacy the other way round, that the secret of the part can be found in the whole. Where the radical finds traces of space-time distancing or space-time compression in every locality and institution, the skeptic presumes there is nothing fundamentally new on earth because the macro indicators of trade, price convergence, and labor flows are unchanged. Radicals and skeptics alike write history by postulating changes or continuities at the global level that are presumed to imprint themselves on the local level.

We have found no such isomorphism between local and global. At both levels movement is manifold and multiple, combined and reversible, uneven and unpredictable. We, therefore, work in the opposite way, ascending from the local to the global by stitching together our ethnographies. But this has its problems too. It cannot be done tabula rasa. We needed an orienting map that is attentive to both global and local simultaneously, that would allow us to compose the global from below. It had to be a vision that identified what was new about globalization against the skeptics, but without surrendering to the totalizing mode of the radicals. It needed to be a vision that acknowledged limits imposed by globalization but also identified spaces from which those limits could be challenged or negotiated. It needed to be a vision that recognized itself as a product of the world it sought to grasp without getting mired in perspectivalism. We found such a vision, such a theoretical compass in the work of the sociologist Stuart Hall.12

Hall sets out from his own biography—an intellectual transplanted from Jamaica to England, from colony to metropolis. From this vantage point he distinguishes between "Global Imperialism" and the "Global Postmodern." Global Imperialism is the era of empire, of British (English) domination in which other human races are deemed inherently inferior and denied their own voices, while the Global Postmodern refers to a decentered world of American mass culture. Ironically, it is a world in which the previously silenced have found a voice with which to fight for new places. Global
Imperialism describes a world centered around nations organized in a hierarchy of domination, while the Global Postmodern has lost any such hint of totalizing logic. It describes a world in which homogeneity calls forth diversity, in which difference is pluralized, deployed, and valorized rather than enclosed in water-tight compartments of superiority and inferiority.

The Global Postmodern appears unevenly with the reconstitution of world markets (commodity and finance), migration and decolonization, supranational regional bodies and ecological interdependence. Hall offers the following loose characterizations. At the economic level, capitalism adopts a new model of flexible accumulation which exploits and recreates difference. At the political level, the world of interacting nation states is transformed by relations that move above and below the nation. On the one side, above the nation, the global mobilizes rather than silences difference, while on the underside the local reclaims its own historicity. At the cultural level, in place of essentialist categories of nation, race, class, and gender—that is, entities with teleologies that drive history forward—we find the proliferation of hybrid, recombinant, often fragile identities.

Even though Hall does not fall victim to the fallacy of globalism—that is, he does not infer the character of the local from the global or vice versa—nonetheless, he too is bereft of micro-foundations, or what we might call ethno-foundations. Without ethnographies such as our own, ethnographies of global forces, connections, and imaginations, he cannot understand how globalization in whatever form is upheld and reproduced, or is challenged and transformed. Moreover, without ethnohistories, he cannot connect his two templates, Global Imperialism and the Global Postmodern, since there is no way of analyzing displacement and emergence without careful attention to movements at the local level. So with our ethnohistories we begin to peg the two globalizations together in terms of different modalities of displacement.

**BETWEEN GLOBAL IMPERIALISM AND THE GLOBAL POSTMODERN**

So far in this book we have organized our studies in terms of the lived experience of globalization—the way global forces, global connections, and global imaginations uphold, accommodate, resist, or contest the existing order. I now want to move from the synchronic to the diachronic, from the reproduction/contestation of globalization to the movement of and between Global Imperialism and the Global Postmodern. With this end in mind, it helps to think of our nine case studies as archeological sites scattered around the world. In our excavations we hope to piece together a picture of the emergence of the Global Postmodern and of the displacement of Global Imperialism. To advance toward this goal I have reorganized the studies into accounts of institutional change along the lines of Hall’s analysis.

First, there is the displacement of old economic forms—Fordist manufacturing is losing out to information technology, service work, and independent recycling. Second, there is the displacement of old political regimes—Hungarian socialism and Brazilian dictatorship were replaced by liberal democracies. Third, old cultural identities are shunted aside in favor of a proliferation of new ones—the fracturing of blue collar identity and the rupture of enclosed womanhood coincided with the multiplication of work identities and femininities. I will consider each institutional sphere in turn, with a view to understanding the different “modalities” of displacement—that is, how the dominant becomes residual and gives way to the emergent.

**Flexible Accumulation.** I begin with the economic and the most dramatic transformation, namely Pittsburgh’s move from “steel city” to “global city.” Pittsburgh was at the heart of the Fordist era of class compromise between steel unions and the great steel corporations, a compromise protected from international competition and with a guaranteed market. When the steel industry entered its tailspin, Pittsburgh’s corporate elite showed rare agility in restructuring its economy. The steel plants became museums or carcasses and alongside them arose high-tech manufacturing and a flourishing service sector. Pittsburgh’s government followed the lead of its corporations, granting tax cuts, promoting the privatization of public services, and demanding layoffs and wage concessions from county employees. But this aggressive neoliberalism did not always have its own way. It met with determined opposition from local service-sector unions, organized around local interests and identities. Flexibility from above engendered flexibility from below but not without its own frictions. The new unionism, rooted in local communities, was hampered by rigidities inherited from the Fordist past. Union officials were accustomed to backroom dealing, while the membership expected their leaders to deliver improvements. They did not expect to have to fight for their demands. Displacement of bureaucratic unionism in one space was obstructed by its tenacity in another.

If the arrival of Pittsburgh’s global city required a seismic disconnection from its past, the Irish software industry had a smoother passage. Until the 1980s American computer businesses exported only their most peripheral operations to Ireland. But in the process they created demand for localized products, and, with inducements from the state and with abundant skilled labor, spin-off firms took root and produced their own agglomerations. Some even took off into the global arena. As the Celtic Tiger began to flourish, American transnational corporations expanded their Irish investment in research and development, and with them came the flexible workplace of software development. But this global workplace, far from being disembodied from place and time, calls forth and requires for its operation local solidarities. Even as they spiral through transnational labor markets, Irish soft-
ware engineers are rooted in Irish communities. The old and the new are rebonded.

We can find flexibility not just in the sky but also on the ground. If anyone exhibits flexibility it is the homeless recycler who lives from the refuse of consumer capitalism. As the securities of Fordism and its welfare state crumble in advanced capitalism, and as structural adjustment delivers its blessings elsewhere, flexibility becomes the survival strategy of the poor everywhere. The break with the past is greatest here but still it is by no means complete. Homeless recyclers sustain themselves with a nostalgia for their past, their lives as blue collar workers, as servicemen, as heads of household. No matter the trauma of real displacement, memory is not so easily conquered. The past is imaginatively reenacted along the avenues of our cities.

Global-Local Synergy. Transnational corporations and independent recyclers operate in the shadow of the state, but in many places the state is itself withdrawing, creating new global-local synergies. We turn, therefore, to the modalities of displacement in the sphere of politics. The demise of authoritarian states and their replacement by weak liberal democracy encourages global invasions of civil society. Feminist groups in Brazil are no longer defending themselves against the state but, under the impulse of imported and indigenized feminisms, they set new agendas and proliferate into the hidden recesses of community life. Here the erosion of the state-society nexus creates a vacuum that draws in global connections. Similarly, in postsocialist Hungary, “democratization” has created spaces for global and local interests to converge, lock, tangle, and diverge. No longer marginal to the political process, villagers forge alliances with different international incineration companies or latch onto the oppositional Greens. The most marginalized localities under state socialism exploit their hazardous wastes to tangle with global actors. Erosion of the old state-society nexus allows the local to circumvent the state, but at the same time the state itself becomes vulnerable to new supranational predators. State agencies are seduced and coerced by the neoliberal packages for welfare “reform,” prepared by the World Bank and IMF. Thus, the weakness of the postsocialist state is measured not only by its retreat from national politics but also by its subservience to global forces. It acts as a transmission belt, turning universal child support, for example, into the stigmatizing, claims-processing of “welfare mothers.” The state-society nexus dissolves from both sides: the state is caught up in the magnetic field of supranational bodies while society is hooked into transnational flows and connections.

New Identities. Global Imperialism generated relatively stable and enduring subjects of class, race, gender, and nation. Such entities had a certain insularity and essentialist character. Their self-realization was in step with history. We could talk of the industrial working class, Third World poor, autonomous nation states, the racialized ghetto, the women’s movement, and so on. With the demand for flexibility and the rise of the global-local nexus, boundaries have broken down, and identities proliferated. The modality of cultural displacement is fragmentation. Thus, as long as they are trapped within successive shells of family, community, and nation, Kerala nurses cannot escape their subordination and stigmatization. Breaking into global labor markets threatens to disrupt these patterns. As first movers in migration, they challenge conventional gender identities, especially when their husbands, who follow, can find only lower-status employment in the United States. Gender and class relations are no longer “given” but have to be negotiated in the family, at work, and in the community. Although the transnational community attempts to reenclave women and their husbands—and so once again the past never disappears—nonetheless exigencies of migration, as well as rebellion from second-generation immigrants, challenge and break through conventional boundaries. These experiences become more common as migration cuts national identity adrift from states, building new diasporas within fluid boundaries.

Even more remarkable is the deenclaving and proliferation of identities around breast cancer. Where women previously lived with their breast cancer as a private trauma, the last twenty years have seen them come out of the closet. The transformation of medical practices—the extension of screening, multiplication of treatments and diagnoses, and the rise of support groups—created the grounds for turning private stigma into public movement. Where difference was previously hidden, silenced, colonized, it is now openly uncovered, exposed, and expressed. In this case the emergent identities—survivor, resister, victim—feed into tenuous, overlapping, intermingling social movements.

But the dissolution of old identities does not always foreshadow movement. Far from it. The unraveling of working-class identity among shipyard workers leaves them tripping in many directions—taxi-driver, salesman, photographer; union official, sociologist. Unitary subjects splinter and then recombine in hybrid forms. They congeal into movements when cemented by an imagination of an alternative, better world.

TOWARD GROUNDED POLITICS

We have compiled our ethnographies and ethnohistories into the displacement of, first, an economic order based on detailed division of labor, organized relations between classes, and economies of scale; second, a political order centered on the nation state around which revolved civil society and which mediated unequal international relations; and, third, a cultural order
that was connected to enduring and relatively homogeneous identities firmly entrenched in economy or state. In its place we have found an emergent order of flexible accumulation, global-local mutuality, and new hybrid identities.

Displacement of the old order took many forms: burial, erosion, retreat, dissolution, subordination, transmutation, recombination, fragmentation. Do these modalities of displacement of Global Imperialism add up to a transition to the Global Postmodern? A simple linear transition might serve our purposes well. It would challenge the skeptics by identifying transformations in the global order along lines that they cannot so easily measure. It would also bring the radicals down to earth, challenging their teleology of increasing globalization by insisting instead on the transition between two incommensurable, qualitatively different globalizations.

But this formulation is problematic. Many qualifications are in order, and none more important than the most obvious. The transition, if that is what we were to call it, is uneven across the globe, whether within or across national boundaries. Liberal democracy, for example, has been around as long as Global Imperialism, but some are only just entering or reentering its orbit. Change is also combined in that the Global Postmodern works with the preexisting capital, state, and identities. It works in part on the terrain of preexisting Global Imperialism. That is why we speak of supranational forces, transnational connections, and postnational imaginations to underline the repositioning rather than demise of the nation state. The transition cannot be unilinear because interests congeal around each of the orders. Every step in the direction of flexible accumulation, global-local mutuality, and new identities calls forth a reaction, the reassertion of Fordism, the state, and old essentialist subjects. The dinosaurs of Fordism are still around, not least the auto companies themselves. Welfare states have not disappeared, however trimmed down they may be. The economy still requires and receives ample regulation, ideology notwithstanding. Old identities have not dissolved in a welter of hybridity. Blue collar workers still organize themselves into unions and in some countries they even have parties. Xenophobic nationalism and even racism still greet foreign workers. Indian nurses are still stigmatized. It was the great achievement of Thatcherism and Reaganism that they could bring up the rearguard of Global Imperialism while presenting themselves as the vanguard of the Global Postmodern.

We do not, therefore, subscribe to the view that there is a transition between globalizations, between Global Imperialism and the Global Postmodern, even understood in this open-ended and indeterminate manner. Instead we prefer the more agnostic perspective of globalization in transition. Our studies point to the displacement of an old order while the contours of the new one are simply not clear. But more than that, we would also argue that the Global Postmodern is a world without a grand narrative. There is no path toward a homogeneous world capitalism or for that matter a single world socialism. There are many capitalsms just as any renaissance of socialism would have to be multiple. A totalizing theory too easily stifles imaginaries from below, silences diversity of the local, and becomes a new ideology, presenting what is as natural and inevitable. As Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan intimate, in their evocative use of "scattered hegemonies," constructing any vision of the Global Postmodern is as much a political as a theoretical project.\(^{15}\)

Instead of reaching for a global theory of the Global Postmodern, we should try to map out its distinctive and emergent political terrain. If Global Imperialism governed through coercion, the forcible domination of center over periphery, metropolis over colony, empire over satellite, the Global Postmodern is a world governed by hegemony in which consent prevails over coercion. It is dominated by a constellation of ideologies—market freedom and liberal democracy, sovereignty and human rights—that recognizes and works through difference. To be sure, hegemony is always "protected by the armour of coercion,"\(^{16}\) but the latter is deployed only episodically (if dramatically) and in the name of universal principles. Global Imperialism called forth wars of movement, violent anticolonial struggles, international wars, but in the Global Postmodern wars of movement are doomed to defeat. Just as national hegemony cannot be overthrown by revolution, so Western global hegemonies cannot be overthrown through violence. Instead, we turn to wars of position in which different groups with multiple identities have to be woven together around universalistic interests such as human rights or environmental justice. It is a war of position because it builds up a mosaic from multiple locations. Its trenches lie in the burgeoning transnational society of ethnic diasporas, deterritorialized nations, nongovernmental organizations, professional associations, the global civil society that becomes denser by the day. It is not so much a matter of creating movements outside the hegemonic order but rather on its terrain, radicalizing the meaning of democracy, appropriating the market, democratizing sovereignty, and expanding human rights.

Grounded globalizations call for a grounded politics. Where the "skeptics" (de)mythologize neoliberalism and uphold a social democratic politics revolving around the nation state, where the "radicals" see no alternative but to work with the forces of globalization, we have tried to show that a politics from below is also possible, a politics that can arrest or divert the tide of globalization, play off its different tendencies, and invent its new meanings. To Giddens's cosmopolitanism from above we propose, following Boaventura de Sousa Santos, a new cosmopolitanism from below.\(^{17}\) Globalization cannot be reduced to an inexorable force; it is also a process in which we participate; it is a process embedded in imaginaries we construct. It opens up opportunities as well as closes them down.

Even as I write, in this last month of the millennium, unprecedented protest from labor, human rights, and environmental groups has laid siege
to the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle. With its overwhelmingly American presence, it is premature to call this dramatic intervention from the streets a "counter-hegemonic globalization." Nonetheless, this frontal challenge to a supranational organization on its own terrain—the regulation of trade—beckons the proliferation of transnational social movements, propelled by imaginations of a global dimension.

NOTES

Special thanks to Erik Wright for always demanding clarity and veracity.

1. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World.
2. Ibid., Lecture 1, p. 6.
4. See, for example, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question*; Robert Wade, "Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy are Greatly Exaggerated"; Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization"; and Linda Weiss, "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State." They all contribute to the same argument, challenging the "radical" interpretations of globalization.
7. Ibid.
8. Castells, *The Information Age*, volumes 1, 2 and 3.
13. Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes similar moves from defensive politics under the Brazilian authoritarian order to a more aggressive politics, buttressed by the Catholic Church and international norms, around human rights (Santos, *Toward a New Common Sense*, chapter 5).
15. Grewal and Kaplan criticize much postmodern thinking for its "Western" bias and instead stress the transnational connections of postcolonialism—a postcolonialism which of course includes advanced capitalist countries as well as the so-called "Third World." They seek a transnational feminist politics that will knit different groups together, across borders and from below. See "Introduction: Transnational Feminist Practices and Questions of Postmodernity."
18. See the prescient article by Peter Evans, "Counter-Hegemonic Globalization: Transnational Networks as Political Tools for Fighting Marginalization."

BIBLIOGRAPHY