

In the Soviet Union it was more difficult to gain access to the worlds of workers, even while I toiled on the shop floor at Polar Furniture. When the collapse came, I became dependent on my collaboration with Krotov and Lytkina. For much of the research we spent time with managers and entrepreneurs who were steering Russia through the market inferno, developing their own barter schemes, their own banks, and even their own currencies. Workers were indeed passive onlookers, suspicious of the machinations of the new grasping, speculative bourgeoisie. As the workers used to joke, all that the communists taught about socialism was wrong, all that they taught about capitalism was right. From the beginning I found myself critical of the taken-for-granted but false comparison of this Russian merchant capitalism with ideal-typical capitalism, as though the former would naturally evolve into the latter. Those who did recognize the abyss that separated the two fell into the trap of a false imputation—that the obstacles to the Russian transition were to be found in the legacies of communism. Harboring illusions of another radiant future, no one wanted to listen to the ravings of this alien Cassandra.

I began my socialist escapade in an optimistic vein, searching for the roots of Solidarity and the possibilities of a democratic socialism. I ended up in a pessimistic vein, recounting the eclipse of the very idea of socialism, dissolved in a primitive, marauding capitalism. Such are the dialectics of ethnography—you never end up where you begin, if only because this is research in real space and time. History takes its own course, which defies the very theory that makes it intelligible.

Conclusion

The Ethnography of Great Transformations

The twentieth century was strewn with the corpses of unrealized ideals—freedom, equality, and self-realization. In thwarting their realization, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, no century has been more brutal or more violent—it was indeed an age of extremes (Hobsbawm 1994). As the inheritors of the twentieth century, we can blame the specific ideals and seek out others whose realization might be less recalcitrant. Alternatively, we can blame idealism itself, banish ideals, and make the best of the existing order as the only possible world. But there is a third possibility. We can hold on to the old ideals, seeking new ways for their realization, ways informed by examining the social processes that led to their initial defeat. It is this third road that I have chosen.

The third road beckons us to refuse the nihilism that sees the twentieth century as a succession of events that piled wreckage upon wreckage and instead to step into the storm in order to take a closer look, turning a chain of catastrophes into distinctive

processes of social transformation. The twentieth century began with transitions from capitalism to a socialism that then betrayed its own ideals. By the end of the twentieth century socialism-as-it-was collapsed under its own weight, returning its exhausted subjects to an unbridled capitalism. In between we witnessed the transformation of capitalism at its center and an anticolonial revolution at its periphery, each with its own alarmingly destructive variants. These four transformations defined the experience of the twentieth century and laid the foundations of the twenty-first century. Together these four transformations have exercised my attention, and this conclusion briefly assembles what I have learned.

In this book my approach to these social transformations has been first and foremost methodological. In trying to show how the horizons of ethnography are not limited to the here and now of field research, in chapter 2 I developed the idea of the ethnographic revisit to understand history. I now return to the ideas of that chapter to show how I investigated each transformation: the postcolonial transition through digging up the past in an archeological revisit and returning my research to its subjects in a valedictory revisit; the transformation of capitalism by comparing two ethnographies of the same place separated in time, that is, in a focused revisit; the transition to state socialism by framing it in terms of previous revolutions, what I called a heuristic revisit; and finally the transition from state socialism to capitalism in a succession of ethnographies, or a serial revisit. Great transformations are not just historical but societal; they involve the transformation of the relation between state and civil society or civil society and the economy. Studying a great transformation means considering not only the broad swathe of history

but extending beyond the field site to national institutions, that is, from the microprocesses to the macroforces shaping them. If my point of departure has been mines and factories, my destination has been of much broader scope, seeking to understand the economy, the state, and society within which they are embedded, and through which they are transformed.

There are perils in this endeavor. If, in recent years, much has been made of the danger of romanticizing the subjects of ethnography, there is also the obverse danger of reifying the world beyond the field as unchanging and homogeneous. As I will suggest, I have been all too guilty of this second error in my treatment of market and state, not recognizing that they too are sites of human action, sites of contradictory processes, sites with their own dynamics.

Errors are always in abundant supply. They become the spice of science, when we interrogate them carefully. In making predictions we are bound to make mistakes; that is why we make predictions—to put our theories to the test so that we can then improve them. Improving theory requires obsessing about its failings. Science proceeds by correcting falsehoods rather than by capturing final truths. That is, science proceeds not by being boringly right but by being brilliantly wrong. Reflecting on the errors I made in these studies has allowed me to push theory forward.

In other words, there is more to methodology than method. From the beginning method is inextricably bound up with theory; it cannot operate without theory. As Karl Popper warned, and as I showed in the case of Skocpol's account of revolution (chapter 3), to put the induction machine into motion without the fuel of theory leaves us where we were, standing

still. We need to begin with theory if we are to end with theory, so best pick theorists that we find worth developing. Thus Frantz Fanon was my lens for Africa, Antonio Gramsci for advanced capitalism, Leon Trotsky for the Russian Revolution and its Stalinist fallout, Iván Szélenyi for the transformation of state socialism, and Karl Polanyi for its demise. Each theorist was an inveterate participant in the societies he studied; so he therefore had a distinct advantage over social science at a distance. These theorists never hesitated to make predictions, to map out roads into the future, which made them great but fallible scientists.

THE POSTCOLONIAL TRANSFORMATION

If methodology is not theoretically innocent, then for it to be an asset rather than an impediment we need to be theoretically self-conscious from the beginning. It took me many years to come to this realization, so I have not always followed this precept myself. My first study, conducted between 1968 and 1972, the study of Zambianization, was the most unreflective, both theoretically and methodologically. It expressed the pure undisciplined joy of social research. Even here, however, Frantz Fanon hovered in the background as a guide to postcolonialism. His class analysis of the colonial and postcolonial racial formation informed *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines*. Zambia was not Algeria—it was not a settler colony, and its economic basis was not agrarian but industrial—so this called for a reconstruction of Fanon's theory of postcolonialism for an enclave economy based on copper. In Zambia the national bourgeois road to postcolonialism—the one in which the color of class changes but

not the class structure—remained largely unchallenged by any radical visions of liberation that were among the responses to the settler colonies of Africa.

To understand the class forces behind the reproduction of the racial order in the copper mines, specifically, the principle that no black shall have any authority over any white, the principle of the color bar, I conducted an archeological revisit. I excavated the colonial history of African advancement, that is, the ways Africans were slowly advanced into positions in the industrial hierarchy hitherto monopolized by whites—a process of fragmenting and parceling out parts of white jobs to African successors but always under the guiding rule of the color bar. I concluded that the capitalist foundation of Zambia's economy set the parameters for racial succession in both periods. If anything, independence rationalized the domination of capital *and* the racial order upon which the mining industry rested. As Fanon had warned, the postcolonial transition proved to be less radical than its rhetoric. If the national liberation road to democratic socialism was blocked, then, he surmised, postcolonial rule would degenerate from democratic pluralism to one-party democracy to military dictatorships and one-man despotisms.

After my departure in 1972 the trajectory of Zambia and its copper mines was, indeed, tragic. As part of the nationalist project the Zambian government nationalized the copper mines in 1971, and in return the multinational companies received a handsome management contract. Soon after nationalization the international price of copper began to fall, turning profits into losses, but the mines were kept open as a major source of employment. Moving heavily into debt, the Zambian government took a structural

adjustment loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was conditioned on reprivatization of the mining industry. During the 1970s and 1980s Zambians had advanced to the highest positions in the industry, but under privatization expatriates were pulled back into management positions from different parts of the world to make the mines a more appealing purchase on the world market. We might call it a recolonization. After some initial interest from one of the old multinationals, the Anglo American Mining Corporation, Chinese and Indian capital began taking over the industry in the twenty-first century. The story of the 1980s and 1990s was a falling price of copper that plunged the Zambian mining industry and thus the country into debt and its people into poverty and disease. Ironically, once the government off-loaded its losing investment, the price of copper shot up to four times what it was in 2002, bringing in windfall profits.

I had made at least two errors in my analysis of the copper industry and its racial order. First, in assuming that “the state” preferred the line of least resistance and so would not touch the color bar, I had homogenized the interests of the state. I did not see the state as a contradictory set of institutions in which some might pursue racial justice even at the expense of short-term economic disruption. The extended case method is in danger of reifying the external forces that shape the social processes under observation, not recognizing (because not seeing) those forces as themselves the product of uncertain social processes. I saw the errors of my ways when I undertook a valedictory revisit, that is, when I presented my ethnography to the ruling powers and unexpectedly found considerable support from the very state that I had so vehemently criticized.

My second error was to limit the macroextension to the national configuration of class forces, thereby excluding global forces, be they the price of copper or what would be the structural adjustment of the IMF. This was a deliberate reaction against the ruling elite’s ideology that pointed to “neocolonialism” as the cause of continuing underdevelopment, masking its own domestic class project. While the ruling elite did promote and disguise its own interests behind the rhetoric of neocolonialism, global forces were nonetheless real. Both errors might be traced to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*. I had reconstructed some parts of his theory but not others.

Disillusionment with postcolonialism has inspired new perspectives in social theory. Subaltern studies, originally developed in India, are one of its best expressions. The universality of postcolonial depression called into question the original project of independence, a project ensnared by the same metropolitan notions of nationalism that had driven colonial subjugation. Subaltern studies began to recover indigenous projects buried in the anticolonial struggles of India’s peasantry and working classes. Debates raged about the alternative represented by Gandhism. Of the two tasks—the critique of Western discourses and the recovery of counterhegemonic projects—it was the former that increasingly preoccupied subaltern studies, but it was also the one that was more easily assimilated into Western academia. In denouncing Fanon’s nationalism, subaltern studies, perhaps deliberately, lost sight of his emancipatory concerns and the investigation of historically suppressed alternatives. As I shall argue later in this conclusion, today we are in desperate need of a sense of alternatives to capitalism.

THE TRANSITION TO ORGANIZED CAPITALISM

Shifting from the colony to the metropolis, the second great transformation treated in this book is the one that brought organized capitalism into existence. If the *Zambianization* study showed how social processes reproduced themselves despite wider changes aimed at their disruption, the second study traced small but significant changes on a factory shop floor to systemic changes in the character of capitalism.

I found my way into a machine shop in south Chicago, the engine division of Allied Corporation, a large multinational corporation, only to discover that it was precisely the same factory that had been studied by the famous Chicago ethnographer Donald Roy. He had worked there as a radial drill operator in 1944–45, and I worked there as a miscellaneous machine operator in 1974–75. At first I was stunned by how little had changed (which was why I was led to identify the plant as the one Roy had studied), but then, as I settled into his dissertation, I found small but significant changes, not so much in the technology but in the way work was regulated, what I called the internal labor market and the internal state. Broadly speaking, during the thirty years the regime had moved along the continuum from despotism to hegemony, that is to say, the balance of force and consent had shifted in the direction of consent.

It was the reconstruction of the new Marxism of the 1970s—theories of the economy, of state, and of politics influenced, especially, by the writings of Antonio Gramsci—that first allowed me to focus on this shift in the regime of production and then allowed me to explain and interpret that shift. I had been especially interested to investigate and elaborate Gramsci's claim that in the

United States hegemony was born in the factory. Specifically, the thirty years saw the consolidation of a dual economy—on the one side a monopoly or corporate sector with workers organized into unions and a production regime increasingly monitored and regulated by the state, and on the other side an unregulated competitive sector of unorganized workers. Allied Corporation had bought up Roy's Geer Company, moving it from the competitive to the monopoly sector, at the same time that the monopoly sector had itself adopted a more hegemonic regime of production.

Very different from the archeological revisit of the *Zambianization* study, in which I dug up the past, the Chicago study was a focused revisit—a detailed comparison of two distinct ethnographies of the same place separated in time. Theoretical reconstruction allowed me to extend—or, more precisely, to project into history—the specific differences between Geer and Allied in an account of the transition from competitive capitalism to organized capitalism. In early capitalism life depended on work, whereas under organized capitalism the dependence of life on work was mediated by the state—a state that gave certain guarantees to those without work whether because of age, infirmity, or redundancy. Since workers were less fearful of losing their jobs, they had to be persuaded rather than coerced into cooperating with management. At the same time that the state gave workers certain welfare guarantees, it also held management accountable to procedural norms in the treatment of workers. The result was a hegemonic regime of production in which coercion was applied in a regulated manner and was itself the object of consent.

The persuasion of organized capitalism was not always of a gentle kind. It could also be coercive as under fascism, and in the

late 1970s a more despotic regime—hegemonic despotism—was emerging in the core sectors of U.S. industry. The hegemonic regime, which I mistakenly saw to be so stable, represented only a brief moment in history. The recession of 1974 signaled an impending double offensive against organized labor: on the one side from global capitalism that would destroy the industries of south Chicago and on the other side from the state, initiated in 1981 by the Reagan administration's firing of striking air traffic controllers. Competition from overseas manufacturing turned south Chicago into an industrial wasteland, an enormous ghetto, a warehouse of surplus population, ejected from Chicago's housing projects, themselves pulled down to make way for real estate development. As in the Zambian case study, I missed the storm of global capitalism waiting on the horizon but also the contradictory character of the state. The state is not a reified object of constant effect but itself the product of unfolding social processes. What we have witnessed, therefore, since the late 1970s is a broad erosion of labor protection and a return to the brutality of early competitive capitalism but now operating on a truly global scale, aided and abetted by more or less neoliberal states. As in Zambia, so in Chicago unfettered markets wrought their misery.

THE SOVIET REVOLUTIONS

We come now to the second set of transformations that has defined what used to be called the second world: first the transition to state socialism and then the transition to market capitalism. Methodologically, my study of the postcolonial transition involved a reconstructive projection into history based on

archives and reports, whereas the analysis of the transition to advanced capitalism was based on a revisit to a plant studied thirty years before. The third transition, ostensibly of a different character, concerns the Russian Revolution. Here I rely on another participant observer, Leon Trotsky, whose analysis first anticipated and then reflected on the revolution and its denouement, an analysis that was originally based on a heuristic revisit, or retrospective reconstruction of the understanding of the French and failed German revolutions, a reconstruction that also involved the transformation of Marxist theory.

Long before the October Revolution, Trotsky was wrestling with the Marxian conception of history, according to which revolution would first occur in the most advanced capitalist countries, because there both contradictions and class struggle were the most mature. Trotsky countered this classical Marxism with an alternative account in which the world capitalist order actually concentrated contradictions in semiperipheral countries, thus creating the seeds of revolution in those countries first. Faced with competition from states built on more developed economic foundations, the Russian absolutist state sought to extract surplus more coercively and as a result stifled rather than incubated the productive forces. The percolating economic crisis coincided with the formation of a militant proletariat, militant because it was recently ripped from the land and herded into large-scale modern factories built with foreign capital. At the same time that revolution became an economic necessity, the only class capable of carrying it forward was the working class—the bourgeoisie was weak and dependent on French and German finance. The balance of forces favoring the working class distinguished the Russian Revolution from the French

Revolution, where the emerging bourgeoisie prevailed, and from the failed German Revolution of 1848, where bourgeoisie and working class were in equilibrium.

If the working class became the leading political force in Russia in 1917, its instincts and interests, so Trotsky argued, would drive it forward to socialism—improved working conditions, democratic control of production, shortening of the working day, and so on. Yet all these were impossible, given the underdevelopment of the productive forces. The success of the Russian Revolution depended on triggering revolution in Europe, which was most likely to break out in Germany. Failing that, the Russian Revolution would inevitably degenerate. Here Trotsky's perspicacity shone—his anticipation and then analysis of Stalinism was without parallel for his time, yet his continuing anticipation of an imminent revolution in the West was deeply flawed. Other Marxists would have to come to terms with the failure of revolution in the West and the stabilization of organized capitalism.

Trotsky was the supreme participant observer, allowing him to develop theory and practice alongside each other, leading him to participate in what came to be a self-destroying revolution. His interested participation in the Russian Revolution and its denouement was not an obstacle but an asset to his analysis and the grounds for his imaginative reconstruction of Marxism. As a revolutionary he had to get his science right—this was no academic exercise but a matter of world historical importance. So when it came to understanding Russia, Marxism was not a dogma but a body of theory that had to be refashioned in accordance with and alongside Trotsky's participation. By the same token his distance from the European theater of class struggle

and class compromise led to a more stunted analysis of the West, following a more conventional Marxism.

WITHER STATE SOCIALISM?

In his analysis of the Soviet transitional period in the 1920s, as well as in his analysis of Stalinism, Trotsky already posed the question of whether the Soviet Union: socialism or capitalism? With the consolidation of Stalinism, especially during the Second World War and the post-Stalin thaw, the question of socialism or capitalism divided the world but not the future of the Soviet Union. State socialism seemed to be here to stay. To be sure, it faced challenges on the periphery: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, but these rebellions were quickly quashed. Moreover, they aimed at the reform of state socialism rather than a transition to capitalism. The Polish Solidarity movement of 1980 and its self-limiting revolution, however, went far deeper into society and lasted much longer (sixteen months). The movement contained divergent tendencies, but even here its guiding vision was the democratization of state socialism.

Although I was not able to make my way to Poland before General Jaruzelski seized power, the Solidarity movement whetted my interest in state socialism and its potentialities. Locked out of Poland, I began a series of ethnographies, a serial revisit, that took me from factory to factory in Hungary and then into the heartland of Russia. When I embarked on this twenty-year odyssey in 1982, I was in search of the seeds of democratic socialism. Little did I expect to be a participant in or observer of the transition to capitalism. My Hungarian journey

began in a champagne factory on a collective farm and moved to a textile factory of an agricultural cooperative, and from there I made my way into an industrial plant similar to Allied. Finally, I reached the heart of the socialist working class, landing a job in a steel mill. Between 1985 and 1988 I worked there for more than a year.

Just at the very moment that I thought I had discovered a working class with a socialist consciousness, the entire order fell apart and descended into capitalism. I gazed upon the broken pieces of a socialist imaginary—justice, equality, and efficiency—won against the mendacity and false promises of the party-state and founded on solidarity produced in the workplace. I took seriously the argument of Konrád and Széleányi that legitimacy was the lynchpin of state socialism but also, so I claimed, the source of its vulnerability. It generated a working class that demanded that the state make good on its claim to be a workers' state. Working with János Kornai's theory of the shortage economy, I drew the conclusion that the pathologies of the socialist workplace required the collective self-organization of work. Thus, paradoxically, it was the political and economic vulnerability of state socialism that inspired visions within its working class of a democratically empowered and economically efficient socialism. My socialist imaginary, however, proved to be more imaginary than socialist.

Why had I been so wrong, so misguided, in believing that state socialism could usher in democratic socialism rather than market capitalism? In part it was wishful thinking, in part I was simply looking in the wrong place—the transition did not come from within the bowels of production but spread down from the political superstructures of society. The ruling elites had lost

confidence in their ability to reform state socialism. Once again the problem with the extended case method lay in the reification of forces beyond the ethnographic site, as though they were natural and eternal. The party-state, the planning ministries, may appear as impervious forces from the standpoint of production but in reality they too are the product of social processes and strategic action, albeit hidden from production. Another source of error lay in the question that propelled my investigations—why would the first working-class revolution occur in state socialism, and why Poland and not Hungary? I was asking about the basis of Solidarity so as to understand the conditions for its reenactment, whereas the ruling elites were way ahead of me. Having diagnosed those conditions, they were determined to transform them precisely so there would be no reenactment.

At the same time that Hungarian state socialism was disintegrating from above, the Soviet Union became the site of burgeoning social movements from below. A fateful trip to the Soviet Union in 1990 led to a decade of fieldwork, beginning in early 1991. The developing schisms in Soviet society, which were very different from those in Hungary, *were* very visible from within the factory. In the first study conducted in a Moscow rubber factory, the colliding forces—plan versus market, Soviet Union versus Russia—divided management into warring factions, whereas a few months later in northern Russia I witnessed the emergence of a new form of capitalism—what we called merchant capitalism—that would destroy the existing economy in a process of primitive disaccumulation. The Soviet transition to a market economy was neither revolutionary as the big-bang theorists prescribed nor evolutionary as the institutionalists desired, but instead it was involutionary—a process in which

the market expanded at the expense of production. As a result Russia experienced a precipitous economic decline, unparalleled in the twentieth century, that continued unabated until 1998. My theory of merchant capitalism and its consequence, economic involution, offered accurate depictions of the first decade of the market transition. Together with Pavel Krotov and Tatyana Lytkina I traced the reverberations of involution in the timber, coal, and construction industries and in the survival strategies of formerly working-class families.

Unlike my studies of *Zambianization* and hegemonic regimes of production that called for a deliberate reconstruction of the past, I had become a participant in a historical process that became the object of analysis. As with Trotsky there were two phases—a more optimistic phase of late Hungarian socialism and the more depressing phase of Russian decline and degradation. The second phase called for a profound revamping of Marxist theory, a shift away from production to a focus on the destructive power of the market. Here I took up the ideas of Karl Polanyi, who had devoted his life-work to the dangers of market fundamentalism. Many have drawn from Polanyi the idea that markets have to be embedded in society and, furthermore, require the regulation of the state. For me what is more interesting is Polanyi's historical analysis, that if taken too far markets generate countermovements: in the nineteenth century the countermovement was from society, involving the factory movement and the creation of trade unions, cooperatives, and voluntary associations, while in the twentieth century it was the reaction of states—social democracy and New Deal but also fascism and Stalinism. Given the traumatic reactions of the twentieth century, Polanyi

believed that the liberal creed had exhausted itself and that socialism, formed by a collectively self-organized society subjugating market and state to itself, was on the agenda. But he was wrong. Market fundamentalism rose for a third time—a veritable cyclone destroying everything in its path.

That indeed has been the aftermath of the great transformations I have studied for thirty years. We see in Zambia, and Africa more broadly, the devastation wrought by structural adjustment. Even postapartheid South Africa, with its long history of socialist struggles, has turned to the market, privatizing utilities and services, opening itself up to cheap commodities from abroad, allowing the accumulation of wealth on the one side and the destruction of the social wage on the other. We see it in south Chicago, and the industrial heartlands of the United States more generally, which have become wastelands for warehousing surplus populations. We see the political side of market fundamentalism in the calamity that struck New Orleans, a security state that failed to prevent death and misery even though it had been long anticipated, a state that failed to organize relief measures once the storm had struck, and, finally, most amazing of all, a state that has failed to rehabilitate the population in the aftermath. Moving farther afield we see it most brazenly in the embrace of shock therapy by Russian elites aiming to destroy all vestiges of the planned economy by taking a revolutionary road to the market economy. The Stalinist terror of primitive accumulation achieved through collectivization and central planning has turned into its opposite—the primitive disaccumulation of privatization and unbridled markets. We have yet to see the fallout of the (so far) more successful, regulated transition to the market in China.

FROM THIRD WAVE MARKETIZATION
TO REAL UTOPIAS

Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* concerns itself with the transition to a market society—a transition fateful for all humanity that no place in the world escaped. His account stretches from the end of the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War. Where he sees one long transformation, I see two distinct waves of marketization—the first stretching through the nineteenth century and the second spanning the period from World War I to the middle 1970s. Today we are in the midst of a third wave of marketization that Polanyi never anticipated, one that took off in the last quarter of the twentieth century and has since enveloped the globe.

One of Polanyi's distinctive contributions lies in the analysis of the countermovements to marketization that protect society from unregulated commodification. We can discern a distinctive countermovement for each wave: the reaction to the first wave took the form of local organizations that were responding to the commodification of labor, the reaction to the second wave took the form of distinctive state formations (New Deal, social democracy, fascism, Stalinism) reacting to the commodification of money, while the reaction to the third wave is assuming a distinctively global character, reacting to the commodification of nature, especially land and natural resources. We can look upon the succession of waves as a dialectical progression in which the institutional basis of the countermovements are, at least, partially inherited from one wave to the next—civil society (including labor unions and political parties) from the first, regulatory states from the second. Equally, labor and money continue to

undergo commodification in the third wave, but nature assumes increasing centrality in public debate and social movements.

The Soviet Union was shaped by all three waves. The revolution of 1917 was a late reaction to first-wave marketization, while the Stalin revolution of collectivization and central planning, beginning after the failure of the New Economic Policy, was the Soviet reaction to second-wave marketization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the last decade of the twentieth century marked the demise of statist response to second-wave marketization while also consolidating third-wave marketization. The transition from competitive to organized capitalism represented the reaction to second-wave marketization in the core, while the postcolonial transition represented its counterpart in the periphery.

What is striking is how all these great transformations succumbed to third-wave marketization. Whether it be Zambia, south Chicago, Hungary, or Russia, the advent of third-wave marketization has brought devastation and inequality unanticipated in the studies I undertook, except in the Russian case, where the writing was on the wall. In the other studies I missed the global context in part because its impact was still relatively episodic but also because the theories I worked with, and classical sociology more generally, were focused on national social formations. To be sure, third-wave marketization was mediated by national social formations, but it was also often aided and abetted by the nation-state. It struck with such devastating force, a weapon of mass destruction, that it swept away many protective levees.

While I was at pains to bring the state back in, I failed to elucidate its internal contradictions and dynamic processes. In focusing on the vulnerable and the downtrodden, entering the