

- 4 For an analysis and description of the Anglo-American empire see the special survey conducted by the *Financial Mail of South Africa*, issued as a supplement to the *Financial Mail* of 4 July, 1969.
- 5 Hall (1969), pp. 87-8.
- 6 *Statistical Year Book, 1970*, table 4.3.
- 7 *Ibid.*, table 4.3.
- 8 *Ibid.*, table 4.2(a).
- 9 See, for example, the labour histories described in University of Zambia Sociological Association reports Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14 and 15.
- 10 *Chamber of Mines Year Book, 1955*, table XL.
- 11 *Mining Year Book of Zambia, 1969*, table 17.
- 12 See memorandum of agreement between Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd, Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd and the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, 7 September 1970.
- 13 At the National Convention held in Kitwe in 1969, Party politicians were instructed to refrain from interference in industrial relations. Since then there has been little direct intervention by the local Party politicians.
- 14 Government of Zambia (1966a), p. 1.
- 15 *Times of Zambia*, 15 February 1971.
- 16 See Gouldner (1970), for an illumination of the assumptions which underpin the work of Talcott Parsons.
- 17 Van Velsen (1969).
- 18 See Burawoy (1972) for a review of Bates, R. H., *Unions, Parties and Political Development* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1971).
- 19 Gluckman first stated the case in 1945. See Gluckman (1945), p. 12.
- 20 Gluckman (1961), pp. 69-70.
- 21 Gouldner (1968).
- 22 Guest (1962a).

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE
INDUSTRY AND COPPERBELT SOCIETY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The copper industry of Zambia has been developed by migrant labour. On the one hand unskilled work was performed by Africans, many of whom had worked elsewhere in southern Africa, while the semi-skilled and skilled work was carried out in the initial period by white migrants, the majority of whom came from the gold mines of the Johannesburg Reef. The close congruence between stratification on the one hand by race and on the other by industrial skill and authority engendered and perpetuated a set of values, attitudes and beliefs amongst both races closely parallel to those found on the South African mines. However, the development of Northern Rhodesia was not to follow the same pattern as South Africa because, among other reasons, the British Government brought the territory under its administration as a protectorate in 1924. It is possible to find statements dating as far back as 1921—before the copper mines had begun to operate commercially—in which the British Government clearly adopts a stand opposed to the colour bar system to be found in South Africa.¹

It is the accepted policy of His Majesty's Government to give the Africans of Northern Rhodesia, as well as other dependencies of tropical Africa, opportunities for qualifying for any post or employment for which they are capable, and to supply the requisite educational training.²

But it was the Russell Commission,³ appointed after the first Copperbelt disturbance of 1935, which, for the first time, focused many people's attention on the industrial status of the African. One man in particular, Charlie Harris—a trade unionist from South Africa—on visiting the Copperbelt viewed with great apprehension the few Africans who were already breaching the sacrosanct line dividing unskilled labour from skilled labour.⁴ It was partly on his advice, based on the experience of the white miners in South Africa, that the Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers' Union was formed in 1937. From the Companies' point of view, Bromwich writes,

The local newspaper at that time began to carry first letters to the editor warning against the encroachment by Africans into European employment. The profits of the Companies were not high enough to stand a

protracted stoppage on this issue, they were not in a position to risk a European exodus, nor were there anywhere near enough Africans available for even a limited amount of general advancement. In 1937 the Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers' Union (the European Union) was formed and protection of employment was its main spur.⁵

Following strike action by the European Union in 1940 in a bid for higher wages, the Africans organized themselves again as they had done in 1935 and put forward their own demands. Disturbances broke out and the upshot was the Forster Commission,⁶ which amongst other matters considered, for the first time formally, the issue of African advancement, suggesting that management, in consultation with the European Union, should consider to which jobs the African could now advance. At the same time the white miners exploited their increased bargaining power,⁷ occasioned by the urgent demand for copper for the war effort, by forcing management, which was also under pressure from the Northern Rhodesian Government, to recognize a closed shop clause as a concession for the possible dilution of labour. By allowing the dilution or fragmentation of jobs, it was felt that African advancement would be facilitated in those instances where there was a shortage of white labour. The agreement over the dilution of labour, signed in 1940, made it clear that this was just a temporary expedient to be enforced only during the emergency period of the war.⁸ In fact very little use was made of the dilution agreement. After the war an extensive revision of the agreement between the Companies and the European Union was the replacement of the dilution clause by 'clause 42', which, together with the closed shop, was to thwart African advancement for the next decade.

The Company agrees that work of the class or grade that is being performed, or job that is being filled, by an employee at the time of the signing of this agreement shall not be given to persons to whom the terms and conditions of this agreement do not apply.⁹

The policy changes arising from the new post-war British Labour Government eventually materialized in the formation of an African Mineworkers' Trade Union in 1949. But during the preparatory years the white miners had tried to gain the initiative by seeking to absorb the Africans into their own trade union. It may be presumed that they feared competition from a strong and well organized African Union and that absorption under the umbrella of the European Union, and therefore subject to its control, would be less likely to place its membership in jeopardy from advancing Africans.¹⁰ All such attempts were resisted by the mining companies¹¹ and the Northern Rhodesian Government¹² and failed to materialize. Meanwhile another Commission, chaired by

Sir Andrew Dalglish, was set up to inquire specifically into the problems of African advancement, but this was boycotted by the European Union. By clinging to clause 42, and by insisting on 'equal pay for equal work'—internationally recognized trade union principles—the European Union effectively barred any form of African advancement. For, the European mineworkers argued, any African doing the same job as themselves must also receive the same pay, knowing full well that the mining companies would not be prepared to pay the African at European rates, for two reasons. First, if certain select Africans were given European rates of pay, then this would be, as it in fact turned out to be, a strong lever with which the African could then campaign for a general wage increase so that all African wages might keep in line with those which had been advanced. This would be a very costly exercise for the Companies. Secondly, the European Union could also rely on management making the assumption, widely held by whites of that time, that even if an African were to take over a European's job, he would not perform it as effectively as the European and a decline in efficiency would be the consequence. Indeed, in their submission to the Guillebaud tribunal of 1952 the mining companies stated,

Raising wages in the manner suggested would probably mean that the African would do less work, preferring greater leisure to greater earnings.¹³

Though the Dalglish Commission made many recommendations as to which jobs Africans could now advance to, the European Union successfully resisted the implementation of the recommendations for a few more years.

The young African trade union scored a number of victories in its early years—a paralysing three-week strike in 1952, the favourable award of the Guillebaud tribunal, also in 1952, and the abolition of the tribal representatives in 1953.¹⁴ As regards African advancement, however, no progress was made. Indeed, the Guillebaud tribunal reported,

During the course of the hearings reference was made on a number of occasions to the report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Advancement of Africans in industry—the so-called Dalglish Report of 1948. Concern was expressed especially by the mining companies over the failure to implement any of the recommendations put forward by the Commission . . . It is none the less the truth that the fundamental issues which led to the appointment of the Dalglish Commission remain largely unresolved and throughout this arbitration I have been conscious of them hanging like a dark cloud in the background . . . I feel bound to record my profound conviction that satisfactory and harmonious industrial relations on the Copperbelt will not be attained unless or until effective

steps have been taken to enable the African workers to advance to position of greater responsibility and importance than those now open to them.¹⁵

The mining companies and Roan Selection Trust in particular were becoming increasingly anxious about the problem of African advancement,¹⁶ but until April 1953 they had been under such pressure from the British Government for continued and increased production that they felt unable to risk a major confrontation with the European Union. However, in 1953 pressure from the British Government was relaxed and steps were taken to reach an agreement.

In 1954 the 'four-party talks' were opened to look into areas of compromise between the white and black unions. Though all parties agreed that African advancement meant an advance into positions currently monopolized by white miners, nevertheless the talks soon deadlocked over the divisibility of the jobs and their remuneration. The European Union maintained that the jobs in question represented indivisible entities within the European wage structure and that their indivisibility was part and parcel of the principle of equality and non-discrimination against the African. The Companies, on the other hand, insisted that only their fragmentation could ensure effective advancement. The Forster Board, which enquired into the deadlock, came out in support of the Companies view.¹⁷ It recommended that there should be two different scales of remuneration, one appropriate to the African and the other appropriate to the European—a system which has come to be known as the 'dual wage' structure. In justifying their adherence to a dual wage structure the Companies have always emphasized the migratory nature of both the white and the black sections of the labour force. They have argued that the wage disparity between European and African labour must be linked not only to the jobs they are doing but also to the standards of living, wages and labour market current in the indigenous areas of recruitment.¹⁸ It has been felt—and the Commissioners have in general accepted this view—that because the African is accustomed to a low standard of living in his rural environment, and the European by comparison is accustomed to higher wages and 'standards of living', so the earnings of the European must be correspondingly higher. In fact, of course, to pay Africans at the same rates as those necessary to attract Europeans to the Copperbelt would be economically prohibitive and would make the copper industry a less attractive prospect for investment.

The Forster Board also agreed that effective advancement could take place only if jobs hitherto monopolized by the European Union were fragmented and then given to the African. Management, it

appears, was quite willing to see Africans advance into jobs hitherto barred to them, though it was to be a gradual and systematic advance confined to low-grade jobs. The Europeans, as we have already suggested, feared exploitation if the Africans were to take over their work at cheaper rates and rejected the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry.

Now quite prepared for a showdown with the European Union, Roan Selection Trust—at that time more favourably disposed towards African advancement¹⁹—decided to give notice of termination of its recognition agreement with the European Union. This forced the issue, and eventually, in September 1955, the first advancement agreement was signed, providing for the excision of twenty-four jobs from the European field of representation. But 1955 saw another development which complicated the matter—namely, the recognition by the Companies of the African Staff Association, to which most of the excised jobs fell. The Staff Association had splintered off from the main African trade union and included among its membership many of the African Union's leaders. The ranks of the African workers' leadership had been driven into two hostile groups, with the smaller, better-off group receiving the bulk of the advantages derived from the advancement agreement. The recognition of the Staff Association undermined the solidarity of the African workers and weakened African demands in pursuit of African advancement.

The attempt to implement the 1955 agreement met with difficulties that were inevitable in view of the pressure under which the European Union signed the agreement. The resistance to the Companies' scheme came, in fact, from many sides, and has continuing relevance to the problems encountered today in the implementation of Zambianization programmes.

First the European Union met with opposition from its members, who refused to assist in the training of Africans for Advancement jobs, refused to induct them into their jobs, and insisted that there should not, on any mine, be any partial hand-over of Advancement jobs, i.e. no jobs in an Advancement category should be handed over until a total hand-over of that category could be achieved.

Secondly . . . the African Union . . . bitterly resented the existence and recognition by the Companies of MASA [the Miners' African Staff Association] . . . and they accused the Companies of attempting to destroy the Union by fostering the growth of the Staff Association.

Thirdly, MASA also objected to the Companies' Advancement proposals, primarily the qualifications and wages proposed for the Advancement jobs and the option which then existed for persons in staff and supervisory jobs to remain on ticket-paid wages.

Fourthly, the implementation of advancement was also hampered by the inability to find sufficient candidates of the right standard and by the inability of many employees to carry out the required work . . .²⁰

1956 was an exceptional year in many ways, but it did mark both the height of the European Union's influence and the beginning of its decline. The 1956 Chamber of Mines *Year Book* recalls that

The year 1956 was one of great prosperity and achievement. New records were set up in production and during the year the selling price of copper rose to the unprecedented figure of £437 a ton.²¹

With the rocketing price of copper, the European Mineworkers received a corresponding boost in their income through the operation of the copper bonus scheme. The final rate of bonus for the year ending 30 June 1956 was 102.5 per cent,²² which meant that the European worker was doubling his earnings for the period. Disputes between the African Union and the Companies developed into a long series of strikes between May and September. The Branigan Commission, set up to inquire into the cause of the unrest in the copper industry, came to the conclusion that the

. . . cause of the unrest . . . was the irresponsible opposition of the Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers' Trade Union to the Mining Companies' recognition of the Miners' African Staff Association . . .²³

Not only was there unrest amongst the African mineworkers but the European mineworkers struck fourteen times at different mines in the period January 1956 to July 1957, culminating in the rockbreakers' dispute.²⁴ A day after the European Union had given notice of its unilateral declaration to shorten the rockbreakers' week by two hours, management countered with a threat 'to begin closing down the Mines in an orderly manner'.²⁵ With the price of copper having slumped considerably from the March 1956 record of £437 to £181 at the end of 1957, the Companies were now in a stronger bargaining position *vis-à-vis* their employees. Management proceeded to force its will on the European Union, trying to remove the restrictive practices which militated against efficiency. These demands were rejected by the Union, and after conciliation had failed, the Europeans embarked on a strike which was to last seven and half weeks, from September to November 1958.²⁶

The back of European resistance, however, was now broken.

The strike left the Union a defeated party, its leadership seriously split and hardly in a position to give constructive thought to the grave problems of African advancement and the future of white daily paid labour, which inexorably pressed in upon it. By this time moreover, the future pattern

of political change all over Africa was beginning to take shape with baffling speed and growing clarity, and the centre of gravity was being shifted from the specific problem of the advance of African labour in a white-controlled industry, to the more fundamental and wider-embracing question of the future of white enterprise and settlement in a possibly black-controlled territory.²⁷

Under these circumstances the leadership of the European Union yielded to management's request for the release of a further thirty-eight jobs to the African field of labour. At the same time the European Union was granted certain concessions affecting those immediately threatened by the advancement agreement, namely that the anticipated expansion of the industry would create more employment opportunities for European labour and that there would be special provision for the training of sons of white miners to fit them for European jobs. In submitting the proposals to its membership the Union leadership put its case for acceptance as follows:

It must be obvious to all that in the context of this country the question of African Advancement must be faced. It should be equally obvious that failure by the Mining Joint Industrial Council to evolve a plan may well result in irresistible political and economic pressures being exerted from within and without forcing an outsider solution upon us.²⁸

In the 80 per cent poll which followed amongst the European mineworkers, 1,868 voted in favour of accepting the Union's recommendations, with 1,288 voting against.²⁹

The proposals submitted to the membership also included the following statement:

The proposals are an attempt to provide a final solution to the African Advancement problem in the industrial field by creating a ladder of jobs from the top to the bottom of the scale. The only criteria on which selection will be based will be ability and character.³⁰

In other words, the European Union was no longer going to operate a colour bar to exclude Africans from performing jobs in its field of representation. Yet such advanced Africans would receive European rates of pay.

Paradoxically, it was the African Union's interpretation of the latter guarantee as a 'final solution' which led to the breakdown of negotiations between the Companies and the African Union over the second advancement proposals in 1961.

The Morison Commission, appointed to look into the breakdown in conciliation, reported that the strained relations between the Companies and the African trade union were largely due to their differing

conceptions of the meaning of African advancement.³¹ Since advancement had little immediate consequence for the average worker, and since most of the jobs excised went to the Staff Association, so the African Union's interpretation of advancement hinged on the overall improvement of conditions for all Africans. They argued that the wages paid to the lower-category jobs should be brought into line with those paid to the incumbents of 'advanced jobs' in the European field of representation by raising the remuneration for the former. They were demanding a unified wage structure in which the wages paid for all jobs in the African field of representation should be systematically linked on an evenly graduated scale to the wages paid for jobs in the European field of representation. Such a demand, if met by the Companies, would have meant considerable overall increases for the entire membership and not just those in the newly created advanced categories. The Companies were totally opposed to a unified wage structure, pressing for the retention of the dual wage structure, in which jobs in the European field of representation were to be remunerated on a pay scale unrelated to the 'African' scale. The Commission compromised by awarding a wage increase that would go some way towards reducing the gap between the lowest paid workers in the European field of representation and the highest paid workers in the African Union's field.

At the time the Morison Commission sat, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was already showing signs of collapse. With the prospect of independence being granted to Northern Rhodesia in the near future uppermost in many people's minds, the Europeans realized that their present status would soon be untenable and were therefore prepared to negotiate compensation for any loss incurred.

The two advancement agreements had provided a ladder of advancement into the field of the European Union's representation, but the Companies felt that only major reorganization of the manning structure could facilitate African advancement.

In 1964 we increased the amount of supervision, fragmented jobs and added new jobs. We felt that this was necessary because we were promoting people of less experience and therefore less competence at their jobs. It was at this time that the intermediary level of supervision—the Section Boss—was introduced, the number of Shift Foremen was considerably increased as was the number of Assistant General Foremen. Zambianization has exceeded all expectations. I must admit that myself and many others did not anticipate that the Zambianization programme would be so successful. However, the initial panic measures have made the whole structure top-heavy; many of the levels and jobs created in 1964 could now be done away with.³²

Before all these changes could be implemented the Companies had to persuade the European Union to drop its closed shop clause and to end all forms of job demarcation. This was accomplished in the first round of negotiations in 1964; subsequent rounds saw previous guarantees of employment finally turned into compensation agreements and expatriate conditions of service in 1966. Under severe pressure from rival leadership, the Zambian Mineworkers' Union (the former African Mineworkers' Trade Union) accepted the new manning structure, and with it the implications of a dual wage structure in exchange for relatively small wage increases. The Brown Commission of 1966, faced with the existing dual wage structure, with one pay scale for expatriates and another for Zambians, attempted to bridge the gap between the two with a 22 per cent pay increase for the membership of the Zambian Mineworkers' Union who were on 'local' conditions of service.³³

Even now there still exists a wide gap between the income received by expatriates and by Zambians doing the same jobs. Even though expatriates are on the same basic pay as the Zambians, they receive in addition inducement allowances in the form of fringe benefits which are not available to the Zambian. Since 1966 and the Brown Commission's recommendations, the Government, in co-operation with the Companies, has taken great pains to limit wage increases to the Zambian miners to the very minimum, insisting on productivity increases before considering wage claims. They have argued, as have the Companies on many occasions in the past,³⁴ that wage increases granted to a section of the Zambian labour force whose average income is already twice the national average for industrial employees,³⁵ would do untold damage to the national economy, precipitating spiralling inflation and a widening urban-rural income gap.

We can now draw a few conclusions from the historical evidence presented above which have continuing significance to the present issues of Zambianization. The first and most obvious feature of the history of African advancement has been the persistent and remarkably successful resistance to the very idea by the European daily-paid workers and, to a lesser extent, the European salaried employees. Linked to the resistance is the consolidation of African distrust and suspicion of any white moves in the direction of furthering Zambianization, whether from the Companies or from white employees. Third is the tendency for advancement agreements to leave the structure of the industry largely unchanged, with lines of authority continuing to flow from white to black. Fourth, the interests of the African Union's membership was in the advancement of the material welfare of all and

not just the favoured few, and this is how the Union leadership interpreted African advancement. Fifth, the mining companies have always appeared in favour of African advancement so long as it was gradual, systematic and incorporated the dual wage structure. Sixth, the Northern Rhodesian Government and the Colonial Office in London have played decisive roles in determining the lengths to which the mining companies were prepared to go to implement and force the pace of African advancement. Seventh, in the negotiations over concessions to be made to African advancement, the white employees have managed to capitalize on the urgency of Zambianization by securing for themselves handsome compensation agreements.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY AND COPPERBELT SOCIETY

The particular mine which we shall be concerned with has an expatriate labour force which represents a little under 10 per cent of the total labour force. Lines of authority flow almost without exception from white to black employees. Nevertheless there is a small overlap of income between the lowest paid expatriates and the highest paid Zambians. Thus formally the organization of the mine shows one or two Zambians occupying positions of greater authority than a few expatriates; in practice such Zambians command authority only over




Fig. 1

other Zambians in the same department. The organization may be portrayed graphically by two interlocking pyramids, one composed of white incumbents and the other of black incumbents (Fig. 1).

Jobs at the bottom of the white hierarchy are usually the most senior supervisory positions which necessitate contact with all levels of black labour. In other words, they are the highest positions below the managerial positions. These levels, e.g. mine captains, shift foremen, artisans, etc., are at present being Zambianized. At the top of the mine organization is the General Manager, who is directly responsible to

head office in Lusaka. He is assisted by a group of approximately ten managers, assistant managers and divisional superintendents. Beneath them are the various heads of departments, of which one, the personnel manager, is a Zambian. The organization chart, Fig. 2, shows those layers where expatriates are still to be found.

Accommodation for the few high-income Zambians is in the low-density areas alongside the expatriates. There is no longer any noticeable racial segregation in these areas, though many Zambians who qualify for low-density housing complain that expatriates are favoured in the allocation of houses. However, the legacy of the past and the rigid racial stratification within the industry determines the persistence of segregated patterns of social activities. The various clubs, once the exclusive privilege of the white miners, have lost their popularity among whites as more and more Zambians have joined. There is a tendency even here for segregation to invade the club premises, with each 'race' congregating around its own bars, though this may be attributed as much to class as to race—the two being very difficult to disentangle.

The social pressures militating against interaction across racial lines are difficult to overcome for those who wish to retain the esteem and friendship of members of their own race. This is as true of the Zambian as it is of the expatriate. The black who is seen with a white in his leisure hours is still perceived to be some form of 'stooge', 'informer' or 'pimp' by his fellow Zambians. The basis of a relationship with an expatriate is assumed to be pecuniary and not friendship. On the other hand, the white who mixes with the Zambian is seen as a 'munt-lover' or at the least as eccentric.³⁶ That race relations are still so poor on the Copperbelt, and yet markedly better in Lusaka, the capital, reflects to a great extent the unchanging structure of the copper industry, with blacks never commanding authority over whites—a phenomenon which, by contrast, occurs frequently in the civil service and Government offices.

A survey conducted in 1961 noted a greater resistance among whites to social integration than to African advancement within industry. While 50 per cent of white employees would not tolerate social mixing, only 30 per cent were against Africans doing the same jobs as themselves.³⁷ Thus one finds that even in those work situations where whites and blacks are doing the same jobs, or are of equal formal status, the two groups tend to interact only when the job makes it unavoidable. Otherwise they work as segregated groups.

NOTES

1 For an account of the colour bar system on the Copperbelt in the early years of mining see Lewin (1941).




Fig. 2. Organization chart for a copper mine

□ Zambian incumbent, ○ expatriate incumbent

- 2 Quoted in Government of Northern Rhodesia (1948), p. 34, para. 253. The Commission was chaired by A. Dalgleish and the report will be referred to as the Dalgleish report.
- 3 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1935). The Commission was chaired by Sir Alison Russell and will be referred to as the Russell Commission.
- 4 Epstein (1968).
- 5 Bromwich (1961), p. 3.
- 6 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1940). This Commission was chaired by Sir John Forster and will be referred to as the Forster Commission.
- 7 Prain (1954), pp. 94-8. Prain, at that time chairman of Rhodesian Selection Trust, describes those pressures under which the Companies operated which militated against the pursuit of African advancement. Support for his views is given in Government of Northern Rhodesia (1957); see p. 31, para. 101. This Commission will be referred to as the Honeyman Commission, after its Chairman.
- 8 Bromwich (1961), p. 4.
- 9 Cited in Government of Northern Rhodesia (1954), p. 7, para. 21. This board of inquiry was chaired by Sir John Forster and will be referred to as the Forster Board.
- 10 See Epstein (1968), p. 91, for an analysis of the motives of the European Union and the African Mineworkers' Union. For a different interpretation of the European Unions' objectives see Prain (1954), p. 95.
- 11 See Prain (1954), p. 95.
- 12 See, for example, Rotberg (1967), p. 178.
- 13 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1953), para. 18 (henceforth referred to as the Guillebaud tribunal or award). For a similar view see, for example, Government of Northern Rhodesia (1954), paras. 149 and 150.
- 14 The tribal representatives constituted a body elected by and responsible to the mineworkers who were to act as a go-between in the conduct of worker-management relations. They followed in the wake of tribal elders, who were appointed by tribal chiefs, after the Forster Commission (1940) recommended the abolition of the latter. See Epstein (1968), chapter III.
- 15 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1953), para. 28.
- 16 See Prain (1954), p. 98.
- 17 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1954), pp. 28-9.
- 18 See, for example, Government of Northern Rhodesia (1953), para. 18; *id.* (1954), para. 103, Government of Zambia (1966b), para. 36. This Commission was chaired by Mr Roland Brown and will be referred to as the Brown Commission. See also Prain (1954), pp. 100-1.
- 19 See Epstein (1968), pp. 107-8.
- 20 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1962), companies' evidence, pp. 17-18. The Commission itself was chaired by Sir Ronald Morison and will be referred to as the Morison Commission.
- 21 Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (1957), p. 7.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 23 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1956), para. 156. This Commission was chaired by Sir Patrick Branigan and will be referred to as the Branigan Commission.
- 24 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1957), paras. 23-49.
- 25 *Ibid.*, para. 41.
- 26 Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (1959), pp. 8-9.

- 27 Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), I, p. 17.
 28 Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union (1960), p. 2.
 29 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1962), companies' evidence, p. 21.
 30 Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union (1960), p. 3.
 31 See, for example, Government of Northern Rhodesia (1962), p. 11, para. 52.
 32 Interview with a management official who had been intimately concerned with the introduction of the new manning structure at one of the mines.
 33 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1966b), conclusions of the Commission, chapter one.
 34 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1953), para. 18.
 35 Government of Zambia (1971a). Table 4.3, p. 43, shows the relationship between the annual earnings of African mineworkers and all other African industrial employees.
 36 Dollard (1937) illustrates similar pressures in a racially segregated society in the southern states of America. 'Munt' is a racially insulting expression used by whites to refer to Africans.
 37 Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), II, pp. 108-10.

CHAPTER THREE

ZAMBIANIZATION—TOO FAST OR TOO SLOW? FORCED SUCCESSION

FROM AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT TO ZAMBIANIZATION

The struggle for African advancement took place over the conference table between representatives of the Companies and the various Unions and Staff Associations. From the time the first advancement agreement was signed in 1955, the struggle revolved around the number of jobs to which Africans could now advance and the remuneration to be awarded to those jobs. Once African advancement had been accepted in principle by all parties in 1964 it took on the new name of *Zambianization*, but its pursuit still carried with it an orientation more appropriate to the previous era. The assessment of *Zambianization* was still pre-eminently quantitative—how many expatriates remained in the industry, to what jobs the *Zambians* were now advancing and how much they would be paid. The problems were debated around conference tables in Lusaka at meetings of the *Zambianization* Committee by representatives of the Companies, the Government and the Mineworkers' Trade Union. Interested parties failed to break with the past or to see that the problem of *Zambianization* was less a matter of formal agreement than of implementation. The Brown Commission¹ similarly failed to formulate a new set of questions and problems germane to the new circumstances. Rather than inquire into the support the Companies gave to the schemes, which the Commission agreed was satisfactory, it might have been more appropriate for the Commission to have paid some attention to the attitudes of the lower levels of mine management. The *Zambianization* Committee's report² of 1968 continued in the tradition of African advancement by dwelling on figures provided by the Companies and also came to the conclusion that *Zambianization* was progressing satisfactorily. Figures can be selected, discarded or interpreted to suit one's particular interests—in this case the interests of the Companies and possibly of the Government. They obscure an understanding of the problems peculiar to *Zambianization* as distinct from African advancement: problems related to the abilities of the newly promoted *Zambians*, to the degree of fragmentation, problems relating to supervision and relations with supervisors, problems of training and selection and the legacy of continued resistance to *Zambian* aspirations.

The shift from African advancement to *Zambianization* involves a