

- 27 Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), I, p. 17.  
 28 Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union (1960), p. 2.  
 29 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1962), companies' evidence, p. 21.  
 30 Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union (1960), p. 3.  
 31 See, for example, Government of Northern Rhodesia (1962), p. 11, para. 52.  
 32 Interview with a management official who had been intimately concerned with the introduction of the new manning structure at one of the mines.  
 33 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1966b), conclusions of the Commission, chapter one.  
 34 Government of Northern Rhodesia (1953), para. 18.  
 35 Government of Zambia (1971a). Table 4.3, p. 43, shows the relationship between the annual earnings of African mineworkers and all other African industrial employees.  
 36 Dollard (1937) illustrates similar pressures in a racially segregated society in the southern states of America. 'Munt' is a racially insulting expression used by whites to refer to Africans.  
 37 Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), II, pp. 108-10.

## CHAPTER THREE

## ZAMBIANIZATION—TOO FAST OR TOO SLOW? FORCED SUCCESSION

## FROM AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT TO ZAMBIANIZATION

The struggle for African advancement took place over the conference table between representatives of the Companies and the various Unions and Staff Associations. From the time the first advancement agreement was signed in 1955, the struggle revolved around the number of jobs to which Africans could now advance and the remuneration to be awarded to those jobs. Once African advancement had been accepted in principle by all parties in 1964 it took on the new name of Zambianization, but its pursuit still carried with it an orientation more appropriate to the previous era. The assessment of Zambianization was still pre-eminently quantitative—how many expatriates remained in the industry, to what jobs the Zambians were now advancing and how much they would be paid. The problems were debated around conference tables in Lusaka at meetings of the Zambianization Committee by representatives of the Companies, the Government and the Mineworkers' Trade Union. Interested parties failed to break with the past or to see that the problem of Zambianization was less a matter of formal agreement than of implementation. The Brown Commission<sup>1</sup> similarly failed to formulate a new set of questions and problems germane to the new circumstances. Rather than inquire into the support the Companies gave to the schemes, which the Commission agreed was satisfactory, it might have been more appropriate for the Commission to have paid some attention to the attitudes of the lower levels of mine management. The Zambianization Committee's report<sup>2</sup> of 1968 continued in the tradition of African advancement by dwelling on figures provided by the Companies and also came to the conclusion that Zambianization was progressing satisfactorily. Figures can be selected, discarded or interpreted to suit one's particular interests—in this case the interests of the Companies and possibly of the Government. They obscure an understanding of the problems peculiar to Zambianization as distinct from African advancement: problems related to the abilities of the newly promoted Zambians, to the degree of fragmentation, problems relating to supervision and relations with supervisors, problems of training and selection and the legacy of continued resistance to Zambian aspirations.

The shift from African advancement to Zambianization involves a

corresponding shift of attention away from the conference table and the adding machine to the psychology and sociology of the work situation. The following discussion, based on this assumption, treats Zambianization as a special case of 'succession'.<sup>3</sup>

#### FORCED SUCCESSION

Zambianization has been a 'forced succession' in the sense that personnel from both races have privately questioned the legitimacy of the 'displacement' of white by black, and also in the sense that the new incumbent has often been inadequately prepared to take over the new position. The decision to Zambianize has been 'forced' upon management by the political climate of Independence, which demands the fulfilment of Zambian 'aspirations' by replacing white personnel with Zambian personnel as quickly as is consistent with efficiency.<sup>4</sup>

The legitimacy of the authority exercised by whites developed from their colour, which over the years had come to symbolize in the mind of the African on the one hand expertise and on the other brutal and often arbitrary discipline.<sup>5</sup> The social distance which separated the races and the unquestioning supremacy of one made it impossible for the African to temper white oppression through informal social and political pressure. White man's authority bore strong elements of 'tradition' and 'charisma' which the Zambian, when he takes over, is not able to emulate. Though he may try to act like a *bwana*<sup>6</sup> he may fail because, for one thing, he does not bear the symbol of authority and, for another, unlike his predecessor, he is subject to informal social, economic and political pressures from his subordinates. But such influences can also work in the reverse direction, and, as we shall see, the Zambian supervisor is able, under favourable conditions, to manipulate informal social controls to strengthen his position. Nevertheless the crisis of legitimacy brought about by the breakdown of traditional and charismatic authority leads the Zambian to place ever-increasing reliance on authority derived from the bureaucratic system.

Unfortunately for him this, too, is often a diminished version of what was potentially available to his predecessor. For the authority exercised by the newly promoted Zambian over his subordinates derives from the support extended to him by his supervisor and other expatriates who control the bureaucratic apparatus. Because the expatriate is often indifferent, if not resistant, to the success of Zambianization, the support the Zambian successor receives from above is not always the same as his predecessor used to enjoy. The attitude of the expatriate can be explained by reference to the peculiar circumstances and history of black-white relations on the Copperbelt, the racial prejudices of both

the Zambian and the expatriate communities, the continuing racial stratification within the industry and the transient commitment associated with expatriate status. On the other hand, such resistance to change is a common phenomenon in industry and is also found, for example, among civil servants when there is a change of government. There is a natural resistance to any succession which is seen by the permanent incumbents as threatening their interests or demanding adjustment.

Acknowledging the inevitability of some resistance by expatriates to Zambianization, and assuming that efficiency can be maintained only if displacement takes place in a systematic and planned manner, the mining companies each year prepare Zambianization forecasts for the following few years. These forecasts are available for Government examination, and considerable pressure is applied by top management on the lower levels of management to fulfil the predictions. In this way the Companies can be assured that progress is being made and can present visible evidence of this to Government. On the other hand, the very bureaucratic manner in which departments are compelled to adhere to Zambianization forecasts, and the assumption that without these the department would in fact resist Zambianization, have given rise to manipulations which militate against effective Zambianization. When Zambianization is imposed from above, whole-hearted co-operation is unlikely to prevail. When there is compulsion to satisfy forecasts, then there is a danger that Zambians will be promoted to positions for which they are obviously unprepared, with the result that new posts may be created for expatriates to oversee the new Zambian successor.

The heritage of educational underdevelopment<sup>7</sup> and resistance to advancement has left Zambians often unprepared to take over many of the new jobs. The consequence of sometimes inadequate training, low levels of literacy and numeracy and the remorseless implementation of Zambianization forecasts has been to promote a number of Zambians above their level of competence. All these factors add up to what we have termed 'forced' succession.

#### REACTION TO FORCED SUCCESSION

A number of organizational changes have been introduced to cater for the competing demands of expatriate labour, Zambianization forecasts and industrial efficiency. The first is an old one, for which the Companies fought without much success for years, namely fragmentation. The newly promoted Zambian takes over only a portion of the job done by his predecessor, but is verbally assured that when he proves capable he will be given the whole job. In the meantime the succession is

accompanied by the creation of new posts for some of the displaced expatriates. This not only provides further employment for expatriates but also increases the number of authority levels between the Zambian and the head of department.

The figures for the copper mines indicate that expatriate strengths have declined steadily since Independence in 1964, when there were 7,326, to a total of 4,390 at the end of 1970.<sup>8</sup> The rate at which the numbers have declined has been steadily falling as the jobs being Zambianized become more important and therefore fewer in number. Another reason for the decline, apart from the direct impact of Zambianization, has been the unwillingness of some expatriates to stay in a country ruled by Africans, and the difficulties the mines have had in replacing such labour, resulting in an under-strength expatriate labour force. Another set of figures shows the tendency, referred to above, to create new posts for expatriates at higher levels. Taking statistics for the copper mines, Broken Hill lead and zinc mine and associated companies, we see from Table III that, though the total numbers of expatriates show a decline since 1967, the number in senior staff positions and above has increased.<sup>9</sup>

Table III

*Expatriate employees on the copper mines, Broken Hill lead and zinc mine and associated companies*

	Senior staff and above (expatriates)	Industry total (expatriates)
30 September 1967	872	6,299
29 February 1968	907	6,164
30 September 1969	1,214	5,935
28 February 1970	1,094	5,602
28 February 1971	1,184	5,567

*Source.* Copper Industry Service Bureau. Figures refer to the whole industry, including both the mines and associated companies.

In some instances the newly promoted Zambian and the expatriate displaced into the newly created position do much the same jobs as they did before the succession occurred. All that has changed are their salaries, which have both increased, and their job titles, which both sound more important than the previous ones. Such distortions have been justified

by reference to the level of manpower available, though, as we have seen, they also further the material interests of the expatriates. These expedients necessarily increase operating costs. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that increases in senior staff are much more pronounced

Table IV  
*Expatriate senior staff increases*

Mine	No. of expatriates in senior staff positions		
	at 30 September 1967	at 30 September 1969	% increase
Nchanga	137	164	19.7
Mufulira	103	124	20.2
Rokana	207	236	9.2
Luanshya	116	121	4.3
Bancroft	82	83	1.2

*Source.* Copper Industry Service Bureau.

Table V  
*Engineering Department strength at a selected mine*

Position	No. of incumbents		
	in 1962	in 1969	in 1971
Manager, Engineering	0	0	1
Engineering Superintendent	1	1	2
Divisional Engineer	4	6	6
Assistant Divisional Engineer	0	8	14
Section Engineer	26	30	40
<i>Total</i>	31	45	63

*Source.* Copper Industry Service Bureau.

in the richer mines—Nchanga, Mufulira and Rokana—than at the 'marginal', high-cost mines of Luanshya and Bancroft, as Table IV indicates. Table V shows that at one mine, where production has not

changed significantly, the engineering department has doubled its strength in the most senior positions over the last decade. The figures suggest that the engineering department has capitalized on *Zambianization* to expand the number of expatriate personnel.

As a result of expatriate resistance, and possibly of the *Zambian* successor's inadequacy, the latter may not be accorded, either formally or informally, or both, the same status as his white predecessor or his white colleagues. He may not be invited to the meetings which his predecessor attended,<sup>10</sup> or he may not be granted the same favours by his supervisor, such as using the latter's toilet or awarding overtime to his men. In each case his authority over his men is undermined and the respect he can command from them is diminished.

It is to be expected in any well prepared *Zambianization* scheme that as *Zambianization* progresses so one level of expatriates disappears after the next and that those who remain are at the top of the pyramid. In contrast to the civil service, where the top ranks were *Zambianized* at an early stage, on the mines the accepted view is that the absence of technical qualifications and long experience of mining among top-level management would endanger production. In addition to the tendency to *Zambianize* only from below, those who prepare the *Zambianization* programmes for their departments have taken great pains to ensure that stratification by race invariably coincides with stratification by authority and that no expatriate has to take instructions from a *Zambian*. As a result, expatriates are never found competing for the favours of a *Zambian*; hence they retain their solidarity in opposition to the *Zambian* and their grip over the bureaucratic apparatus. They are able to decide how much authority and power shall be delegated, who shall be promoted and how the organization shall be structured.<sup>11</sup>

To the extent that they are concerned to protect hitherto 'white' jobs from being *Zambianized*, those who control the departmental organizations can introduce a number of barriers. One such barrier, which has also been noted by the Copper Industry Service Bureau, is the introduction of qualification requirements in excess of the *actual* requirements of the job. This is to be found most commonly in the technical field, where promotion may be barred to those who have not the requisite 'diplomas' or 'certificates'. Yet the supervising expatriates do not have these same qualifications which are required of the aspiring *Zambian*. It is only since *Zambianization* has become a reality that qualifications have become such an important criterion for progression within industry. Apart from the refusal to promote *Zambians* because they lack some basic attribute which may have little to do with the quality of the job performance, in some instances *Zambians* have been held in acting positions for long periods until they have become so

frustrated that they have asked for a transfer or left the mine. (Whether the expatriate is deliberately frustrating the *Zambian* in order to protect his own job or those of his fellow expatriates, or whether he genuinely feels that the *Zambian* is not able to cope with the job in question, is never easy to discern and will vary from situation to situation and from person to person.) Another organizational manipulation which has the same consequence is the expansion of the department to include a greater number of expatriates and, equally significantly, a greater number of organizational levels. By bringing in 'experts' from overseas with fancy job titles who do relatively mundane jobs, so expanding the department, the organizational gap between the *Zambian* and the head of department is widened. This again can be done only so long as profits are high enough to cover the additional cost of the inefficiencies that are involved.

#### PRESSURES ON THE SUCCESSOR

Further to the organizational changes, consideration must be given to the pressures with which the successor must contend—namely, resistance from his immediate subordinates, indifference, if not resistance, from his expatriate supervisors, and the satisfaction of efficiency requirements, while all the time struggling with mounting anxiety through being on prolonged 'trial'. His success in adapting to such pressures will depend largely on the powers granted to him by his supervisors. I shall consider these first.

THE EXPATRIATE AND HIS ATTITUDES. During the 'fifties, when the Federation was in its heyday and when the selling price of copper was so high that incomes were doubled by the copper bonus,<sup>12</sup> the European felt that the country and the mines belonged to him. The atmosphere within the white communities and in the clubs around which revolved the mainstream of social life<sup>13</sup> was that of a moneyed class who were 'living it up' on their newly won wealth. With the 'sixties came the 'winds of change' and the imminence of Independence. The collapse of the Federation in 1963 was closely followed by the transfer of political power to the *Zambian* people. The white mining community was also acutely aware of the upheavals that were occurring across the Congo border in Katanga.<sup>14</sup> Though the white miners may have resented the usurpation of white power, they nevertheless adapted to the changed circumstances and confounded many of the pessimistic predictions that there would be a mass exodus from the Copperbelt. Table VI shows the changes in labour turnover and length of service of expatriate employees since 1960.

Political independence, coupled with the change to expatriate conditions of service, marked a corresponding change of attitude to work, to the mines and to the country. Whereas before their commitment was likely to be high, even though their stay might have been brief, since they were striving for their own and possibly their children's prosperity (white prosperity), now they were being hired on three-year contracts to provide expertise to man the mines for the Zambian Government and to train Zambians to take over from them. The morale of the communities dropped as they failed to identify with the aspirations of the

Table VI  
*Expatriate labour turnover and length of service*

Year	Annual % turnover	Average length of service (years)
1960	17.4	5.6
1961	20.7	5.5
1962	15.2	6.0
1963	33.0	5.6
1964	25.1	5.8
1965	22.5	6.4
1966	33.9	6.3
1967	28.6	6.0
1968	32.0	5.6

Source. *Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry Year Book, 1968* (1969), tables 14 and 17, p. 47.

newly independent Zambia and continued to hark back to 'the good old days'.

Once South Africa was proscribed as a source of expatriate labour by Government decree, the mining companies began to experience difficulties in recruiting manpower sufficiently qualified and experienced to run the mines.<sup>15</sup> The scarcity of expatriate labour was reflected in the calibre of the personnel who were actually recruited from English-speaking countries outside South Africa and Rhodesia. The high cost of recruitment from Europe and the short supply gave the expatriate employees increased bargaining power with management. The expatriate, realizing his strong position, was able to escape any severe demands upon him. He could if he wished adopt a very casual approach to work. As one metallurgist from the U.K. said,

The present foremen recruited from England—not graduates but from industry—tend to take it easy. They don't set a good example to the

workers, they tend to stand aloof. . . . Where they don't know the job properly then the workers can run rings around them, refusing to cooperate and trying to get away with anything. They will have little respect for the foreman who does not know his job properly. . . . If he doesn't want to learn from the Zambian then he is sure to be in trouble. The new foremen do not anticipate that the job would be so tough. There is a lack of interest in the job. . . . They come out here only for the cash.<sup>16</sup>

Three other factors have adversely affected the expatriates' attitudes and work behaviour. First, the inducements held out to the expatriate recruited overseas were very often not fulfilled on arrival. Families often complained that the high cost of living made it impossible for them to save as much as they had anticipated. Second, there was the widespread feeling of physical insecurity amongst expatriates fearing burglary or attack and worrying about the safety of their families when they were on night shift. Third, expatriates have become increasingly concerned about the schooling of their children ever since segregation was eliminated. Now plans are being made to restore mine primary schools at a fee of approximately K150 a year, which would preclude most Zambians and provide superior primary education for mainly expatriate children. Fourth, many expatriates complain about the length of the working week—five and half days—which leaves only one day for rest. Many, of course, have to work on different shifts also. Fifth, the newer expatriates recruited from the United Kingdom experience resistance from the old hands who have spent more time on the Copperbelt or in South Africa. The antagonism of the old-timer, who is usually in the more senior position, makes it difficult for the 'VC 10-er'—the contemptuous name given to those who fly out from the U.K. on contract—to establish himself and perform his job effectively. As one expatriate assistant general foreman said,

The newcomers to the plant are particularly resented when they shoot up the promotion ladder. This is understandable when one realizes that the Dutchmen [a pejorative word for South Africans of Afrikaaner origin] would spend years climbing to positions which we slot into in a matter of months. As a result there is an unwillingness for the old-timers to train newcomers or to give them any co-operation. The old-timer will often do the dirty behind your back. The newcomer has therefore got an uphill task in trying to prove himself capable and many fail to do so.

All these factors—expatriate status, low-calibre personnel, strong bargaining position, unfulfilled expectations, insecurity and antagonism from the old-timers—contribute to a relatively low commitment to the job. The Companies have failed to record publicly the difficulties they

are experiencing with expatriate labour for reasons I shall consider later. However, the conclusions of a board of inquiry into railway accidents in 1967 are of immediate relevance.

Our investigations also disclosed that there has recently been a lessening in standards and discipline, morale and co-operation amongst railwaymen. Although these did not actually affect this accident, they could easily lead to other accidents. This deterioration was partly due to the growing pains of a young railway but was contributed to by a non-caring attitude on the part of other expatriates who have elected to stay with Zambia Railways, and to a general feeling of indifference amongst a number of recent Zambian employees. The latter was in part due to inadequate disciplinary fines imposed for offences against discipline. These had little effect when amounts earned in wages and overtime were very much greater.<sup>17</sup>

An expatriate mining engineer recently graduated from an overseas school of mining had this to say:

We feel that expatriates are here under sufferance. The contracts are for short periods and we are to be pushed out as soon as possible. We are not trying very hard; I should say I am putting in about 50 per cent effort. The external influences are most important in making us despondent. With little security for my wife and children, and hostile attitudes from Government, sometimes I wonder whether I will finish my contract. But there's nothing wrong with the job itself.<sup>16</sup>

Comments of a 45-year-old semi-skilled Malawian mineworker who had a labour history going back to 1942 are also revealing:

The policy of Zambianization has encouraged foreign workers to become lazy. We people from Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa and all the whites pretend for the eyes of our supervisors that we are working hard but in fact we are not. Even the whites who used to be very strict in supervision seem to be very relaxed now.

The expatriate can escape management sanctions because, as I have suggested above, he is in a much stronger bargaining position owing to his scarcity value. A Zambian worker reports:

White men go with newspapers underground and no disciplinary action is taken, but when an African does this, discharge is effected . . . Also white men are now trying to work against Zambianization instead of trying to promote productivity.

Of course, the expatriate is also in a more favourable position in relation to his supervisors, who are of the same ethnic origin and who may therefore be subjected to informal social pressures not to take action.

The expatriate reaction to Zambianization cannot be reduced to a

simple stereotype. The survey of 1961 already referred to<sup>18</sup> showed wide discrepancies in expatriate attitudes towards Africans. Thus whereas 56 per cent of the daily-paid workers would not tolerate any social contact with Africans, the corresponding figure for staff categories was 37 per cent. The figure for South Africans was 60 per cent and for citizens of the U.K. 33 per cent, for the English-speaking South Africans 47 per cent and for the Afrikaans-speaking ones 74 per cent. A similar, though less marked, division exists today between the conservative old-timers and some of the new recruits. (Sixty-three per cent of expatriate employees have been in Zambia less than six years, 82 per cent less than eleven years.<sup>19</sup>) None the less the recently arrived expatriate quickly internalizes many of the values inherent in the community, e.g. that the African's ability, if not actually inferior, is decidedly different. Expatriate assessments made openly conform to a narrow pattern—the Zambian lacks initiative and a sense of responsibility, he fails to plan and 'you've got to be tough with him or else he won't respect you'. As to social mixing, both on and off the job, its absence, for those who need to justify it, is excused by cultural explanations, 'they can't think along our lines and we can't think along theirs', or 'the cultural differences are too big to be bridged', etc. On the job, patterns of segregation may develop over tea and in change houses. However, only a few—usually old-timers—will deliberately go out of their way to make life difficult for the Zambian successor, but at the same time few will try to assist the Zambian unless specifically requested to do so by the Zambian himself. 'Why bother when all you get is criticism, suspicion and racial accusations when you get tough with them?' is a common attitude.

With the expatriate uncommitted to his own job, and not sympathetic to his African successor, the results are not very difficult to foresee. Often it is the Zambian who has to take a large proportion of the responsibility and blame for the inefficiency of the white supervisor. A young Zambian surface workman comments:

White men are ruining the economy of this country because whenever it is necessary to advise the African, they just look at him until an accident occurs. Then they say that they have Zambianized the job so it's our fault. Also, white men do not bother about production; whether it drops down or goes up it does not affect them because they are interested in getting their big salaries and drinking in the bars.

An expatriate foreman speaking from his own experience:

The Zambians on the whole get much tougher treatment from their superiors than their white colleagues, who are allowed to get away with a lot. The expatriates try and excuse themselves by saying they haven't

been trained for the job. When it comes to discipline there is a lot of buck-passing, with the General Foreman pushing the responsibility down the line to the Zambian, whereas in fact it might be the expatriate responsible for the mistake.

By focusing the blame on the Zambian and the problems of 'too rapid Zambianization', the expatriate is able to escape responsibility for his own inefficiencies.

Zambianization has become a scapegoat for any failings, no matter what their true origin, as the following story illustrates. When making an investigation into the payments of pensions to the wives of deceased miners, I found that the payment was often delayed by three or four months, during which time the widow might become destitute. I pointed this out to a very senior mining official, showing him a record of the times miners had died and when payments had been made. He rang up the Personnel Manager, who was responsible for disbursing the funds. The latter claimed that the gap was only a few days. When I was told what the Personnel Manager had said, I pointed out that my own figures were taken from the records of the same personnel department. The senior official's immediate remark was 'That's Zambianization for you'. Coming from so important an official the response was significant—'Zambianization' was a once-and-for-all, irrefutable explanation for all that went wrong: 'there's nothing one can do about it'.

**ATTITUDE OF THE ZAMBIAN SUCCESSOR TO THE EXPATRIATE.**  
Brought up in an atmosphere of racial discrimination and discovering that, no matter how high he moves, still the whites have a monopoly of the control of the industry, the Zambian becomes an 'outcast' amongst his expatriate colleagues. To the Zambian they are a hostile group determined to undermine his performance and disgrace him before his subordinates.

The expatriate colleague is listened to by higher officials who are also expatriates. He is treated better, and shown some respect, while I am not. He keeps company with the higher officials outside work but keeps himself to himself at work . . . Our expatriate colleagues usually move faster than Zambians . . . because they have patrons in higher positions. When I find an expatriate colleague or even a Zambian who is less smart than myself getting promotion before myself I don't care how hard I try to feel calm and friendly to this fellow, I find I can't. So even though I don't think he is responsible for the injustice I group him together with the higher supervisors who pull him up by deliberately throwing away the correct promotion procedure and adopting one based on racial groupings.

One particularly sensitive area is the training and occupational mobility of the expatriate as compared to the Zambian.

For Zambians of similar or the same qualifications as expatriates, training periods on the job are far too excessive. The reason given is that we need experience, but then if we need this experience why don't the expatriates? Some of the expatriates are novices right from University or School of Mines. You ask them why they only spend a little time on training and they answer you that even the Government knows that they are on contract and that they cannot afford to spend too much time on useless jobs, so they move up more rapidly. You ask them if they can do the jobs in the higher ranks after not doing so well in the lower ranks. They tell you that it is no concern of theirs, the Government knows better.

Some Zambians are as well qualified as the expatriates, and yet they still receive inferior treatment. This is interpreted by the Zambian to mean that management and possibly Government also assume the Zambian product to be inferior to the expatriate product simply because it is Zambian.

Our supervisors have made up their minds that the Zambian can't be competent. If you give them excellent work they pat you on the shoulder, but behind the scenes they wonder if you actually did the work . . . The Zambian's qualifications are as black as his skin. A Zambian does not necessarily find people in the mines—bosses, that is—who recognize him as a qualified person. His capability is always doubted for reasons of keeping him down. A Zambian given the same task to do as an expatriate usually does it better and in a shorter time, but he is given more work to prove himself capable, whereas an expatriate is passed as competent and taken to the next stage.

Comments from shift bosses who have obtained promotion on the basis of experience rather than qualifications were as follows:

There is a lack of trust among whites when it comes to Africans in responsible jobs. They just fear Government action, that's why they give us such jobs.

Or

A Zambian shift boss can be charged by a mine captain but a white shift boss can never be charged by a mine captain, only by the manager.

Fragmentation and the creation of new posts, quite reasonable expedients in some circumstances, are seen as the white man's means of prolonging his lucrative stay in Zambia.

Zambianization in the mines simply means more jobs being done by Zambians, but for every new job taken up by a Zambian there must be a new and better job for an expatriate. As an example, now that we have

Zambian mine captains on the night shift we have also night shift assistant underground managers. It has not been necessary to have these people before; what now has made it necessary to have underground managers on the night shift?

Another comment about the new post of assistant underground manager was:

Zambianization should come but it is dangerous to Zambianize for fear of Government action. We don't have a good education, all of us here, but we have experience. I would think it necessary to have an assistant manager at first, but that particular assistant should be told how long he is going to assist. At the moment we are not free because we don't know how long the assistant will be there. He is also probably watching us to discover our faults so that he keeps his position.

The Zambian trained overseas also resents the different conditions of service which apply to him and not to his white colleagues with the same qualifications.

A Zambian graduate's salary compared to that of an expatriate of the same qualifications is somewhere between one third and one half. The Companies defend themselves by saying expatriates get allowances which boost their salaries, but how can they pay more in allowances than in salaries? . . . A Zambian is not allowed a loan of any kind. On arrival from overseas university a Zambian is told: 'You have your parents here in Zambia, so you can't get a loan.' Housing is a problem for a Zambian graduate. If, after a long period of waiting, he is promised a house, the promise is good only if no expatriate arrives before the date when the Zambian is to get the house.

At the conclusion of the interview this graduate declared,

My future, like that of many others in my position, is at the mercy of the expatriate officials as long as I remain on the mines. There is only one hope. This is to leave the mines and seek employment in some other industry where conditions of service are much more attractive, economically, socially and with respect to job content. This action is not easy to take, for it means changing a career, but it can be done even to this extreme because the mines are really bad at the moment. Some people have been contemplating going back to university taking a different degree course and that way getting over the problem of joining some other industry as a non-graduate if their present qualification is confined to mining.<sup>20</sup>

Management's reasons for favouring expatriate employees are not here being questioned, but what I have presented is the Zambian successor's interpretation of them: that they symptomize the assumption of Zambians' 'inferiority'. The Government and mining companies

are faced with the problem of having to recruit expatriate labour from other continents to do the same jobs as Zambians, yet paying them rates determined by the international market and the necessary inducements to work in a newly independent African State. To pay the Zambian incumbents at these same rates would not only be expensive but disastrous for the economy as a whole (see chapter one, p. 3, and chapter two, pp. 16 and 21).

At the same time one can readily appreciate the Zambian graduate's perception of his circumstances and his resentment towards the expatriates who control his progress, his job and his status, apparently with the acquiescence of his Government. The racial stratification and non-communication between races except on a master-servant basis can lead only to misconceptions of one another's motives for acting in the way each does. Dishonourable intentions are attributed to well-meaning behaviour. The breach of confidence which is particularly apparent at the threshold level where expatriates and Zambians are doing the same jobs must disrupt the bureaucratic organization, dependent as it is on effective communications and the delegation of authority. The rupture of relations between the Zambian and the expatriate must inevitably have some repercussions on the relations between the Zambian successor and his subordinates.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUCCESSOR AND HIS IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES. Though he will claim publicly that his relations with his immediate subordinates are cordial and that 'they are happy to have an African because he understands their problems', the opposite is probably more usual. The subordinate who yesterday was being trained alongside or was actually himself training his supervisor may fail to comprehend why he was not given preference in promotion to the new post. Others assume that the expatriates deliberately choose those Zambians whom they know will do as they are told and not pose a threat. Jealous of his success, the subordinates of the Zambian successor compare him unfavourably with his white predecessors, who are now glorified as being 'less severe', 'fairer' and more competent.<sup>21</sup>

For any bureaucratic organization Gouldner (1959) has distinguished two criteria of recruitment—one based on seniority and loyalty and the other based on professional status and expertise. The heritage of colonialism has left Zambia with few personnel able to combine both attributes, and the strain between the two patterns is therefore accentuated. The choice is between the old-timer with a low level of literacy and numeracy, and the youngster with little loyalty or experience but a command of the basic educational requirements of the job. Views expressed by the lower-level expatriates indicate a



preference for the 'old-timer', who is, they maintain, more reliable, hard-working and responsible. A distinct distaste has developed for the 'impudent' and 'arrogant' staff learners recruited from outside the industry for accelerated training and promotion. The inclination towards seniority reflects a natural desire for the expatriate to have loyal, obedient subordinates who fear the loss of their jobs rather than critical, self-confident and ambitious youngsters who can easily find jobs elsewhere. The latter are also resented by the older, experienced but less well qualified Zambian supervisors. As an old-time Zambian shift boss remarked,

I don't think the staff learners have the experience to make mine captains. They overlook very important aspects of mining in their rush to become shift bosses in three years. They do not want to take any advice from the uneducated shift bosses.

The youngster with qualifications, on the other hand, will resent his older Zambian supervisor, regarding him as less competent than himself and as thwarting his future progress. The horizons of the younger generation are often blotted out by what he perceives as a layer of incompetent supervisors who exist to protect the junior expatriates from any serious threat of Zambian advancement. The following comments of a well-qualified Zambian typify attitudes to the older generation.

The Zambian who does the same job as myself but who does it because of experience alone is not too easy to get along with. He is sensitive, often feeling that you are going to take over from him and probably become his boss. Thus often he reports trifling matters to higher officials about his trained colleague. I have to be extra careful how I behave towards him, the people I supervise and just about everybody in order to avoid being dismissed as a failure through the reports made by this colleague.

Be they young or old, invariably the Zambian subordinates of the Zambian successor are unlikely to assist him in demonstrating that a Zambian can perform his job as well as, if not better, than an expatriate. In his initial period of trial supervisors and subordinates will be looking for faults in the Zambian successor, while he will be very anxious to fulfil the efficiency requirements of the job.

**DEFENCE MECHANISMS.** What opportunities are open to the successor to offset the cumulative pressures converging on him? Conscious that he is on trial before his supervisor, perceiving an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility amongst his expatriate colleagues, he attempts to seal himself off from anxiety-producing situations by non-interaction with the world of whites. He sees his supervisor only at the latter's request; if

he can, he will avoid meetings; if he can't, he will keep quiet throughout the session. At all costs he must divert attention away from himself and his job by giving the impression that everything is going smoothly in his section. He does not raise the problems he is experiencing or ask questions about what he should be doing. In short, he is intimidated by the power of the expatriates.<sup>22</sup>

With his legitimacy as a successor in doubt, he is forced to draw support from his position in the bureaucratic organization. However, the effectiveness of such a defence is largely conditioned by the amount of discretion and authority extended to him by his supervisors. Thus the new Zambian mine captain situated in the middle of the management hierarchy of a rigidly organized mining department is granted little authority to effect changes or to dispense favours to his subordinates in exchange for their loyalty. A different picture emerges for the Personnel Manager, who has been accorded almost unassailable discretion in dealing with members of his own department. The following account focuses on his position and the defence mechanisms he is able to adopt.

#### THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT AND ITS ZAMBIANIZATION

To understand the variety of defence mechanisms at the disposal of the Personnel Manager it will be necessary to give a brief outline of the department, its function and its history.<sup>23</sup>

The African Personnel Department is an outgrowth from the offices of the Compound Manager—a man who in the first two decades of copper mining wielded incontestable power in the African townships and who ruled, sometimes arbitrarily, over all matters affecting African labour. Originally he was responsible for the recruitment, welfare and discipline of the African employee both at work and in the township. Industrial relations problems, disputes between workers, domestic problems, absentee cases, housing, welfare facilities, etc., were all ultimately the responsibility of the Compound Manager.<sup>24</sup> He was given the power to dismiss employees at his own discretion.

Under the old order, the African employee was hired and fired by the African Personnel Manager, through his deputies. All, or practically all, discipline was enforced by an African Personnel Officer hearing and judging a case in the Compound Offices, remote and apart from the work site and its influences. Not infrequently he did not know the work or work place referred to, and he was therefore unable to really appreciate the severity of the offence in the eyes of the person laying the complaint. Nor had he knowledge of the personalities of the European ganger and the African concerned.

Little or no effort was made to understand the difficulties of the

African on the job. He was offered no incentive or training facilities to do better work, and if he had ability and imagination, he had no way of satisfying them, as promotion was largely a matter of luck. Provided he turned up for work regularly and did what he was told, he was allowed to carry on. If he was not satisfactory, because labour was plentiful and cheap he was dismissed without any particular effort to find out reasons, or to fit him for another job.<sup>25</sup>

From 1955 onwards the department underwent reorganization, with the appointment of personnel officers specifically responsible for labour control, discipline, leave, loans, transfers, promotions and discharges at each work point. Attempts were made in the early 'sixties to diminish the powers of the personnel officers, but as late as 1965 workers were still being hired and fired by them. As late as 1966 there were only two African personnel officers, the majority of Africans in the department being assistants, interpreter clerks or simply clerks.

In response to Government pressure the Lusaka top management personnel instructed the mines in 1966 to Zambianize their personnel departments within a period of two years. This was done, but the size, authority and area of discretion of the new department was dramatically reduced. Whereas before the Personnel Manager had control over the department of manpower allocation, work study, training and such odd attachments as 'Parks and Gardens', the Zambian Personnel Manager had control over industrial relations as they affected employees in the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia field of representation and community affairs. Employees in senior staff positions, who with only a few exceptions were expatriates, had their own personnel manager, known as the Staff Development Advisor, who also took control of many of the functions which were previously the monopoly of the Personnel Manager. In fact the position of Staff Development Advisor was created just before the department was Zambianized and the incumbent was the previous white Personnel Manager. The Staff Development Advisor, though he had no direct authority over the Zambian Personnel Manager, was actually given more authority than the Personnel Manager. He had direct access to the General Manager, to whom he reported, whereas the Zambian Personnel Manager was responsible to the 'Manager, Mining' and had no direct access to the General Manager. In practice it was common for management officials to refer to the Staff Development Advisor matters that were rightly the responsibility of the Personnel Manager, because they either got no satisfaction from the Personnel Manager or had no confidence in him. The General Manager, too, would consult the Staff Development Advisor over matters that were in the Personnel Manager's sphere of discretion. These informal contacts naturally gave rise to bitter anta-

gonism between the Personnel Manager and the Staff Development Advisor.

When appointed, the Personnel Manager was assured that his 'lost empire' would be restored to him as he gained more experience and that the Staff Development Advisor would be phased out of existence. In practice, even though the Staff Development Advisor disappeared after three years, as planned, his functions were not transferred to the Personnel Manager, with the exception of the small manpower department. Instead the Staff Development Advisor's duties were fragmented and distributed to a variety of other departments. Management justifies the devaluation of the Personnel Manager's position in two ways. First, it has argued that the old set-up, with considerable power concentrated in the hands of the Personnel Manager, led to unnecessary conflict and inefficiencies and that the true role of the Personnel Department is advisory. Second, management has argued that the low level of competence and experience of the Zambian successor would not permit the transference of the whole job into his hands immediately. Why, then, was the particular Zambian chosen to be Personnel Manager? Management claims that at that time there was no choice, since in manpower allocation Government received priority and what was left for the mines was hopelessly inadequate. Why then Zambianize so rapidly if there was not the available manpower? Management claims that it 'over-reacted' to Government pressure.

These explanations represent but half the story. In practice the order to Zambianize transmitted from head office was greeted with disdain at the mine, particularly within the department. It appears that the responsibility for the successful Zambianization of the department in a period of less than two years was entrusted to one man, who assumed the role of Personnel Manager knowing that his job was to Zambianize himself out of a job. He was less interested in completing his assignment successfully than in getting out of the country quickly with all the compensation a Zambianized expatriate received. The expatriate personnel in the department, though possibly not opposed to the principle of Zambianization, were nevertheless somewhat dismayed at the rapidity with which they were expected to execute it. Zambians who had recently been their interpreter clerks or junior personnel officers were pushed up into senior positions.

At the time the study was made the Acting Personnel Manager, who had been in that position for a year, was in almost everyone's assessment placed clearly above his level of competence, supported by assistants who were equally out of their depth. The function of the department had been largely reduced to investigations of disciplinary cases and advising management on action to be taken—advice that

was not necessarily heeded. The work of the section personnel officers, operating from the work points, is largely clerical and confined for the most part to being present at meetings investigating serious disciplinary cases and submitting daily reports on occurrences at the work point. Such matters as loans, transfers, promotions, leave, etc., all of which had once been the responsibility of the white personnel officers, are outside their area of discretion. They are, in the eyes of the brighter amongst them, nothing more than glorified clerks who have no authority and whose advice may or may not be taken by line management at the latter's discretion. Their competence on the job varies considerably, many having risen from the ranks of lowly clerks with a poor educational background, while others have been recruited from outside after gaining a number of O level passes.

The Acting Personnel Manager, promoted above his level of competence, is subject to all the pressures from above and below that we have already referred to in general terms. His informal contact with expatriate colleagues who are also heads of departments is virtually nil. During working hours he seeks to avoid expatriates and they make no great effort to contact him except when it is necessary. In meetings with heads of departments he generally keeps very quiet and his image of the expatriate is very much coloured by racial prejudices, seeing their actions as being motivated by racial feelings. In this way he is able to rationalize some of his own failings. From below, within his own department, he experiences hostility from juniors who regard him as unsuitable for the job and in whose eyes he has no legitimacy. With regard to the latter he adopts a set of defence mechanisms which minimize his anxiety and offset pressures from his subordinates.

Prior to Zambianization, authority in the department was widely dispersed amongst the personnel officers at the various work points. With Zambianization the Personnel Manager found it convenient to gain a tighter control over his subordinates and has gradually centralized the major decision-making into his own hands. He operated bureaucratic procedures to develop a rigid control of information. By stamping 'Confidential' on important memoranda he is able to justify restricted circulation. The extension of bureaucratic rules with the proliferation of written instructions helps to keep critical subordinates at a distance from the Personnel Manager. Hostilities are in this way redirected against his assistants. Reshuffling personnel from work point to work point with little notice makes it impossible for an officer to establish himself at any one place. Withholding promotion from the deserving or keeping promoted officers on acting grades for unduly long periods exacerbates anxiety and uncertainty. The personnel officers, denied sufficient control over their own jobs, find their perfor-

mance deteriorating, which puts them on the defensive towards their superiors.

The organizational discretion of the Personnel Manager not only enables him to centralize control and dispense penalties but also gives him the opportunity of distributing rewards—usually granted in return for meritorious performance, but sometimes in return for loyal support of the Personnel Manager. One obvious reward is promotion, in which, as head of department, he has the final say. To the extent that he is concerned with efficiency such criteria as tribe, kin or trusted friend must take second place to merit. In practice the scope for dispensing such favours to kinsmen or tribesmen is limited, if only because members discriminated against might precipitate a crisis of confidence and the department lose a number of key men. In addition the Personnel Manager fears accusations of tribalism or 'mulamuism',<sup>26</sup> and these, in the same way as witchcraft accusations,<sup>27</sup> act as a powerful social pressure to conform to acceptable practices. The continuous and open complaints of tribalism and mulamuism that abound are better explained by the projection of personal failings in a fluid competitive situation on to the firm and more ego-gratifying platform of nepotism.

A more effective defensive strategy for the Zambian successor is the recruitment of trusted lieutenants from all levels of the department who will pass on information about the activities, feelings, etc., of the more 'suspect' subordinates to the head of department. Such a network is linked to the Personnel Manager by tribal and kinship ties or on the basis of shared experiences or possibly concubinage. Usually such 'informers' need support from the Personnel Manager, either because their abilities do not meet the requirements of the job or they hope for early promotion. The existence of such a network engenders suspicion, distrust and animosities within the department. Antagonism towards the Personnel Manager, however, is again deflected, this time against his informal group of lieutenants.

A further way of consolidating his status is to seek the support of the Party. Holding a senior position in the personnel department enables the incumbent to control recruitment to the mine, the progress of disciplinary cases and matters relating to community affairs, as well as access to certain confidential and non-confidential information. These are areas in which the Party is also particularly interested. Once cordial and co-operative relations between senior ranks of the personnel department and the local or regional officials of the Party have been established, each has a vested interest in supporting the other. Thus it may prove very difficult to dislodge or demote a senior man in the personnel department without incurring open opposition from the Party, which management will seek to avoid at all costs.

The younger, brighter and better qualified members of the department whose progress is barred by their supervisor resent the latter's consolidation through 'external' supports. Because the more junior members are seen as a threat, they continually suffer frustrations and it is therefore not surprising that they too should seek support from outside in their attempt to progress into high positions. Thus the apparent strength of the United Progressive Party in 1971 in the personnel department suggests that rendering support to an opposition Party was one way of combating their supervisors' monopoly of control and authority. With the banning of U.P.P. and the detention of its leaders, one or two of whom came from the department, frustration among the juniors has mounted. The result is a gradual exodus of all the more competent junior personnel officers into jobs outside the mines. Those who can, leave; those who can't, stay. This, of course, suits both the senior men in the department and also line management, which may often prefer to deal with a docile and insecure personnel officer than one prepared to argue with white management.

By manipulating bureaucratic controls, centralizing authority operating a clique of informers and gaining outside support the Personnel Manager keeps his subordinates at a distance and in a state of anxiety while consolidating his position. But this is done at the expense of conflict, inefficiency, low morale and a rapid turnover of personnel.

## NOTES

- 1 Government of Zambia (1966b). See chapter three of 'Conclusions' for the Commission's assessment of Zambianization.
- 2 Government of Zambia (1968a).
- 3 For comparative studies of 'succession' see Gouldner (1968), Lipset (1968), Guest (1962a, 1962b) and Grusky (1960).
- 4 Mindeco (1970), p. 18.
- 5 See, for example, Rotberg (1967), p. 160.
- 6 *Bwana* is a deferential term of address used by Africans towards their white 'masters', conveying respect and unquestioning acceptance of the white supervisor's authority. Since Independence its use has declined, particularly among younger Zambians, except in a pejorative sense.
- 7 See 'Introduction' for an outline of the development of education in Zambia.
- 8 Figures supplied by the Copper Industry Service Bureau. These figures refer to the mines alone and not to the associated companies.
- 9 Figures supplied by the Copper Industry Service Bureau, referring to the whole industry including both the mines and the associated companies. Figures for February 1971 show that there were 80 Zambians in senior staff positions as compared to 1,184 expatriates.
- 10 It is true that the Zambian successor is often relieved at not being invited or may even go to the extent of deliberately avoiding attendance of meetings, where he may feel intimidated by the presence of expatriates.

- 11 The Zambianization of the personnel department is in some senses an exception to this rule, since the Personnel Manager has sole control over his subordinates and even has one expatriate assistant (advisor) and an expatriate personal secretary under his authority.
- 12 See Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (1957), p. 26.
- 13 See, for example, Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), I, particularly chapter 3.
- 14 Hall (1969, p. 26), for example, speaks of white refugees fleeing south from Katanga after the 'spectacular savageries' of the Congo.
- 15 See, for example, Zambian Anglo-American Corporation's annual report for 1969 and the annual statement of the R.S.T. Group Chairman, Sir Ronald Prain, for the same year.
- 16 Unless otherwise stated, the following quotations are extracted from interviews conducted either by the writer or by one of his collaborators during the period of the field work, December 1970 to April 1971.
- 17 Government of Zambia (1968c), para. 62, p. 18.
- 18 Holleman and Biesheuvel (1960), II, pp. 108-15.
- 19 Copper Industry Service Bureau (1969), table 14, p. 47.
- 20 The comments of this graduate closely resemble those portrayed by a Zambian engineer in the *Times of Zambia* for Wednesday 17 March 1971 under the headline, 'Why the mines lose Zambians'. The engineering graduates are amongst the few who feel sufficiently self-confident and secure to speak out against what they perceive to be the injustices of the Zambianization that operates on the mines.
- 21 Evidence for these latter statements is not direct but comes from reports of informal conversations which personnel officers had with shift bosses at the time of the promotion of Zambian mine captains.
- 22 These comments may not refer to a Zambian successor who has been recruited from outside industry on the basis of his expertise or qualifications. Such personnel tend to be much more confident and assured of another job elsewhere should they not get on well in the mines. However, such successors are very rare, for two reasons. First, high positions in mining are achieved only after some considerable experience has been gained in the lower ranks. Second, there is, as has been repeatedly stressed, an acute shortage of Zambian 'expertise'. The Zambian successor who makes his way painfully up the promotion ladder is less self-assured and naturally experiences considerable job insecurity being at the mercy of his expatriate supervisors. His future in the mining industry depends, as he sees it, on pleasing his expatriate supervisors, since he has no alternative employment opportunities which will bring him equivalent earnings.
- 23 The following account is an abridged summary of the findings of a study the writer conducted of one personnel department. The report of the findings was submitted to the mining company concerned as strictly confidential material.
- 24 See, for example, Epstein (1968), p. 23. Also of interest is Spearpoint (1937).
- 25 Bennett (1961).
- 26 'Mulamuism' is a term coined by the personnel officers to express the exploitation of kinship bonds (as opposed to tribal bonds in 'tribalism') for the distribution of favours, and rewards. (From Cibemba *mulamu*, 'brother-in-law'.)
- 27 The classic study of witchcraft as a form of social control is Evans-Pritchard (1963). For the application of the principles outlined in this work to other societies see Gluckman (1944).