CHAPTER SIX

WORKING CLASS CONSERVATISM?

We saw earlier that African advancement meant little to the average African worker, but that it was used by the Union leadership as a lever to win wage increases for all its members. The majority of the workers show little interest in Zambianization except in so far as it affects their immediate interests. When asked for their views on Zambianization some declared their lack of interest by such comments as:

I have heard of Zambianization. It does not affect me much. Only those who are educated worry about it. I can work with anyone, be they Tanzanian or Congolese.

I have not been affected by Zambianization and I don’t know if it’s progressing properly.

Often workers would give a general approval along the lines:

I have heard of Zambianization—it is good for those who have chances. Zambianization on the mines is very good. There are many Zambians who have taken jobs done by white miners. Zambianization has made a lot of difference in many aspects of the mining industry.

I have seen blacks doing the jobs done by whites. Since Zambians have started taking over the jobs of whites things have greatly changed. We work peacefully. These people understand our problems, though they report us to the general foremen for cases.

The above comments came from workers who were young and who had been recruited since Independence. They had no frame of reference against which to compare the present. The older employees, on the other hand, gave more detailed accounts of their views, including a number of qualifications of approval and in some cases outright disapproval.

Paradoxically, the Zambian successors were seen to be more humane than their predecessors by some and more severe by others. The following is an account of the reaction of a group of underground workers to the news that their mine captain was to be Zambianized.

‘Oh we are finished,’ Alex exclaimed. We all laughed and then I asked him why he thought like that. “The Europeans are better than Zambians. We are knocking off early because the white mine captain said we could knock off early.” Another lasher joined in, “Just see how that shift boss over there behaves. He thinks he can speak cikabanga better than the

Boers. Do you think if he becomes a mine captain we would have any peace?” Stone said, “A Zambian mine captain will make us work very hard because he would like us to know that he is a buana.” I told him I thought Zambians understood our problems better than whites, and that in view of this they would be tolerant in dealing with us. ‘Never! Africans are more severe with other Africans. You will see when he starts. We are going to work like animals.’

The paradox is resolved when one considers that the whites, since they have been on expatriate conditions of service and since Independence, have been very careful not to perpetuate the arbitrary brutal discipline they meted out before Independence. In fact, as I have already suggested, they have often behaved in a remarkably lax manner towards the Zambian. In relation to the post-Independence behaviour of the whites, the new Zambian successor may indeed be more severe. However, many of the old-timers will remember the treatment they were subjected to during the pre-Independence years, and in comparison with that the Zambian successors are very much more humane. The difference of attitudes, then, may be explained in terms of the different reference groups adopted, which themselves depend on the experiences of the individual miners.

In the last quotation there are suggestions that the black mine captain will not be granted the powers of his predecessor. This is a common complaint of the successor, as we have seen, and there for all to see. As an old-time section boss said, I asked Ojukwu what he thought about the Zambian mine captain who will be beginning soon. ‘He was my lasher when he first joined the mines. He was quiet and never gave any trouble. I know this boy [the mine captain] is good and knows his job, but have you ever heard of an assistant underground manager in charge of lashers? . . . Because the new mine captain is black they have found him a buana. He can’t work alone as a black man. They talk about the Zambian mine captain but he only exists in name. The real mine captain is that assistant underground manager in charge of lashing. The mine captain will be just like a shift boss because he will have to go underground all the time. What can you do in an office when your boss is there? The mine captain usually only goes down underground for a short time or for emergencies. His job is to drink tea in the office and receive telephone calls from the shift bosses. Look at these African shift bosses, do you think they are really shift bosses? They just cluster around their mine captain every day for instructions. They are never as independent as the white shift bosses. The white shift boss does whatever he wants and will never ask the mine captain what to do in his section as regards things like overtime, bonuses and other small matters. These black shift bosses take every little case to their mine captain. A European will never trust an African, no matter how educated
he may be. My fear is that the new mine captain is going to be tough with his fellow Africans and they will argue with him because they know he hasn’t had a superior education or understanding of the job.’ I asked Ojukwu how he would regard him in view of his previous position as his lasher. ‘With me he is going to be my kusana. What can I do about it? He is not going to get any trouble from me but from his young friends.’

A rather blunt statement of similar views comes from a young surface worker:

Independence has changed very little on the mines. Though there is nationalization and Zambianization, all these are superficial because white men control everything.

Thus the picture many workers have is that the Africans, though more humane than the whites of the colonial period, are nevertheless more severe than many of their expatriate predecessors. Partly because he has less power and authority and partly because he is insecure in front of his white supervisor the Zambian successor is seen to fear his expatriate boss. To many of the old-timers Independence, nationalization and Zambianization have brought no fundamental changes to the pattern of control in the mining industry. Perhaps the department which has suffered the greatest damage in the eyes of the workers is the personnel department, which, as I have already shown, lost many of its powers on Zambianization. The workers expected that the considerable powers vested in the previous white personnel officers would not only be available to the successors but would be used by the black successors to the advantage of the workers rather than to that of management. The workers perhaps feel betrayed by members of their own race who put class interests before the interests of the racial group. Yet at the same time the emergence of class divisions within the African mining community had occurred long ago, as was witnessed, for example, by the split in the trade union and the rise of the Mines African Staff Association in 1953. Nevertheless the workers still categorize black personnel officers as members of their own race and therefore in so far as they have sided with management they have tended to regard them as ‘stooges’ in much the same way as the ‘tribal elders’ and the mine police had been regarded in the ‘forties and ‘fifties. The following extracts from interviews with workers portray the typical image of the black personnel officer.

The personnel department is not effective. It is on the side of management. The personnel officers are a group of people who have no say. They always tell you to come tomorrow. They do not know what they are supposed to do. Any case does not finish in their offices but is always referred to the mine captain, who decides what to do. I complained to the personnel officer in July this year about my ganger, who said I should go when I have finished my end. When I finished I did not see him and I went home. I was then charged for leaving the job without permission. When I complained to the Industrial Relations Officer he just confirmed the charge without even asking me what had happened. That’s why they are quite useless. They cannot help us. I know one European personnel officer who was fair and did not side with management. One of our friends was fired and complained to the personnel officer. He was back at work because the mechanic who had charged him had no good reasons. I cannot imagine that happening now.

Or another who takes a more class-conscious approach,

The management is good but the black people who have taken over from expatriates are very bad. Once they have been given a big house in town they are happy and forget about the black. People like personnel officers are useless for employees. They are jealous of their fellow Zambians, fearing that their jobs may be taken over if many Zambians are promoted.

The black personnel officer as a representative of management to the workers finds himself the focus of worker-management conflict. He is in one of those intercalary positions to be found in any bureaucracy, on the one hand being in direct contact with the workers and their problems while on the other hand being part of management. His position is exacerbated by the loss of power vested in him by management and by the small influence he has over his superiors in the department and over white line management to settle the workers’ problems in their favour. The previous white personnel officers had closer relations with line management, and more formal authority was vested in their position. They therefore exercised more influence with management and commanded greater respect from the workers.

An examination of the above and many other views expressed by workers towards Zambianization reveals a consistent pattern. The virtues and defects of Zambianization are assessed in the light of immediate rewards and penalties. There is no unquestioning approval of Zambianization on ideological grounds nor any instinctive objection to the persistence of whites who still man the positions of power in the industry. The evidence suggests that the worker is not committed to the rapid Zambianization of the mines. Indeed, his enthusiasm for the emergence of a managerial class of Zambians is often very restrained. We must now seek to discover why this should be.

Working class conservatism has been empirically documented in other countries. For example, Engels, writing to Marx after the first
general election in England in 1868, made the following comments on
the perversity of the British worker:

What do you say to the elections in the factory districts? Once again the
proletariat has discredited itself terribly... It cannot be denied that the
increase of working class voters has brought the Tories more than their
simple percentage increase; it has improved their relative position.9

The authors of *Angels in Marble*—a study of working-class Conserva-
tives in urban England—report that approximately a third of the
working classes vote Conservative at each general election. The writers
divide the working-class Conservative voters into two categories. The
first comprises those who ‘defer’ to the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘inherited superi-
ority’ of the traditional Conservative ruling elite as ‘uniquely qualified’
to govern the country. The Labour challengers for political leadership,
on the other hand, are assessed by such ‘deferentials’ as not sufficiently
competent to rule the nation. The second category—the ‘seculars’—
vote Conservative when they perceive that the policies enunciated by
that party are the more appropriate to their interests. The distinction
between the two groups lies in the differing criteria of legitimate leader-
ship—the one based on ‘competence’ and the other based on ‘policies’.

There is, however, a difference between the legitimacy of a Conser-
vative government amongst the working classes and the legitimacy of
expatriate management amongst the black mineworkers. The ‘compe-
tence’ of a political leadership is perceived to be important to the
ruled, for the latter wish to be ‘well governed’. They feel they are par-
ticipants in the governmental apparatus, identifying with the govern-
ment of the day and demanding that it serve the interests of the nation.
On the other hand, the ‘competence’ of a managerial class is of little
significance to the worker, since ‘competence’ leads only to higher
profits, which the workers generally see nothing of. The worker does
not feel part of, or a genuine participant in, the bureaucratic machin-
ery, which is not perceived as existing to advance the interests of the
workers. What is important to the worker, however, are the labour
policies, wages, working conditions, general treatment, disciplinary
procedures, etc., of management. In this respect the Zambian worker
perceives his fellow Zambian supervisors and bureaucrats with distrust.

Zambianization is no good because Africans are fond of reporting and
harassing their fellow Africans. Obviously they will be involved in
 nepotism and corruption as regards job selection and promotion. White
men are good at understanding their workmen and promotion comes by virtue of one’s experience and long service.

The worker considers that the newly ‘arrived’ Zambian in a high
position will not be able to refrain from misusing his power to favour

some and oppress others in more lowly positions. The expatriate will see
Zambians as an undifferentiated group and cannot be subjected by
Zambians to social pressures based on kinship, tribal, religious, political,
friendship, etc., allegiances, and is therefore more likely to treat each
case equally on ‘universalistic’ criteria. The Zambian, on the other
hand, can be more easily subjected to ‘particularistic’ pressures from
below, just as expatriates are influenced by ‘particularistic’ allegiances
in their dealings with other expatriates. There are suggestions in the
remarks of the workers that the Zambian successor, conscious, as I have
indicated,10 of his social origins, will try to ‘prove’ that he really has
‘arrived’ by over-using and misusing the authority at his command. The
distrust shown by workers towards high-ranking Zambians reflects a
class conflict in which the upper class is quite prepared to exploit the
lower classes ruthlessly in a way the expatriate would not dare so long
as he had no political base of support.

The Zambian worker thus finds himself in a situation of role conflict
—his interests as a worker clash with his interests as a Zambian. For
whereas his nationalist feelings demand that expatriates be replaced
by Zambians, at the same time he fears that the Zambian will exploit
him in a way the expatriates will not so long as they have no political
power. He has, in other words, to choose between two alternative
managerial classes—a white one which is politically insecure and a
black one which suffers from status anxiety. But on what evidence does
the worker base his belief that the Zambian will not necessarily look
after his interests better than the expatriate? Here an analysis of the
workers’ attitudes to the new African Government and the trade union
would be illuminating.

Earlier11 I discussed the emergence of a strong African trade union
after the Second World War, which had much success in winning for
its members considerable wage increases. During the ‘fifties and early
’sixties the Union held regular meetings at each of its branches,12 was
well organized and enjoyed considerable popular support amongst
the membership. The leaders of pre-Independence days have achieved
legendary status. After the attainment of Independence the Zambian
Government perceived the mineworkers as both an economic and a
political threat to the stability and development of the country.
Already the mineworkers were by far the highest paid section of the
country’s black industrial labour force, though of course by no means
as well paid as the expatriate labour force. A wage rise for Zambian
miners inevitably led to similar demands throughout the economy, with
spiral inflation and the exacerbation of the rural–urban income gap.
Though the diversification of the economy, and rural development in
particular, were recognized priority objectives, the greater bargaining
power of the workers in the towns made them difficult to implement. The bargaining power of the mineworkers, who are in a particularly strong position, derives from their control of the copper industry—the mainstay of the economy. Throughout the post-Independence period the Government has feared the power of the mineworkers, and has therefore sought to weaken the Mineworkers’ Trade Union (MUZ). It has attempted to turn the Union from ‘consumption orientation’ to ‘production orientation’—making it an agency that will promote production and productivity rather than looking to the wages and welfare of its members. As far as utterances from the leadership at head office are concerned, it would appear that the Government has succeeded in changing its outlook. Thus the Union’s official policy is hostile to strike action by its members and to any form of ‘labour indiscipline’ such as absenteeism. Where the Union has failed to control its workers the Government has not hesitated to move in and, for example, remove any informal leaders who may be inciting the workers to strike action. In May 1971, when miners were threatening strike action over the productivity agreement signed between MUZ and the Companies, the known leaders were sent into restriction. Strong formal leaders who have risen to pose a threat to the incumbent leadership in Union head office on a platform favourable the interests of the workers have been forced to accept Government positions. The ruling party, UNIP, did try in 1966 to usurp the leaders of the Union and replace them with its own candidates, but failed. Nevertheless the Government has generally succeeded in controlling the mineworkers since 1966, as is witnessed by the absence of any major strike, by the sole wage increase that has been awarded—not a big one at that—and by the perpetuation in office of a leadership prepared to toe the Government line. At the same time the Government has assisted the leadership by legislating for ‘one Union, one industry’, thus eliminating any competition from rival unions, and by seeing to it that the more popular leaders do not successfully challenge the established leadership. The check-off system, combined with a closed shop reluctantly accepted by management in 1964, provides the Union with 50s (30c or just under a dollar) each month from each worker in the MUZ field of representation—about 40,000 workers in all. Thus the Union and its leadership are assured of financial viability without actively campaigning and advancing the interests of the rank and file.

The nature of the Mineworkers’ Union today contrasts vividly with what it was before Independence. We should therefore expect the attitudes towards the trade union of those who were familiar with it before 1964 to be very different from the attitudes of those who are newer to the industry. A survey conducted by the writer in 1969 showed that among the younger generation (those workers under 26), 50 per cent were dissatisfied with the Union and 40 per cent had no interest in it, whereas only 10 per cent were content with its performance. The figures for those older than 26 showed a greater amount of dissatisfaction; 73 per cent were dissatisfied, 9 per cent not interested and 8 per cent content with the Union.

As symptoms of apathy it was found that 63 per cent of the sample did not know the name of their shop steward, 83 per cent did not know the name of their branch chairman, and only 9 per cent managed to mention the names of either the President or the General Secretary of MUZ. Symptoms of dissatisfaction are best illustrated by a few quotations from the interviews. Some old-timers would continually refer to the heyday of the Union.

I only know Katilungu. It appears that when he died the Union died with him.16

What the previous Union won for us has been lost by the present Union.17

Attitudes to the check-off system are predictable and consistent.

They deduct money without first consulting me. You are forced to be a member whether you like it or not.

Workers are very conscious of the way the Union has been bureaucratized, with the leadership becoming increasingly remote. To many, in fact, the leadership appears as a privileged class which is given political support from the Government and management while deriving its wealth from the workers’ subscriptions.

I subscribe to the Union but I don’t want to be a member. They are just thieves. The Union people have a bar in town where they get drunk. They buy themselves nice cars, but they do nothing about our latrines.

Asked if he knew who the branch chairman was, one replied,

He is a fat man, who moves in a green Zephyr. I don’t know him because I just see him move in a car.

The workers see a grand alliance between the Union, the Government and the Companies. The following are typical comments.

It appears that the Union works for the Companies these days; they always follow what the Companies say without considering the interests of the members first.

As for the relationship between the Government and the Union,

The Government has now come in in a big way, stamping its foot on any active trade unionist. They have all been deprived of their powers.
Bitter resentment was also expressed towards the Union's policy on strike action.

When we want to go on strike we just go and without consulting the Union because their policy on strike action is difficult to understand. I do not know how it works. They have delaying tactics when dealing with their colleagues. They are not strong because they are part and parcel of management. They cannot do anything to inconvenience management.

There is a similar disillusionment over Independence and nationalization, particularly amongst those who were working before Independence. To many it appears that Independence and nationalization are synonymous, that the Government took over the mines at the time of Independence when the miners lost their copper bonus. For others,

Nationalization has not made any difference. In fact work has become harder than we expected. The present management is better only in that it treats us well at work, there is no bullying now. The pay scales have fallen because the Company has brought in new grades, and when we complain management says our Government has taken all the money in the 51 per cent and that we should not complain to the Companies but to the Government. We ought to be getting more now because production is high and we are working harder than before.

An extreme view:

Nationalization is bad. Where the Government sets foot there is confusion. The colonial government had many advantages for the miner.

Another view gives expression again to the notion of a grand alliance created to oppress the workers.

We work harder than we did in the Federal days. Pay scales are low. The Union and the Company work together with Government to bring in pay groups which have cut our categories and acting allowances.

While working on surface the following conversation was recorded by a student participant observer:

I do not know what is happening with our Government. During the colonial days we were getting a copper bonus and now this has been abolished and the mining companies say that it has absorbed the bonus into our salaries but we see no difference in our salaries. Then recently we have been cheated that there has been a 5 per cent increase. We tried to complain to the management but it only said, 'Your Government has a 51 per cent share and we only have 49 per cent therefore if you want to complain then go to the Union.' Then we went to the Union and they said, 'If you are tired of the job go home and cultivate the land.' So all this is annoying us and that is why we intend to withdraw our membership of the Union. All the unionists, especially Mr Chakula, are Government supporters and I suspect that the mine management gives them money to cover up its evils in dealing with our genuine complaints.

The worker, therefore, perceives the co-ordination of three 'power elites’—the Union, the Government and the Companies—seeking to exploit him and suppress his demands and complaints. Nationalization, if he perceives it as different from Independence, is an expression of the consolidation and co-operation between the three power elites. The worker is not impressed by the continual call of the 'politicians' to make sacrifices for the development of the rural areas, when those very same politicians appear to be making no sacrifices themselves. Indeed the miners see the Government, Party and Union as elites all amassing great wealth for themselves from the copper produced by the sweat and toil of the workers.

Having expressed the above attitudes towards the Union and Government leadership, it is not surprising that the workers are not convinced that their fellow Zambians would treat them any better than the expatriates who are politically inert and insecure. The workers realize that just because the national leadership achieved power in the name of the Zambian, this does not mean that once in power it will not exploit its weaker brethren. When considering Zambianization the worker is conscious of what he perceives to be a tendency for Zambians in positions of authority to exploit their compatriots. On the other hand the expatriate, whose stake in the country is more transient, fears and is less concerned to oppress the Zambian worker.

Another significant reason for the low worker commitment to Zambianization is the absence of criticism, publicity or propaganda from the country's leadership. Information concerning Zambianization is given the greatest publicity in the management-financed weekly mine newspapers. The Union, the Party and the Government have all been significantly quiet on the issue and have not made any attempts to arouse the workers' interest in Zambianization. In the past African advancement was a powerful political weapon which the Union could brandish before management in the process of wage bargaining—that management was denying the African opportunities to advance. With the growing co-operation between management, the Government and the Union and the emergence of a well defined upper class within these groups it is perhaps no longer in the interests of the Union and national leadership to stimulate worker sentiments in the area of Zambianization. But there are other reasons why the Government and Union should not force the pace or give much publicity to Zambianization.
which I shall consider after discussing the position of the Companies in the next chapter.

CLASS RATHER THAN COLOUR

It would be naïve to presume that a black ruling class would not exploit black workers simply because they were of the same colour. Considering their relations to the means of production the two groups are enmeshed in a structural conflict which takes precedence over the unifying bonds of colour. After all, if whites exploit whites, then why shouldn’t blacks exploit blacks? Alongside the appearance of a Zambian ruling class has appeared a corresponding ideology which, like other managerial or ruling class ideologies, proclaims the worker as indolent and undisciplined. Before Independence the colonial ruling class, in seeking to justify the extreme exploitation of the black worker, claimed that he was in many ways so very ‘different’ (inferior) to the white. He was supposed to be lazy, lacking initiative, responsibility, etc. The black ruling class has taken over many facets of the colonial ideology to buttress and legitimize its own rule. Thus one finds members of the political elite complaining that the Zambian worker is lazy, undisciplined, etc. Elsewhere I have attempted to show that in fact the Zambian worker is far from lazy by any mode of comparison, and the previous chapter suggests that it is the ruling class itself which is the least disciplined and constrained by social norms. As Durkheim has written,

Those who have only empty space above them are almost invariably lost in it, if no force restrains them. At least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by those above them, and for this same reason their desires are more modest.

From the point of view of the worker, Zambianization has brought increasing fragmentation of jobs, control and supervision. Overall, it appears that effort has been intensified while remuneration has increased only slightly, compared with those fortunate enough to move into the ruling class. At the same time the increased effort has been greeted with a barrage of abuse suggesting that the workers are slothful and unpatriotic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the workers, far from being enthusiastic about Zambianization, are more usually apathetic.

NOTES

1 The following comments by workers are extracts from the field notes of Nameta Tembo, Abel Pandawa and Toney Simusokwe. See University of Zambia
CHAPTER SEVEN
PRESSURE ON THE COMPANIES: WHERE DOES POWER LIE?

The Companies' raison d'être, like that of any other business enterprise, is to produce economic profit—a well defined, specific and measurable goal. Without profit, the Companies would close down the mines and abandon their investment until such time as it appeared profitable to re-open them. In their pursuit of profits all economic enterprises incur costs emanating from the physical, economic, social and political environment in which they operate. The physical environment in the case of mining will give rise, for example, to technological costs, while the economic environment may be held attributable for loss of profits through taxation. The political and social environments also impose their own constraints on the efficiency with which the Companies may operate, as for example the Government of Zambia's decree that trade with Rhodesia be cut back or that expatriate manpower be no longer recruited from South Africa. Each party which has a direct stake in the production of Zambian copper has its own interests to pursue and protect, which it will attempt to do in so far as its bargaining power permits. These interests may seriously conflict with the principle of maximization of profits, but so long as the Companies find it worth while to operate, and depending on the negative sanctions at the disposal of those interests, so the Companies will accept constraints on their efficiency.

Changes in the power of the different parties brought about by such events as a falling price for copper, a change of government in Downing Street, or the granting of political independence to Zambia, necessarily lead to corresponding adjustments in Company policies. As chapter two suggested, this is an issue particularly sensitive to the power relations between four major interest groups asserting their claims on the Companies. First there was the Northern Rhodesian Government, acting as a representative of the Colonial Office in London, but which had also been granted varying degrees of autonomy to favour the European population, particularly in the early years of Federation. In the days when the most senior officials of both companies were based in London the British Government was able to exert direct pressure to maintain production at all costs. The Government of the Republic of Zambia has replaced these two pressure groups since Independence. Third was the European Union and its membership, which felt threatened by African advancement, and lastly there was a force which emerged as an articu-