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M.B.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

The Republic of Zambia, formerly the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, became an independent State in 1964. From 1953 to 1963 Northern Rhodesia was part of the Central African Federation, which also included Southern Rhodesia and what was then Nyasaland (now Malawi). In theory the Federation was founded on the principle of partnership between the constituent territories and between the different races. In practice the so-called partnership was also an instrument for legitimizing the exploitation of the rich copper deposits in Northern Rhodesia for the expansion of the Southern Rhodesian economy and the perpetuation of white supremacy. According to Richard Hall, 'the Copperbelt was the milch cow and Northern Rhodesia suffered a net loss in the years 1953-63 of nearly £100 million—the bulk of which was used to develop Southern Rhodesia and the rest to prop up Nyasaland'.¹

Since Independence Zambia has attempted to free herself from the stranglehold South Africa and Rhodesia had over her economy. After the 1965 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence' Zambia made considerable sacrifices to cut off trade with Southern Rhodesia. After two and half years of U.D.I., President Kaunda estimated that sanctions had cost Zambia some K35 million.² Yet, being landlocked, Zambia has been forced to use the Rhodesian and Portuguese railways as a means of exporting her copper and bringing in imports from Beira. Though trade with Rhodesia has declined considerably, trade with South Africa has increased.³ The patterns of the Federation economy continue to bind the newly independent State to its declared enemies to the south. Many of the major companies now operating in Zambia have their parent bodies farther south, while others have very close links with South Africa. One of the mining companies—Anglo-American Corporation—has its head office in Johannesburg and has long been associated with gold and diamond mining in South Africa.⁴ Roan Selection Trust—the other copper mining company—though backed by American capital and with its head office in London, also has links with mining enterprises in South Africa.⁵ Thus only the most superficial examination of Zambia's political economy reveals how extensively it still depends on the white supremacist regimes which surround her to the south, east and west.

A second element of economic dependence is Zambia's reliance on her copper industry to provide over 90 per cent of her foreign exchange and 50-70 per cent of Government revenue. Being heavily dependent on copper as a source of revenue, the Zambian economy finds itself precariously at the mercy of the selling price of copper. National development plans and projects may be frozen arbitrarily and without notice if the copper price takes an unanticipated drop. Attempts have been made since 1964 to diversify the economy, but inevitably, when starting from scratch, such developments take time to materialize. Their success also depends on the willingness of the nation to do without certain goods for a considerable time and to make do with poorer quality substitutes. Zambia has not always been prepared to make such sacrifices.

In 1969 the two mining companies were asked to offer the Government a 51 per cent shareholding in the mines they were running. The compensation terms were generous, being based on the book value of the mines' assets and to be paid back to the shareholders over a period of eight years in the case of Roan Selection Trust and twelve years in the case of Anglo-American Corporation.

In all there are six major copper mines, three belonging to each group. Employed at these mines are approximately 48,000 workers, of which about 10 per cent are expatriate. The average income of the black employees, known as 'local' employees in management phraseology, is K1,248 per year, while the average for black workers in all industries in Zambia is K789 a year.⁶ On the other hand, the average income of expatriates working on the mines is K7,600 a year and in the industrial economy as a whole it is K4,875.⁷ Thus while there is a yawning gap between the average earnings of the expatriate worker and those of the local employee, at the same time, in the context of black employment, the mineworkers constitute a 'labour aristocracy' comprising only about an eighth of total industrial employment.⁸

For these and other reasons employment on the mines has always been the most sought after. Labour histories show Africans progressing from one job to another until finally they are recruited to one of the mines.⁹ Once there they tend to hold on to their jobs. The days of migrant labour, when workers would come to town for short-term employment, have long since passed. Even as far back as 1955 the average length of service of African employees was 4.3 years.¹⁰ In 1969 the average length of service was 9.4 years (as compared with expatriates, whose average was 5.0 years) with a turnover of 6.4 per cent per annum—extremely low by any standards.¹¹

Prior to Independence the African mineworkers were organized in a powerful trade union which since its formation had consistently won

substantial wage increases for its members. The post-Independence period, however, has seen a considerable decline in the Union's independence, since it has been perceived by the Zambian Government as a threat to the prosperity of the country. Miners are continually being exhorted to restrain the pursuit of their own economic welfare because increases in their wages would lead to inflation and to the widening of the gap between rural and urban incomes. Attempts have been made to convert the trade union into an instrument for imposing 'discipline' and sanctions on the workers. Thus the official policy of the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) is to condemn strike action, absenteeism, etc., and to exhort the membership to greater productivity.¹²

The United National Independence Party (UNIP), which has dominated the political scene since Independence, is still strong on the Copperbelt. The official opposition party—the African National Congress—commands support in Southern and Western Provinces, but in the general elections of 1969 it managed to capture only a fifth of the seats in Parliament. Though a one-party State has not been declared, there are signs that such a declaration might be made in the near future. The creation of a third political party in August 1971 with a particularistic appeal to the Bemba-speaking people of the north and the Copperbelt provoked harsh counter-action from UNIP. How strong its support was is not clear, as the party was later banned and most of its leaders were put in detention. UNIP, too, has been used to constrain the miners' demands for wage increases and other improvements in working conditions. Leading regional Party officials have been seen ordering men to return to work when wildcat strikes have broken out.¹³

The third element of 'dependence' is Zambia's reliance on expatriate expertise to run her economy, administration, educational system, etc. The extent of the reliance is greater than in other independent African States because during the Federation very little was done to develop the educational system. As far as Salisbury was concerned, Zambia existed for her copper, and apart from the narrow belt where copper mining took place the country hardly developed at all. As regards the critical shortage of manpower, the *Manpower Report* of 1968 had this to say:

But the lack of priority, the general shortage of funds for education and the limitation of training opportunities meant that steps that were taken in other countries during the crucial decade before Independence were not taken in Zambia. Zambia was less prepared than most other African countries to the North, East or West of Africa.

The result was that at Independence the scarcity of educated Africans in Zambia was extreme. In Zambia in 1964 there were in total just over 1,200 Africans who had obtained secondary school certificates in the

country—about the same number as in Kenya in 1957, Uganda in 1955, Tanzania in 1960 and Ghana in 1943. The number of Zambian graduates at the same time was scarcely 100.¹⁴

The consequences of this situation has been a continuing dependence on expatriate skills in almost all fields. Out of a working population of 756,800, 27,000, or nearly 4 per cent, are non-Africans. But when the situation is viewed in terms of broad occupational groups one can more

Table I
Racial breakdown of the working population, August 1969

	<i>Total</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>Non-African</i>
Professional, technical and related workers	21,300	11,700	9,600
Administrative and managerial workers	10,000	7,500	2,500
Clerical and related workers	63,500	59,400	4,100
Sales workers	39,700	37,600	2,100
Service workers	87,400	86,800	600
Agricultural and allied sectors workers	330,300	329,300	1,000
Production and related workers	204,600	197,500	7,100
<i>Total</i>	<i>756,800</i>	<i>729,800</i>	<i>27,000</i>

Source. Statistical Year Book, 1970 (1971), table 4.19.

readily see the extent of the reliance. Table I refers to the working population 15 years of age and over.

Just as Zambia has tried to wrench herself free of the south and from a reliance on copper production, so too she has sought to replace expatriates with Zambians, the process being known as Zambianization. A glance at the table in note 33 on p. 113 reveals that the Zambianization of positions in central Government service has had the effect of increasing rather than reducing the number of expatriates. One of the main reasons for this is the expansion of the secondary school system, which has necessitated the recruitment of additional teachers from overseas. From the figures, Zambianization on the mines had been consistently pursued with apparently much greater success. Table II refers to employment in the mines, including Broken Hill lead and zinc mine.

It was clear from the outset that the first posts to be Zambianized

would be in the administrative and executive fields, since these deal with policy decisions and require a minimum of formal qualifications. This is indeed what has happened. The personnel departments, for example, were the first, and until now the only, departments to be totally Zambianized.

But the pressure to Zambianize has often had unfortunate consequences. Trade unionists, for example, whenever they comment on Zambianization, complain about the pervasive 'window dressing' that has invaded industry—the tendency to give increased earnings and new

Table II
Expatriate and Zambian mine employees

	<i>Total No. of expatriates</i>	<i>Total No. of Zambians in the field of expatriate employment</i>
December 1964	7,621	704
March 1966	6,592	1,138
September 1966	6,358	1,884
October 1967	5,671	2,617
June 1968	5,024	3,671

Source. The Progress of Zambianization in the Mining Industry 1968, p. 9.

job titles to the Zambian while the man who actually pulls the strings behind the scenes and makes the decisions is the expatriate. Window-dressing Zambianization, in so far as it does exist, stems not only from the pressure to Zambianize but also from the combination of resistance to such pressure from expatriates and the non-availability of sufficiently qualified Zambians.

Rapid Zambianization leads to the succession of Zambians often not equipped to do the jobs to which they are assigned. This in turn gives rise to even more serious problems when it comes to replacing them with better qualified Zambians. The demands for rapid Zambianization and quality performance are inextricably in conflict with one another.

It is one thing to make valiant calls for speedy Zambianization, understandable though they may be, but it is quite another to fill the gap between the call and the actuality.

The Government has played a decisive role in calling for Zambianization, but to what extent is it concerned with the quality of the result? Does its role end with a call to action and the sight of a Zambian face in the personnel office? If so, then it has acquiesced in industrial abortion.¹⁵

THE APPROACH TO THE STUDY

The study, which goes back over a period of four years, was begun with the conviction that the continuing reliance on expatriates was imposing severe and undesirable constraints on social change in Zambia. In this sense, therefore, this has been a piece of 'applied' research, in that it has focused on a very real and practical problem. However, I do not tackle this 'problem' with the explicit intention of providing any 'solution'. I offer no programme of action nor any proposals for the acceleration or deceleration of Zambianization. I am concerned here to explain why people behave in the way they do, and in doing so I draw upon ideas developed in the discipline of sociology for assistance. In this sense this is more 'theoretical' research.

Those who believe in the concept of 'applied' research in the social sciences often speak of 'social engineering', characterized by its critics as social manipulation, and often associated with political authoritarianism. The 'believers' see the problem of social engineering in terms of a shortage of knowledge. If only those who wield power were better informed, so they seem to argue, then the decisions they make would be so much more beneficial to Zambian society. The 'problem' of 'underdevelopment' has its source in the inadequacy of knowledge and the poverty of communications. This reaches to the very farthest 'limits of naivety'.

In reality knowledge plays a relatively minor role in the determination of decisions. In fact decisions are the outcome of struggles for power and influence. Ultimately most decisions are political decisions. What, then, has happened to our social engineer? Fortunately, as a *social engineer* he is very much a mythical figure. His role is not so much to determine or influence decisions but to *legitimize* them. The social scientist, appointed to look into a specific problem, will write a report and perhaps make recommendations. Whether his recommendations are implemented will depend only marginally on his analysis, data and arguments. They will be put into effect only in so far as they coincide with the predetermined decisions made on political grounds. Where conclusions or recommendations conflict with those pre-ordained decisions, then the report will be allowed to rest in peace—untouched and unpublished. How many reports submitted to Government have met such a fate?

Looking more to the lining of their pockets than to academic respectability, some of our brethren will discreetly discover those pre-ordained decisions before beginning their research. Having written the conclusion, it then needs only a minimum of fact-finding and data-gathering, a limited capacity to manipulate statistics and a generous, but not over-generous, admixture of esoteric vocabulary to keep the

sponsor happy. Of course, this is the stock in trade of the 'expert' or the 'consultant', who generally says what he is asked to say. At the same time such an approach is no more nor less than academic prostitution.

By labelling such processes as 'research', the sponsor is appealing to the myth of 'objectivity'. If Professor X has carried out 'research' on problem P, then his conclusions are indisputable. Who would question the academic pundit? There are other techniques of mystification. The expert, for example, who employs a computer—the instrument of ultimate rationality—stamps his pronouncements as unchallengeable. Though some find it convenient to believe in value-free social science, it is nevertheless a myth. Every piece of social research contains within it a whole gamut of assumptions, often unstated, which can assume no universal validity but reflect the value orientation of the writer.¹⁶ Data, particularly of the numerical kind, can be selected, manipulated and interpreted in any number of ways. Their precision is no testimony to their objectivity. The main function of the expert, therefore, is to justify and legitimize decisions already taken. Applied research becomes an ideological crutch for those who seek to justify their behaviour to a wider audience whose interests are often adversely affected.

If the social scientist has little impact on the decision-making process, what then becomes of the distinction between applied research and theoretical research in the social sciences? Each can equally be used to legitimize a particular political point of view. Rather we may draw a distinction, if that is what we want, between research which either explicitly or implicitly supports the *status quo* and research which attacks the *status quo*; between those who seek to discover what holds society together and those who are interested in conflict and change. In practice, however, the distinction blurs, as any piece of research looks at a problem from both perspectives.

This study takes the view that Zambianization is a positive development, and it is in this light that I examine society and its component interest groups. In so doing the issue is raised out of its local context and viewed as a particular case of a more general phenomenon—succession. It is a common theme in the literature dealing with Latin America, Africa and Asia that phenomena occurring in such countries are not found elsewhere. By drawing comparisons between Zambianization and 'succession' described in other countries I hope to point to similarities rather than differences between what have come to be referred to as the 'developed' and the 'underdeveloped' worlds. Once one escapes from the cultural idiom and ideology in which 'problems' are cast, then in structural terms the differences diminish. The confusion often emanates from what van Velsen¹⁷ refers to as 'false comparisons': comparing a stereotype of the 'developed' world with the realities of the

'underdeveloped' world. A closer examination of what many writers, often through naivety or ignorance, portray as unique to the 'underdeveloped' world often reveals it as in fact commonplace in the less 'visible' sectors of their own society.

Dichotomizing the world into 'underdeveloped' and 'developed', with the rider that the former is trying to emulate the latter, development studies have generated their own characteristic vocabulary. Africa is in transition from 'tribal' society to 'modern' society and the process is conceptualized in terms of 'institutionalization', 'mobilization', 'national integration', etc. The dichotomous approach stresses the importance of values and conceives the 'developmental' process as a struggle between 'modern' and 'traditional' values. The implication is that the people of Africa are in some way 'different' and that the problems of Africa are unique. I have dealt in detail with one such development study elsewhere.¹⁸ Gluckman's statement of the case almost three decades ago, that 'a miner is a miner', is by no means widely accepted but nevertheless provides a starting point for this research.¹⁹

An African townsman is a townsman, an African miner is a miner . . . The urbanized African is outside the tribe but not beyond the influence of the tribe. Correspondingly when a man returns from the towns into the political area of his tribe he is tribalized again—de-urbanized—though not beyond the influence of the towns.²⁰

Thus town life is so structured that 'rural' life loses its significance, and rather than use 'traditional' life as a frame of reference the sociologist should take as his frame of reference urban and industrial situations elsewhere in the world. Thus where the social structure rigidly defines social behaviour through an enforceable set of norms, beliefs and values, then other unrelated social structures are of diminishing significance. To speak of anomie prevailing amongst townsmen simply because they have recently arrived from the villages is misleading. Where there is mobility—social or geographical—from one well defined and rigidly structured situation to another well defined and rigidly structured situation, then anomie as a social condition is unlikely to exist. It will exist, however, in those situations where the structure of social relations and the norms and sanctions associated with it are relatively weak forces in constraining and determining human behaviour. This, as I shall suggest in chapter five, is the case when a 'caste' or group undergoes rapid social mobility into higher positions where social sanctions outside broad kinship networks are relatively weak.

In the following discussion of Zambianization I have chosen to make use of the sociological concepts of succession and social mobility. Chapters three and four examine Zambianization as a special case of

succession. Gouldner's treatment of succession in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*²¹ forms the model on which the third chapter is based. The heritage of African advancement described in chapter two raises the problem of the effect of the prior expectations and experiences of subordinates and supervisors on the 'success' of succession. In what situations do the workers, the immediate subordinates, the supervisors relate to the Zambian successor in terms of colour, and in which situations in terms of class? Can the Zambian successor gain access to and receive support from the pre-existent white class? What defence mechanisms are open to the successor if his superiors or his subordinates or both deny him legitimacy in his new position? In chapter three I suggest that Zambianization is an example of a forced succession in which the successor is often neither equipped nor receives sufficient support to carry out his functions effectively.

In the fourth chapter a more deliberate effort is made to draw parallels between different studies of succession.²² Three key factors are isolated as influencing reaction to and consequences of succession. They are considered in relation to Zambianization and the organization of the mining industry.

The ramifications of Zambianization can also be analysed from the standpoint of social mobility, since, in the early stages particularly, the ascent to wealth and power has been extremely rapid. What are the social consequences? Durkheim's observations of Europe are pertinent and his concept of anomie proves useful in analysing many of the problems facing Zambia. Comparisons may also be made with the American *nouveau riche* as described by Veblen. In the United States too a 'class' of people had to adjust to rapid mobility from 'lower' to 'upper' society. Parallels between Zambianization and caste mobility may also be drawn in that an entire 'black' group—caste—is upwardly mobile, seeking to gain acceptance by adopting a style of life it feels to be in keeping with an upper class, in much the same way as an upwardly mobile *caste* group would 'sanskritize' its way of life.

In the sixth chapter the attitudes of the workers to Zambianization are explored. What legitimacy do they extend to the Zambian successor? How are their interests affected by Zambianization? To what extent have class antagonisms developed amongst the Zambians which would work to the disadvantage of the successor? The following chapter is devoted to the mining companies themselves. How have they reacted to the changed political climate? How successful have they been in adapting to the needs and aspirations of independent Zambia, with particular reference to Zambianization? Lastly the orientation of the Government to Zambianization is explored. Does the pursuit of Zambianization conflict with the pursuit of other goals, such as the

maximization of profit? In so far as there is a clash of goals, is the Government prepared to compromise its ideals and aspirations for the sake of increased earnings? What effect has nationalization of the mines had on the issue of Zambianization? The problems experienced by the Zambian Government are typical of any government which has won accession to power on the basis of radical and often socialist ideology. Has the Zambian Government's solution to the dilemma been any different from that of other governments?

In the final chapter I return to a persistent theme throughout the entire paper, *viz.* the relationship between class and colour. As one of the fundamental problems in sociology, no study of this nature can ignore the challenge of seeking a conceptual framework for the analysis of class and colour.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

I first became interested in Zambianization while working as a research officer in the Copper Industry Service Bureau, a body responsible for the co-ordination of industrial relations and other matters in which both mining companies pursued a common policy. First-hand access to the operation and attitudes of management to Zambianization and other labour matters has provided the framework for chapter seven. During my association with the Copper Industry Service Bureau I was fortunate enough to conduct a social survey of 'local' employees at one of the mines using personnel officers as interviewers. It was this survey that provided a basis and stimulus to launch further research; some of the results are used in chapter six. Following my year in the employment of management, I joined the University of Zambia with a view to continuing the research which I had already begun on the mines. Under the auspices of the University Sociological Association I undertook, together with a number of other students, a research project in two consecutive vacations, relating to the determinants of work behaviour and industrial conflict.

In our endeavours during this period we were given every conceivable assistance from management. Our investigations were carried out with the mines' full co-operation and at no time did we find obstacles placed in our way, though our research led us into sensitive areas. A variety of techniques were adopted to collect information. Interviewing, participant observation and non-participant observation took place at each of four work points. I took a particularly keen interest in the personnel department. While an employee I was never able to overcome the barriers of suspicion due mainly to my position in management. However, on my return as a member of a research team I was able to

establish very close relations with many of the personnel officers. The investigation I undertook provided me with the first case study of Zambianization.

The examination of three other work situations by the other members of the team is still in the process of being written up. This paper is in fact a by-product of these investigations, supplemented by additional information collected from other sources during a four-year period. At one of the work points we were particularly fortunate in being able to witness the Zambianization of the position of mine captain, and this provided me with a second case study of Zambianization. Though I had earlier asked to be allowed to carry out a study of Zambianization, I had been politely told that this was a sensitive area and perhaps better left alone. Therefore, though our investigation was formally an inquiry into 'the determinants of work behaviour', all of us kept our eyes open for material that would be relevant to the problems of Zambianization. It was equally impossible to tell employees—expatriates or Zambian—that we were looking into the problems of Zambianization, since that would immediately have put them on their guard and created suspicion, so in our interviews we had to tackle the subject in a roundabout way. (This was not the case with the personnel department, where I stated my area of interest in unequivocal terms.) By the very nature of the study it became difficult to have any lengthy and intensive conversations with the upper levels of mine management on the subject of Zambianization, and because the major project had been sponsored by management we also felt it advisable to avoid systematic discussions with Government officials. These two interest groups are under-represented in terms of interviews, and I have had to rely on other sources of evidence and on observation of their actions. I was fortunate enough to have a large number of conversations with members of top management both in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt concerning the issues of Zambianization. When they discovered that I was indeed going ahead with a study of Zambianization they gave me every encouragement.

NOTES

- 1 Hall (1969), p. 61.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 168. One *kwacha* (K1) = £0.583 or U.S. \$1.40.
- 3 Trade figures with Rhodesia and South Africa changed over the period since U.D.I. as follows (K000):

Year	South Africa		Rhodesia	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1965	24,856	41,379	10,940	71,077
1969	7,671	69,946	438	21,772

Figures are taken from the *Statistical Year Book, 1970*, Central Statistical Office, table 14.8.

- 4 For an analysis and description of the Anglo-American empire see the special survey conducted by the *Financial Mail of South Africa*, issued as a supplement to the *Financial Mail* of 4 July, 1969.
- 5 Hall (1969), pp. 87-8.
- 6 *Statistical Year Book, 1970*, table 4.3.
- 7 *Ibid.*, table 4.3.
- 8 *Ibid.*, table 4.2(a).
- 9 See, for example, the labour histories described in University of Zambia Sociological Association reports Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14 and 15.
- 10 *Chamber of Mines Year Book, 1955*, table XL.
- 11 *Mining Year Book of Zambia, 1969*, table 17.
- 12 See memorandum of agreement between Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd, Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd and the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, 7 September 1970.
- 13 At the National Convention held in Kitwe in 1969, Party politicians were instructed to refrain from interference in industrial relations. Since then there has been little direct intervention by the local Party politicians.
- 14 Government of Zambia (1966a), p. 1.
- 15 *Times of Zambia*, 15 February 1971.
- 16 See Gouldner (1970), for an illumination of the assumptions which underpin the work of Talcott Parsons.
- 17 Van Velsen (1969).
- 18 See Burawoy (1972) for a review of Bates, R. H., *Unions, Parties and Political Development* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1971).
- 19 Gluckman first stated the case in 1945. See Gluckman (1945), p. 12.
- 20 Gluckman (1961), pp. 69-70.
- 21 Gouldner (1968).
- 22 Guest (1962a).

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE
INDUSTRY AND COPPERBELT SOCIETY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The copper industry of Zambia has been developed by migrant labour. On the one hand unskilled work was performed by Africans, many of whom had worked elsewhere in southern Africa, while the semi-skilled and skilled work was carried out in the initial period by white migrants, the majority of whom came from the gold mines of the Johannesburg Reef. The close congruence between stratification on the one hand by race and on the other by industrial skill and authority engendered and perpetuated a set of values, attitudes and beliefs amongst both races closely parallel to those found on the South African mines. However, the development of Northern Rhodesia was not to follow the same pattern as South Africa because, among other reasons, the British Government brought the territory under its administration as a protectorate in 1924. It is possible to find statements dating as far back as 1921—before the copper mines had begun to operate commercially—in which the British Government clearly adopts a stand opposed to the colour bar system to be found in South Africa.¹

It is the accepted policy of His Majesty's Government to give the Africans of Northern Rhodesia, as well as other dependencies of tropical Africa, opportunities for qualifying for any post or employment for which they are capable, and to supply the requisite educational training.²

But it was the Russell Commission,³ appointed after the first Copperbelt disturbance of 1935, which, for the first time, focused many people's attention on the industrial status of the African. One man in particular, Charlie Harris—a trade unionist from South Africa—on visiting the Copperbelt viewed with great apprehension the few Africans who were already breaching the sacrosanct line dividing unskilled labour from skilled labour.⁴ It was partly on his advice, based on the experience of the white miners in South Africa, that the Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers' Union was formed in 1937. From the Companies' point of view, Bromwich writes,

The local newspaper at that time began to carry first letters to the editor warning against the encroachment by Africans into European employment. The profits of the Companies were not high enough to stand a