

took a 51 per cent interest in the Companies, there was again no mention of Zambianization. As Harvey has written,

Nevertheless, the moment of take-over was certainly an opportunity to negotiate an arrangement on Zambianization, perhaps with a timetable and agreed provisions for slowing it down or speeding it up according to circumstances. This opportunity was not taken, at least not publicly.⁴

Nowhere in the management and consultancy contract signed between Roan Selection Trust and the Government of Zambia is there any mention of Zambianization. The Government has abdicated from any efforts to interfere with a matter which they have come to regard more and more as the responsibility of the mining companies. Mindeco, the new Government holding company for Zambia's equity participation in the mining industry, has not been given any powers to effect policy changes which still emanate from the mining companies. It has only been given the right to collect information from the mines. In this it claims not to have been very successful, either because the mines have not co-operated or, as is more often the case, because the information is just not available. Most decisions made by management that might be of interest to Mindeco are arrived at on the basis of experience, intuition or political expediency rather than 'rational' assessment. Thus it is not surprising that Mindeco has little direct influence over Zambianization, though it may query Company policy in the few instances that come to its notice.

Over and above the abdication of responsibility there are occasions when the Government has appeared to attempt to divert public attention away from the issues of Zambianization. There has, for example, over the last three years been only one major article in the daily Press devoted to the problems experienced in Zambianizing the mines. This particular article attempted to reveal the extent and nature of the 'window-dressing' that was taking place.⁵

The Mineworkers' Trade Union has also been conspicuously quiet over the issue. In their public utterances trade union leaders rarely refer to the matter and when they do it is usually to complain about the weakness and management orientation of the black personnel departments. The Secretary General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions made the following revealing remark in response to the question, 'Are you satisfied with the pace of Zambianization?'

I'm not very conversant with this, and perhaps I'm biased by examples of Zambianization that I have seen and which have not satisfied me at all . . . I have seen examples of Zambians being offered good chances to exercise their education and experience. But on the whole I consider that a great deal of Zambianization is just not genuine . . . There is a tendency

CHAPTER EIGHT

A PARADOX OF INDEPENDENCE— ZAMBIANIZATION AND THE GOVERNMENT

I have already referred to the contrast between the attention given to African advancement before Independence and the publicity given to Zambianization since 1964. This, it was argued, was one of the reasons why the mineworkers were so uninterested in Zambianization and its progress. I have also noted that the Zambian Government has come to identify with the Companies more and more, culminating in the 51 per cent take-over in 1969, and therefore perhaps has not seen fit to be critical of the progress of Zambianization. There are a number of other pointers to the Government's lack of concern for Zambianization, some of which are discussed below.

The report of the Brown Commission,¹ which awarded a 22 per cent wage increase to all workers represented by the Zambian Mineworkers' Trade Union, as it was called at the time, devoted almost a third of its contents to the subject of Zambianization. Yet in the Government White Paper endorsing the Brown Commission recommendations not one of the twenty-one paragraphs was concerned with the Commission's recommendations on Zambianization. One of the recommendations—the establishment of a Zambianization Committee which would comprise officials from the trade union, from Government and from the Companies—was in fact to be implemented soon after under the chairmanship of the Minister of State for the Cabinet and Civil Service—Aaron Milner.² In 1968 a report³ was produced on the progress of Zambianization in the mining industry which congratulated the Companies on their achievements and avoided any mention of the problems that have been brought up here under the heading of 'forced succession'. The report contrasts vividly with the Brown Commission report, which was highly critical of some of the discriminatory practices which, the commissioners discovered, still continued in the mining industry. On the contrary, the progress report on Zambianization tended to be more critical of the Zambians taking over the new jobs. Subsequently the committee was disbanded and Zambianization was left for the mines themselves to administer. Only in 1972 has Zambianization again been taken up—this time by a joint Mindeco and mining company committee.

When the mines were nationalized in 1969 and the Government

for industry to 'window dress' as far as Zambianization of personnel officers is concerned—which is extremely unfortunate because the value of the personnel officer in industrial relations could be tremendous.⁶

Clearly Zambianization is not a high-priority concern among trade unionists, which is interesting in view of the militancy with which they pursued African advancement. This is all the more paradoxical since the most dissident sections of the trade union membership are those in the higher levels who complain bitterly about the manner in which Zambianization is implemented.⁷ In order to win the support of such outspoken and potentially dangerous opposition within the Union, it would have been natural for the trade union leaders to pursue their complaints with management. But this they have not done. Indeed, we may conclude that both the trade unions and Government have abdicated their responsibility for Zambianization, creating the impression that they regard it as a matter for management to pursue.

Recalling the long fight for African advancement and considering the nationalist aspirations that Zambians should control their own economy and in particular the mines, the legacy of African suspicion and mistrust of the mining companies, the widely held belief that expatriate miners have a vested interest in retaining their 'lucrative' jobs, the costly business of recruiting expatriates from Europe and beyond, and the problems of a dual wage structure which follow in their wake—in view of all these factors it would appear paradoxical that the Government is so little interested in Zambianization.

Harvey has suggested a number of reasons why the Government did not take advantage of the nationalization of the mines as an opportune moment to negotiate a deal on Zambianization:

In part, this lack of mention of Zambianization must be because the companies already had large training programmes. The economic incentive to Zambianize was certainly there, and in fact was present even before Zambian independence, and the mining companies were an extreme example of institutions so large that in the short term top management's position was not threatened. In the long term, both groups had world-wide operations into which to absorb displaced senior management. The translation of these incentives to the shop floor, so to speak, is a question of management communication and has already been discussed. Certainly there is no inherent reason for thinking that the take-over will make any difference in this regard. At best, it may improve understanding of the problems at the board level, but the communication problem on this subject can only really improve when Zambianization itself has advanced.

Another reason for the failure to mention Zambianization must be that it depends to a great extent on the supply of suitably educated man-

power. Government is by far the main supplier of basic education, and government therefore determines to a considerable extent the proportion of different skills produced, for example by applying a quota to the different specializations at the University of Zambia. Thus far, priority has been given to producing secondary school teachers, over 90 per cent of whom were expatriates in 1970. The government also has some control over the employment of graduates and has shown a marked tendency to take students graduating in such fields as economics and politics directly into the civil service. Thus, it may be that Zambianization of the mines is not a particularly high priority.⁸

Harvey ends by asking the most crucial question—'Why is Zambianization of the personnel running the mines such a low priority?'—but neither Harvey nor Bostock attempts an answer. Their brief as economists ends where the 'political' questions of priorities enter. It is this problem which is of central interest and importance to my examination of Zambianization.

The problem Zambia is facing is by no means unique. It occurs wherever political power falls into the hands of a government which had never previously been in power, or only rarely, and whose ideology and strength lay in opposing the pre-existing regime. Engels, speaking of the power of management expertise in the workers' revolution, wrote:

If, as a result of a war, we come to power before we are prepared for it, the technicians will be our chief enemies; they will deceive and betray us to the best of their ability.⁹

Lenin's Bolshevik Government was faced with this very problem—what to do with the 'bourgeois specialists' (the technocrats and managerial specialists who had been bitterly opposed to the revolution) who controlled the industries vital for Russia's economic survival. Lenin himself had insisted that they would co-operate with the new regime to organize industry according to Marxist doctrine. In the event Lenin's prophecy was born out to a remarkable degree. Just as the whites on the Copperbelt, once staunch supporters of white supremacy, either packed their bags and left or adjusted to black rule, so the bourgeois specialists underwent a reversal in orientation to the Bolshevik Government. The willingness of the Government to compromise its egalitarian principles and pay high wages for expertise was a major factor in the reorientation of the specialists, in much the same way as expatriate conditions of service continued to make employment on the Copperbelt very attractive for many whites. The liquidation of 'workers' management'—a major compromise with the Marxist ideology of the 'proletarian revolution'—was a further inducement to active collaboration and co-operation from the technicians. A parallel compromise in the 'nationalist

revolution' of Zambia was to be the relaxation of pressure to Zambianize. It is interesting to note that both these 'compromises' took place one or two years *after* the ascendancy to power of the new governments, suggesting, perhaps, a growing awareness of the governments' reliance on the managerial and technical specialists.

In both countries managerial personnel argued that rather than oppose the new regimes they should bolster them in the name of the national interest by remaining 'politically neutral' in their capacity as 'professionals'—so long, that is, as they made sufficient profits. It was in their interests, clearly, to support the new regimes and to ingratiate themselves with their leading figures. After 1928 Stalin increasingly demanded a wider commitment from the technocrats and managerial personnel, insisting that they be political activists or, as thousands were in the purges, be removed from office. Whereas economic incentives were paramount in engineering the co-operation of expatriates on the Copperbelt and of the bourgeois specialists prior to 1928, in the subsequent period in Russia penalties, threats and force became more common. Such sanctions were effective in Russia, where the specialists were Russian themselves and would have had difficulty in finding alternative means of livelihood, but would not be effective in Zambia, where the whites can pack their bags and leave. In Zambia the specialists are in a much stronger bargaining position.

Having made the decision that industrial production must continue and having no confidence in the expertise contained in the Party cadres, Lenin saw no alternative but to solicit support from the 'bourgeois specialists'. In securing their co-operation he preferred to compromise ideological principles rather than bully the technocrats into submission. In so doing, however, he sowed the seeds of dissension within the Party and had to face tough opposition from all sections, including the 'red directors', the trade unions, and Bolshevik theorists, who argued that Lenin was betraying the revolution and setting the stage for a bourgeois restoration. Their arguments were irrefutable in ideological terms, and their fears that Soviet industry would be controlled by managers who were not Party members were also substantiated, but nevertheless Lenin was able to get his management programme accepted as official policy.

Interestingly enough, the Zambian Government did not experience much opposition to the conciliatory attitudes adopted towards expatriates, though in the early years of Independence local Party officials were active in denouncing expatriates who showed the slightest inclination to oppose the new Government. Workers, seeking to ensure that their complaints were given a sympathetic treatment, rather than go to the personnel officer or trade union official would take them direct to

the Party officials, who in turn would demand priority attention from management or would directly intimidate those involved.

Intimidation of supervisors, both local and expatriate, does exist. There is evidence available that certain political ward organisers set up *ad hoc* 'party courts' to which supervisors are summoned in order to explain themselves. In many instances it would appear that the 'evidence' of the complainant, who may have been justly disciplined by the supervisor, is taken without question as representing the true facts of the situation.¹⁰

Given the political circumstances in which it found itself, management was powerless to intervene in cases of unfair incrimination, and a number of expatriates have been dismissed and in some cases even deported for alleged insults. Since the second National Convention on Productivity, Incomes and Prices in Kitwe 1969, when the President made it clear he would tolerate no interference in industrial matters by politicians, extraneous pressures have declined considerably. At the same time passive acceptance of the *status quo* by the Party leaves any potential political opposition party with a very attractive appeal to rapid Zambianization and black aspirations.¹¹

Opposition to Lenin's compromises had strong ideological backing, but this was not the case in Zambia. For whereas the essence of Marxist doctrine is the liquidation of the bourgeoisie as such, Kaunda's philosophy of humanism declares the principle of non-racialism as one of its basic tenets. By appeal to such an ideology and to Christian humanitarianism Kaunda justifies a conciliatory attitude to those who yesterday were either actually oppressing his people or rendering support to the oppressors.

Lipset describes another situation where the ideological commitments of an opposition party, when it comes to power, conflict with the bureaucratic and efficiency requirements of government.¹² It was those with executive responsibilities, most notably the Cabinet Ministers, who were most ardent in the defence of compromising ideological principles for the sake of efficiency. But they too came under fire from members of the Party.

The failure of the Government to discharge old top-level civil servants has precipitated a major conflict with the CCF movement between the cabinet ministers and many of the party leaders who do not hold office. The majority of CCF members of the legislature, of the party Provincial Council, and of the delegates to provincial conventions have repeatedly demanded that the government 'carry out CCF policy' by replacing old administrators with more sympathetic personnel. The members of these groups cite many examples of actions that they consider to be administrative sabotage on a local or provincial level.¹³

The pressures from the Party did in fact result in a number of concessions being granted to C.C.F. ideology and Party leaders. C.C.F. personnel were recruited to top level positions and a few non-C.C.F. administrators demoted.¹⁴

The mining companies made similar concessions to Zambian aspirations by, for example, the hasty Zambianization of the personnel departments.¹⁵ But the fundamental dilemma remained both for the C.C.F. and for the Zambian Government—whether to pursue efficiency or Party ideals.

We want more socialists in the government service, but they must be trained and efficient. Until we have enough socialists trained for expert jobs, we must use our discretion in using civil servants who are not socialists but who are competent and are only trying to do a job.¹⁶

Such a sentiment from the Premier bears a remarkable resemblance to Mindeco's pronouncement on Zambianization:

It is the policy both of the mining companies and of Government to Zambianize the industry's labour force as rapidly as is consistent with the maintenance of efficiency.¹⁷

PROFITS, EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY

Though there are similarities in the outlook of the C.C.F. Government towards its civil service and the Zambian Government's attitude to the mines, there are also major differences. The mines exist to make profit, and without profit, as far as the Companies, and to a lesser extent Government, are concerned, they serve no purpose. Of course, the mines provide a 'social' service in that they employ 40,000 Zambians. A civil service, on the other hand, performs a 'social' service by running the country. It does not work on a profit basis, and though efficiency may be important it is not essential for its existence. The effective performance of the civil service is dependent on the availability of financial resources. In the case of Zambia the public sector is heavily reliant on the large contribution mining makes to the national economy. In 1969, for example, copper represented 52 per cent of the gross domestic product, 59 per cent of Government revenue and comprised 97 per cent of visible exports.¹⁸ In other words, copper is the mainstay of the Zambian economy and without it virtually all national development would be dependent on overseas aid. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Government regards the copper industry as something of a sacred cow and any action which may endanger profits is subject to the greatest scrutiny. One does not have to look far for evidence of this outlook. I have already referred to the Government's decree that all political interference in the

smooth running of industrial relations shall cease. There has also been a deliberate avoidance of public attacks on expatriates in circumstances when they provide an obvious scapegoat for any failings of the Government. While a relative softness has characterized the Government's attitude to expatriates and management, a correspondingly tough approach has characterized its attitude towards the workers. The Zambian Government developed a marked capitalist orientation towards the miners, an orientation symbolized by the banning of strikes,¹⁹ the incessant hammering of the workers for greater discipline²⁰ and the insistence that wage increases must be linked to increases in productivity.²¹

A number of reports written by foreign 'experts' give credence to the Government line. The Turner report,²² which has come under bitter attack as misrepresenting and misinterpreting the available data,²³ came to the conclusion that productivity had declined by 20 per cent since Independence in 1964.²⁴ The reaction of the Government to the report was predictable.

The trend of falling productivity must be reversed. Thus one big question the Convention ought to consider is why the fall has taken place. I have given much thought to this, and it seems to me we are witnessing in Zambia a conflict between the desire for increased material standards of living and widespread rejection of the discipline which alone can make higher standards attainable. The ILO report says, 'the colonial system of labour discipline has broken down and nothing has yet developed to take its place'.²⁵

The blame for the assumed fall in productivity is placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the workers; management, it will be noted, escapes practically all censure. Other reports, notably the one relating to accidents on Zambia Railways,²⁶ and the Heron report on accidents on the mines,²⁷ stress the same points, namely that discipline is deteriorating.

There is a disturbing correspondence between the change in the accident rate from 1963-64 and the change in the incidence of breaches of mining and domestic regulations that took place at the same time. While without a specially designed study it is not possible to show that this general correlation exists at the level of the individual, there is agreement in industry and in the Government Mining Department that any deterioration in discipline increases the probability of preventable 'accidents' occurring.

The Government inspectors, senior officials in the mines and surface plants, and both Zambian and non-Zambian supervisors are agreed in recognizing a problem of discipline for which a solution must involve not

only a revision of sanctions available to those in authority but also a vigorous programme on the part of Government to change public opinion on disciplinary matters.²⁸

This is precisely what Government has attempted to do. Bates (1971) stresses the importance Government has attached to 'controlling' the mineworkers, and the institutional machinery it has used to achieve such ends. Whether in fact the Turner and Heron reports are correct in their assessments and conclusions is not germane to the argument here, which is aimed at illustrating the convergence of Government and management policies. The formula of State capitalism which has emerged seeks to impose a policy of restrictions and discipline on the miners which the Federal Government would have been unlikely to follow. The managerial orientation of Government may be attributed not only to the preservation of class interests but also to the importance it attaches to the profits obtained from copper production.

On the surface one might interpret the nationalization of the mines as a sign that the Government wished to implement a socialist ideology or at least desired to gain control of its major source of income and acquire a greater percentage of the profits. However, the air of mutual co-operation, the rapidity with which negotiations were conducted and the nature of the agreement itself question such an interpretation. There appeared to be an attempt by Government to reach an agreement that left things as close to what they were before as possible within the constraints of a take-over. The deal was negotiated in such a way that both sides appeared to profit from the nationalization. One commentator has even concluded

... that little was lost in possibly making the final terms a little more favourable to the Companies than they might have been. The long term risk of taking a harsher short term line was probably not worth the expected utility of the outcome. Compensation which would have led to a measurable loss to shareholders might have resulted in much harsher service fee demands as well as in the creation of an atmosphere less favourable to mutual co-operation and future investment. With Zambia's competitor producers each unilaterally announcing substantial increases in production it was vital that Zambia should be in a position to do the same. Her share of the exported copper market had already fallen by 2% since Independence and production estimates compiled by CIPEC projected a further fall from 34% to 28% by 1975. Without a favourable investment climate and the positive co-operation of her two large producers there was little hope of reversing this trend.²⁹

There are other reasons, as we shall see later, why the Government was not in a position to force an agreement on the Companies that was more

favourable to itself, but the overall impression is that the Zambian Government took great pains to impress upon the Companies its good faith and its willingness to co-operate. The deal was so negotiated as to maintain the *status quo* and not jeopardize any of the profits accruing from the copper mines. Thus managerial and technical control still remained almost entirely in the hands of the Companies. The management and consultancy contract between the 'new' nationalized company R.C.M. (Roan Consolidated Mines) and the Government states:

RST shall provide to RCM all managerial, financial, commercial, technical and other services which, prior to 1st January 1970, were supplied or procured by the RST Group to Mufulira, Luanshya and Mwinilunga with the intention that the business affairs and operations of RCM shall be maintained in a manner no less efficient and to an extent and standard no less than those before 1st January and which shall be directed towards the optimisation of production and profit of RCM and any subsidiary companies.³⁰

If it was not of great economic benefit to the Government, and control in effect remained with the Companies, why then were the mines nationalized? The political pay-offs were considerable in that nationalization was portrayed as a socialist or 'anti-capitalist' measure in consonance with Zambia's philosophy of humanism, which is a Christian variant of African socialism. To the public, and particularly to restless Party officials, nationalization was interpreted as a major step along the path to socialism and economic independence—'the mines are now ours'. To many others, notably the mineworkers themselves, the move was greeted only with cynicism—as a means of cementing management and the Government together in opposition to themselves. The take-over—its content, the way it was conducted and the publicity it received—reflect the apparently irreconcilable conflict between a commitment to 'socialism' and a commitment to greater material welfare through the expansion of profits.

One of the reasons why the Government could not appropriate great financial benefit from the take-over was the anticipated hostility which would be engendered amongst the expatriates on whose service the mines depend.

The first and most obvious internal bargaining strength in the hands of the mining companies was the skilled manpower they employed. The majority of expatriate mineworkers, in particular those who had served for a long time and were therefore in relatively key positions, not only strongly identified themselves with the company for which they worked and might have been averse to working for a Government-controlled Company but also often held substantial amounts of their savings in the

shares of their company. Although this was of course a very small percentage of the overall shareholding it was nevertheless extremely important. Poor compensation terms or any attempt to rearrange the conditions of service might lead at best to labour unrest, and, at worst, to a mass exodus. The attitude and position of these employees, numbering perhaps a thousand, played a major part in the Government's willingness to adopt, from the mining companies' point of view, reasonable settlement terms.³¹

It is this same relatively conciliatory attitude towards the expatriate that may partially explain the Government's willingness to abdicate responsibility for Zambianization on the mines. The Government may well fear that to apply pressure for more rapid Zambianization may alienate the expatriate labour force and jeopardize production in that way. But this is only a partial explanation.

It is accepted by Government that if Zambianization were accelerated the Zambian personnel would be occupying posts for which they were neither qualified nor sufficiently experienced. The immediate consequence would be more expatriates in higher posts as 'necessary' overseers and supervisors. Ultimately this would give rise to greater inefficiency. Though Zambianization must progress, it must do so, according to the Government, within the requirement of maintaining efficiency.

Over and above this factor there is also the belief that the Zambian who is as well qualified as his expatriate counterpart will nevertheless not do the job as well. The belief is found not only among expatriates but among Zambians too. The Vice-Chancellor of the University has made this a persistent theme in his addresses.

It is generally agreed that Africa's image of herself and her ideas about other continents have been distorted by the colonial experience. This distortion lingers on long after the attainment of political independence. Thus, in the matter of recruitment, the conquered mind continues to have blind faith in the supposed superiority of personnel from the former metropolitan and allied countries and so recruitment is still sought there by preference; while those who have had their training from 'untraditional' areas and even those from the local national university are presumed to be inferior and may, consequently, be denied appropriate employment. Many of those in responsible positions continue to send their children or dependants abroad for study because they doubt the quality of their own national institutions.

In the matter of expert advice, the African governments and countries do not make full use of expertise concentrated in their universities and colleges. The reasons for this, as I pointed out at the first National Education Conference in Lusaka last year, would seem to be 'insufficient decolonization of the mind and the consequent uncritical adulation of foreign experts and know-how'. The work of local experts is often not

seriously appreciated or demanded by Government, and the various sectors of the national economy. 'Instead specialists are brought in [from abroad] at very great expense to produce, in a few days, reports that are often worth next to nothing. In some cases the advice that the visiting so-called experts give today may be identical with what the local experts have been saying for years, but have never been listened to.'³²

I have noted earlier (chapter three) how the Zambian successor has to confront what he perceives as the assumption of 'black inferiority' from his expatriate supervisors. I have also referred to the pervasive lack of trust and confidence in each other displayed by members of the personnel department. It is widely assumed, as in the above passage, that the phenomenon is a 'colonial hangover' but there are other equally plausible explanations. The assumption of Zambian inferiority is most widely held by those in competition with potentially competent and well qualified Zambians. Employees at the threshold level of Zambianization, to a lesser or greater extent, see other Zambians as a potential threat to their position. In this context the assumption of inferiority can be an effectively 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. Because the Personnel Manager, for example, has no confidence in his juniors, he denies them sufficient discretion with which to carry out their duties effectively and thereby brings his 'assumption' to fruition. The same applies to the expatriate. The assumption of inferiority justifies the adoption of a series of defence mechanisms designed to frustrate the competent junior members of a department.

On the other hand, since they are in the country on contract and have no political base of support, the expatriates are not seen as a threat to the power or position of Zambians. Government officials are therefore often content to place expatriates in key advisory or even executive positions because, they may argue, they are more competent and reliable. In fact this may be only half an explanation. The other half is that the expatriate does not pose a challenge to the Zambian; he is seen more as a politically inert instrument, and a convenient scapegoat for anything that may go wrong. Such an explanation may also illuminate a further element in the Government's reluctance to accelerate Zambianization on the mines. The more Zambians there are in high and powerful positions on the mines the greater will be their threat as a potential source of political opposition, just as the C.P.S.U. feared the strength of the bourgeois specialists.

In this connection it is interesting to note a difference between Zambianization on the mines and Zambianization in Government. In the latter it has proceeded both from the bottom upwards and from the top downwards, while in the former it has advanced only from below. If the Government Minister can be made a Zambian, why not a General

Manager of a mine? Such a move could have immediate benefits. First, it would help to break down the rigid and wasteful racial stratification within industry that has succeeded in projecting itself on to the society outside. Blacks and whites would be forced to work more closely together and, above all, lines of authority would begin to flow from black to white. Perhaps a closer examination and greater appreciation of the problems of Zambianization would also emerge. However, there appear to be no plans for such a move. Thinking on these matters is still hide-bound by politically anachronistic constraints, a heritage of the days of African advancement, when the replacement of white by black at any but the lowest levels was unthinkable. The widely held view emanating from the Companies dictates that the General Manager must be an experienced expert in mining. Certainly General Managers have tended to be recruited through the organization after many years of experience, but this by no means makes it a *necessary* avenue of mobility. In accepting the conventional wisdom the Government may have come to regard the Zambianization of General Managers and senior administrative personnel as a threat to production and therefore to profits. But the presence of blacks in command positions on the mines may also be regarded as a political threat.

A final and perhaps most important reason for the Government's withdrawal of pressure to Zambianize the mines is one of priorities. The number of expatriates in Government service is still considerable even in administrative and executive positions, and particularly in teaching positions.³³ It would be logical for such personnel to be replaced first, before the technical experts involved in mining. Essentially the argument is that while there is only one way of maximizing profits from copper production, there are many ways of governing, some of which are in the interests of the Zambian population and others not. It might be then argued that the Zambian is more likely than the expatriate to govern his country in the interests of its people and that the replacement of expatriates in the service of Government must therefore take priority over the Zambianization of posts in a profit-making organization. In that case all available manpower must be first channelled into Government service and the mines should get only second choice. However, once Government pursues such a policy, and it does seem to do so,³⁴ then it is in a weak position to complain about the slow rate of Zambianization, for the mines can always respond with demands for more qualified manpower.

In summary, the reluctance to apply pressure to Zambianize the mines may be explained by the Government's orientation towards the mining industry as a profit-making organization upon which the country's economy is founded. The Government has repeatedly insisted

that the mines be run on a profit-making basis and that efficiency and productivity take precedence over Zambianization. At the same time the continuing shortage of high-level manpower means that the Zambianization of the Government service absorbs the greater proportion of qualified personnel.

NOTES

- 1 Government of Zambia (1966b).
- 2 Aaron Milner, noted in management circles for the relentless way he pursued Zambianization in the mines, was replaced as chairman of the Zambianization Committee following a clash with the General Manager of Zambia Railways, when, according to Milner, the latter refused to acknowledge the existence of the Zambianization Committee (*Times of Zambia*, 22-24 July 1969). It is interesting to note that no such clash between the chairman of the Zambianization Committee and the mine management ever occurred, at least publicly. This might be taken as indication of a greater willingness of the mining companies to co-operate with the Government.
- 3 Government of Zambia (1968a).
- 4 Bostock and Harvey (1972), p. 176.
- 5 'Reaching for the top', *Times Review*, *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 20 December 1970.
- 6 Interview with Basil Kabwe, Secretary General of the Z.C.T.U., *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 5 September 1971.
- 7 The dissident sections, involved in a move to break away from the mineworkers' union and a challenge to its leadership, were previously represented by the Staff Association. The leaders of the dissidents attempted to organize a strike against the Union leadership, who, they claimed, had betrayed the workers by signing a productivity deal which militated against the interests of the workers. To avert the threat of a strike, and to offset the opposition that was crystallizing against the Union leadership, the Government removed the leaders and put them under restriction in June 1971.
- 8 Bostock and Harvey (1972), p. 176.
- 9 Quoted in Azrael (1966), p. 25. For the following discussion of the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution the writer relies largely on Azrael's book. Though this may not be a definitive version of what happened—he himself says that in some places shortage of material made assessment difficult—it does nevertheless provide an interesting framework with which to compare the succession to power of the Zambian Government.
- 10 This question was discussed at the productivity seminars which took place on the Copperbelt in January 1968. The passage cited comes from a submission of *Additional Comments on the Seminars* to Government by the individual mines.
- 11 It is interesting to note that the formation of the United Progressive Party in August 1971, led by Mr S. Kapwepwe—a former Vice-President of Zambia—who defected from Government and the United National Independence Party, had appeal primarily amongst the Bemba-speaking people, but most particularly, it would appear, among the more middle class sections. Thus the mines' personnel departments were in some cases centres of support for U.P.P., and from my observations of the personnel department which is described in this paper the basis of support was to a certain extent attributable to frustration with the

Zambianization of the department. However, Kapwepwe never came out into the open on a platform of more rapid Zambianization. (N.B. The Copperbelt is a Bemba-speaking area, though the miners come from all over Zambia.)

12 Lipset (1968), chapter xii.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 321-2.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 322-3.

15 It is acknowledged by all levels of management that the Zambianization of the personnel department described in this paper was too hasty. In this case it may be that management was too sensitive to Government pressure. At the same time, it seems clear that the Zambianization of other personnel departments which took either the same time or a little longer has been on the whole more successful, as far as I can judge. From an examination of the history of the personnel department it appears that the Zambianized department inherited a somewhat disorganized department. But still further examination does reveal that top mine management and top-level personnel in Lusaka did not scrutinize the manner in which the Zambianization plans were being put into practice and failed to perceive the resentment that was current in the department among the whites during the period of the take-over. It would appear that the entire programme was left in the hands of a man who was concerned only to see a Zambian in his position as soon as possible so that he could leave the country. It appears also that this expatriate personnel manager was left very much alone to carry the programme through. In conclusion, there seemed, in addition to the rapidity, also a lack of commitment to the successful Zambianization of the department.

16 Lipset (1968), p. 321.

17 Mindeco (1970), p. 18.

18 Copper Industry Service Bureau (1970).

19 Though no legislation has been passed which makes strikes illegal, President Kaunda has officially 'banned' them (*Zambia Mail*, 15 August 1969).

20 For an account of the Government's official labour policy and particularly its emphasis on discipline, see Bates (1971), chapter three.

21 For an analysis of the way productivity and productivity deals can be used to management's advantage, see Cliff (1970).

22 International Labour Office (1969).

23 See, for example, 'Varsity corner', *Times of Zambia*, 3 and 10 April 1970, for two critical articles by James Fry of the Economics Department of the University of Zambia. Also Bas de Gaay Fortman in 'Varsity corner' of 8 May 1970. For a deeper study see Fry (1970).

24 I.L.O. (1969), p. 43.

25 Opening address by Dr Kaunda to the second National Convention on Prices, 1969. See Government of Zambia (1969), p. 13.

26 Government of Zambia (1968c).

27 Heron (1968).

28 *Ibid.*, para. 11.3, p. 15.

29 Potter, G. J., 'The 51 per cent nationalisation of the Zambian copper mines', in Faber and Potter (1971), p. 127. See also Bostock and Harvey (1972).

30 Roan Selection Trust (1970), appendix G, para. 2.

31 Potter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 105-6.

32 Goma (1970).

33

ZAMBIANIZATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT,
DIVISIONS 1 AND 2

	1963		1966		1968	
	Zambian	Non-Zambian	Zambian	Non-Zambian	Zambian	Non-Zambian
Administrative and Executive	103	719	846	974	1,729	697
Professional	11	418	60	281	193	826
Technical and works	531	891	720	866	1,375	956
Clerical, medical, police posts and prisons	712	1,807	2,884	1,530	4,212	920
Teachers:						
Primary			8,557	501	11,400	549
Secondary			118	1,044	145	1,636
Other			45	265	69	324
<i>Total</i>			13,230	5,461	19,123	5,926

Source. *Statistical Year Book, 1970* (1971), table 4.4., p. 44.

34 One of the complaints of the department responsible for the recruitment of school-leavers is that the cream which they select rarely find their way into mine employment, being attracted elsewhere, and even if they do many will drop out. One may presume that this is a transitional phase and as attractive positions in central Government become fewer and fewer so the mines will attract better material.