

NOTES

PROLOGUE

1. In the US, Paul DiMaggio (1979) was among the first, followed by Rogers Brubaker (1985) and Lamont and Lareau (1988). Then in the 1990s came more comprehensive assessments based on earlier articles: Swartz (1997), Robbins (1991), and the critical assessments in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone (1993). By far the most significant overview was written by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992).
2. I still adhere to this view that Bourdieu has no theory of history or social change and his central contribution is to a theory of social reproduction. This is not to say that he does not undertake historical analysis. He certainly does, for example, when he studies the genesis of the literary field or the modern state, but this does not amount to a *theory* of social change; it is an *account* of social change. Thus, the essays in Gorski (2013) show how Bourdieu's ideas about social reproduction can be very useful in studying historical events, but they have no predictive power that would mark a theory of social change. There are germs of a theory of social change in his account of the self-destruction of the Béarn kinship system or French colonialism—how social reproduction is simultaneously social transformation. But these germs remain underdeveloped. Overall, if there is an implicit account of social change it is that of Durkheimian social differentiation.
3. David Swartz (2013, chaps. 6 and 7) offers an extended discussion of Bourdieu as public sociologist and how he fits with my own version.

1. SOCIOLOGY IS A COMBAT SPORT

Epigraph: Carles (2001).

1. See the responses of Anderson (2002), Duneier (2002), and Newman (2002) to Wacquant's (2002) attack on their work.
2. There is, of course, an element of combat in Parsons too, for example, in the way he deals with Marx at a time when Marxism was enjoying a certain renaissance in US sociology: "Judged by the standards of the best contemporary social-science theory, Marxian theory is obsolete" (1967, 132). Marx was a "social theorist whose work fell entirely within the nineteenth century. . . . He belongs to a phase of development which has been superseded" (135).

2. THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY

This conversation is a revision of Burawoy (2018b). Epigraphs: Marx ([1847] 1963, 173); Bourdieu ([1984] 1991b, 251).

1. Note how different this is from Edward Thompson's (1963) classic, *The Making of the English Working Class*, according to which the working class makes history itself without the aid of a distinct body of intellectuals, especially Marxist intellectuals. In effect, Bourdieu is saying that Thompson commits the typical Marxist error of regarding the working class as making itself. Not surprisingly, many have accused Bourdieu of being a "Leninist" for his emphasis on the central role of intellectuals (Lane 2006).
2. Bourdieu often failed to specify the people he was attacking, leaving that to the reader's imagination and thereby leaving the enemy undefined and defenseless. This idea of class on paper might well be associated with Erik Wright's successive theorizations of class, although even his successive formulations were based on the analysis of survey research.
3. Indeed, some, such as Perry Anderson (1976) regarded the "idealism" of Western Marxism as a betrayal of a "true" Marxism. Ironically, what Anderson regards as the essential truth of Marxism, Bourdieu considers to be its essential flaw.
4. Throughout this conversation I will be referring to Marx except where he is a joint author with Engels. This is not to belittle the contribution of Engels but to reflect Bourdieu's focus on Marx whenever he is not making blanket statements about Marxism.
5. Here is how Marx and Engels berate Feuerbach: "Thus if millions of proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their 'existence' does not in the least correspond to their 'essence' then . . . this is an unavoidable misfortune, which must be borne quietly. The millions of proletarians and communists, however, think differently and will prove this in time, when they bring their 'existence' into harmony with their 'essence' in a practical way, by means of revolution" (Marx and Engels [1845–46] 1978, 168).
6. As Jacques Bidet (2008) emphasizes, the dynamics of Bourdieu's fields relies on struggle and competition among its agents rather than an underlying structure equivalent to the interaction of the forces and relations of production.
7. While Talcott Parsons and Pierre Bourdieu share a commitment to a general theory of action, Parsons develops four analytical subsystems (analogous to fields) whose functions—adaptive, goal attainment, integrative, and latency—contribute to society as a whole and whose interdependence is orchestrated through universal media of interchange (money, power, influence, and value commitments) that are parallel to Bourdieu's capitals. From here Parsons develops a theory of history as differentiation, governed by evolutionary universals. Bourdieu makes no attempt to advance such a grand account of history and totality. Indeed, he recoils from any such project. He systematically refuses systematicity.
8. There is also a curious parallel between Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" and Marx's conception of "forces of production." Both are durable, transposable,

and irreversible—the one a measure of the development of the individual, the other of society. Both come into conflict with wider structures within which they develop. For Marx, however, those structures (relations of production) are transformed through revolutions that allow a new higher mode of production and that impel the expansion of the forces of production, whereas for Bourdieu, it is the opposite: habitus tends to give way to structures.

9. In the more abstract formulation of Bourdieu and Passeron ([1970] 1977), lower-class students accept the legitimacy of the school and exit quietly but later, following the reform of secondary education, the school becomes embroiled in rebellion. See Bourdieu et al. ([1993] 1999, 421–506).
10. In writing about Algeria, however, Bourdieu ([1963] 1979, 62–63) argues that it is the relative stability and the "privilege" of experiencing "permanent, rational exploitation" that gives the working class revolutionary potential, very different from the dispossessed peasantry and subproletariat, who live from hand to mouth and are, therefore, unable to plan for an alternative future. It is the distinction between a genuine "revolutionary force" and a spontaneous "force for revolution." This is a very different portrait than the one of the French working class weighed down by necessity, accepting the legitimacy of the dominant classes. While Bourdieu makes no effort to reconcile these opposed visions of the working class, he might argue that it revolves around the symbolic violence in France and the material violence of colonialism. Alternatively, these may be strategic positions that Bourdieu takes up in two different political fields: against the Front de Libération Nationale/National Liberation Front (FLN), which favored the peasantry as a revolutionary class in Algeria, and against the Marxists, who regarded the working class as inherently revolutionary in France.
11. They are what Alvin Gouldner (1979) calls a flawed universal class, only he was more realistic about the corporatism of intellectuals. Antonio Gramsci would see Bourdieu's intellectuals as "traditional intellectuals" who, in defending their autonomy, are able to present the interests of the dominant class as the interest of all, as the universal interests.

3. CULTURAL DOMINATION

Epigraphs: Bourdieu (1979) 1984, 386; Bourdieu (1987) 1990, 27–28; Bourdieu 1989, 109.

1. In another reference, Bourdieu (1991, chap. 8) opportunistically turns Gramsci warnings about the dangers of the trade union oligarchy—"a banker of men in a monopoly situation"—and of the sectarian politics of the party apparatus, cut off from its followers, into a blanket denunciation of "organic intellectuals" as deceiving both themselves and the class they claim to represent. It is curious that Bourdieu here draws on Gramsci's more obscure political writings, while avoiding the *Prison Notebooks* and their key ideas of hegemony, civil society, intellectuals, and the state.
2. Reflecting their very different intellectual positions and dispositions, they diverge fundamentally in their relation to their class origins. In the film *La*

sociologie est un sport du combat, which is a portrait of Bourdieu's academic and political life, there is a scene in which Bourdieu describes his revulsion for the dialect of his home region in the Pyrenees, illustrating the class habitus he developed in the academic establishment, whereas Gramsci writes moving letters from prison to his sister imploring her to make sure that her children do not lose their familiarity with folk idioms and vernacular.

3. The obvious exceptions are Bourdieu's account of May 1968 in which there are temporary alliances between intellectuals and working classes, merging into general crisis, and his account of the Algerian "revolution within the revolution" when the colonized fuse into a struggle against colonialism.
4. Even Bourdieu is led to the appropriation of the idea of the organic intellectual: "All this means that the ethno-sociologist is a kind of organic intellectual of humanity, and as a collective agent, can contribute to de-naturalizing and de-fatalizing human existence by placing his skill at the service of a universalism rooted in the comprehension of different particularisms" (Bourdieu [2002] 2008b, 24). But it is an organic intellectual of an abstract entity (i.e., humanity)—the very antithesis of Gramsci's organic intellectual—indeed, the apotheosis of Gramsci's traditional intellectual.

4. COLONIALISM AND REVOLUTION

Epigraphs: Bourdieu ([1987] 1990, 7); Pierre Bourdieu, in Le Sueur (2001, 282).

1. The English versions to which I will refer are *The Algerians* ([1961] 1962); *Algeria, 1960* ([1963] 1979), which is an abridged version of the French *Work and Workers in Algeria* (1963); and *Algerian Sketches* (2013), which includes excerpts from *Le déracinement* (1964).
2. For an important set of essays on the contradictions and paradoxes of Bourdieu's Algerian writings, see Jane Goodman and Paul Silverstein (2009), especially the chapter by Fanny Colonna, who criticizes Bourdieu for his poorly stylized fieldwork that misses the realities of daily life and for his unsubstantiated claim that the Kabyle misrecognize what they are up to.
3. First published in *Esprit* 1 (January 1961); English translation appeared in Bourdieu ([1961] 1962, chap. 7).
4. Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 172) writes of the difficulty of changing the habitus, calling for "thoroughgoing process of countertraining." Fanon is saying the same: that the internalization of oppression is so deep that the colonized can only transform themselves through violence.
5. Writing with Sayad in 1964, Bourdieu analyzes the possibilities of socialism very much in terms familiar from Durkheim and Mauss. Bourdieu and Sayad cast doubt on the feasibility of self-organized, decentralized socialism based on autonomous peasant organization of the farms vacated by colonialists, just as they fear the possibility of a centralized authoritarian socialism imposed from above. Like Fanon, they hope for an educative leadership responsive to needs from below. They easily fall back, however, on the cultural legacies of tradition to explain economic and political regression.

6. We find this vision laid out in the earliest writings of Bourdieu ([1961] 1962)—a secondary account of the cultures of different ethnic groups—and then in the self-consciously theoretical works written in France, most notably *Outline of a Theory of Practice* ([1972] 1977).
7. Bourdieu does try to mark his distance from one of the modernization theorists of the day—Daniel Lerner (1958)—by criticizing his psychological characterization of modernity as the recognition of other, as the expression of empathy, and as a rationality freely chosen. As orientations to the world, "tradition" and "modernity" are not freely chosen, says Bourdieu, but spring from specific material contexts, the clash of unequal civilizations under colonialism (Bourdieu [1961] 1962, 117, 119–20). But the concepts of tradition and modernity are never called into question, simply redefined.
8. Bourdieu (2000) relies on the misinterpreted case of the Kabyle cook—a man who moves from one job to another. There is little evidence that this is a sign of anomie or that he is beholden to some traditional habitus. Instead, the cook shows great entrepreneurial adroitness in adapting to the exigencies of urban life under colonialism.
9. Gramsci seemed to think that the war of position either preceded the war of movement (in the West, where civil society was strong) or followed the war of movement (in the East, with its undeveloped civil society, where socialism would be built after the revolution). Fanon understood the dangers of postponing the struggle for socialism until after independence.
10. Interestingly, Fanon and Bourdieu held opposite views about the working class in advanced capitalism too: for Fanon, it was potentially revolutionary; for Bourdieu, it was not. Although there is no sign that Fanon had read Gramsci, he had a very Gramscian view of the West with a developed civil society and a bourgeoisie able to make concessions, all of which was absent in the periphery (Fanon [1961] 1963, 38, 108–9, 165, 175).

5. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED

Epigraph: Bourdieu and Passeron (1977 [1970], 210).

1. Gramsci's use of the male pronoun throughout jars with contemporary sensibilities and leads him to miss the gender side of education, which is as important as the class dimension. Bourdieu and Passeron are more sensitive to contemporary usage, but they too are primarily focused on the significance of class.

6. THE ANTINOMIES OF FEMINISM

Epigraph: Bourdieu (1995, viii).

1. An obvious reference to *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*, the first volume of Beauvoir's autobiography.
2. I will rely on the original English translation of *The Second Sex*, despite its known problems; see Moi (2002).
3. Toril Moi says as much herself. After referring to Françoise Armengaud's claim that Bourdieu stole the ideas of contemporary French feminists, Moi (1999,

283n21) goes on to write, “In the same way he [Bourdieu] completely fails to acknowledge that his own analysis of patriarchal domination echoes that of Simone de Beauvoir. . . . As I say repeatedly in the text, Bourdieu’s general understanding of women’s oppression is hardly original or new to anyone vaguely familiar with feminist thought in this century. My point, however, is that whatever we think about Bourdieu’s own lack of feminist credentials, the concepts he develops (*habitus*, field, symbolic capital, distinction, and so on) remain deeply useful for certain kinds of feminist projects.” This is also the general tenor of the collection *Feminism after Bourdieu* (Adkins and Skeggs 2004). Feminists too easily let Bourdieu off the hook by separating his concepts from his theory of symbolic violence—a theory pioneered by Beauvoir.

4. Beauvoir devotes a whole chapter to prostitution as an alternative to marriage. Just as lesbianism is a departure from normal sexualization, so prostitution is an alternative road to marriage whose significance and evaluation differ from society to society.
5. The same structure can also be found in Sartre’s *Anti-Semite and Jew* ([1946] 1948), which appeared, probably not coincidentally, just as Beauvoir began work on *The Second Sex*.
6. This is what Patricia Hill Collins (1986) almost forty years later will call the perspective of “the outsider within,” although she will trace its genealogy not to Beauvoir, but to George Simmel.

7. THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION

Epigraphs: Mills (1959, 187); Bourdieu ([1977] 2008, 76–77); Bourdieu ([2000] 2008, 24).

1. Mills supported Norman Thomas’s 1948 presidential bid as a candidate of the Socialist Party.
2. Exceptional, therefore, is Bourdieu’s treatment of “love” and the gay and lesbian movements in *Masculine Domination* ([1998] 2001).
3. Obviously, Mills and Bourdieu are also affected by the styles of thinking and writing that prevail in their own national intellectual fields, manifested in the opposed styles of Continental and Anglo-American philosophy.

8. THE TWOFOLD TRUTH OF LABOR

An earlier version of this conversation was published in *Sociology* (Burawoy 2012). I am borrowing the term *Homo habitus* from correspondence with Bridget Kenny, who coined it to express Bourdieu’s deeply pessimistic view of human nature.

Homo ludens comes from the famous Dutch theorist Johan Huizinga ([1938] 2014). Epigraphs: Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 202); Burawoy (1979, 30).

1. I would later call the internal state “the political and ideological apparatuses of production” or “the regime of production” (Burawoy 1985).
2. There is no shortage of studies that suggest the ubiquity of games. For some outstanding recent examples, see Ofer Sharone’s (2004) study of software engineers, Jeffrey Sallaz’s (2002) study of casino dealers, Rachel Sherman’s (2007) study of

hotel workers, and Adam Reich’s (2010) study of juvenile prisoners. With the development of the gig economy, the organization of work as a game has become an industry unto itself, employing consultants in “gamification.” Digital platform design incentives that exploit the human propensity to play games, especially when workers face coercive and boring regimens. See, for example, Sarah Mason’s (2018) fascinating account of working for the ride-hailing company Lyft.

3. It was while working and teaching with Adam Przeworski at the University of Chicago that I developed the idea of social structure as a game. During this time he was developing his Gramscian theory of electoral politics: party competition could be thought of as an absorbing game in which the struggle was over the distribution of economic resources at the margin, thereby eclipsing the fundamental inequality upon which the game was based (Przeworski 1985).
4. Indeed, Przeworski (1985) has shown just how rational it is for socialist parties to fight for immediate material gains in order to attract the votes necessary to gain and then keep power.
5. This is more consistent with Bernard Lahire’s (2011) view of individuals as carrying a plurality of selves, activated in different situations, than with Bourdieu’s notion of a singular integrated and cumulative habitus.
6. Interestingly, the major Bourdieusian analysis of the transition in Eastern Europe—Eyal, Szclényi, and Townsley (1998)—is an analysis not of the collapse but of the post-socialist succession of elites in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Again, it is an examination of the inheritance, fate, and distribution of different forms of socialist capital (economic, cultural, and political) in the post-socialist era.
7. This is most systematically elaborated in Bourdieu’s ([1984] 1988) account of the crisis of May 1968, where he examines the consequences of the declining opportunities for expanding numbers of university graduates and the way the crisis in the university field dovetailed with the crisis in the wider political field.
8. Gil Eyal (2013) makes the point forcefully that, while Bourdieu is very concerned about internal relations *within* fields, he has little conception of the relations *among* fields. In a meticulous account of Bourdieu’s treatment of the sociology of knowledge, Charles Camic (2013) also draws attention to the ambiguities in Bourdieu’s understanding of the relations among fields and how his programmatic statements substitute macro forces—economic, political, an religious—for a constellation of fields.
9. “Knowledge and recognition have to be rooted in practical dispositions of acceptance and submission, which, because they do not pass through deliberation and decision, escape the dilemmas of consent or constraint” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000, 198).

9. THE WEIGHT OF THE WORLD

This chapter has been in gestation for many years. It was originally given at a conference on Bourdieu and Work in Paris at CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique) in 2012. Since then it has been rewritten many times under the influence

of comments from Erik Wright, Mike Levien, and Mark Gould. It is published here for the first time. Epigraphs: Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 180); Bourdieu (*WW*, 614); Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 163); Bourdieu ([1984] 1991a, 204, 206).

1. Hereafter, Bourdieu et al. (1993) 1999 will be cited as *WW*.
2. As we shall see, this is related but not reducible to the more conventional distinction between Bourdieu the professional sociologist and Bourdieu the public sociologist.
3. Inspired by *Weight of the World*, Javier Auyero (2015) and his students undertake a rare portrait of the underbelly of Austin (Texas) through extended interviews of carefully selected respondents. Unlike Bourdieu and his colleagues, the authors don't write introductions to excerpts from their interviews but instead use the interviews to create a mosaic of perspectives that pay attention to the broader forces creating the urban precariat. The overall impression is similarly bleak—individuals having to fend for themselves—except the “accidents” that befall the respondents have catastrophic consequences, in part because there is no safety net. Although Bourdieu is the guiding light behind these studies, there is no concern with issues of symbolic violence or misrecognition.

CONCLUSION

1. In developing his ideas in the lectures on the state at the Collège de France, Bourdieu ([2012] 2014) shows that he is quite aware of wide-ranging literature, including the Marxist literature. Their omission in the finished works is a strategy, not a sign of ignorance.
2. As Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998) write in *Making Capitalism without Capitalists*, it was only with the transition to capitalism that intellectuals finally ascended to power as managers of postsocialism. They describe this process using a Bourdieusian framework of the conversion of different forms of capital. But this, too, turned out to be a temporary aberration.
3. See chapter 8.
4. Perhaps the most interesting advances have been made by proponents of a “dual process” model borrowed from cognitive psychology (Lizardo 2004; Vaisey 2009; Lizardo et al. 2016), in which a distinction is made between reflexive action that requires slow, conceptual processes of symbolic mastery and the prereflexive spontaneous, impulsive action based on accumulated, embodied processes developing over a long period of time. Focusing on symbolic violence, I have sliced Bourdieu in a different way: an internalization process that is unconscious and a gamelike interaction that works at a more conscious level. Whichever approach one takes, the big question pertains to the dynamic interplay between the conscious and the unconscious, of the sort that psychoanalysis has explored.
5. See chapter 3.

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