THE ANTINOMIES OF FEMINISM

Beauvoir Meets Bourdieu

If the scholarly principle of her literary “vocation,” of her emotional “choices” and even of her relation to her own status as a woman offered to us by Toril Moi have but little chance of appearing as Simone de Beauvoir, this is because she is separated from this by the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre to whom she delegated, in a way, her capacity to do philosophy. . . . There is not a better example of the symbolic violence that constitutes the traditional (patriarchal) relationship between the sexes than the fact that she will fail to apply her own analysis on relations between the sexes to her relationship with Jean-Paul Sartre.

She loves this destiny [aggrégation in philosophy] like she loves he who embodies the realisation of what she would long to be: Normalien, instituted by the rite of the concours in a superman socially authorised to despise the inferior castes . . . a philosopher who is sure of being one—sure to the point of destroying, for the sole pleasure of shining or of seducing, which are the same thing, this is the project of Simone de Beauvoir.

—BOURDIEU, “APOLLOGIE POUR UNE FEMME RANGÉE”

Bourdieu very rarely refers to Simone de Beauvoir (1908–86), but when he does it is with undisguised contempt, reminding us of his treatment of Fanon. Of course, both had a close relation to Jean-Paul Sartre, Bourdieu’s imagined combatant and intellectual archival. The passages above are drawn from Bourdieu’s preface to the translation of Toril Moi’s biography of Beauvoir. In this preface, written under the mocking title, “Apology for a dutiful woman,”1 Bourdieu claims that Beauvoir had no significant ideas of her own independent of Sartre and then reduces her to a project of his own (Bourdieu’s) projection—to be a philosopher dismissive of those beneath her.

This strategy of reductionism justifies the silencing of Beauvoir. If her ideas are an emanation of Sartre’s, then there’s no need to take them seriously. Bourdieu thereby exercises the very symbolic violence he condemns, namely the masculinist practice of silencing women. The final move in this denigration is to appropriate as his own Beauvoir’s ideas from The Second Sex ([1949] 1989)—a foundational classic in the analysis of masculine domination as an expression of symbolic violence. Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination ([1998] 2001) is but a superficial and diminutive gloss on The Second Sex. Reductionism, silencing, and appropriation are three stages in the labor of producing one’s own distinction through the conquest and erasure of others. In this conversation, I attempt to recover Beauvoir’s voice so that she can enter into a conversation with Bourdieu.

ON SILENCING BEAUVOIR

These strategies of combat, doubtless not fully conscious but deeply embedded in Bourdieu’s academic habitus, come into full view in Masculine Domination—a book that is full of references to a diverse array of second-wave feminists. Beauvoir, however, receives a single dismissive footnote:

For a specific illustration of what is implied by this perhaps somewhat abstract evocation of the specific forms that masculine domination takes within the educational institution, see Toril Moi’s analysis of the representations and academic classifications through which Sartre’s hold imposed itself on Simone Beauvoir. (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 86)

Once again he opportunistically exploits Toril Moi’s (1994) biography of Beauvoir. He focuses on Moi’s first two chapters, which do indeed place Beauvoir in her relation to Sartre and then in relation to the French intellectual
field, but he ignores Moi’s subsequent chapters devoted to the interpretation and original contributions of *The Second Sex*.

Moreover, Bourdieu claims that Beauvoir does not analyze her relation to Sartre, yet *The Second Sex* contains precisely that. Whether one looks at the chapter on love or on the independent woman, she is examining her own relation to Sartre, or her imagined relation to Sartre. Her prize-winning novel, *The Mandarins* (1958), is a thinly veiled dissection of her two major relations, one with Sartre and the other with the American poet Nelson Algren. And then there are the four volumes of memoirs. Moreover, even as she undertakes such a self-analysis, she does not make the mistake of universalizing her own situation as an intellectual woman; she recognizes how different she is from others, who are trapped in domesticity. If there is one thing one cannot accuse Beauvoir of, it is a failure of reflexivity. Paradoxically, it is Bourdieu, the great exponent of reflexivity, who systematically fails the test of reflexivity. We never discover any reference to, let alone analysis of, his relations with women (or men), even in his own *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*. Total silence.

Of course, Bourdieu is not alone in this silencing of Beauvoir, as Moi (1994, chap. 7) has herself shown. When *The Second Sex* first appeared in 1949 it became an instant national scandal. There was public outrage at the bluntness with which Beauvoir—one of France’s leading intellectuals—dealt with male domination and female complicity. Everyone seemed incriminated in her uncompromising indictment of the oppression of women. Subsequently, feminists have been loath to refer to her work, no matter how much they have borrowed from her. It became a sacrilegious text of unpleasant revelations, whose reading would often take place in secret. Plagiarize from it, yes, but to take it seriously is to taint one’s intellectual and/or feminist reputation. Influential though it was for second-wave feminism, homage to Beauvoir was all too often paid in silence.

Why then is Bourdieu, the advocate of reflexive sociology, complicit in this collective amnesia? It is especially surprising given that the silencing of women is precisely a strategy of domination that he explicates, and seemingly condemns, in *Masculine Domination*. In a section fittingly entitled, “Masculinity as Nobility,” Bourdieu ((1998) 2001, 59) writes of “the virtual denial of their [women’s] existence” in which “the best intentioned of men (for symbolic violence does not operate at the level of conscious intentions) perform discriminatory acts, excluding women, without even thinking about it, from positions of authority.” He denounces the silencing of women, but that does not give him pause when invoking Beauvoir’s supposed “dutiful” relation to Sartre to justify his own suppression of her understanding of masculine domination.

That would be bad enough, but he would at least be following the crowd in expunging her work from the recognized intellectual field. Bourdieu, however, is doubly guilty in that Beauvoir prefigured not only so much of second-wave feminism but also so much of what Bourdieu himself had to say about masculine domination fifty years later. Moreover, she does so in far richer, more complex, subtle detail and, as we shall see, always seeking paths beyond masculine domination. Yet not a single acknowledgment of *The Second Sex* finds its way into Bourdieu’s *Masculine Domination*, although there are ample references to second-wave feminism, particularly the Anglo-Saxon feminists who took so much from Beauvoir.

The argument of this conversation, therefore, is that *Masculine Domination* is a pale imitation of the ideas of *The Second Sex*. Nor should such a convergence be surprising. After all, both Bourdieu and Beauvoir were implacable enemies of domination, always seeking to reveal its hidden and manifest contours. Both were uncompromising in their denunciation of the mythologies of the naturalization and eternalization of domination. Both were vocal enemies of identity politics, of all forms of essentialism, and, thus, of difference feminism. Both denounced any attempt to romanticize the resistance or culture of the dominated. To recover and then celebrate the particularity of women, or any other oppressed group, from within the field of its domination is to affirm that domination. Rather, they both insisted that domination is overcome by giving the dominated equal access to the universal.

Here, therefore, I wish to restore Beauvoir’s originality, showing how Bourdieu’s categories and arguments not only already existed but were far better elaborated in *The Second Sex* and, moreover, how Beauvoir goes beyond him by always gesturing to freedoms beyond domination—and all this despite her book predating his by half a century.

**SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE**

Apart from the strategic importance for any theorist of “distinction” to pronounce on such a central trope of modern social thought, why is Bourdieu interested in masculine domination? For him, it is

the prime example of this paradoxical submission, an effect of what I call symbolic violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the
purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling. (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 1–2)

For Beauvoir, masculine domination is the supreme form of othering, of which race and class are also examples:

[Woman] is simply what man decrees. Thus she is called “sex,” by which is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex—absolute sex, no less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other. (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, xxii)

Already here we see that Beauvoir gives more agency to men in the constitution of women, although she will show how men are also dominated by their domination. Still, the effect is the same: “She [woman] has no grasp even in thought, on the reality around her. It is opaque to her eyes” ([1949] 1989, 598).

Symbolic violence is not a matter of combining force and consent; it operates far more deeply through the internalization of social structure via those “schemes of perception and appreciation” that are constitutive of habitus:

So the only way to understand this particular form of domination is to move beyond the forced choice between constraint (by forces) and consent (to reasons), between mechanical coercion and voluntary, free, deliberate, even calculated submission. The effect of symbolic domination (whether ethnic, gender, cultural or linguistic, etc.) is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing consciousness but through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are constitutive of habitus and which, below the levels of the decisions of the consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship that is profoundly obscure to itself. Thus, the paradoxical logic of masculine domination and female submissiveness, which car, without contradiction, be described as both spontaneous and extorted, cannot be understood until one takes account of the durable effects that the social order exerts on women (and men), that is to say, the dispositions spontaneously attuned to that order which it imposes on them. (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 37–38)

A fish is so attuned to the water in which it swims and without which it could not exist that it does not recognize the water for what it is and takes it for granted as natural and eternal. So it is with masculine domination. It is interesting, therefore, to read how Beauvoir explains her own discovery of masculine domination. Writing her memoirs in 1963, she reflects back on the moment of epiphany. It was 1946 and she was having a conversation with Sartre about writing her memoirs:

I realized that the first question to come up was: What has it meant to me to be a woman? At first I thought I could dispose of that pretty quickly. I had never had any feeling of inferiority, no one had ever said to me: “You think that way because you’re a woman”; my femininity had never been irksome to me in any way. “For me,” I said to Sartre, “you might almost say it just hasn’t counted.” “All the same, you weren’t brought up in the same way as a boy would have been; you should look into it further.” I looked, and it was a revelation: this world was a masculine world, my childhood had been nourished by myths forged by men, and I hadn’t reacted to them in at all the same way I should have done if I were a boy. I was so interested in this discovery that I abandoned my project for a personal confession in order to give all my attention to finding out about the condition of women in the broadest terms. I went to the Bibliothèque Nationale to do some reading, and what I studied were the myths of femininity. (Beauvoir [1963] 1964, 94–95)

In this rendition, Beauvoir, by an act of self-conscious willpower, pursues the origins and reproduction, the architecture and archaeology of masculine domination, all laid out in The Second Sex. This discovery of what had been unrecognized or misrecognized appears here as a quite conscious process—as indeed it was for Bourdieu, who claims to have discovered the structures of masculine domination through scientific observation of its elementary forms among the Kabyle. On the other hand, one might argue that Beauvoir’s consciousness did not transform her practice of femininity. She does not escape the dilemma of being complicit in masculine domination, as The Mandarins—the novel of her two lives, the one among Parisian intellectuals and the other with her American lover, Nelson Algren—makes clear. She is far more honest about her own complicity than Bourdieu, who retreats to Virginia Woolf (1927) when he wants to talk about the concrete practices of male domination.
Like Bourdieu, Beauvoir is under no illusion about the depth of female subjugation: "The bond that unites her [woman] to her oppressors is not comparable to any other. The division of the sexes is a biological fact, not an event of history" (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, xxv). So it is easily presented as natural, inevitable, and eternal. "They have no past, no history, no religion of their own; and they have no such solidarity of work and interest as that of the proletariat" (xxv). They have no awareness of themselves as an oppressed collective. "When man makes of woman the Other, he may, then, expect her to manifest deep-seated tendencies toward complicity" (xxvii). Thus, Beauvoir sees masculine domination as a special type of domination that is stronger and deeper than class or racial domination, for the latter occupy spaces from which oppositional identities can be formed. "Having no independent domain, she cannot oppose positive truths and values of her own to those asserted and upheld by males: she can only deny them" (611). In one of his rare comparative moments, Bourdieu seems to think the opposite, namely that masculine domination is the prototype of symbolic violence but that class domination is its deepest expression (Bourdieu [1979] 1984, 384). Yet for both—and this is the important point here—masculine domination is the purest form of symbolic violence, that is, domination not recognized as such, or when it is recognized, that does not affect the unconscious practical sense.

Finally, one might surmise that the revulsion that greeted The Second Sex, as well as its subsequent silencing, speaks to the unconscious levels it excavates and the resistance, whether among the dominators or the dominated, to recognizing deeply internalized hierarchies. Thus, as we shall see in detail, Beauvoir's treatment of masculine domination embraces the notion of symbolic violence, but it also seeks to transcend it. In demonstrating my claim that there is nothing in Masculine Domination that does not already exist in a more elaborated form in The Second Sex, I have organized the following sections along the thematic lines of Masculine Domination.

**NATURALIZATION, OR REVERSING CAUSE AND EFFECT**

At the heart of masculine domination is its naturalization, which gives rise to the reversal of cause and effect. If it were the case that the differences between men and women are inherent, as though these two beings were different human species, then we could indeed say that the gender division of labor merely reflects differences in natural abilities and talents. We could, say, for example, that women are by their nature emotional and men by their nature rational. In reality, what is presumed to be cause—the natural differences between men and women—is actually the effect of historical forces and socialization. Thus, Bourdieu writes,

The biological appearances and the very real effects that have been produced in bodies and minds by a long collective labour of socialization of the biological and biologicization of the social combine to reverse the relationship between causes and effects and to make a naturalized social construction ("genders" as sexually characterized habitus) appear as the grounding in nature of the arbitrary division which underlies both reality and the representation of reality and which sometimes imposes itself even on scientific research. ([1998] 2001, 3; see also 22–23)

Beauvoir goes into far more detail. Indeed, part I of The Second Sex, entitled "Destiny," devotes successive chapters to the biological, psychoanalytical, and historical materialist foundations of masculine domination. While there are those who ground masculine domination in the biological differences between men and women, after examining biological evidence in excruciating detail, Beauvoir finds this view wanting. Biological differences there are, and women experience their bodies very differently than men—for women the body is an alien force outside their control, whereas men are at home with their body—yet these experiences are not given anatomically but are shaped by society and upbringing. In the final analysis, biological differences cannot explain the subjugation of women, which is the cumulative product of social and economic forces, most importantly the relationship of production to reproduction. Biology is not destiny.

Psychoanalysis represents a major advance in that the body exists no longer in and of itself but as lived by the subject. In a subjectivist flourish, Beauvoir writes, "It is not nature that defines woman; it is she who defines herself by dealing with nature on her own account in her emotional life" ([1949] 1989, 38). While psychoanalysis gives the framework within which to study the dynamics of gender, it does not explain the origins of masculine domination nor its persistence, resting as it does on the assumption of the patriarchal father. Beauvoir's next chapter, therefore, turns to historical materialism and, in particular, Engels's claim that private property is at the root of masculine domination. While acknowledging the influence of economic forces, she rejects Engels's argument on the grounds that it never explains the very constitution of male and female subjects. Rejecting, therefore, both the "sexual determinism" of Freud and the "economic determinism" of Engels,
she presents a history of male domination by integrating the biological and psychoanalytic into a materialist analysis of history:

In our attempt to discover woman we shall not reject certain contributions of biology, of psychoanalysis, and of historical materialism; but we shall hold that the body, the sexual life, and the resources of technology exist concretely for man only in so far as he grasps them in the total perspective of his existence. (60)

In this way, Beauvoir dispenses with the scientific foundations for views that regard woman as by nature destined to be man’s Other, showing them all to be fallacious. Yet she will also draw on these very same theories to reverse causality, showing how history and biography shape the concrete hierarchical relations through which man and woman produce each other.

THE HISTORICAL LABOR OF DEHISTORICIZATION

For Bourdieu, the naturalization of masculine domination lies with the matching of subjective and objective structures, the inculcation of a habitus by social structures, and the resulting harmonization of the two so that domination cannot be recognized as such ([1998] 2001, 33). This matching of the subjective and the objective is not spontaneous but the result of a long historical labor that produces the effect of eternalization:

It follows that, in order to escape completely from essentialism, one should not try to deny the permanences and the invariants, which are indisputably part of historical reality; but, rather, one must reconstruct the history of the historical labour of dehistoricization, or, to put it another way, the history of the continuous (re)creation of the objective and subjective structures of masculine domination, which has gone on permanently so long as there have been men and women, and through which the masculine order has been continually reproduced from age to age. In other words, a “history of women” which brings to light, albeit despite itself, a large degree of constancy, permanence, must, if it wants to be consistent with itself, give a place, and no doubt the central place, to the history of the agents and institutions which permanently contribute to the maintenance of these permanences, the church, the stats, educational system, etc., and which may vary, at different times, in their relative weights and their functions. (82–83; emphasis original)

Such a history that Bourdieu calls for in programmatic terms, Beauvoir had already attempted in part 2 of The Second Sex, itself divided into five chapters. She knows that a history of the second sex must be a history of the social production of masculine domination and its “naturalization,” “eternalization,” or, as Bourdieu calls it, “dehistoricization.” Bourdieu’s chapter 3, “Permanence and Change,” does not compare to Beauvoir’s ambition, scope, and accomplishment—heavily influenced by Engels’s flawed history, to be sure, but an enormous achievement nonetheless. Included here is an anticipation of feminist appropriation of Lévi-Strauss’s idea of women as objects exchanged among men in the pursuit of masculine politics, as well as a sophisticated analysis of how the second shift will reproduce rather than undermine masculine domination. Beauvoir prefigured the work of Gayle Rubin (1975) and Arlie Hochschild (1983), whose ideas Bourdieu subsequently takes up as though they were original to them.

In justifying his own intervention into gender studies, Bourdieu claimed as his contribution the focus on the reproduction of the structure of masculine domination outside the domestic sphere in agencies such as the church, the educational system, and the state (and, he might have mentioned, the economy), as if feminists had not explored these areas already. But even more to the point, The Second Sex itself recognized the importance of these arenas, both in the chapter “Since the French Revolution: The Job and the Vote” and in part 5, where Beauvoir describes “woman’s situation.”

Having drawn up a history of masculine domination, a history in which man defines woman as other, so Beauvoir asks how men have imagined women in their dreams, “for what-in-men’s-eyes-she-seems-to-be is one of the necessary factors in her real situation” ([1949] 1989, 138). Part 3 of The Second Sex is devoted to the exploration of the myths men create about women to justify their subordination. It describes the struggles of men to realize themselves with, through, and against women, as well as the fantasies they create about women as nature, as flesh, as poetry. Woman is constituted as other, as slave and companion to man’s fanciful desires for his own self-realization, as an idol to worship, as a distraction or compensation for the anxieties of his own entrapment in the cruel or noble competition with other men. Woman serves so many functions as other to man’s projection of himself, both his limitations and his potentialities. Man cannot live without the mythology and reality of woman. Beauvoir discovers the most vivid expression of these imaginations in literature. There she also detects the possibility that man, seeing woman as necessary to his existence, defining
himself in her mirror, also catches sight of a human being with her own
needs with whom he might share a life of transcendence.

Even in his treatment of the Kabyle, there is no ethnographic coun-
terpart in Bourdieu to Beauvoir’s dissection of the creative literary outpour-
ings of men. Although Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic violence is one in
which the dominated apply the dominant point of view to themselves, he
never explores that dominant point of view in any detail. But it is here that
Beauvoir not only discovers myths that ratify and eternalize domination but
also catches glimpses of transcendence when men, caught in the grip of their
dependence on women, recognize that their freedom can only be won with
and through the freedom of women. The relentless pursuit of the sources of
domination never blinds Beauvoir to the possibilities of liberation, so dif-
ferent from Bourdieu’s notion of habitus as internalized social structure that
preempts the possibility of any such vision. Important as they are in prefig-
uring alternatives, Beauvoir is under no illusion that such imaginations can
be easily sustained against woman’s bondage to immanence.

PRODUCING THE GENDERED HABITUS
The history of the collective unconscious has to be supplemented, says Bour-
dieu, by an understanding of the personal unconscious; we need both an
ontogeny and a phylogeny. Here too Bourdieu offers general formulations:

The work of transformation of bodies which is both sexually differ-
entiated and sexually differentiating and which is performed partly
through the effects of mimetic suggestion, partly through explicit
injunctions and partly through the whole symbolic construction of
the view of the biological body (and in particular the sexual act,
conceived as an act of domination, possession), produces system-
atically differentiated and differentiating habitus. The masculiniza-
tion of the male body and the feminization of the female body, im-
mense and in a sense interminable tasks which, perhaps now more
than ever, always demand a considerable expenditure of time and
effort, induce a somatization of the relation of domination, which is

Beauvoir devotes part 4 of The Second Sex to the formative years of the
woman: childhood, the young girl, and sexual initiation. It opens with the
sentence for which she has become famous (and famously misunderstood):
“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”

No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the fig-
ure that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as
a whole that produces this creature, intermediate between male
and eunuch, which is described as feminine. Only the intervention
of someone else can establish an individual as an Other. ([1949]
1989, 267)

It is painful even to read the way she describes what must, after all, have been
close to her own upbringings. She draws on an array of literatures to develop
a psychodynamic view of the way femininity is forced upon girls, the fanta-
sies and anxieties of compulsory segregation in adolescence, and, ﬁnally, the
traumas of sexual initiation. From then on she has been made, she has been
painfully disciplined, to be woman.

Well, not always. Beauvoir insists that socialization can go awry. She
points out, anticipating the work of Nancy Chodorow (1978) twen-
nine years later, that as a result of their upbringing, speciﬁcally being moth-
ered by women—but also in revulsion against aggressive masculinity—
from early on, alongside heterosexual dispositions, women develop strong
bonds with other women. This can lead to lesbian relations. She devotes
an entire chapter to “The Lesbian”—an enigmatic chapter, perhaps re-
flecting her own ambivalence—in which she wavers between, on the one
hand, lesbian sexuality as second best to heterosexuality (i.e., a casualty
of masculine domination) and, on the other hand, lesbian sexuality as a
liberated sexuality of mutual recognition. Of course, we must not forget
that in the France of 1949, lesbianism was a “forbidden” sexuality. It was
an extraordinary act of courage to even broach the subject, let alone affirm
its propriety.

Times have changed, so that today Bourdieu feels compelled to add
what seems to be an obligatory appendix—“Some Questions on the Gay
and Lesbian Movement”—in which he too wavers between seeing the gay
lesbian movement as subversive of masculine domination and seeing it as
upholding dominant classifications. But Bourdieu simply takes lesbian and
gay sexuality as a given, whereas Beauvoir offers a rudimentary theory of
its emergence. Bourdieu’s notion of socialization, of habitus—the bodily
inscription of social structure—misses all the ambiguities, resistances, and
contradictions so central to Beauvoir’s more open and indeterminate an-
alysis. In Masculine Domination, the limitations of the notion of habitus be-
come particularly clear.

Chapter Six
DOMINATION AND ITS ADAPTATIONS

Once the girl becomes a woman and enters as an adult into society, she faces the strictures of marriage and motherhood, and then the transition from maturity to old age. The story is always a bleak one, a story of domestic drudgery, boredom, and confinement. Isolated in a "living tomb," woman serves only to "assure the monotonous repetition of life in all its mindless factuality" (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, 604). The child becomes an obsessive focus of attention, both in resentment of and as compensation for woman's chains.3 Working with a definite vision of the nuclear family and the male breadwinner, Beauvoir describes the woman's escape via adultery, friendship, or community as unsound evasions, each road paved with falsehood. This is the picture of the American woman in the 1950s that Betty Friedan would later paint in *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), a destiny against which the feminist movement would rebel.

Beauvoir is aware that domesticity is not necessarily woman's destiny. Escape from confinement and entry into the labor force is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liberation, since oppression easily follows her into the workplace. She is now bound in servitude to employer and patriarch. Nor does she think all is paradise for men. Indeed, just as Bourdieu insists that the dominators are dominated by their domination, so Beauvoir describes how men are also oppressed by their oppression, chained by their sovereignty.

Reflecting the shift that occurred over the subsequent fifty years in which women have become more mobile and less prisoners of domesticity, Bourdieu focuses more on the body in motion, the way the woman's body is a body for others, the way it is surveilled and self-surveilled, generating insecurity and anxiety. Women become objects in a market of symbolic goods. Not for nothing does he insist that masculine domination has no center but is diffused throughout society. Still, woman is not only object but, even in Bourdieu's rendition, has a subjectivity and a vision of men. Here he draws on Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* to capture the many ways in which women's dependency on men leads them into a supporting role, participating vicariously in men's games, a cheerleader of their men. The wife pacifies and protects the man against other men, trying to alleviate his anxieties and to comprehend the harshness of his domestic rule as a measure of his paternal love or as a response to the insecurities he faces.

Above all, women love men for the power they wield, the power denied to women:

Because differential socialization disposes men to love the games of power and women to love the men who play them, masculine charisma is partly the charm of power, the seduction that the possession of power exerts, as such, on bodies whose drives and desires are themselves politically socialized. Masculine domination finds one of its strongest supports in the misrecognition which results from the application to the dominant of categories engendered in the very relationship of domination and which can lead to that extreme form of *amor fati*, love of the dominant and of his domination, a *libido dominantis* (desire for the dominant) which implies renunciation of personal exercise of *libido dominandi* (the desire to dominate). (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 79–80)

Here, too, Beauvoir had said it before in her extraordinary second chapter of Part VI of *The Second Sex*. "Women in Love," where she describes how women deify men, putting them on a pedestal in order to worship them. He is her representative in the outside world, his victories are her victories, his defeats her defeats. She idolizes him only to drag him down into her lair, demanding his everlasting attention. She realizes herself through him, but this love of the powerful man is doomed to disaster, either because man cannot sustain her expectations or because his desire is capricious and ephemeral:

Shut up in the sphere of the relative, destined to the male from childhood, habituated to seeing in him a superb being whom she cannot possibly equal, the woman who has not repressed her claim to humanity will dream of transcending her being towards one of these superior beings, of amalgamating herself with the sovereign subject. There is no other way out for her than to lose herself, body and soul, in him who is represented to her as the absolute, as the essential. Since she is anyway doomed to dependence, she will prefer to serve a god rather than obey tyrants—parents, husband or protector. She chooses to desire her enslavement so ardently that it will seem to her the expression of her liberty; she will try to rise above her situation as inessential object by fully accepting it; through her flesh, her feelings, her behaviour, she will enthrone him as supreme value and reality; she will humble herself to nothingness before him. Love becomes for her a religion. (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, 643)
Such are woman's attempts at salvation—idolatrous love, along with narcissism or mysticism—attempts to "transform her prison into a heaven of glory, her servitude into sovereign liberty" (628).

These notions of woman enclosed in domesticity sound rather antiquated, and Beauvoir herself recognizes that "today the combat takes a different shape; instead of wishing to put man in a prison, woman endeavors to escape from one; she no longer seeks to drag him into the realms of immanence but to emerge, herself, into the light of transcendence" (717). She thinks it will be transcendence, but it turns out to only intensify her subjugation, the one at home intensified by the one at work (680–81). Indeed, all these stratagems to realize herself, to become a subject, are illusory and self-defeating. They are what Beauvoir calls "justifications" and what Bourdieu calls "making virtue of necessity," adaptations of the dominated to their domination. Both paint a bleak picture in which women understand such adaptations as paths of freedom, whereas in fact they intensify subjugation.

But neither Bourdieu nor Beauvoir, but particularly Beauvoir, can leave women doubly imprisoned, objectively and subjectively. Both search for a possible escape from immanence, entrapment, and symbolic violence.

**Liberation**

Once again, Bourdieu adopts a notion of liberation surprisingly close to Beauvoir's. This is all the more astonishing as Bourdieu has generally scoffed at the attempt to formulate utopias. Yet in his postscript to *Masculine Domination*, he does just that, serving up a weak replica of Beauvoir's last chapter. The postscript begins by reasserting that "love is domination accepted, unrecognized as such and practically recognized, in happy or unhappy passions" (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 109). Yet he then goes on to imagine the possibility of the suspension of domination in favor of mutual recognition:

This is a world of non-violence, made possible by the establishment of relations based on full reciprocity and authorizing the abandonment and entrusting of self; a world of mutual recognition, which makes it possible, as Sartre says, to feel "justified in existing" . . . the world of the disinterestedness which makes possible deinstrumentalized relations, based on the happiness of giving happiness, of finding in the wonderment of the other, especially at the wonder he or she arouses, inexhaustible reasons for wonder. (110)

This is exactly what Beauvoir had elaborated in the last chapter of *The Second Sex*:

To emancipate woman is to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to man, not to deny them to her; let her have her independent existence and she will continue none the less the less to exist for him also: mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an other. (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, 731; emphasis original)

Even the expressions they use are the same, not only "mutual recognition" but the idea of the "gift of self" Beauvoir writes of genuine love through mutual recognition as "revelation of self by the gift of self and the enrichment of the world" (667; emphasis added), and Bourdieu follows with the true love of mutual recognition that can be found in "the economy of symbolic exchanges of which the supreme form is the gift of self, and of one's body a sacred body, excluded from commercial circulation" ([1998] 2001, 110–11; emphasis added).

Still, the difference is clear. For Bourdieu, liberation is thrown in as an obligatory and ill-fitting afterthought, perhaps a concession to the feminists he is trying to win over, perhaps a reflection of one of his own ongoing affairs, whereas it is Beauvoir's central concern, a subterranean stream running through the entire book that springs up in a final resplendent fountain of hope—there can be no domination without the possibility of liberation. She does not imagine a dissolution of the differences between men and women but instead imagines a plurality of such relations, "differences in equality": "New relations of flesh and sentiment of which we have no conception will arise between the sexes" (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, 730).

Whereas Bourdieu tells us nothing of the conditions for his "pure love," "art for art's sake of love" ([1998] 2001, 111), Beauvoir insists that authentic love requires structural equality that would, in turn, require access to abortion, contraception, and voting rights (remember this is France 1949), but also more radical ideas such as co-parenting ([1949] 1989, 726). Beauvoir is dismissive of that spurious "equality in inequality"—an equality of opportunity that becomes meaningless under unequal conditions. Instead, she affirms a socialist equality that does not yet exist (680)—a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of liberation. While she is only too mindful of the shortcomings of the Soviet Union with regard to the question of female emancipation, nevertheless she applauds its promise of equality, its
imagination of equality (724). For Beauvoir, women’s emancipation is not just an abstract utopia; it is a real utopia based on what she sees around her, what could be.

Beauvoir is clear that solitary individuals cannot successfully strive for transcendence in a capitalist society. The economically independent woman is a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition, as she makes amply clear in her penultimate chapter on the dilemmas of professionalism—contradictory pressures and double standards—that holds up well in the light of present-day research. For Beauvoir, liberation can only be a collective project and under economic conditions that provide for its possibility. And yet she does not see how women can strive together, collectively, for the transformation of the conditions of their existence. Indeed, the argument of The Second Sex rests on distinguishing masculine domination from race and class domination. Whereas workers or blacks can forge an organic unity among themselves in opposition to a dominant group, not so with women, who orbit as individuals around individual men, complicit in their own subjugation, seeking the best possible partnership on the matrimonial market, subjugated in body and soul to masculine domination. The only hope for women, it would seem, is for the working class to first make its revolution and then—and only then—create the conditions for women to seek emancipation. It would be hard, therefore, for Beauvoir to comprehend the feminist movement to which her own book contributed so much. Feminist movements that express the genuine interests of women have never existed:

The proletarians have accomplished the revolution in Russia, the Negroes in Haiti, the Indo-Chinese are battling for it in Indo-China; but the women’s effort has never been anything more than a symbolic agitation. They have gained only what men have been willing to grant; they have taken nothing, they have only received. (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, xxv, but also 129)

So was the feminist movement she witnessed toward the end of her life another movement that was confined to the interests of men? Was this a movement conducted on the terrain of masculine domination, or did it challenge that domination?

Like Beauvoir, Bourdieu is also sensitive to the dilemmas of challenging domination from below. In writing about the gay-lesbian movement, Bourdieu analyzes the possibilities, but also the dangers, of struggles that successfully articulate the interests of an alternative sexuality. Once recognized, however, gay sexuality becomes invisible again and subject to many of the same oppressions as women. Querying the extent to which the feminist movement has eroded masculine domination, he enters a polemic against consciousness raising, which cannot be what it claims to be. The very language of consciousness is inappropriate for comprehending masculine domination that is inscribed deeply in an enduring habitus. “If it is quite illusory to believe that symbolic violence can be overcome with the weapons of consciousness and will alone, this is because the effect and conditions of its efficacy are durably and deeply embedded in the body in the form of dispositions” (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 39). He continues:

Although it is true that, even when it seems to be based on the brute force of weapons or money, recognition of domination always presupposes an act of knowledge, this does not imply that one is entitled to describe it in the language of consciousness, in an intellectualist and scholastic fallacy which, as in Marx (and above all, those who, from Lukács onwards, have spoken of “false consciousness”), leads one to expect the liberation of women to come through the immediate effect of the “raising of consciousness,” forgetting—for lack of a dispositional theory of practices—the opacity and inertia that stem from embedding of social structures in bodies. (40)

The foundations of symbolic violence, therefore, lie not in a “mystified consciousness” but in “dispositions attuned to the structure of domination,” so that the “relation of complicity” that the dominated “grant” to the dominant can only be broken through a “radical transformation of the social conditions of production of the dispositions that lead the dominated to take the point of view of the dominant on the dominant and on themselves” (42–43). But we have no idea what such a transformation entails or how it might occur.

Is Bourdieu’s symbolic violence different from Beauvoir, who also sees women thinking in terms given to them by masculine domination? Women’s critical faculties are critically limited: “Having no independent domain, she cannot oppose positive truths and values of her own to those asserted and upheld by males; she can only deny them” (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, 611). You might call this absence of a “counter-universe” (617) “false consciousness” to be sure, but it is also deeply embedded, nurtured over a lifetime. Indeed, every page of The Second Sex is testimony to just how deep it is and the elaborate ways it is inculcated and reproduced. Moreover, let it
be said that Beauvoir is no devotee of consciousness raising and is skeptical of programs for oppressed women to assert their own standpoint. She is deeply pessimistic about any good sense emerging within common sense. Like Bourdieu, she sees an ocean of bad sense, dotted with islands of momentary liberation.

FROM FEMINIST CRITIQUE TO FEMINIST MOVEMENT
We see now just how different both Beauvoir and Bourdieu are from Frantz Fanon’s writings on Algeria that promote intellectuals’ engagement in revolutionary activity. That was the theme of The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon’s earlier book, Black Skins, White Masks ([1952] 1967), however, is the counterpart to The Second Sex. There, Fanon dissects the psychic consequences of racial domination, discovered when he came to France with a view of himself as a Frenchman and not a black Martiniquan. The shock of racism, just like the shock of sexism for Beauvoir, led Fanon to a devastating account of the situation of the racially oppressed, the mythologies that support racial domination, and the inauthentic responses to that domination, namely attempts to assimilate to whiteness that were doomed to failure. The analysis closely parallels the situation, myths, and justification linked to masculine domination found in The Second Sex. More than Beauvoir does for women, Fanon emphasizes the virtues of the dominated culture, specifically the Negritude movement, as necessary to give dignity to blacks, but always his goal, like Beauvoir, is to transcend racism toward a universalism where race exists but not as an instrument of domination.

Black Skins, White Masks ends in despair, with no clear road to the universalism Fanon seeks, just as Beauvoir ends The Second Sex with a similar vain hope of liberation. Whereas Fanon would soon travel to Algeria, where the liberation movement becomes his key to universalism, Beauvoir would have to wait many years for the feminist movement, and even then she had to overcome her skepticism before declaring her support in 1972. She had always kept her distance from feminism, thinking that the woman question was subordinate to the socialist project, but when she realized that the Left had little interest in the emancipation of women; when she saw the continuing oppression of women in France, especially around rights of abortion; and when she became more familiar with the realities of women’s position in the Soviet Union, she threw her intellectual and political weight behind an autonomous and radical feminism (Schwarzer 1984).

For Fanon, theory and practice come together in a revolutionary catharsis, whereas for Beauvoir they always remain in tension. Hers is a more contradictory position in which she dissects masculine domination yet in her own life finds herself falling into the same traps that she denounces as inauthentic. While she is writing The Second Sex she is having a passionate affair with Nelson Algren that bears all the marks of her analysis of “women in love” — knowing it to be an inauthentic and ultimately futile response to masculine domination. More successful, though never without its tensions, is the “brotherhood” of Sartre! Throughout her life, Beauvoir lives out, reflects on, and struggles with the contradictions between her theory and her practice.

Bourdieu, on the other hand, seems far less self-conscious about the contradictions between the moral implications of his theory of masculine domination and his practice, between the logic of theory and the logic of his own practice. He acknowledges that well-intentioned men can fall victim to deeply ingrained cognitive structures and unwittingly reproduce these, even when they think they are challenging them. He suggests this is true of Kant, Sartre, Freud, and Lacan, but he doesn’t examine his own complicity in masculine domination. We have already noted how he dismisses Beauvoir, on the grounds that she is simply an appendage of Sartre. Yet, as I have shown, Bourdieu’s work is but a pale imitation of Beauvoir’s. He practices sexism in the very act of denouncing it.

Masculine domination runs deep in the unconscious of both men and women. But perhaps women, as the victims of domination, are in a better position to bring it to the surface. Even Bourdieu recognizes that women’s insights into the life of men are often inaccessible to men themselves. Women see the games of men for what they are (Bourdieu [1998] 2001, 31, 75). They are more aware of the pitfalls of domination and how it leads to contradictory and inauthentic behavior. Notwithstanding their common concern to elucidate the structures of domination, Beauvoir’s analysis is incomparably more profound than Bourdieu’s, addressing rather than repressing the ambiguities and contradictions of approaching freedom from within the cage of domination.

THE INSIGHT OF THE OUTSIDER
If the habitus of masculine domination runs so deep, how is it than anyone, not least Beauvoir and Bourdieu, can even recognize it for what it is? If masculine domination is opaque and beyond the grasp of men and women, how have Bourdieu and Beauvoir managed to develop their insights (and, indeed, how have we managed to recognize them as insights)? Here, too, there is some convergence, and both rely on their position as outsider.
Bourdieu argues that masculine domination is most “magnified” in traditional societies like the Kabyle, and, while it is not recognized as such by the participants themselves, an outside ethnographer (like himself) can undertake “a socioanalysis of the androcentric unconscious that is capable of objectifying the categories of that unconscious” ([1998] 2001, 5). He then transplants his appreciation of the Kabyle androcentric unconscious to the more complex and differentiated unconscious structures of masculine domination found in advanced societies.

Just as Bourdieu’s distance from, but connection to, Kabyle society gave him insight into its androcentric unconscious, so Beauvoir argues that it is her composite position as independent-woman-intellectual that gives her both distance from and insight into the subjugation of women—an insight denied to both intellectual men and dependent women.

Very well, but just how shall we pose the question? And to begin with, who are we to propound it at all? Man is at once judge and party to the case; but so is woman. What we need is an angel—neither man nor woman—but where shall we find one? Still, the angel would be poorly qualified to speak, for an angel is ignorant of all the basic facts involved in the problem. . . . It looks to me as if there are, after all, certain women who are best qualified to elucidate the situation of woman. . . . Many of today’s women, fortunate in the restoration of all the privileges pertaining to the estate of the human being, can afford the luxury of impartiality—we even recognize its necessity. . . . Many problems appear to us to be more pressing than those which concern us in particular, and this detachment even allows us to hope that our attitude will be objective. Still, we know the feminine world more intimately than do the men because we have our roots in it, we grasp more immediately than do men what it means to a human being to be feminine; and we are more concerned with such knowledge. (Beauvoir [1949] 1989, xxxiii–iv)

Objectivity for Beauvoir, like Bourdieu, comes from being an outsider, located in a relatively autonomous space, but, crucially, she is also an insider connected to the subjects under interrogation.6

While Bourdieu’s “outsider from without” connection to the Kabyle is different from Beauvoir’s “outsider from within” connection to the expe-

rience of women, nonetheless they both have a notion of objectivity that is grounded in some segregated intellectual arena. For Bourdieu, it is the academy, defined by skhole and the competitive struggle for truth; for Beauvoir, it is the public sphere, epitomized by intellectual debate in the Parisian café or in journals like Les Temps Modernes. Such distance is necessary to avoid being mired in the misrecognition that accompanies symbolic violence—women seeing themselves through the eyes and with the categories of men. Thus, both are suspicious of movements based on the romanticization of resistance, for that would be the triumph of misrecognition or bad faith. Most fundamentally, they both agree that with some exceptions (like themselves), when it comes to appreciating the foundations of masculine domination, men and women are dominated by their “bad sense” and, specifically, women are complicit in their own subjugation.

They are, therefore, both traditional intellectuals demystifying masculine domination from on high. They are different not only from Fanon in Algeria, who is deeply engaged with revolutionary struggle, but also from Gramsci, who, like Bourdieu and Beauvoir, finds himself in what in the end proves to be a non-revolutionary context, but unlike them believes in the good sense of the oppressed, or at least the working class. Given the presumption of good sense, there is therefore a place for organic intellectuals who can elaborate that good sense (while also attacking bad sense), developing a war of position. We find analogous feminist intellectuals who see insight and good sense arising from the dominated. Patricia Hill Collins (1990), for example, argues that the most oppressed have the clearest view of the social structure and of their own position within domination and that they spontaneously generate cultures of resistance. She is specifically talking about poor black women in the United States. White women and black men, being in contradictory positions no less than white men, cannot see through the mists of domination. Collins, therefore, endorses the standpoint of an organic intellectual closely tied to communities of poor black women, elaborating their standpoints and their culture, transmitting these to wider publics. Consistent with this perspective, Collins (2005) is critical of contemporary, mainly male, black intellectuals such as Henry Louis Gates and Cornel West for being cut off from the communities they supposedly represent.

Indeed, there are strong traditions of feminism, very different from Beauvoir’s, that have deep roots in women’s communities. Beauvoir was the traditional intellectual who gave language and vision to the movement and
thereby established the very possibility of organic intellectuals. It remains to be seen whether Bourdieu's critical role as a traditional intellectual will also contribute to a movement that forges a reciprocal connection between sociology and its publics—a position he himself adopted in later life, despite his oft-stated contempt for organic intellectuals.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
Mills Meets Bourdieu

It is the political task of the social scientist—as of any liberal educator—continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his task to display in his work—and, as an educator, in his life as well—this kind of sociological imagination.

— MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION

Political competence, inasmuch as there can be a universal definition of it, undoubtedly consists in the ability to speak in universal terms about particular problems—how to survive dismissal or redundancy, an injustice or an accident at work, not as individual accident, a personal mishap, but as something collective, common to a class. This universalization is possible only by way of language, by access to a general discourse on the social world. This is why politics is in part bound up with language. And here again, if you like, we can introduce a bit of utopia to attenuate the sadness of sociological discourse, and convince ourselves that it is not too naive to believe that it can be useful to fight over words, over their honesty and proper sense, to be outspoken and to speak out.

— BOURDIEU, "GIVING VOICE TO THE VOICELESS"